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ABSTRACT
The main focus of the research is on the concept of territorial competitiveness (TC). 
In TC literature, territory is assumed either as a set of locations that can be sold in a sort of 
market or as a set of assets that can influence firms’ competitiveness. In both case, TC 
concept cannot be addressed without an explicit theorisation of the economic importance 
of territory.
The aim of this thesis, on a theoretical level, is to use autopoietic system theory as 
a framework for conceptualising the territory-economy linkage introducing the concept of 
Territorial Productive Systems (TPS). TPS can be defined as a set of components (mainly 
firms, but also public administration, research centres, universities, employers’ and 
employees’ associations, training centres etc.) systemically linked by relationships founded 
on territorial proximity, that is both organisational and physical proximity. What makes the 
TPS different from other geographical and economic objects -  like industrial districts, 
clusters, mere agglomerations -  is its explicit systemic construction, focusing on the 
differentiation between organisation (the basic set of processes that define the 
distinctiveness of a given TPS) and structure (the set of contingent characters).
In the second part of the dissertation, the TPS is applied to analyse Turin’s 
economic and productive transformation. Though traditionally identified as one of the main 
cases for Fordist organisation in Europe, Turin has always escaped the traditional features 
of the one-company-town. Grounding on literature review, previous studies, and a survey 
of about 400 face-to-face interviews we will try to describe how Fiat’s supply-chain has 
been changing over the last decades, setting local sub-systems free to follow new 
development and learning patterns. In particular, we will be claiming that the existence of 
continuity over time does not imply the existence of a unique development path and a 
reification of the territory, but rather the fact that continuity can cope with variety and 
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Chapter 1: On the concept of territorial 
competitiveness.
Within the broader debate about the spatial and territorial dimensions of economic 
activities, during the last two decades, the issue of territorial competition and 
competitiveness spread among both scholars and practitioners interested in regional 
development processes and policies1. Because of the complex overlapping with other 
emerging streams of research and praxis -  globalization, local development, governance, 
rescaling of both political and economical power, industrial clusters and districts etc. -  the 
concept of territorial competitiveness became rapidly a fashionable short key for explaining 
the fast growth of “new places”, the decline of some old industrial areas and the 
resurgence of others.
In this first introductory chapter, our main purpose is to review the different 
contributions that compose the archipelago of the territorial competitiveness debate. 
Before entering the literature analysis, nevertheless, we would like to develop some 
reasoning about the concept and the definition themselves of “territorial competitiveness”.
1. Where everything begun: national competitiveness in question.
The concept of competitiveness relies, obviously, on that of competition. This quit 
tautological statement implies a number of risky issues about the consistency of the 
concept itself, as there is not a shared opinion about what economic competition is and 
how it is shaped by both economic and non-economic behaviours. Postponing the 
competition issue to a further development in next sections, we would like here to start 
with the meaning of the concept of territorial competitiveness in economics.
Considering a number of dictionaries of Economics, we can immediately observe 
two significant features of this concept:
1 As a benchmark of the growing interest in territorial competitiveness we can refer to the monographic 
issues of some of the most important journals in Economics and Economic Geography, like Urban Studies 
(in 1999), International Regional Science Review (in 1996) and the Oxford Review of Economic Policy (in 
1996).
(i) it is ignored by most of the more prestigious dictionaries (e.g. the Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, which has not any entry for the word 
“competitiveness”);
(ii) when present, the concept of “territorial competitiveness” is strictly identified with 
“national competitiveness”.
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Business, for instance, competitiveness is 
defined as:
The ability of an economy to supply increasing aggregate demand and maintain 
exports. A loss of competitiveness is usually signalled by increasing imports and 
falling exports. Competitiveness is often measured in a narrower sense by 
comparing relative inflation rates (Pallister and Isaacs, 2002, pp.112-113)
Despite this use of the word “competitiveness” establishes a clear link with its 
geographical dimension, its strict identification between competitiveness and the share of 
international market detained by a nation implies two stigmata, which accompany the fate 
of territorial competitiveness and create some misunderstanding in interpretation:
(i) the first is the identification of the territorial dimension with the national scale. This 
is not the case for a coincidence, of course, but it rather mirrors the predominance 
of the national scale over different ways of being “territorial";
(ii) secondly, this definition with reference to market share bounds the issue of 
territorial competitiveness into the intellectual framework of International Trade 
Theory, ignoring other explanations and theories that can offer a more complex 
‘ alternative view on this issue.
If we consider the definition of competitiveness found in a second dictionary, The 
Economist Dictionary of Economics, we can find how this interpretation may assume a 
deeply negative meaning:
A loose term, popularly used to reflect the ability of a nation to grow successfully, 
and to maintain its share of world trade. [...] It is used as though it refers to the 
state of the productive base of the economy, yet attempts to apply a precise 
definition have foundered. It either reduces to a measure how rich a country is, 
measured by its gross domestic product per head of population, or to a measure 
of the price or tradable goods expressed in foreign currency. Yet those who use 
the term appear to believe they are talking of a broader concept than either of 
these. Those who have criticised the growth in usage of the term, argue that basic
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economic theory of international trade and comparative advantage makes clear 
that we should not view the world as a group of nations competing in a zero-sum 
game. (Bannock, Baxter and Davis, 2003, pp.65-66)
This definition echoes the negative judgement expressed by Paul Krugman about 
the concept of national competitiveness in his seminal “Making sense of the 
competitiveness debate” (Krugman, 1996):
the view that nations compete for world markets in the same way that corporations 
do, that a nation which fails to match other nations in productivity or technology will 
face the same kind of crisis as a company that cannot match the cost or products 
of its rivals. [...] While influential people have used the world ‘competitiveness’ to 
mean that countries compete just like companies, professional economists know 
very well that this is a poor metaphor, (pp. 17-18)
Apart from the usual display of rhetoric weapons, Krugman’s argumentation 
deserves consideration. Krugman distinguish four different attitudes towards national 
competitiveness: the Mercantilist, the Classicist, the Strategist and the Realist. Even if 
many differences are considered between the four, the relevant categories are actually 
two: Mercantilist/Strategist versus Classicist/Realist. According to the first category, 
national competitiveness would be a meaningful concept to justify protectionism and 
strategic support to national producers against international competitors. Classicist-New- 
Trade-Theorist-Realist Paul Krugman’s objections are quite clear (1996 and 1998):
(i) unlike corporations, nations cannot fail as they will exist anyway, even under a loss 
of competitiveness;
(ii) stressing the competition between nations in international markets implies a zero- 
sum view of international trade which is proved to be fake, according to the most 
elementary notions of comparative advantage classical theory;
(iii) not necessarily an higher degree of export means an higher degree of common 
health;
(iv) the major world economy -  the USA -  relies only marginally on export to secure its 
growth in living standards;
(v) the growth of the other nations creates new demand also for national products;
Krugman’s points have been challeged by a number of authors, focusing on his 
narrow interpretation of competitiveness (Camagni 2002) or on the limits of neoclassical 
both Old and New International Trade Theory (Dunning, 1995; HSmalainen, 2003). 
Moreover, Krugman is very skilful in designing a caricatured definition of his target in order 
to emphasize the explanatory capability of classical/realist international trade theory. In
doing so, he deliberately misses that a large part of the territorial competitiveness debate 
is something more than a mercantilist defence of jobs and national champions: for 
instance he does not seem to consider at all the National Systems of Innovation literature, 
which gave in the last year a substantial contribution to the debate about territorial 
competitiveness (Lundvall, 1992a; Nelson, 1992).
Nevertheless, although there is an evident rhetoric oversimplification of his 
competitors’ point of view (for instance he does not quote at all Michael Porter) and 
although he refers only to the concept of national competitiveness (which is actually quite 
marginal in the current debate about territorial competitiveness), Krugman’s observations 
arise at least two issues that cannot be ignored for the purpose of our research.
The first issue is whether territories can be treated as having some form of juridical 
personality, which is whether collective actions can be attributed to a territory. In other 
terms, can a territory be treated as an actor, with its own objectives and strategies? And 
who is actually representing territories in competition? The government? The enterprises? 
The citizens? Fully addressing these questions would imply to open two broad research 
fields, somehow typically geographic, that is the issue of place and identity and the issue 
of local governance, but this is not the purpose of the present dissertation. More 
importantly the competitiveness metaphor implies that there is some degree of proximity 
and resemblance between a territory and an enterprise. To which extent this metaphor can 
be sustained? Are their goals and means similar? The concern about how to link together 
economic competitiveness and social cohesion has became one of the main issues in EU 
policy making (Lawton Smith, Tracey and Clark, 2003; Sharp, 1998). Analogously, many 
criticisms have been moved towards some neo-liberal implications of the need-to-be- 
competitive imperative, which are, in fact, a consequence of the entrepreneurial metaphor 
of the competing territories (Hudson, 2003). Another question related to territorial 
metaphors built on the ground of entrepreneurial analogies is given by the fact that a 
territory does not have only a single market or limited number of markets where to 
compete, like firms do. Within the territory there are many functions and activities that 
imply the existence of as many markets as they are. As Budd notices:
[...] one can conceive two types of territory [...]. The two types of territory are the 
urban agglomerations which comprise city-regions and the economic functions 
and/or specialisms which occur within the agglomeration. (Budd, 1998, p. 669)
In other terms, the issue of juridical personality arises the issue of the complexity of 
the territories, but it addresses it in an ambiguous way. On the one side, in fact, collective 
agency is meant to express exactly this complexity, postulating that the territories are more 
than the sum of the things that are localised in and hence that they possess emergent 
properties, such as competitiveness. On the other side, attributing competitiveness to a
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territory implies that it behaves like a firm, with some homogeneity in interests, needs, 
purposes and strategies, which is actually a strong oversimplification of the complexity of 
territories.
The second point is the accusation to the excessive emphasis on export rather 
than on productivity that characterises the national competitiveness debate. The export 
bias is said to mismatch the real terms of national economic growth for three main 
reasons:
(i) if the world market is fixed-size, then export competition will lead to a zero-sum 
game. If it is not, comparative advantage is said to guarantee the mutual benefit for 
engaging in trade. This is a sort of naturalisation of the economic development 
process, where it is a sort of spontaneous endowment to secure growth rather than 
a set of interests, purposes, and actions coordinated in a competition strategy;
(ii) export competition is often considered as pure cost competition: to be competitive 
nations would be forced to lower their cost, mainly salary with a twofold 
consequence: on the one side, the lower cost of national exportations would make 
more expensive the imports, which according to Krugman are the real reason to 
engage in international trade; on the other side, according to Krugman, cost 
competition would cause a decrease in salaries and therefore a loss of public 
wealth, which is the opposite of the purpose that competitiveness literature claims 
to have;
(iii) moreover, the export bias would lead to underestimate the importance of domestic 
markets and competition, which are often the main source of economic growth 
within the nation.
Although these criticisms need for further and bigger consideration in the 
competitiveness debate, Krugman does not consider that most of the contemporary 
literature considers export just as evidence, rather than the aim, of competitiveness. The 
focus is less and less on cost competition, but it is rather on quality, innovation and 
demand anticipation and satisfaction, that is, somehow, a broader interpretation of 
productivity (Camagni, 2002). As HSmalainen pointed out:
we must distinguish between a competitive advantage that is based on non-price 
factors (such as quality, speed, design, colour, taste, performance, etc.) and that 
which is price and cost-dependent. We will term the former competitive advantage 
as ‘real’ competitiveness. (Hamalainen, 2003, p. 6)
Moreover, the distinction between export and domestic market is an artificial 
boundary, which should be considered in a more dynamic and evolutionary perspective. In
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his The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter shows clearly that there is a strong 
correlation between {he export sector and its local supplier chain (Porter, 1998). As the 
example of the Italian tiles district in Carpi shows, the competitiveness shifts from the mere 
tiles production to the production of machine tools and equipments, which originally were 
purely domestically oriented and started successfully to compete in international markets 
themselves. Even more: in Porter’s interpretation, the domestic market is explicitly one of 
the main features that determine national competitiveness.
2. Towards a definition of territorial competitiveness.
Although national competitiveness is a fundamental concept, most of the 
contemporary debate about competitiveness is centred on different scales rather than the 
national one. Regions and above all cities are now considered to be the “right” scale of 
territorial competitiveness.
2 .1 From national competitiveness to temtorial competitiveness.
In broadening the concept of territorial competition from its narrow meaning of 
national competitiveness, we shall adopt Cheshire and Gordon (1996), defining territorial 
competition -  and subsequently competitiveness as the capability to behave successfully 
in competition -  as:
a process through which groups, acting on behalf of a regional or sub-regional 
economy, seek to promote it as a location for economic activity either implicitly or 
explicitly in competition with other areas. In principle it involves both active local 
economic development measures of various kinds and a self-conscious strategy to 
guide policy-development and implementation, with regard both to the future 
economic role of the area concerned and to its principal competitors. Part of this 
competitive activity is inevitably addressed to the attraction of investment, 
sometimes with discrimination between more and less desirable activities to attract. 
But part can be concerned with enhancing the share (and social profitability) of 
existing local businesses in the market they serve and generating new businesses 
and markets. (Cheshire and Gordon, 1996, p. 385)
This definition of territorial competitiveness reverses somehow the terms in which 
national competitiveness has been conceptualised: the focus is not any more on export 
quotas for national manufacturers, but it is rather on investment attraction and local 
businesses’ success2, that is on regional growth and development.
2 That is also about international markets share and not only, per se national markets quotas can be 
meaningful and fundamental to define competitiveness.
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Moreover, rescaling the territorial competitiveness issue is central in encountering 
Krugman’s criticism about the (mis)use of the ‘competitiveness’ metaphor. Even if cities or 
regions do not fail' like enterprises, nevertheless they ‘pay’ the consequences of their lack 
of competitiveness more than nations do. This for at least three reasons:
(i) the first one is referred to the financial status of these scales, as cities and regions 
have limited but increasing financial autonomy. Devolution processes establish 
more and more forms of direct local taxing, while local and regional authorities 
cannot draw on traditional monetary policies: in particular regions and cities cannot 
freely manage public expenditure and difficulty they can access to international 
loan. These means that local finances are more likely than the national ones to 
encountering deep financial crisis, even if not failure;
(ii) secondly, the decrease in competitiveness can cause an evident and immediate 
decline in the urban and regional structure, like emigration, loss of advanced 
functions, loss of real estate value. These phenomena are quite unlike to happen 
at the national scale, but at the regional and urban ones they can come out to be a 
deep crisis, comparable with firms failure (Norton 1979 and 1987; Teaford, 1993);
(iii) finally, in the policy realm, the last twenty years witnessed the diffusion and growth 
of local development agencies, which should represent territories in global 
competition, enhancing new forms of ‘territorial personification’.
The shift from national to sub-national scale, like the region, the city (or, better, the 
city-region) also has important implication with reference to other Krugman’s criticisms. As 
Camagni pointed out:
unlike the case of countries, cities and regions compete in the international market 
for goods and production factors, on the basis of an absolute advantage principle, 
and not of a comparative advantage principle. This means that there is not efficient 
automatic mechanism to grant each territory some role in the international division 
of labour, whatever its relative performance. (Camagni 2002, p. 2407)
Camagni’s argument is quite straightforward, focusing on the fact that al least three 
assumptions of the comparative advantages model do not apply to sub-national scales. 
Signally:
(i) it is not possible to assume as starting point the autarchy situation in which the 
two countries are in the Ricardo’s original insight. Therefore there is not an 
automatic relationship between real wages and the level of productivity. 
Moreover, salaries are based on collective national contracts and related to an
15
average national level of productivity: as a consequence, the gap between 
regional productivity and national salaries can be turned into territorial 
competitive advantage;
(ii) there are movement of factors of production between regions and cities. This 
implies that a deprived region can afford an imbalance in the trade balance 
through compensating the lack of export via other means: the income of 
commuting workers, selling or renting local assets to foreign residents (like 
tourists or retired people for instance), public and private transfer (like the 
remittances from emigrants). Secondly migration flows will be likely preventing 
wages shortage, impeding the convergence between productivity and salaries;
(iii) at the sub-national scale, there is not a specific equivalent to national currency 
and therefore to exchange rate. This has two strong implications. First, national 
exchange rate represents an average between strong and weak regions, so that 
poor localities have to compete in a framework defined by a national exchange 
rate which does not mirror their economic conditions. Second, a locality should 
face an eventual decrease of its comparative advantages without being able to 
use the more common policy, that is devaluing the exchange rate.
There is also another important change to consider, if we reason in terms of 
territorial rather than national competitiveness: the emphasis on export radically changes 
meaning. In a broader sense, if we assume the point of view of a sub-national somehow 
bounded scale -  like the city, the region or the functional local system -  also national trade 
toward other regions or cities can be considered like “export”. Of course it is true that 
selling on international market involves different and maybe more sophisticated 
competences, facing different transaction costs, adapting to heteronomous competing 
rules, dealing with unknown cultural and economic institutions etc. Nevertheless, we might 
accept the metaphor that national purchase and sell are somehow “external” to the local 
economic base, and therefore they are somehow similar to export. In this perspective, 
what counts is that territories have to deal with other territories: whether they are internal 
or external to the national boundaries can be assumed as a secondary question. In the 
perspective of the creation of broader and broader free trade zone, the distinction between 
national and international markets might become weaker and weaker for city-regions and 
localities: to some extent, in facts, EU policies towards interregional cooperation -  like in 
the Interreg programme -  tend to vanish the difference between national and international 
competition. In this perspective the indifference between national and international 
markets can become more than a mere metaphor.
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2.2 Direct and indirect territorial competition.
Some of the main problems of the “territorial competitiveness” literature arise from 
the fact that it is a multi-fold concept, where different meaning and interpretations -  
sometimes inconsistently -  coexist. This complexity has been noticed already more than 
ten years ago by Richard Nelson (1992) who argued for existence of three different and 
sometimes conflicting cluster of approaches to the competitiveness issue3:
In one cluster of literature, individual firms are the object of inquiry. These authors 
are concerned with factors internal to firms that make them strong or weak. [...] A 
second cluster is almost exclusively the work of economists. Its focus is on the 
macroeconomic performance of national economies and on the factors that lie 
behind strong or weak economy-wide performance. [...] A third body of writing [...] 
is also concerned with government policies; but with microeconomic ones rather 
than macroeconomic policies, i.e. with “industrial policies”. Here the focus tends to 
be at the level of an industry. (Nelson, 1992, pp. 127-128)
More recently, Budd (1998) has distinguished between two different types of 
territorial competition:
The two types of territorial competition consist, first, of competition between the 
economic territories (activities or markets) which operate from city-regions, in other 
words, localisation economies, for example, competition between London and 
Paris airports for new international air services. Secondly, there is competition 
between the characteristics of city-regions and the social capital with which they 
are imbue, for example, provision of infrastructure and quality and availability of 
educated and trained specialist labour, in other words, urbanisation economies. 
(Budd, 1998, p. 669)
Analogously to Budd’s typology, for the aims of the present work, we will 
distinguish between at least two kind of territorial competition, direct and indirect.
As far as the first is concerned, we can define “direct territorial competitiveness” as 
the degree of attractiveness of a certain territory with reference to targeted subjects, which 
time by time by time by time can be enterprises, residents, international organizations, 
workers, researchers etc. In this perspective, attractiveness -  and therefore 
competitiveness -  can be measured as the amount of newcomers localising into the 
territory. This kind of competition is named “direct” because the territories compete each 
against the others to gain access to scarce -  or at least limited -  resources and/or to “sell”
3 Although Nelson’s concern is mainly focusing on explanations about the loss of competitiveness of the 
American production system, his typology refers quite properly to the general issues we have to deal with 
when considering territorial competitiveness.
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successfully a product which, in this perspective, is “space” rather than “territory”. 
Territories compete basically to sell locations. Lever identifies at least five realms where 
cities and territories are competing directly each against the others (1999, p. 1029):
(i) mobile investments, signally FDI, or employment-creating sectors;
(ii) economic growth, measured as gross value added or gross domestic product;
(iii) population, which can be assumed to represent human capital, income, political 
power and demand;
(iv) public funds, both at the national level and at the international one (in particular 
for European funding);
(v) hallmark events, like Olympic Games or international agencies brands, like UN 
sites or EU authorities.
Second, we can define the “indirect territorial competitiveness” as the capability of 
a territory to sustain the local firms involved into competition, through a set of territorial 
assets that confer local firms a competitive advantage. For territorial assets -  or 
endowments -  we mean those localised, place-specific, features that can influence firms’ 
behaviour and therefore productivity and competitiveness4. In this perspective, because of 
some kind of transitive property, competitive territories are those who can actively promote 
the competitiveness of the firms that are localised within their boundaries.
We have now to spend some words about the relationship between direct and 
indirect competitiveness. Of course there are some similarities between the two. First of 
all, there is some like a circular causation between direct and indirect competitiveness. As 
economic processes show a tendency towards concentration and localisation (Malecki, 
1997; Storper, 1997), the existence of a specialised and competitive economic basis will 
attract new investments in those sectors, facilitating the duties of local development 
agencies involved in direct territorial competitiveness. At the same time, the attraction of 
newcomers will make the local basis more complete and diversified, enhancing the range 
of externalities locally available (Amin and Thrift, 1994).
Nevertheless, there are some differences that make it useful to maintain the 
distinction between direct and indirect territorial competitiveness. At a first sight, the first 
difference refers to their main focus: while direct territorial competitiveness is concerned 
with the process of regional or national development -  that is what we might call a ‘macro 
focus’ - ,  indirect territorial competitiveness is more biased towards the firm’s behaviour 
and how territories’ features affect it -  that is a ’micro focus’. Also, the effect of direct
4 In chapter 4 this concept will be reworked in a systemic perspective, distinguishing different kinds of 
territorial assets.
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competition on indirect one is ambiguous and difficult to forecast: attracting FDI always 
opens possibilities to free-riders seeking for resources exploitation. Finally, the main 
difference can be drawn with reference to the different attitude towards location theory. 
While direct territorial competitiveness is explicitly a location problem, in that consider 
prevalently one firm’s behaviour, the location choice, indirect one is concerned with the 
whole relationship between enterprises and territories, also with those aspects that are not 
explicitly considered during the location process and with those that last after the choice of 
a location. This difference is also mirrored by the different attitude toward location factors. 
Like traditional location theory, direct territorial competitiveness literature consider a 
broader set of location factors, both traditional (such as infrastructures, accessibility, real 
estate market etc.) and contemporary, like research centres, quality of life, institutions 
(Cheshire and Gordon, 1996; D’Arcy and Keogh, 1998). On the opposite, indirect territorial 
competitiveness scholars focus on concept like regional innovation system (Cooke, 2003) 
or milieux innovateurs (Rallet et Torret, 1995), underestimating the set of factors inherited 
by location theory and regional science, or, better put, stressing the importance of 
territorialisation -  that is the way the territorial assets are put into work through a network 
of untraded interdependencies -  rather than the location.
2 .3  The role o f indirect territorial competitiveness.
In the following chapters, the focus will be exclusively on indirect territorial 
competitiveness, that is on the broader relationship between territorial assets and firms’ 
competitiveness. The reason for this choice is that only a broader comprehension of the 
relationship between territories and firms can avoid the zero sum trap which is implicit both 
in national competitiveness (Krugman, 1998) and in direct territorial competitiveness 
(Cheshire and Gordon, 1996).
The problem arises, in fact, from being both national competitiveness and direct 
territorial competitiveness related to a closed system interpretation of the world, in which 
territories compete to gain a bigger quota of scarce resources -  respectively market 
shares and different kinds of flows. Within such a framework there is no space for that 
degree of freedom and novelty that only can guarantee the production of new value and 
not just the sharing of a given amount of wealth. As Cheshire and Gordon noticed:
The activity may be pure waste even at the local level, either because gains 
achieved by some local businesses/developers displace activity in others, or 
because it is totally misdirected in terms of the real demands of firms [...]. Some 
policies, however, may represent only gain to the system as a whole. An example 
might be policies which effectively help to foster new businesses in a locality from 
amongst the existing population. (Cheshire and Gordon, 1996, p. 396)
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On the contrary, the concept of indirect territorial competitiveness does not engage 
directly in resources competition, to focus rather on the growth mechanisms that link 
territories and firms, and therefore on the creation of new business opportunity. The 
meaning of questioning about indirect territorial competitiveness echoes the questions 
arisen about territorial competitiveness by Gordon:
[there are] two aspects of the question of whether cities as such actually compete, 
that need to be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the (economic) issue of 
how important, if at all, urban or locational attributes are to the success and failure 
of businesses based, or operating, in particular places, within modern economies. 
On the other hand, there are (more political) questions as to: how meaningful the 
notion of a collective urban economic interest is, whether in particular cases local 
integration ensures that gains to keys sectors benefit all; and how the priorities of 
competitive strategies are actually constructed. (Gordon 1999, p. 1002)
This two questions mirror the reason why it might be useful focusing on indirect 
territorial competitiveness. First of all, indirect territorial competitiveness claims for more 
realism, focusing on the existing set of specializations and competencies which already 
exist, rather than on the policy book of dreams. The fact that most of the current policies 
are very often limited to the mantra of ICT, biosciences and hi-tech fantasies (Massey,
1992) can be an example of how policy makers forgot the importance of continuity and 
path-dependence in favour of a stereotypical notion of diversification of the local economic 
specialisation5.
Second, considering the territorial competition as an indirect competition precisely 
meets Krugman’s criticism towards the metaphor of nations competing in world markets: 
firms are definitely the ones who compete to sell cars, software and shoes. Territorial 
competitiveness arises only secondarily as a result of firms’ competitiveness, but at the 
same time is something more than the simple sum of individual firms’ competitiveness. 
National or regional share of international market is the result of a process which is not 
guaranteed by the mere comparative advantage, but it depends on a more complex set of 
relationship between firms and localities. While national competitiveness approach is 
interested in the outcome -  market shares -  the indirect territorial competitiveness 
framework is more interested in the process itself.
Both these arguments lead us to consider another realm where the metaphor of 
juridical personality of territories becomes unsustainable: if territories have a clear 
economic identity then the identification of markets where actually territories compete is 
not a secondary one Which is the sector to invest in to increase territorial
5 In chapter 4 we shall try to address exactly this question, how variety and change can go together with 
continuity.
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competitiveness? As Gordon notices, “it may be particularly problematic in large 
metropolis with diverse economic bases serving a variety of different market area” (1999,
p. 1002).
This issue is strictly related with the role that specialisation plays in territorial 
competition, above all when we are dealing with cities and regions characterised by a 
former industrial splendour now declining6: is the ancient specialization worthy of new 
investments to restore its unflourishing competitiveness or might it better to concentrate 
the policy efforts on forefront sectors and activities, like financial services and ICT? This is 
truly one of the main Krugman’s concern in addressing his criticism to the concept of 
territorial competitiveness and to related industrial policies aimed to choose those sectors 
supposed to be the engine of competitiveness and growth (Krugman 1996, pp. 23-24). 
Porter himself makes more or less a similar point to Krugman’s one, in the updated 
introduction to his main book, where he notes:
The Competitive Advantage of Nations rejected industrial policy. All clusters can 
support prosperity if they can be productive. Instead of treating particular 
industries, all a nation’s existing and emerging clusters deserve attention. 
Government should not get involved in the competitive process -  its role is to 
improve the environment for productivity, for example, by improving the quality and 
efficiency of business inputs and infrastructure and creating policies and a 
regulatory context that stimulate upgrading and innovation. (Porter 1998, p. xxvii)
This is a very strong point that will deserve more attention in the rest of the present 
work7. For the time being, it is important to note that both Krugman and Porter would 
probably condemn the industrial policy-makers mantra about future scenario where a few 
knowledge-based sectors will be the key to national and regional success and wealth8 
(Watkins 2003). Where the two authors probably conflict is rather the emphasis on 
productivity -  an issue which will be discussed in next section.
As a consequence, focusing on indirect territorial competitiveness can enhance 
reflection on direct one. A better comprehension of the dynamics between territory and
6 The case study will be addressing specifically this question, with reference to Turin’s Fordist heritage in 
the car production.
7 As we shall see in chapter 4, sectorial specialization and endowment will be considered very marginally 
as they will be assumed to be simply the structural evidence of a Territorial Productive System, that is a 
transitory manifestation of something deeper and more stable: the local organisation of the learning 
processes.
8 To be honest, it has be said that both World Bank and OECD display a more complex understanding of
the knowledge-based economy than it is usually accustomed to local public managers and policy makers.
For instance, in the WB account there has large room for low-tech and indigenous knowledge, even if in
the last years there has been a clear shift towards more codified forms of high-tech scientific knowledge.
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firms may help in differentiating policies and enhancing FDI and residents attraction. 
Unless there is more complex understanding of the processes behind the relationship 
between territorial assets and firms' competitiveness, the only policies suitable to give a 
positive sum effect are the infrastructure related ones, which will enhance the productivity 
indistinctly for all the firms localised in a given territory. But infrastructural policies are too 
generic in scope and can be fostered by any localities: this would Improve the overall 
efficiency but it will never mark a difference in competitiveness. Designing specific policies 
requires a better knowledge about the ways territories and firms influence each others, 
that is working on indirect territorial competitiveness.
Secondly, in the perspective of indirect territorial competitiveness, FDI attraction 
policies can achieve unintended consequences. Attracting footloose trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) can get positive effect on employment rate in the short period, but it 
guarantees a positive effect neither on the local suppliers basis nor on the stability and 
durability of the location. The debate about the degree of embeddedness of the electronic 
sector in Scotland, strictly related to governmental attraction policies and consequent 
investments by TNCs (Turok, 1993; McCann, 1997, Turok, 1997) or about the inequality 
rise in developmentalist Ireland (Kirby, 2002; Coleman, 2003) clearly show that FDI 
attraction does not imply automatically the creation of a real common goods, but rather 
reinforces privileged shareholders rather than the whole community. Even in case of pre­
existence of a competitive local specialization in some sectors, the attraction of new 
investment can come out to be a problematic issue: newcomers might not integrate in the 
existing production fabric or, on the contrary, might integrate too much, taking advantage 
of pecuniary externalities, knowledge spillovers and even public benefit, in order to exploit 
local resources as a free rider and to compete with local firms. Once again, only linking 
direct to indirect territorial competitiveness can help targeting the territorial policies in a 
consistent way. In fact, much of the contemporary literature about networking and trust-  
which is a consistent part of the indirect territorial competitiveness, as we will argue in next 
chapter -  is focused on the control of opportunistic behaviours and the exploitation of local 
intangible resources by newcomers (Lazaricand Lorenz, 1989; Hakansson and Johanson,
1993).
3. Territorial competitiveness and productivity: conflict and convergence.
After considering Krugman’s general criticism to the concept of national 
competitiveness and how shifting our attention to sub-national scales challenges 
profoundly his points, there is another key issue to address in order to clarify the meaning 
and the extent of the concept of territorial competitiveness. This is the productivity issue, 
that is comprehending how the discourse about territorial competitiveness relates to the 
concept of productivity.
22
Although Krugman’s criticism about the lack of interest for productivity in the 
competitiveness debate, in fact, most of the current literature consider territorial 
competitiveness as strictly related to the productivity issue. This is particularly true for 
indirect territorial competitiveness, where the focus on the firms’ necessarily implies some 
hypothesis on productivity to be addressed. Porter stated it very clearly:
The ability to do so (to produce a high and rising standard of living for its citizens) 
depends not on the amorphous notion of “competitiveness” but on the productivity 
with which a nation’s resources (labour and capital) are employed. [...] The only 
meaningful concept of competitiveness at the national level is national productivity. 
(Porter, 1998, p.6)
Nevertheless, in the territorial competitiveness debate, the reference to productivity 
seems more to be a concession made to economists rather than a fully accepted and 
implemented notion. The misunderstanding about productivity arises, we suggest, from a 
sort of confusion between two uses of the term: productivity as a synonym of 
competitiveness or productivity as a means to achieve competitiveness.
In the first case, which is arguably Porter’s case, productivity is the compendium of 
what can be interpreted to be competitiveness. In this perspective productivity can be 
treated as a better alternative to export to measure competitiveness. In fact, Porter seems 
to consider productivity in a technical way, as the main road to common wealth:
Productivity is the prime determinant in the long run of a nation’s standard of living, 
for it is the root cause of national per capita income. The productivity of human 
resources determines their wages, while the productivity with which capital is 
employed determines the returns it earns for its holders. High productivity not only 
supports high level of income but also allows citizens the option of choosing more 
leisure instead of long working hours. It also creates the national income that is 
taxed to pay for public services which again boosts the standard of living. The 
capacity to be highly productive also allows a nation’s firms to meet stringent social 
standards which improve the standard of living, such as in health and safety, equal 
opportunity and environmental impact, (ibid.)
On the contrary, some works refers to productivity as a means to increase territorial 
competitiveness. This approach is found in both the direct territorial competitiveness and 
the national competitiveness literatures and focuses exclusively on labour productivity, that 
is the value of the output produced by a unit of labour. In particular, some arguments have 
been arisen in favour of lowering wages policies. In a DTC perspective, a higher level of 
labour profitability obtained through cutting salaries is meant to have some power of 
attraction toward FDI. This has been particularly true explaining partially the growth of new 
industrialised countries like the Asea-3 (Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines) and more
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recently China’s economic growth (Rahmah and Ishak, 2003). Also in Europe, the Celtic 
Tiger’s fast growth has been somehow related to existing wage differentials within EU 
(Mac Sherry, 2000; Coleman, 2003). It has also been proposed that allowing regional 
differences in the wage level might offer a solution to enhance competitiveness in 
Southern Italy. Analogously, on the national competitiveness side, labour productivity 
policies aimed to cutting nominal wages can be designed to modify the real exchange rate, 
adjust the external balance, reduce unemployment and therefore influence the national 
competitiveness.
In any case, salaries compression can work only in the short term: in the long run, 
in fact, those FDI that are more sensitive to labour cost are likely to become footloose and 
productivity will be seriously damaged by export-biased attitudes (Boltho, 1996). Moreover, 
Fagerberg has given some empirical evidence that lowering relative unit labour cost has 
little impact on competitiveness and that other factors, like technological improvement and 
competitiveness on delivery, have a more significant effect (Fagerberg, 1988). Moreover, 
there is some evidence that a convergence in factor costs is occurring within some 
countries of the EU, diminishing the possibility to consider labour cost as a competition 
leverage (Webber and White, 1993).
Also, the idea that competitiveness is inversely correlated to the cost of labour is an 
important part of the neo-liberal rhetoric of territorial competitiveness. Many of the 
discourses about the threats posed by the rise of international trade are centred on the 
argument that the lower labour costs in developing countries will mean the destruction of 
labour intensive sectors in old industrial economies (Thurow, 1992). The same argument is 
consequently used to prescribe free market policies dismantling totally or partially the 
welfare and work rigidities for the sake of competitiveness and globalization 
(Swyngedouw, 1992; Swyngedouw et al., 2002).
4. Overcoming the competitiveness versus productivity dilemma.
As a consequence, the focus on productivity is fundamental but not essential, in the 
sense that it does not solve all the problems and the questions arisen by the concept of 
territorial competitiveness. If economic productivity -  mainly labour one -  has to be 
interpreted as a mean to achieve competitiveness, then territorial competitiveness 
becomes reduced to very poor theoretical and political insight. If, on the contrary, 
productivity is the aim -  that is a synonym of competitiveness -  the field become broader 
and there is room for further reflection. This widen, in fact, the range of economic factors 
influencing competitiveness: not only labour cost, but also labour skills, specialisation, 
technology and innovation must be considered as playing an important role in shaping 
both direct and national territorial competitiveness.
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4.1 Porterian accounts of territorial competitiveness.
Porter’s position about this issue is enlightening. As we noticed above, Porter 
makes continuous reference to productivity, but it seems to be a way to fulfil a compulsory 
duty to get audience and respect among economists, rather than an intellectual framework 
which encompasses his overall thought about competitiveness. His explanation does not 
rely, in fact, on labour productivity and factors endowment -  which are the core of the main 
classic economic explanation for trade and international specialization, that is Ricardo’s 
comparative advantages theory -  and even less on macroeconomic conditions like trade 
balance or currency devaluation.
In fact, when it comes to describe the determinants of the competitive advantage, 
in his famous competitiveness diamond, Porter focuses on microeconomic explanations 
rather than macro ones. Even more significantly, only one of the four main determinants is 
somehow depending on and directly referable to the single firm -  that is firm strategy and 
structure -  and therefore eventually suitable to be analysed in the methodological 
individualistic framework. Two out of the three remaining factors (demand conditions and 
related and supporting industries) are, in fact, the outcome of a process which is not easily 
understandable in terms of productivity. Only one -  factor conditions -  can be drawn back 
to the factors endowment which is the cornerstone of comparative advantage explanation. 
Anyway, even in this case, Porter’s account largely diverges from classic one: if we 
consider the list of factors he considers (human resources, physical resources, knowledge, 
capital and infrastructure), it appears clear that he is closer to Camagni’s observation that 
resources, which territorial competitiveness is based on, are locally produced through 
policies rather than to Ricardo’s -  and partially Krugman’s -  believing they are endowed 
by chance. Moreover, Porter’s account has two main features that will be central in the 
prosecution of this work:
(i) his perspective on competition and value creation his not only strategic or 
managerial but also and moreover relational: at least two out of four determinant 
are in fact depending on the organization of relations outside the single firm;
(ii) if we look carefully at the examples he makes and to his other writings, it is clear 
that this competitive set of relationships is internal to a geographical scale, that is 
to say that competitive businesses tend to concentrate.
It is therefore not surprising that many studies on territorial competitiveness draw 
on Porter’s competitive advantage to address the issue of how territories compete and 
which elements enforce their competitiveness. For instance, in the framework of national 
competitiveness literature, HSmalainen tries to link an institutionalist account for market 
and government failures -  which are mainly macroeconomic issues -  together with an
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account of the determinants of competitiveness clearly influenced by Porter5 (Hamalainen 
2003).
More related to the direct territorial competitiveness issues, Begg proposes a 
simplified model where he distinguishes three outcomes of territorial competitiveness and 
four inputs. On the outcome side there are not big surprises: productivity matters, but it is 
somehow made milder and smoother by the focus on the level of the standards of living (or 
quality of life) and of the employment rate, which are the ultimate goals of territorial 
competitiveness. Also, on the input side there are not big surprises. Drawing on Porter’s 
competitive diamond, Begg identify four components influencing urban performance:
(i) top-down sectoral trends and ‘macro’ influences;
(ii) company characteristics;
(iii) business environment;
(iv) capacity for innovation and learning.
This classification mirrors the growing amount of literature about competitiveness 
focusing on other factors rather than simply on labour cost. This is of course the case for 
indirect territorial competitiveness, where large attention has been devoted to the issues of 
technology and innovation as linking territories, firms and competitiveness (Camagni, 
2002). Nevertheless, also the literature about national competitiveness (Duchin, 1991; 
Dosi and Soete, 1991; Papadakis, 1995; Fagerberg, 1988) and direct territorial 
competitiveness (Klodtand Maurer, 137; Lever, 2002). Several others authors have been 
focusing on several different economic components determining territorial productivity and 
competitiveness, such as specialisation (Dollar and Wolff, 1993) and multinational 
enterprises’ (MNEs) behaviour (Papanastassiou and Pearce, 1999).
More recently, some authors have proposed a more complete interpretative 
framework for understanding the complex articulation of territorial competitiveness 
(Gardiner et a i, 2004). Drawing mainly from Jensen-Butler’s (1996) and Begg’s (1999) 
writings, the authors identify a “pyramid model’’of territorial competitiveness, distinguishing 
three levels of meaning:
(i) the target outcomes are the quality of life and the standard of living, coherently with
the “public good" nature of territorial competitiveness (Cheshire and Gordon, 
1996);
9 Signally, HdmSldinen identify seven determinants: productive resources, technological innovation and 
diffusion, organizational efficiency, product markets characteristics, international business activities, 
institutional framework and government role.
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(ii) revealed competitiveness, that is the set of territorial performances which give 
evidence of a strong or weak competitiveness: gross regional product, labour 
productivity and employment rate.
(iii) sources of competitiveness, finally, are all those factors which are suitable to 
enhance territorial competitiveness.
Focusing on the sources on competitiveness, the authors distinguish two layer of
factors:
(i) those influencing directly the three outcomes: research and technological 
development, SME development, FDI activity, infrastructure and human capital, 
institution and social capital;
(ii) those more related to the territorial assets, laying in the background and 
influencing the evolution of the first layer: economic structure, innovative activity, 
regional accessibility, and skills of workforce, environment, decision centres, social 
structures and regional culture.
This account for territorial competitiveness implies two main consequences, 
relevant for the purpose of this review. First of all it claims for a better understanding of the 
relationship between the three layer of the competitiveness issue and, above all, between 
the two levels of factors. In other terms, it emerges that a deeper account of indirect 
territorial competitiveness is somehow needed to address the question of the relationship 
between scale, competitiveness and productivity. Secondly, it is clear that the discussion 
about productivity and economic factors is only a part of the tale: territorial competitiveness 
necessarily relies also on social factors, in that they both affect directly competitiveness 
and are part of the target outcomes, that is regional and urban wealth.
4.1 Relational and social influence on territorial competitiveness debate.
The second strand -  but anyway strictly related to Porter’s ‘relationality’ of business 
activities -  of reflection broadening the reflection about territorial competitiveness is related 
to the social capital and relational economy debates and marks, since the 90s, a clear shift 
towards “soft” social factors -  like social and human capital, cohesion, identity etc -  rather 
than “hard” economic ones. This shift mirrors somehow that occurred in contemporary 
Economic Geography, focusing on the cultural turn -  that is the believing that many
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economic factors are socially and culturally defined rather than purely economically 
determined10.
In the territorial competitiveness debate, the concern for social factors affecting 
economic performance and the attraction of FDI has focused around the concept of social 
cohesion, like competitiveness and productivity, another fuzzy idea quite spread in both 
the academic and the political realms.
Within direct territorial competitiveness literature, at a first sight, we can distinguish 
at least two meanings of cohesion:
(i) between territories, that is about avoiding excesses of competition which might 
lead to a zero- or even negative-sum result for the overall economy;
(ii) within territories, that is about the relationship between internal social cohesion 
and external competitiveness.
Cohesion between territories is strictly related to the literature about regional 
convergence in the EU (Rodriguez-Pose, 1998; Hudson, 2003). The "between" cohesion 
debate is mainly related to the fear that focusing on competitiveness will enhance rather 
than reduce disparities across regions and localities across the EU (Sharp, 1998). Also it 
might be claimed that the entrepreneurial metaphor inherent in territorial competitiveness 
does not extend to the cooperation: despite the amount of literature concerned with the 
importance of networking between firms in order to get economic success, the idea that 
inter-regional cooperation as well is important is misrepresented in comparison to the 
competitive obsession (McCarthy, 2003).
More relevant for the purpose of the research, the concept of internal cohesion, 
that is the existence of good social performances within the locality (Cooke et al., 
2005). Again, like for productivity, there are two cases for considering social cohesion 
with reference to territorial competitiveness. First of all, as stated in most of the 
literature, the creation of social wealth is considered to be the purpose of engaging 
territorial competition (Cheshire and Gordon, 1996; Begg, 1999; Gardiner eta!., 2004). 
Several measure of social cohesion are therefore adopted as a measure for assessing 
the urban success, for instance trough the related concept of social inclusion/exclusion 
(Boddy, 2002). Secondly, local social cohesion is said to be an important factor 
enhancing territorial competitiveness: drawing on the communitarian framework, the 
sharing of interests and aims, the inter-classes cooperation, the Unions’ participation 
together with the entrepreneurs associations etc would create a positive atmosphere for
10 The issue will be discussed in-depth in next chapter. For a general account see the edited books: 
Barnes and Gertler, 1999 and Lee and Wills, 1997.
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business development and success. Even if it has been argued that there is not a clear 
positive correlation between social inclusion and FDI attraction (Boddy, 2002) the social 
cohesion argument is widespread in the literature. For instance, Johnson proposed a 
model where six kinds of capital are said to determine overall community 
competitiveness: polity capital, financial capital, physical capital, human capital, cultural 
capital and social capital (Johnson, 2002). Analogously, but more critically, Potts (2002) 
identify six contact points between territorial competitiveness and the ‘social fabric’ 
which deserve more attention by the scholars: clusters and business network; labour 
markets and social ties; work quality and egalitarianism; employment; educational 
inclusion; social order and corporate community ties.
Also, cohesion is often associated with the idea that territorial competitiveness is 
related to the issue of governance. Recalling the definition given by Cheshire and 
Gordon, territorial competition is always fostered by groups within the locality (1996). 
The underlying idea is that territorial competitiveness, as it is enhanced by social 
cohesion, can only be implemented through a widespread participation of the greatest 
number of stakeholders: public-private partnerships, real-estate developers, agencies 
for the attraction of FDI, unions, entrepreneurs association, chambers of commerce, 
influential civic personalities and so on. This broad and diffuse network of urban and 
regional actors are supposed to support local administrative authorities in the process 
of creating new forms of political representation which might/should replace traditional 
national competences about regional economic development. The passage of the 
concept of “social cohesion” from a “passive” role as investment attractor to a proactive 
leadership as development engine is no doubt important for developing a consistent 
conceptualisation of territorial competitiveness. Signally, this process of local 
empowerment is extremely important to address one of the main issues arisen by the 
concept of territorial competitiveness, that of juridical personality of territories. 
Governance, in fact, is often presented as one of the main -  if not the main -  outcome 
of collective actions which found the possibility to identify territories like competing each 
against the others (Camagni, 2001 and 2002). At the same time, the governance 
process as been significantly blamed by some critics as collective “inaction” rather than 
action in that it comes out to strengthen existing influential groups of power11 within 
cities and regions (Amin et al., 2000).
11 This is often the case, as an example, for a specifically spatial factor which is usually associated with the
issue of territorial competitiveness, that is real-estate market (D’Arcy and Keogh, 1998 and 1999).
Although the important role of real estate developers, their prominence can be assumed as an example of
the more than realistic possibility that a specific group of shareholders within the set of stakeholders get
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5. Open issues for further discussion.
As a conclusion we might quote Camagni’s own conclusions:
if individual firms and individual people undertake collective activities, facilitated by 
(and creators of) trust and local social capital; and if significant cognitive synergies, 
readily apparent in the local milieu, result from their various interactions; and, 
finally, if these actions and these processes draw additional vitality from 
cooperation with local public administrations; then it appears justifiable to go 
beyond methodological individualism -  which regards only single firms as 
operating and competing -  arguing the logical validity of a ‘collective’ concept such 
as that of territory, and to affirm that territories compete among themselves, using 
the creation of collective strategies as their instruments. (Camagni 2002, p. 2406)
The point is that this depiction of the territory as something shared and collective is 
far from being plain and unproblematic. Even if we do not push our reasoning so far to 
refer to a supposed juridical personality of territories, we must recognise that territorial 
competitiveness debate seems to be trapped into a cumulative causation of 
misunderstanding. Advocates of territorial competitiveness often refer to territorial 
collective agency as mean of recognising the complexity of territories, that is affirming that 
the territory possesses collective agency as an emergent character which cannot be 
reduced to the agency of the individual agents, hence blaming methodological 
individualism. At the same time, despite their better wishes, collective agency relies often 
on cohesion and idealised communitarian values, legitimating some sort of monolithic 
narration of the territory. In other term, while seeking for territorial complexity, territorial 
competitiveness literature produces an oversimplification of the territory.
Starting our analysis from the concept of territorial competitiveness put us in front 
of the most extreme conceptualisation of the relationship between firms and territories, as 
it assumes some sort of a transfer between the economic and the territorial, where the 
latter category is described and analysed as it were severely overlapping with the former. 
This helped to focus some of the unsolved questions in Economic Geography, signally 
oversimplification of the territory itself. Hence, the main purpose of this dissertation is to 
rework the concept of indirect territorial competitiveness taking into account the complexity 
of the territory, in particular the possibility that the variety of patterns and fortunes -  which 
is always present in a given moment of the history of a territory -  goes together with some 
form of continuity- which guarantee that there is a file rouge running across this history. In
the control or at least the more direct benefits of the territorial competition in order to enhance their private 
wealth rather than the overall governance process.
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order to do so we have to broaden twice the realm of our discourse. First, in chapter 2, we 
shall consider how the two main streams currently operating within Economic Geography-  
that is Krugman and fellows' New Economic Geography and geographers' New Industrial 
Geography -  treat the broad issue of the relationships between economic activities and 
territories. Second, in chapter 3, we will shift the centre of gravity of our analysis on a more 
theoretical and epistemological realm, claiming that to address the complexity of the 
territory we cannot rely on reductionism and oversimplification but we need a paradigmatic 
change. The new paradigm we shall adopt is that of complexity theory, with special 
reference to Varela and Maturana's account of autopoietic systems.
This twofold aperture will allow us to refocus on our main issue in chapter 4, where 
we shall address the possibility to build a systemic interpretation of the relationship 
between the territory and the economic activities that are taking place in it. This 
perspective will take us to introduce the concept of Territorial Productive System (TPS) as 
an interface between the micro level of the individual firms and the macro level of the 
territory. The TPS will represent, in other terms, the space where firms and territory 
coevolve. More precisely, this approach will allow to distinguish between different kinds of 
territorialisation and embeddedness, facilitating our task of addressing the questions of 
variety and continuity. Hence chapter 4 represents the climax of our theoretical reflection 
about the territorialisation of economic activities, at the same time opening to 
methodological and empirical issues about the operationalisation of the TPS. Introducing a 
new concept, in fact, implies not only situating it within the broader disciplinary debate, but 
also and above all to put it at work on explanation of real world phenomena. In this 
perspective, chapter 4 ends by introducing the choice of the case study, concerning the 
issue of the analysis and the representation of Turin manufacturing fabric, that will be the 
object of the second part of the present thesis.
The aim of addressing both variety and continuity in the context of a given territory 
has some strong implications for methodology. Assessing continuity implies that a 
historical approach is used to give an idea about the long duree of a manufacturing 
tradition in Turin province, while the issue of variety claims for a more synchronic view of 
how different behaviours can coevolve given a set of shared institutions. These two 
different methodologies, although impossible to clearly separate from each other, are 
respectively applied in chapter 5 and chapter 7. In chapter 5 we will be challenging the 
consolidated image of Turin as a Fordist one-company-town, centred on the presence of 
Fiat, the main Italian car producer and, for a long time, the biggest private enterprise in 
Italy. Our hypothesis will be that rather than a monolithic oversimplified case for Fordist 
top-down territorialisation, Fiat and Turin coevolved in a more complex way. In particular 
we shall show how even in the culminating age of Fordist organisation there was some 
continuity with pre-Fordist processes of collective learning, which survived underground
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not only in small suppliers but also in the main core of the systems, Fiat itself. Chapter 7 
will deal with the hypothesis that in the turn of the millennium this continuity was still 
present but evolved following different, if not divergent, patterns. We shall follow this 
process of differentiation through direct observation -  by the mean of face-to-face 
questionnaire -  of a sample of about 400 firms belonging to the mechanical and 
electrotechnical tradition, moving from the micro scale of the individual firms to the meso 
scale of the TPS. The analysis will end in drawing a TPS radically different from the Fiat- 
centred one we described in chapter 5, where effectively continuity seems to cope with 
variety. Chapter 6 will work as trait d'union between chapter 5 and chapter 7, highlighting 
how the crisis in the organisation of the Fiat-centred TPS played the fundamental role of 
freeing resources which would have been organised in the new emerging XXI century 
TPS.
Finally, the conclusions will sum up together an evaluation of the value added 
offered by the TPS approach within the broader debate in Economic Geography and an 
assessment of the limits of the model itself. We shall end by addressing some possibilities 
for further theoretical speculation and empirical research to be conducted in order to 
reduce the inescapable simplification of territorial complexity which is still present in the 
TPS model.
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Chapter 2: Agglomeration reconsidered.
In the first chapter, attention has been focused on the concept of territorial 
competitiveness, distinguishing between direct and indirect territorial competitiveness. It 
has also been argued that the concept itself risks being quite fuzzy and confusing, raising 
some questions which cannot find uncontroversial solution in the existing literature (e.g. 
the issue of juridical personality of territories). However, the point has been made that by 
only focusing on indirect territorial competitiveness -  that is the set of possible 
relationships between geographical entities and firms -  we can grasp a more general 
understanding of the limits and the extents of the concept itself of territorial 
competitiveness.
The aim of this second chapter is to concentrate on the ongoing debate in 
Geography and in Economics on how geographical and economic phenomena are 
interrelated and interacting each with the other, which is the very base of any discourse 
about indirect territorial competitiveness. More precisely this chapter is dealing with the 
issue of agglomeration as the cornerstone of any contemporary discourse in Economic 
Geography. Rather than the locational choice of the single ideal typical firm, the important 
question is why economic activities are concentrated in some specific places and 
territories. Agglomeration is the key point in addressing the differentiation of abstract 
space into territories that follow different development path. The fact that firms are more 
often agglomerated rather than randomly dispersed is probably the most important stylised 
fact in Economic Geography. Moreover, the fact that some agglomerations "survive" to the 
loss of the specific locational factors that push them into existence suggests the idea that 
agglomeration has some deal with the complexity of the territory, that with the passing of 
time the destiny of the territory and that of the economic activities some how converge and 
melt. At the same time agglomeration implies a various range of possible shapes and 
structures, a set of types which goes from basic co-localisation to more complex forms of 
territorial and economic organisation, like industrial district or innovation systems. Finally, 
the evidence that many firms come together in the same place seems to confirm that 
territory -  or at least space -  counts in explaining firms' performances and behaviours.
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This strict relationship between agglomeration and territory is also well understood -  and 
sometimes misunderstood -  by policy makers who are increasingly founding their local 
and regional development strategies on the implementation and eventually green field 
creation of clusters or agglomeration.
Hence, we can specify that agglomeration is the perspective from which we are 
considering the issue of indirect territorial competitiveness. Nevertheless we are not 
interested in just reconsidering the agglomeration literature, a debate that is some how lost 
in setting typologies and producing new labels. We shall rather be focusing on the two 
main streams working on the concept of agglomeration today, that is Krugman's New 
Economic Geography and geographers' Economic Geography.
This task implies that we spend a few lines explaining what we mean by 
geographers' Economic Geography. In fact, there are so many geographies of 
economies12 that it is quite difficult to summon together the different strands in a shared 
and unambiguous notion of Economic Geography13. We will concentrate only on the so- 
called New Industrial Geography (henceforth NIG) as it is the branch of Economic 
Geography which has most focused on the relationship between territories and firms’ 
behaviour14. Nevertheless, the NIG stream has growth and diversified so much in its 
almost 20 years long life that it now ranges -  often in same author’s scientific production -  
from neo-Marxian regulationist approaches (Amin, 1994) to institutionalistic nuances (Amin 
and Thrift, 1994; Amin, 1999 and 2001) till cultural post-structuralist turns (Amin and Thrift, 
2000).
Our account of the history of NIG is necessarily a simplified one and it will mainly 
focus on the impact of the Californian school of Economic Geography on the debate 
internal to the discipline. Hence we can identify three epochal moments in the evolution of 
the New Industrial Geography. The foundation, in the end of the 80s, was deeply 
influenced by Piore and Sabel's account (Piore and Sabel, 1984) of a new, massive, 
industrial divide, assuming the demise of the Galbraithian Corporation and the rise of a 
new order based on flexible specialisation and networks of SME (Scott, 1988; Storper and 
Walker, 1989). Also the French regolationist school (Boyer, 1986), Williamson's theory of
12 In the last ten years at least three edited books have tried to match with the increasing varieties of 
approaches and orientations in Economic Geography (Clark et al., 2000; Lee and Wills, 1997; Sheppard 
and Barnes, 2000). To these we have to add two important readers (Bryson et al., 1999; Barnes et al., 
2004).
13 NEG as well is becoming a more and more articulated set of theories and approaches. As it has been 
argued (Martin and Sunley, 1996) apart the agglomeration/location studies stream, there is at least 
another important flood in NEG, that is regional convergence.
14 An alternative gaze if offered by Sheppard which match Geographical Economics -  considering both 
Krugman’s NEG and Arthur’s complex Evolutionary Economics -  with Regional Political Economy 
(Sheppard, 2000a).
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transaction cost (Williamson, 1985) and the (re)discovery of Italian industrial districts (Pyke 
et al., 1990) played a fundamental role in influencing the destiny of NIG in its early stage. 
The second stage can be probably traced back to the influence of Granovetter's work on 
the strength of weak ties (Granovetter, 1985; Granovetter and Swedberg, 1985), 
introducing in the geographical debate the concept of embeddedness (Grabher, 1993). 
This embeddedness issue represented a fundamental shift in NIG, moving the focus from 
the initial economic perspective to a narrative more sensitive to the social dimension of the 
relationships between territories and economic activities, summarised by Storper's well- 
known notion of untraded relationships (Storper, 1995). In the same period, another 
important source of inspiration intersected and completed the issue of embeddedness, that 
it the spread of the debate on the knowledge-based economy (Lundvall, 1992; OECD, 
1996 and 1997), bringing to the forefront concepts such as learning region and milieu 
innovateur(Florida, 1995; Maskell eta /., 1998). In this perspective, the strict relationship 
between territory and tacit knowledge and the consequent existence of territorialised 
learning processes have been read as one of the main explanation of the link between 
territorial embeddedness and firms' performance. Finally, in the turn of the millennium, the 
book edited by Lee and Wills (1997), Geographies of Economies, made explicit the debate 
about a deeper break with mainstream Economics, searching for alternative references in 
the history of Economic thought. This process had its peak in the so called cultural turn, 
that is the idea that cultural categories are at least as important as pure economic ones in 
the explanation of the relationship between territory and economic activities (Crang, 1997; 
Amin and Thrift, 2000; Bathelt and Gluckler, 2003). Another proof of evidence of this need 
for establishing a distance between NIG and neo-classical economics is the sympathy for 
Old Institutional Economics, which emerged in the same period (Amin, 1999 and 2001).
What is relevant to our discourse is noticing that this intellectual development within 
NIG can be read as a move from the mere research of alternative economic explanation of 
the agglomeration process, which to an extent might be consistent with mainstream 
Economics -  such as Williamson's account of transaction costs -  to an increasing weight 
of social explanation that escapes the pure economic categories, and then to a stronger 
and stronger mistrust of the explanatory power of methodological individualism with the 
consequent emergence of more cultural and post-structuralist narratives of the territorial 
and the economic. In the next section we shall compare NEG and NIG accounts of 
agglomeration with reference to the first two issues -  i.e. the role of economic and social 
categories -  while in section 2.2 we will show that the reason why we can get no 
satisfaction from the NEG account of the links between territorial and economic 
phenomena is not a deficit of explanation but lies in its meta-theoretical foundation, i.e. 
Neoclassical Economics. Finally, in the conclusion will deal with the need for a change in
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scientific paradigm we build our economic geographies on, and signally that we should 
consider a shift from the dominance of physics-centred metaphors to biological ones.
2.1 Economics and Geography: infinitive facets of agglomeration.
Agglomeration was no doubt one of the central issues in the history of Economic 
Geography, long before 1991, the date of publication of Krugman's seminal Geography 
and Trade. Location theory textbooks have traditionally assigned extensive room to the 
process of co-localisation that brings the birth and growth of agglomeration. One of 
Krugman’s main accusations to geographers is exactly that of having abandoned this 
tradition, started with classical spatial analysis and revitalised by the quantitative revolution 
in Geography and the emergence of Regional Science. What Krugman misses in his 
criticism is the fact that the change of direction which occurred in Geography -  and largely 
in Regional Science and Regional and Urban Economics as well -  was not meant to 
dismiss the involvement in agglomeration studies. It was rather a shift towards different 
explanation and methodology, as Scott’s account of the history of Economic Geography 
clearly shows (Scott, 2000). What we are going to consider here is how NEG theories 
about location and agglomeration differ from geographers’ ones and how the latter can 
take advantage from Krugman’s analysis. In other terms, we are facing now a problem of 
theoretical consistency -  that is, whether the theories are good enough to explain their 
own stylised facts -  between theories formulated in two different disciplinary realms, 
Economics and Geography.
2.1.1 New  Economic Geography versus New  Industrial Geography
Following Martin and Sunley (1996), we can identify three main sources of 
divergence between NEG and NIG. The first point is the account of industrial and market 
organisation. On the one side, Krugman’s approach largely relies on a Chamberlinian 
account of monopolistic competition, the hypothesis that imperfect competition can last in 
time and allow the exploitation of increasing returns. Slight differences in products that are 
not perfect substitutes allow producers to behave as if they were “monopolist”. On the 
opposite side, NIG has always paid tribute to the idea that the flexible specialisation divide 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984) has meant a clear break with the corporation a la Galbraith 
towards a perfect competition model, at least within the agglomeration. Therefore 
emphasis has traditionally been put on external rather than internal economies of scale, 
neglecting the role that internal economies and large firms still play in the World Economy. 
The second difference can be driven back to the different account of externalities: while 
NEG is mainly concerned with pecuniary externalities and signally with market-size effects, 
NIG is more concentrated on transactions costs and, above all, on technological spillovers. 
The third rift is likely to be the most important, as it refers to the question of non-market
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transactions. NIG has progressively broadened its understanding of agglomeration 
economies to consider what Storper calls untraded interdependencies (Storper, 1995 and 
1997a). This meant to be a shift towards a more comprehensive and full understanding of 
the whole set of ties which link firms to each other in a local economy. Starting from 
transaction costs and technological spillovers, NIG developed a geographical 
understanding on how networks work as an alternative/complement to hierarchies and 
markets. This entails taking into account a large set of links which are not easy to reduce 
to market interactions: trust, social capital, shared languages, knowledge and values, 
cultural and political institutions are all seen as elements which explain the relationship 
between territories and firms, embedding the latter in the former.
Therefore even if starting from a common set of stylised fact and relative questions 
NEG and Economic Geography developed two quite distant sets of interpretations and 
theories which explain at least partially geographers’ scepticism in welcoming Krugman’s 
supposed novelties.
2.1.2  Lessons to be learned by geographers
Nevertheless, if we consider these divergences between NEG and NIG on a purely 
theoretical level -  that is as two theories offering different gazes on some stylised facts -  
there is room for cross-fertilisation, as Martin and Sunley are willing to recognise:
It would be wrong to be so readily dismissive however; Krugman’s work is not as 
simplistic as Johnson and others have suggested [...]. For it perhaps less the 
specific results of Krugman’s analysis that are important for economic geography 
than the general stimulus they provide for further inquiry. [...] The challenge, as we 
see it, is to pursue a closer exchange between Krugman’s “geographical 
economics” and the new industrial and economic geography. Neither can claim to 
have a monopoly of insight, but an exchange of ideas between the two worlds, we 
believe, is beneficial. (1996, p. 285)
We believe this beneficial influence mainly refers to the need for a better insight of 
the relationship between competition structure and agglomeration, as it is a very central 
point in our interpretation of the linkages between geographical and economic 
phenomena, that is a key issue in understanding the extent of indirect territorial 
competitiveness. This stimulus is threefold.
2.1.2.1 Rethinking the organization of competition
The first issue is no doubt that of perfect/imperfect competition. As noticed before, 
NIG has been for a long time committed to the ’homecoming’ of atomised small economic 
actors involved in almost perfect competition within the agglomeration. Also industrial
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district authors have been paying tribute to this account: the production chain is dispersed 
in many small independent plants engaged in mutual competition15. Somehow this 
devotion to production system made of concurrent micro-enterprises has caused some 
limitations, for instance in understanding the dynamics of industrial districts themselves, 
characterised by processes of delocalisation and/or infiltrated by larger firms. Above all, 
the bias towards perfect competition has important effects on how we conceive territorial 
competitiveness: if the influence of location and agglomeration is limited to the case of 
fragmented small producers (like in part of the clusters and industrial district literature), 
therefore small room is left for territorial competitiveness as an explanatory framework, as 
it would apply to a limited portion of economic reality. Nevertheless, NIG is not necessarily 
bounded to perfect competition and firms’ size in its explanation. We think that at least two 
features of NIG literature can free it from the size constraints. The first is the emphasis on 
production niches: in fact, serving highly specialised demand segments allows also small 
firms to behave somehow like Chamberlinian monopolists. Not by chance a huge part of 
NIG empirical evidence draws on intermediate goods and machine tools sectors, where 
small and medium firms work on the basis of on-demand tailor-made purchases by a 
limited number of customers. The second feature is the existence in most of the NIG 
literature of a further level of economic analysis between the micro-level of the firm and the 
macro of the economy as a whole, which is precisely the cluster (or the district, or the 
milieu innovateur, etc.). In other term, we can overcome the constraints put by the size of 
the single hypothesizing a sort of systemic effect that make of many firms one collective 
actor (this view is particularly spread in Italian industrial district literature). In this 
perspective it might be less important to state a clear hypothesis about the size of the 
single firms locally interacting. Also, the idea of interpreting the agglomeration like a 
collective actor blurs the boundaries between internal and external economies: both 
internal and external economies (with reference to the single firms) are anyway internal to 
the cluster, which is the relevant unit of analysis. This solution to overcome the size and 
competition matter has also important consequence on the territorial competitiveness 
issue. In the first chapter we have underlined the dilemma of the juridical personality of 
territories, which somehow sounds similar to the possibility of considering the 
agglomeration as a collective action. In other terms, the ‘collective firm’ framework offers 
some suggestions and impressions for overcoming the impossibility of thinking a territory 
as a collective action. Of course this relation is a delicate one, as we cannot just equating 
economic collective action to territorial personality, as the latter is a more complex 
phenomenon than the joint action of a number of firms. As we shall do in next chapters,
15 Of course this is only one side of the tale, as the industrial district literature emphasises as well 
cooperation and not only concurrence.
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these two metaphors must be contextualised in a more complex and complete 
epistemological framework.
2 .1.2.2 Rethinking externalities and agglomeration
The second question highlighted by Krugman’s sharp claim for rigorous modelling 
is the need of a more careful use of externalities argument. As he argues:
[...] it is desirable to put some distance between the assumptions and the 
conclusions -  to avoid something that looks too much like the assertion that 
agglomeration takes place because of agglomeration economies. This especially 
true because much of the analysis we will want to undertake involves asking how a 
changing economic environment alters economic geography. This will be an ill- 
defined task if the forces producing that geography are inside a black box labelled 
‘external effects’. (Krugman, 1998b, p. 9)
NIG literature, on this point, often runs the risk of confusion -  beeing confused and 
making confusion -  as its account of agglomeration economies has been shifting more 
and more towards intangible and untraded set of external economies (Storper and Salais, 
1997). Also the ongoing cultural turn has broadened the range of agglomeration 
economies considered to be suitable for explaining the influence that particular locations 
have on the competitiveness of businesses run there. At the same time, as Martin and 
Sunley properly noticed, NIG consider a limited subset of the conceptualisation of external 
economies available in economic literature, hence mirroring NEG which is correctly under 
accusation for considering only market-size related externalities. The proliferation of 
different ill-defined accounts for external economies can be without doubts seen as an 
evidence of the Markusen’s “fuzzy concept, scanty evidence, policy distance” accusation 
to regional science and economic geography (Markusen, 2003).
Nevertheless, the solution for Economic Geography cannot be an escape back to 
oversimplification, like in Krugman’s account, but rather putting some order and 
consequentially in the forest of concepts which have been developed since the end of the 
80es. This is the case for the development of new taxonomies of the different kinds of 
agglomeration which are often confused under a number of overlapping labels (Markusen, 
1996; Gordon and McCann, 2000; Martin and Sunley, 2003; McCann and Sheppard, 
2003).
On the NEG side, Krugman himself recognises that the emphasis on the 
relationship between agglomeration and market-size effect might be a reductive and 
overestimated explanation:
It would be not surprising if it turns out that the market-size effect emphasized by 
the current generation of new geography models are a less important source of
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agglomeration, at least at the level of urban areas, than other kinds of external 
economies. [...] big cities may be sustained by increasing returns that are due to 
thick labour markets, or to localized knowledge spillovers, rather than those that 
emerge from the interaction of transport costs and scale economies at the plant 
level. (Krugman, 1991a, p. 172)
This is not an ‘auto da fe’ or a demission of NEG purpose and achievements. On 
the contrary, it is a rather a statement about the unavoidable link between NEG and 
Neoclassical Economics: Krugman and his fellow dismiss the importance of knowledge 
spillovers and non-pecuniary externalities on the basis of a twofold argument: on the one 
side, it is said that these externalities are not "universal" but specific of just some sectors 
and industries; on the other side, the reason is more "technical", it is because it is not 
possible to model them within the hypothesis of mainstream Economics.
The gap is therefore between geographers and Neoclassical Economics. This is 
likely to be the root of misunderstanding and lack of communication between economic 
geographers and geographical economists: Krugman cannot figure out why geographers 
have missed the occasion to enter the economic mainstream, while geographers stare at 
Krugman’s reductionism and methodological individualism like a dungeon which they have 
just escaped from. The radicalisation of the opposition is quite evident in Martin’s last 
writing about Geographical Economics, where the target is not any more Krugman’s 
account but the possibility of dialogue with Neoclassical Economics16 itself (Martin, 1999).
By way of conclusion, I argue that the 'new geographical economics’ represents a 
case of mistaken identity: it is not that new, and it most certainly is not geography. 
(Martin 1999, p. 67)
2.2 Neoclassical Economics and territorial competitiveness.
The ontologisation of the conflict shifts the perspective from the theoretical to the 
meta-theoretical level: the issue is not any more the explanatory power of Geographical 
Economics theories versus Economic Geography ones and the consequent possibilities 
for correction and mutual hybridisation on the ground of the theories and their explanatory 
power, but it is rather which kind of economic thought -  that is, a meta-theory -  is more 
suitable to build comprehensive theories about the relationships between territories and 
economic phenomena. In other terms, if we want to use agglomeration as a shortcut to 
explain indirect territorial competitiveness, Neoclassical Economics -  and therefore
16 Krugman’s lack of interest in geographers’ criticisms is almost proverbial, somewhat like a general
equilibrium between marginal arrogance and autism: it is somehow meaningful that, in 2000, called to
contribute to the Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography he even does not quote any of the many
geographers’ article on NEG (Krugman, 2000), just limiting himself to repeating the usual mantra.
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Geographical Economics -  cannot offer an exhaustive framework for the task. We have 
therefore to shift our attention from the relations between NEG and NIG to which kind of 
Economics is more likely to address contemporary geographical questions. We are 
therefore at the opposite of Krugman’s conclusion: the reason for not considering 
‘maximisation+equilibrium’ models in Economic Geography is not technical, but 
epistemological.
The question about to what extent mainstream economics is suitable for 
investigating agglomeration and territorial competitiveness can be effectively summarised 
by Martin’s strong statement about a deep epistemological divide between Geographical 
Economics and Economic Geography:
Krugman is wrong in his explanation of the ‘five lost traditions’ of economic 
geography. These had largely disappeared from geography in the late 70s not 
because of geographers’ ‘failure to understand how far short of the ideal were 
falling’. Rather, they were deliberately abandoned on philosophical and 
epistemological grounds, as part of the large-scale movement away from logical 
positivism that occurred at that time. [...] The key point is that the work of economic 
geographers and the new ‘geographical economics’ represent quite distinct 
methodological and epistemological genres. [...] At the heart of the difference 
between economic geography and the ‘new geographical economics’, therefore, is 
a fundamental difference of view about ‘theory1 and modes of theorising. ‘Theory* in 
the ‘new geographical economics’ is assumed to be synonymous with formal, 
mathematical model building: the method is one of deductivist, mathematical 
demonstration. In much of economic geography, the dominant mode of theorising 
is one of discursive persuasion. (Martin 1999, pp. 81-82)
Actually this bias is specifically an epistemological one and it mirrors the strength 
and the weakness of the neoclassical mainstream where NEG is deeply embedded. That 
is, there are severe doubts that Neoclassical Economics can offer a consistent meta­
theory to draw on in order to build theories about agglomeration and territorial 
competitiveness.
Quite paradoxically, the two main reasons to exclude any serious possibility of 
finding a neoclassical foundation for Economic Geography are just the two issues which 
Krugman’s NEG is praised for, that is:
i. the focus on intermediate level of analysis between the single firm and the 
economy as a whole;
ii. the explanation of dynamic economic geographies of business uneven 
distribution, that is why history counts.
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2.2 .1 N EG  and the scale issue
First we have to consider the question of intermediate levels of economic analysis 
between the micro and the macro. By no doubts, Krugman has shown a serious concern 
with the uneven distribution of economic activities: his New Trade Theory is actually 
largely based on the fact that specialisation occurs within the nation, let us say at the 
regional or the urban scale. Moreover, the consequent emphasis he puts on location and 
agglomeration seems to be the clear demonstration of his willing to introduce spatial 
fragmentation in the realm of Neoclassical Economics. Agglomeration itself, in fact, implies 
that there is a third layer of analysis with own emerging properties. Nevertheless, this 
comes out to be an illusion rather than an effective achievement. The problem is that 
Krugman’s explanation is scaleless. Once again, Martin is extremely sharp in identifying 
the issue:
So cavalier is the treatment of space and place that the same model is often used 
to explain spatial agglomeration and specialisation at vastly different scales, from 
the international level, to broad core-periphery patterns within nations, to local 
urban concentrations, and even intra-urban neighbourhoods. Processes are thus 
assumed to be largely scale-independent. For economic geographers, however, 
the issue of spatial scale is central. (Martin 1999, p. 78)
We have to be aware that this is not only the usual geographers’ lament about the 
impossibility to reduce the complexity of places through logic mathematical models. Here 
the issue is another: the impossibility of conceptualising places and scales descends 
directly from methodological individualism, that is the belief that economic reality can be 
draw back to atomistic economic actors (homo osconomicus): the passage form the micro 
(the individual) to the macro (the economic system as a whole) is just a matter of 
composition of individual preferences and behaviours. Even if we introduce intermediate 
economic entities (like agglomeration and clusters) or even geographical ones (like 
regions and cities) there are not significant changes in the logical order which drives 
economy from the individual to the whole. The homology between scales -  that is the 
obedience to the same laws and principles -  is total and therefore there is not any 
qualitative difference between them, but only quantitative (that is, spatial). But the real 
meaning of scale is to differentiate space, as different scales imply different forces, 
strategies and behaviours. We are therefore facing the impossibility of explaining the 
emergence of something really new, as the different scales are nothing more than the 
mathematical and functional composition of the existing properties at the lower levels. To 
the extent to which methodological individualism is a fundamental feature of Neoclassical
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Economics, the latter is incompatible with a serious account of intermediate economic 
object.
This case is quite sympathetic with Olsen’s rationale about the units of 
Geographical Economics (Olsen, 2002). According to Olsen, NEG failure to explain scale- 
based organisation of the production realm depend on the fact that the focus on 
geographical objects like cities and regions is just illusionary. The real units of Krugman’s 
line of reasoning are the firms, the industries and the whole economy: spatial entities are 
just derived by the interaction of this economic trinity. This would explain the perfect 
matching between the original economic units and the derived geographical ones: the city 
is little more than the agglomeration of firms seeking to exploit market-size advantages, 
while the region is the space where industrial pecuniary externalities take place and the 
nations still coincide with the economy itself. The derived nature of geographical scales is 
even more evident if we consider the fact that their existence is a privilege that can be 
suspended if the economic state-reason requires it:
Depending of what we are trying to model, it is sometimes convenient to think of
the economy as consisting of a finite set of locations (regions or countries),
sometimes to think of it as spread across a continuous space. (Fujita et al. 1999, p.
49)
Now it is easy to argument that this prominence of economic units over 
geographical units is another facet of the supremacy of methodological individualism in 
NEG. The linkages between firms, industry and the whole economy is in fact built upon the 
assumption of Ml which guarantee that the knowledge we possess of the basic unit is 
enough to build a knowledge of the upper layers. When NEG pretends to explain inter­
scalar dynamics with the dynamics between the three main economic units it is simply 
using methodological individualism in a geographical discourse.
Of course this project is fated to failure, as geographical entities are far more 
complex than economic ones and also economic units are more complex in reality than the 
simplistic way they are mirrored by mainstream Economics.
2.2 .2  NEG  and the issue of place
This leads us to consider the second epistemological oversight which undermines 
NEG suitability, the fact that it is an intrinsically placeless approach. This failure to catch 
the meaning of place and territory is strictly related to NEG account of history and time, 
which was one of Krugman’s ‘delight’ in his late 90s apologetic writings (1998a and 
1998b).
In Krugman’s view agglomeration and uneven development start when transport 
costs decrease enough to allow centripetal forces -  essentially related to market-size
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effects as we noted several times -  to win over centrifugal ones -  the uneven distribution 
of scarcely mobile resources -  and to start an agglomeration process. Also, this process is 
said to be cumulative and to establish some form of path-dependency, which Krugman -  
following David -  names the QWERTY effect. The idea is that, once a cumulative process 
begins, then it is locked in the places where it occurred the first time. The ‘where’, on its 
side, is largely determined by fate, depending on the random distribution of resources or 
other factors which remain exogenous.
Of course, this position can be challenged on a purely theoretical level, arguing for 
instance that other -  and more complex -  accounts for cumulative growth can be found in 
heterodox economic tradition, like in Perroux’s and Myrdal’s ones (Meardon, 2001). Also it 
can be maintained that the ‘iceberg’ treatment of transport costs17 -  which is substantial to 
the modelling of NEG -  can be rejected in favour of more realistic and equally compatible 
with neoclassical framework, like McCann’s logistic cost approach (McCann, 1998).
Nevertheless there is a more subtle and radical critique that can be made of NEG 
emphasis on history: here history is just the result of random resources distribution plus 
cumuiative lock-in plus eventual shocks -  just to secure the possibility of interrupting 
circular causation mechanism. What really interests geographical economists is the 
moment in which centripetal forces balance and overwhelm centrifugal forces. This is the 
phenomenon which drives spatial economy to an equilibrium. Path-dependency just 
counts to justify that there are several possible equilibriums. Therefore, NEG is mainly 
interested in points in space (the places where agglomeration randomly occurs) and in 
time (the moment when centripetal forces win). ‘Real’ geography and ‘real’ history are just 
ancillary: they are the black box where to put what cannot be easily modelled.
Again, it is not just question of time -  necessary time to find new technical trick 
which allow a better modelling of previously disdained bits of reality -  but of 
epistemological failure: the neoclassical failure to bring life back to economics (Lawson, 
1997). In this case, it is the impossibility to grasp the complexity of real places and 
territories: these are produced by -  and in turn produce -  a broader range of human 
agency than the one accepted by methodological individualism.
The ‘history’ referred to is not real history: there is no sense of the real and the 
context-specific periods of time over which actual spatial agglomerations have 
evolved (and, in many cases, dissolved). Instead, in the logical model of the new 
economic geography the notion of time employed is that of abstract logical, or 
simulation, time. Likewise, ‘path dependence’ is simply a simulation or solution
17 This is one of the four trick which according to Krugman allow to model geographical economic
phenomena: it simply consists in the hypothesis that a fixed percentage of the traded goods ‘melt' during
transportation and that this summarise consistently all the matters about transportation costs.
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sequence in which the degree and regional pattern of ‘path dependence’ is 
determined solely by the specific initial conditions and parameters of the location 
model, rather than by a real, complex, locally-embedded and emergent socio- 
historical process of technological, institutional and social evolution. (Martin 1999, 
p. 76)
With reference to the issues of history and place, NEG shares some of the limits 
of location theory and the territorial competitiveness literature -  above all that 
concerned with direct forms of competition and the attraction of foreign investments. 
The main limit is here an excessive focus on the moment in which enterprises decide 
about where to locate their activities, passing over what keeps firms there once they 
have settled. Krugman’s perspective also misses how new businesses arise from 
previously different specialisations. Finally, this emphasis on the location choice fails to 
give an account of how geography influences the. competitiveness of small firms 
agglomerated in clusters or industrial district: here the location choice is often very 
simple -  business arises there because the entrepreneur is born there -  and all the 
competitiveness issue is shifted to successive periods.
It is clear that no account of territorial competitiveness can be given in such a 
framework: speaking properly of territorial competitiveness means establishing a 
clear interaction between a territory with something like a juridical personality and 
the firms which are localised in. NEG failures on both the terms of the discourse 
are evident. In a neoclassical account, territories are boxes without boundaries (as 
scales are not differentiated) and without content (as places are not univocally and 
uniquely defined). At the same time the array of firms which are located in is 
generically classified as ‘agglomeration’ without any understanding of its 
organisational order (Gordon and McCann, 2000).
It is worth to insist again on the nature of this failure: it is not a theoretical failure but 
an epistemological one, as it refers to the meta-theory on which NEG theories are built. As 
Sheppard shows brilliantly, the riddle is not ‘the maths’-a s  Krugman usually suggests18 -  
because the problem is not just a methodological one, between quantitative and qualitative 
methods advocates. The problem is about how economists and geographers set their own 
critical assumptions. In this perspective, NEG turns out to be incompatible with Geography 
even for those geographers which are keener on modelling spatial and economic 
phenomena (Sheppard, 1995,2000a and 2001). This also limits harshly the possibility of 
amending Geographical Economics of its faults. Before moving to the higher
18 His usual reply to critics and detractors sounds usual quite paternalistic and annoying: geographers -  as
well as competitiveness scholars -  ignore and dislike mathematics: this is, in Krugman’s world, the only
feasible reason for disdaining Neoclassical Economics and NEG.
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epistemological level -  that of paradigms -  to find a proper foundation for territorial 
competitiveness, it is worthwhile to focus on the current debate about economic meta­
theory which best suits economic geographers’ needs.
2.2 .3  Institutionalist Economics and the Cultural Turn: redefining the Economics in 
Economic Geography.
The refusal of Neoclassical Economics -  well founded on epistemological 
controversies rather than simply on defensive disciplinary boundaries -  has always been 
present, even if subterranean and unconscious in Economic Geography, but there are no 
doubts the NEG ‘aggression’ has contributed in catalysing the attention on this important 
issue since the late 90s, when some seminal collective works and provocative papers 
have marked the evolution of the debate. The two main events have by no doubt been 
Lee’s and Will’s edited book Geographies of Economies (Lee and Wills, 1997) and, some 
years later, the challenging article by Amin and Thrift on Antipode, followed by a various 
and heterogeneous debate on a successive issue of the journal (Amin and Thrift, 2000).
Most part of the debate have been focusing on the availability of several streams of 
economic thought which might better suit the needs and the vocations of Geography’s 
epistemological and social status in explaining the contemporary world, and therefore also 
economy. Moreover the debate had been going radical following the provocative article by 
Amin and Thrift, with their doubtless rejection of any form of economicism, hiding -  
according to their critics -  a more deep-seated refusal of rationality, logic and empirical 
accuracy (Rodriguez-Pose, 2001). In this section we will address sketchily the debate, with 
special reference to the attention largely paid by geographers to (Old) Institutional 
Economics as a comprehensive framework, alternative to Neoclassical Economics.
After the demise of the quantitative revolution in the 70s geographers have been 
spontaneously moving backwards in search of different unorthodox economic thought to 
rely on in their research: Marx, Sraffa and Ricardo have become in different waves the 
economic referents for economic geographers trying to build up a Regional Political 
Economy . Nevertheless, to be quite simplistic, all these approaches maintained the 
eminence of economic concepts and explanations (like values, production, innovation) 
over social and cultural ones in order to explain economic and geographical phenomena. 
Extending Marxian categories improperly to different theoretical realms, we might 
summarise the issue saying that Economic Geography has been so long structuralist, 
although not neoclassical. Things changed progressively in the 80s with the diffusion of 
Derrida’s deconstructivism in Human and Cultural Geography and the proliferation of post­
prefixed branches in contemporary social sciences . Barnes has giftedly followed the red 
line of a demise of the Enlightenment and Modernity project throughout much of the 
Economic Geography literature since the 80s -  considering Harvey’s Marxism, Sayer’s
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Realism, Cooke’s locality debate and Scott’s and Storper’s flexible accumulation -  praising 
for a stronger break with reductionism (Barnes, 1996). Nevertheless, Barnes’ Economic 
Geography is still Economic Geography: the fracture is essentially epistemological and 
methodological, but the economic realm is still, at least theoretically, distinct from the 
cultural one and the reference to the tradition of economic thought is still clear and 
indubitable.
In the more recent debate, on the opposite, not only the boundaries between the 
economic and the cultural have blurred but also the hierarchy between these two realms 
within Economic Geography has been reversed. As Amin and Thrift sustained in an 
outrageously provocative paper, bringing the cultural turn to its extreme severe 
consequences might imply a dramatic methodological reversal from somehow ‘codified’ 
economic knowledge towards discursive forms of economic story-telling, based on an 
unclear non-economists’ economics (Amin and Thrift, 2000). Although not accepting their 
violent attack against the dialogue with academic economists fellows, we must recognise 
that current developments in Economic Geography put on the edge the issue of the 
interface between the economic and the cultural realms. Just limiting us to a corner of the 
ongoing debate about competitiveness, the NIG literature focusing on the knowledge- 
based economy and the competence theory of the firm implies some kind of contact with 
cultural explanation. Analogously, untraded relations between firms need ‘immaterial 
infrastructures’ that are largely culturally constructed: trust, values and habits are not just 
social (in that are built through social interactions), but also cultural (as they are shaped, 
changed, improved and destroyed by the collective and individual representation of these 
linkages.
The fact that some of the 'materials’ that represent the input and the output of an 
economy are culturally constructed rather than and before being economically produced is 
true. Nevertheless, this does not allow the generalisation that the whole economy is made 
of cultural materials. Also within the framework of consumption studies culture cannot 
explain the whole process going on:
[...] most of the work in the new geography of consumption has had to do with 
perceptions, embodiment, performativity, and the identities of consumers and with 
the (postmodern) discourse of consumption, but not much at all with the basic 
socio-economic and political issue of the income inequalities which underpin and 
result from consumer behaviour and differential access to the process and places 
of consumption. (Martin and Sunley, 2001, p. 156)
The second realm, where -  less dramatically than in the case of the cultural turn -  
geographers have been looking for an alternative economic meta-theory, is given by 
Institutional and Evolutionary Economics. In the last ten years, a branch of the rebellion
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against quantitative, models-based and neoclassic Restoration praised by NEG has clearly 
turned itself towards Institutional Economics (IE), usually linked with Evolutionary 
Economics, in search for an authoritative alternative economic doctrine to dialogue with 
and to found on. Institutionalism largely spread in Economic Geography in a quasi-perfect 
identification with the issues of New Industrial Geography (Barnes and Gertler, 1999).
In opposition to the NEG account for territorial competitiveness, New Industrial 
Geography marriage with Institutional Economics offers some undoubted advantages. 
Basically, Institutional Economic Geography is necessarily scale- and place-sensitive, 
rather than space-committed. Institutions are in fact scaled in that:
(i) institutions are the expression of social groups which are often concentrated 
spatially;
(ii) institutions exercise some form of authority on a bounded space, that is, a 
scale;
(iii) different tiers of institution are not isolated but linked by many kinds of 
complex interrelations, in a sort of transcalarity.
Also, institutional analysis offers some advantage with reference to the place issue, 
as we can consider place as ‘filled’ with institutions instead of things and people. To be 
more precise we can interpret institutions as a balance between social structuration and 
human agency that can confer places something like an identity. This argument will be 
developed in the next chapter: here it is just to suggest that institutions can work as the 
shortcut towards considering places’ agency and territorial juridical personality, which is 
one of the key issues of our analysis.
Nevertheless, I EG present some troubles which make it hard to build a consistent 
theory of territorial competitiveness on it. These limitations, I will argue, are strictly related 
to what we considered to be the cultural turn in Economic Geography. We can monitor this 
ambiguity through one of the most fortunate concepts in I EG -  that is, institutional 
thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1994). ‘Institutional thickness’ -  that is an densification of 
institutions which often takes place at the local/regional scale -  can offer a sharp way to 
identify places where territorial competitiveness occurs and to justify the use of the 
metaphor of juridical personality of territories, in that the institutional thickness might be 
read as the expression of this personality. Moreover, we can notice that I EG offers a 
framework to continue the interrupted discourse arising in localities studies about the 
possibility to consider places as agents -  that is the issue of juridical personality of 
territories -  with their own identity (Cox and Mair, 1991; Hayter, 2004).
At the same time, the concept of ‘institutional thickness’ seems to be undermined 
by some tautological weaknesses which it shares with most of the ‘cultural turn’ literature
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and that we might name ‘taken-for-granted’ and ‘everything-goes’ syndromes. The former 
refers to the fact that it is often taken for granted that cultural institutions are more 
democratic and therefore better than economic ones. This leads to an overdose of cultural 
turn in the explanation of institutional behaviours and an excess of optimism in making 
‘institutional thickness’ a normative rather than analytical concept. This also can conduct 
I EG to an ‘everything-goes’ position which is often carped by those scholars who are 
particularly unsympathetic with ‘cultural turn’. As almost everything existing on earth 
surface can be interpreted as an institution, simply relying on ‘institutional thickness’ 
without any serious criterion of choice among institutions might cause a critical loss in their 
explanatory power. As Martin notices:
Although highly suggestive, the term still lacks definitional and theoretical 
precision [...]. Neither case-by-case examples nor somehow tautological definitions 
are substitutes for a general conceptualization of how ‘institutional thickness’ 
emerges at the regional and local level and what precise role it plays in regional 
economic development. (Martin 2000, p. 88)
These ambiguities are even more important with respect to ‘territorial 
competitiveness’ template. Making institutional enhancement a policy before defining a 
clear theory and methodology of institutional analysis boosts the risk of making territorial 
competitiveness a pink voluntarism where institutional consensus alleviates the harms of 
competition, flying over the structures of power that benefit some groups rather than others 
within the local community (Cheshire and Gordon, 1996; Cumbers etal., 2003).
Also, focusing on local institutional assets might turn out as a sort of ‘regional 
fetishism’ -  with the risk of privileging the local/regional scale at the expenses of other 
important scale of institutional production, like the national one, and of disembedding 
regional destinies from more general and ampler socio-economic trend (Cumbers et a/., 
2003).
It is important to recognise that the introduction of some cultural and institutional 
account of the socio-economic phenomena might help NIG in addressing the issue of 
agglomeration, while avoiding the excess of simplification that characterised many of the 
NIG-oriented interpretations of the territory. To a certain extent we might that the more 
economic cote of NIG is still paying for some sort of primary sin, in being largely influenced 
in its very foundation by rigid narratives which introduced into NIG a strong emphasis 
toward dualism and black and white contrasted pictures. Fordism versus post-Fordism, 
vertical integration versus flexible specialisation, hierarchy versus market are all 
dichotomised juxtapositions that lay at the very bottom of all the theories that NIG 
developed in the following twenty years. This led to an oversimplification of the territory, 
hiding the rich tones of grey that make a good B&W picture. More specifically, this
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oversimplification, as we shall see in chapter 4, took the form of a dramatic reduction of 
the variety we can find within a territory, in order to privilege a more comparative account 
of the variety between territories, each of them to some extent frozen in some dualistic 
categories. In this perspective, addressing the richness of cultural meanings and 
institutional arrangements that can be found in a given place helps in moving the variety of 
territory to the forefront of our reasoning. Even more important is the fact that (Old) 
Institutional Economics, with its traditional historical approach to the explanation of 
economic phenomena, and Evolutionary Economics, with its emphasis on path- 
dependence and coevolution, can offer a fruitful contribution in addressing the second 
issue we are interested in, that is continuity within a territory.
At the same time, we should recognise that, while avoiding the oversimplification of 
the territory, cultural and institutional turns in Economic Geography produce an 
overcomplexification of the economy, dismissing together with methodological 
individualism also the fact that economic agents have some economic purpose. In other 
terms, cultural and institutional consider agglomeration mainly in the perspective of the 
richness of cultural and institutional arrangements that produce these territorial assets, 
considering less and less the economic side of the tale, that is why and how firms are 
attracted by such territorial endowments.
The reason for this fuzziness probably lies in what we might the 'epistemological 
multiscalarity’ of Institutionalism, that is the fact that institutional turn can be read at least 
three different epistemic levels: thematic, methodological and ontological (Jessop, 2001).
The first, and simplest, can be called the thematic turn, that is, the intuition, 
hypothesis, or discovery that various institutional aspects of social life should be 
included among the key themes of social enquiries. [...] The second can be named 
a methodological turn, that is, the intuition, hypothesis, or discovery that the 
institutional aspects of social life provide a fruitful [...] entry point for exploring and 
explaining the social world [...]. The third can be described as an ontological turn, 
that is, the intuition, hypothesis, or discovery that institutions constitute the 
essential foundations of social existence. (Jessop 2001, p. 1214)
Most of the concerns about IEG vagueness arise at the thematic level (when 
institutional turn just equates cultural turn in wildly broadening the realm of enquiry of 
Economic Geography) and at the methodological one (when the usefulness of institutions 
in making a sense of otherwise contradictory concepts19 creates an euphoric excess of
19 Jessop lists an amazing number of dichotomies which can be rewardingly approached using an 
institutional methodology: structure versus agency; holism versus individualism; necessity versus 
contingency; abstract versus concrete; simple versus complex; idiographic versus nomothetic; anascopic 
versus katascopic; global versus local (Jessop 2001, p. 1216). In next chapter we will argue that
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expectations about Institutionalism). The solution must be therefore be found at the 
ontological level, that is, about the paradigmatic foundations of the relationship between 
Economics and Geography, which will be next point in our analysis.
2.3 Conclusions: the need for a new paradigm.
In this chapter we have considered the issue of the economic and geographical 
foundation of an exhaustive theory about indirect territorial competitiveness. The first line 
of reasoning has been that agglomeration represents the necessary starting point if we 
want to consider how geographical entities shape economic phenomena and, specifically, 
the competitiveness of businesses which are located in some places. Mirroring the 
structure of the first chapter, we have introduced first Krugman’s NEG: Occam’s razor 
principle in fact suggests that if can find a simpler consistent explanation of a set of 
stylised facts we should privilege that elegant laconic vindication. Nevertheless we have 
argued that matching NEG account for agglomeration with NIG one account for 
agglomeration and territorial competitiveness shows Krugman and fellows economists 
having some trouble in giving an account of world’s geographical and economic 
complexity. We therefore moved to consider in a meta-theoretical perspective the 
relationship between Economics and Geography. Here emerged that NEG neoclassical 
foundation throws up some difficulties with the concept of agglomeration which is relevant 
for geographers: being ontologically scaleless and placeless, Neoclassical Economics will 
hardly offer a comprehensive account for territorial competitiveness, at least a suitable for 
geographers’ representation, identity and performativity.
Our point is that in addressing the issue of agglomeration, both NIG and NEG 
produce an oversimplification of the complexity of the territory and of its multiple 
possibilities for coevolving together with economic activities. Moreover, we shall also argue 
that when NIG comes into considering territorial complexity, it just falls in the opposite trap: 
a sort of overdose of cultural and institutional inspirations make justice of the complexity of 
place and territory but, in doing so, it reduces the possibility of a clear understanding of the 
relationship between territory and firms' competitiveness, creating some problems in 
addressing the issue of territorial competitiveness.
In this section we will try to argue that we have to move a step further in our 
epistemological chain. Theories and meta-theories are not enough: we must rely on a 
paradigmatic foundation. The issues arisen in the previous sections on both NEG and NIG 
side cannot be solved only with reference to the meta-theoretical level, substituting a set of 
economic hypotheses and frameworks with another, that is, shifting from Neoclassical to
Institutional Theories shares this uncommon explanatory power with ‘System Theory’. Moreover, we will try 
to argue that ‘System Theory’ is no less than the paradigmatic template where Institutional methodologies 
and theories are rooted in.
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Institutional Economics. How these alternative economic meta-theories are founded on a 
superior level deserves some attention. In other terms, before proceeding in building an 
interpretative framework for territorial competitiveness, we must enter the highest level of 
epistemological significance of the territorial competitiveness template, that is, the 
paradigmatic one20.
In doing so, we will start from sharp epistemological analyses by Barnes (Barnes, 
1996; 1997 and 1999) and Sheppard (Plummer and Sheppard, 2001; Sheppard, 2000b 
and 2001), who distinguish the use of physical and biological metaphors in Economic 
Geography.
The concept of competitiveness descends without any possible doubt from that of 
competition and therefore it inherits some innate bias towards biologic metaphors. 
Sheppard’s account of territorial competitiveness can offer a profitable starting point to 
consider the relationship between biological metaphors and economic explanation:
Competition is not only a foundational idea in economic and social theory, but also 
in biological evolutionary theory. Indeed, over the last century social scientists have 
frequently appealed the notions of struggle and selection in Darwinian evolutionary 
theory to justify the centrality of competition in human societies. [...] In fact, Darwin 
borrowed the idea from economics. He was inspired to make struggle and 
competition central to his evolutionary theory by the economist (as well as 
population theorist and priest) Thomas Malthus. Darwinian evolutionary theory 
remains controversial among biologists. [...] Alternatives can be conceived. The 
geographer Kropotkin was among the first to argue that cooperation is pervasive 
among animals. [...] Within economic thinking the discourse of competition is that 
market-driven (capitalist) competition is generally economically and socially 
beneficial. This has been articulated through two prevalent metaphors expressing 
how competition works. The first and dominant one is competition as invisibie 
hand. [...] The second is competition as evolutionary progress. (Sheppard 2000b, 
p. 169-170, original emphasis)
Sheppard is doubtlessly right in identifying the come-and-go reciprocal influence 
between Economics and Biology, as well as in refusing social Darwinism and in stressing 
the role of cooperation in economic and social life (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). 
Nevertheless, there are some weak points which make him miss the paradigmatic shift
20 Following Kuhn’ work we can define paradigm as a set of nouns and rules that (we) is shared by the 
large majority of scientific disciplines in a given time and that (ii) shapes the single disciplines 
epistemologies -  that is, what we previously named meta-theories -  which (iii) afterwards the specific 
theories are built on (Kuhn, 1962).
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intrinsic to the adoption of biological metaphors. This is because he drives Evolutionary 
Economics back to the Neoclassical epistemological realm: if it were like this, there would 
be no feasible escape from the meta-theoretical dilemma we highlighted in the previous 
chapter. Exactly as in the case of Williamson’s and Coase’s New Institutional Economics, 
it is true that there is a huge part of Evolutionary Economics committed with Game Theory 
and Rational Choice framework -  that are mainly Neoclassical branches. It is also evident 
in Krugman’s attempt to link his NEG to an evolutionary account of competition rather to 
the invisible hand one. Nevertheless this is only one part of the tale. For instance, drawing 
Nelson’s and Winter’s work back to Neoclassic Economic -  as Sheppard confidently does 
(2000b, p. 170) -  is quite a plucky task, as they are commonly seen as two of the main 
pioneers of the renewal of the Old Institutional School (Samuels, 1988; Hodgson, 1999, 
part three in particular). Also Krugman’s reference to evolution is proved to be quite a 
caricature of institutional Evolutionary Economics: as we noted in section 3.1.2, in 
Geographical Economics evolution and history just matter in influencing which of the 
multiple possible equilibriums will take place.
Moreover, this negative interpretation conceals the most important fact, that using 
biological metaphors instead of physical ones deeply influences how we build our meta- 
theories, that is, the paradigm our geographies live by. Trevor Barnes is beyond question 
the contemporary geographer who most has worked on the metaphoric contribution of 
other sciences to geographical knowledge. A huge literature in philosophy and history of 
economic thought is now available that shows how Neoclassical Economics has been 
deeply shaped by the willingness to establish itself as a science through the sharing of the 
same paradigm with natural science, above all with classical physics (Georgescu-Roegen, 
1971; Hodgson, 1999; Lawson, 1997; Mirowski, 1988). Although it happened some 
decades later, the same influence largely operated on Economic Geography during the 
quantitative revolution the discipline knew in the 50s. Barnes’ research has broadly 
documented the spread of classical physical and mechanistic metaphors in geography -  
the most (in)famous example is the geographical application of the Newtonian spatial 
gravitation model (Barnes, 1996, ch. 5). More recently, Barnes has highlighted in positive 
terms the parallel rise of biological metaphors in Economics and Geography. In particular, 
he addresses three potential stream of biological inspiration in Economics: Marxist and 
regulationist theories of reproduction, Evolutionary and Institutional Economics’ reliance on 
the notions of acquired characteristics and inheritance and, finally post-Keynesian 
emphasis on holism and organicism (Barnes, 1999).
In our perspective it is important to notice that the same dialectic between physical 
and biological metaphors is central in the territorial competitiveness debate. Apart the fact 
that ‘competitiveness’ and ‘competition’ are explicitly biology-biased concepts, there is a 
large use of biological metaphors: from the holism of the concept of juridical personality of
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territories to the organicism underlying the reference to social cohesion. Also the relative 
explanations from both New Industrial Geography and Geographical Economics make 
large use of biological metaphors. We have already stressed Krugman’s claim for 
complexity and evolution, but all NEG is characterised by a wishy-washy misuse of 
biological metaphors. As Sheppard notices in his review of The Spatial Economy [Fujita et 
al., 1999; Sheppard, 2001):
There is much use in The Spatial Economy of concepts favored by complex theory, 
such as path dependence and phase diagrams, and commendably a concern for 
determining the stability of equilibriums and a willingness to simulate when the 
equations cannot be solved. Yet the viewpoint of this work remains far from that of 
complexity theory. (Sheppard 2001, p. 134)
Also the NIG frame is cut all the way through by the reference to biological 
metaphors -  see for instance how Storper contextualised his account of the relational 
regional economy in the metaphors of path-dependence and co-evolution among different 
scales (Storper, 1997b). Nevertheless we cannot fully realise the strength of this 
metaphorical shift if we cannot mover away from the cultural trap and we consider it as the 
expression of a paradigmatic shift. The cultural trap would keep us on the surface, inferring 
that as we largely rely on metaphors we cannot distinguish the economic from the cultural. 
The paradigmatic shift, instead, might allow us to reconstitute the economic on a different 
basis.
In next chapter, we will address the issue of how complexity can be taken into 
account in order to build a framework for the analysis of agglomeration and territorial 
competitiveness without either oversimplifying the territory or overcomplexifying the 
economy. In particular we shall be working on system theory approach, and in particular 
on Varela and Maturana’s autopoiesis account, as a framework which allows to make 
some simplification without being reductionist.
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Chapter 3: The emergence of relational complexity.
In this chapter we shall address the paradigmatic issues arisen in chapter 2. In 
particular we will try to demonstrate that the limits inherent to Neoclassical Economics and 
therefore to New Economic Geography’s explanation depend on a very fundamental 
feature of the paradigm they are inspired by, that is to say, Reductionism. If we introduce 
complexity -  that is unpredictability and emergence -  the funding hypotheses of 
Reductionism loose much of their explanation power. Also in this chapter we will discuss 
the fundamental feature of one of the main branch of complexity theories, that is, System 
Theory and, specifically, autopoiesis.
3.1 Entities and relationships: introducing complexity.
It is possible to start from an extremely generic consideration: our understanding of 
life on earth cannot ignore both the simultaneous existence of many entities -  objects, 
parts -  and the relationships that are established between parts. In every instant, billions 
of relationships take place simultaneously linking billion of entities. Even the simplest event 
like the movement of an object on the earth’s surface can be seen in relational terms, in 
the sense that it relates two distinct points to each other. The theory of gravity is perhaps 
the clearest example of this principle: each mass, by existing, exercises an attraction 
towards any other mass and thus establishes a relationship with it.
The example of the gravity law is twofold: on the one side, it help us in recognising 
that real world is made by relationships and not only by objects, on the other side it shows 
how objects and relationship can be put together in an elegant, formal, universal and 
simple model which explain at least some features of “real world". Social sciences, and 
geography among them, have always aspired to the formulation of necessary and 
universal laws like that of gravity (Wilson, 1969; Barnes, 1996). However, their task is 
made thankless by a concept that is anything but negligible in contemporary science: 
complexity.
“Complexity” is, without doubts, one of the key words in contemporary scientific 
debate. Complexity is actually an encompassing concept which is somehow emerging as a
55
supposed-to-be new paradigm for natural and social sciences, overcoming the distinction 
itself between the natural and the social realms (Katz, 1986 and 1989; Waldrop, 1994). 
Moreover, under the label of “complexity theories” we can find a huge range of different 
streams, from chaos theories to Artificial Intelligence experiments, from system theories to 
cybernetics, until some mystical drifts like Capra’s mix of popular science and eastern 
religiousness (Stewart, 2001).
Although -  or because of -  the widespread use of this concept in different fields of 
enquiry, it is extremely difficult to define it in a satisfactory way, making complexity a 
slippery shortcut through the boundless territories of scientific mythology rather than 
epistemology, above when applied to the realm of social rather than natural sciences (Eve 
et al., 1997; Kiel and Elliot, 1996). Also it must be observed a convergence between 
complexity theories and post-modern ones under the common target of dismissing modern 
epistemologies founded on truth and objectivity21 (Cilliers, 1998).
3.1.1 Complexity as unpredictability.
In order to define complexity, we can start from some closed concept that can 
narrow the semantic meaning of complexity which will be relevant in our discourse. First of 
all complexity is referred to some idea of unpredictability and freedom: the evolution of a 
complex system22 is not predictable starting from the behaviour of its elements. This does 
not mean that it is purely casual or messy: an order might be emerging during the 
evolution of the system, but it is not the outcome of deterministic and mechanistic causal 
relationships. In other terms, given a set of inputs, the outputs is not determined a priori23. 
Moreover, the dismissal of causal mechanism is now a shared opinion also in Physics, that 
is the realm of causal determination in modern Cartesian science: after the quantistic and 
relativistic revolution also Physics laws are defined in terms of probability rather than 
certainty. To be more precise, explanations which are assumed to be true and evident -  
like the gravity law -  are sub-cases of wider explanations that can be defined only in 
probabilistic terms. We can therefore identify an important consequence of unpredictability, 
that is, the mistrust in universality: there are not general rules which apply to all complex 
systems and even the same system, under the same conditions, can show different
21 Nevertheless, complex theories are now largely dismissed by the more critical streams of 
postmodernism as a “conservative", if not “reactionary”, epistemology, about all in Luhmann’s more 
organicistic account (Grundmann, 1990; Zolo, 1992).
22 For the time being, by “system” I mean simply a set of entities linked by relationships. In next pages, the 
concept of system will be contextualised within the framework of System Theory and will acquire 
consequently a stricter meaning.
23 As we will discuss later, this implies severe consequences for methodological individualism which 
assumes that the overall dynamics are reducible to the feature of representative individuals.
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behaviour. The issue of unpredictability of complex systems is strictly related to the 
irreversibility of development patterns in space and time. Irreversibility in complexity 
theories arises from three main elements: the sensitivity to initial conditions, the presence 
of feedback -  that is, of nonlinear rather than linear relationships between elements -  and 
the treatment of time.
One of the main outcomes of quantistic revolution and Einstein’s relativity is, in fact, 
that initial conditions of a process may be irrecoverable, given the exponential number of 
possible originating status and of combinations between them. If we add to the 
irreversibility (the fact that slight differences in initial conditions can produce diverging final 
outcomes) we find as a result that it is impossible to assume the forecasting effectiveness 
of an explanation as proof of its validity, and that any claim for universality should be 
“translated” in mere probabilistic terms. There is a point that must be clearly stated here. 
Complexity does not imply legitimating of post-modern “everything goes”: even if an event 
is not predictable, after it happens it becomes retrodictable in that it makes sense. More 
precisely, the dismissal of predictability it is not equivalent to the dismissal of causality: 
elements have still the capability to determine or at least influence other elements within 
the system. The turning point is that this causal chain is not given once and for all and 
therefore it is not fully predictable.
Moreover, unpredictability does not depend only on the sensitivity to initial 
conditions, but also on the second fundamental feature of complex systems: the presence 
of feedbacks and circular causation. As we shall see in next sections, the normal presence 
of feedback-like relationships among the elements of a system not only increases the 
number of relationships to be taken in account in our explanation, but also may change the 
properties and the status of the previous layers of elements originating changes in the 
causal chain which are not detectable a priori.
The dependence on initial conditions and the presence of circular causality evokes 
a third element of unpredictability, that is the conception of time. Traditionally, modern 
Cartesian science sees time as reversible, that is to say as irrelevant : time can be 
reversed like a chronometer to the starting point and it is therefore possible to remake the 
experiment from the beginning at the same conditions in order to achieve empirical 
evidence of a phenomenon. In complexity theories, on the contrary, as initial conditions 
cannot be achieved any more and continuous feedbacks continuously change the status of 
the system, time matters. To this respect, complexity theories come somehow to a
philosophical TTavTa pei: it is not possible to immerse in the same water, or, in other terms,
to repeat the same experience of reality. There is no surprise, therefore, that contemporary 
natural and social sciences show a substantial similitude with the main achievement of
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phenomenological philosophies24: this is the consequence of a rediscovery of experiential 
time -  and we would like to add, as it will be discussed in the next section, of experiential 
space, that is, place.
3.1.2 Complexity as emergence.
Another way to consider the unpredictability of complex systems is given by the 
issue of emergence, which we can define as the fact that
Patterns or global-level structures arise from interactive local-level processes. This 
"structure” or “pattern” cannot be understood or predicted from the behaviour or 
properties of the component units alone. (Mihata 1997, p. 31)
More generically, emergence is interpreted in complexity theories as the fact that 
novel structures and properties emerge at different levels through the interaction of the 
elements the system is made by. Lawson defines emergency putting that:
[...] an entity or aspect found at some level of organisation can be said to be 
emergent if there is a sense in which it has arisen out of some “lower” level, being 
conditioned by and dependent upon, but not predictable from, the properties found 
at the lower level. (Lawson, 1997, p. 176)
Furthermore, emergence goes beyond simple unpredictability as it puts more 
hypotheses about how the elements are linked each other. Drawing on Stephan’s account 
(1992, quoted in Mihata, 1997) we can distinguish three features which define emergence 
as something more than simple unpredictability:
(i) nonadditivity: emergent properties are not the “sum” of the properties, that is 
to say, there is not an equation whose result is a property of the overall 
system;
(ii) novelty, although the judgement of novelty is largely subjective and depends 
on the observer’s perceptions and values, emergent properties are new when 
they can influence the transformation of the system in a new system;
(iii) nondeducibility saying that emergence is unpredictable means something 
more than mere sensitivity to the initial conditions, as it refers to the 
impossibility to logically deduce laws or rules describing macro-properties of a 
system from laws or rules that produce the properties of its microparts.
24 About the relationship between complexity theories and philosophical phenomenology, it is worth 
noticing that two of the most important theorists of autopoietic systems, the Chilean biologists Varela and 
Maturana, developed, in the latter developments of their thought, an explicit similitude with 
phenomenology (Mingers, 1995; Varela e ta l ,  1991).
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In concluding our basic review of concepts associated with complexity we have to 
make a clear standpoint: complexity is not a matter of single methodologies and theories, 
but a paradigmatic affair. The issue here is not about questioning specific hypotheses and 
explanations, it is not about improvement in forecasting abilities or in becoming “more 
realistic”. A paradigmatic shift is about changing the deeper relationships which link reality 
with the way we build our theories. For instance, as we stated in the previous chapter, 
dismissing New Economic Geography and, generally speaking, Mainstream Economics is 
not ipso facto a refusal of mathematics or quantitative methods in name of a complexity of 
the real world which can not be grasped through formal modelling. As Sheppard wittily 
noticed, within complex theories there is a large use of maths and formalisation: 
quantitative methodologies are not perse  deterministic (Sheppard, 2001; Plummer and 
Sheppard, 2001). The divide is ontological, that is, concerning the epistemological 
hypothesis, or, better put, the paradigmatic level. For instance, neural networks -  a 
simulation technique which is often used in modelling Artificial Intelligence and Life -  can 
be used in the design of forecasting models contravening somehow the principle of 
unpredictability of complex systems. Analogously, preaching for a paradigmatic shift 
transcends dissatisfaction with specific hypothesis of a specific theory, e.g. Neoclassical 
full rationality of individuals, or maximising behaviour. Complexity implies unpredictability 
not because of a lack of rationality, but because of the way relationships link the elements 
of the system -  i.e. the three features of sensitivity to initial condition, presence of circular 
causation and irreversibility of time. In complexity theories, reality is still made of 
mechanistic relationship, without any need to introduce bounded rationality and imperfect 
information in order to justify unpredictability. Better put, complexity is beyond actors’ 
intentionality: the latter can enhance, but not create, the complexity of social realm with 
respect to that of physical realm. Otherwise, it would be a matter of theoretical or 
methodological choice, and not a paradigmatic shift.
3.1.3 Complexity in Social Sciences.
To understand how complexity affects social theorising, we must distinguish two 
main kinds of complexity which are recurrent in the literature: algorithmic complexity and 
organisative complexity (Stewart, 2001). Algorithmic complexity can be synthetically 
described as the quantity of information needed to describe a system.
In these cases, no general explanations, formulae, or equations can adequately 
describe the relevant process; explanation must have recourse to the specific 
causative configuration (such as particular arrangement of DNA or the particular 
circumstances that caused a traffic accident), which must in turn be largely 
explained through their unique history and evolution. Through these unique and
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specific histories these processes select a course through unimaginable large 
sequence spaces. (Stewart, 2001, p. 326)
For instance, one might mention the estimated figure of 102,400,000 microstates in 
sequence space for the bacterial genome: this number, if compared with the estimated 
number of particles in the universe (about 1081) gives an idea about the importance of the 
history and the unique structure of particular DNA configurations.
Moreover, as we stated before there is another kind of complexity, that is, 
organisational complexity, which relates to surprising behaviour and its analysis. This 
approach explores complexity primarily through the notion of the progressive emergence 
of far-from-equilibrium dissipative, autopoietic, or self-steering systems in evolutionary 
space. Increasing complexity is displayed in more complex self-steering forms and in 
ecosystem environments (and their logical analogues), which increase in complexity as 
their component systems coevolve.
The kind of complexity that social sciences have to face is both algorithmic and 
organisational:
(i) algorithmic in that the infinitiveness of relationships which constitute societies 
gives an existential uniqueness to the position of any event in time and 
space;
(ii) organisational as a social system is characterised by the existence of multiple 
levels of organisation which are reciprocally interdependent.
When dealing with social rather than merely physical systems, we have to take into 
account a third kind of complexity, which arises from the fact that people have their own 
intentions and motivations, perceptions and representation, which create multiple layers of 
meaning in social order. In other terms, this means that all individuals perceive and 
deliberately try to modify the flow of relationships in which they are involved. Following one 
of the main streams in contemporary social sciences debate, we label this third source of 
complexity as “reflexive complexity”. Reflexive complexity implies that we have to take into 
account the existence and the role of a situated observer who is not any more located 
closed to God’s eye, uprooted from the reality he is observing and describing. Reflectivity 
has been progressively shifting from the outside to the inside and is now part of the 
system’s complexity. To use Giddens’s terminology, in late modernity reflexivity is not 
distinguishable from self-reflexivity. Better put, social systems are made by acting entities 
-  the agents, the individual -  who attribute a meaning to their action, that is who reflect on 
the multiplicity of the relationship they are entangle in and on the order they can make out 
of them.
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3.2 Complexity and simplification in social sciences.
To understand how the social sciences deal with social complexity, the starting 
point of social analysis must be represented by all the reciprocal relationships between 
individuals. The problem for the social sciences is to understand how the multitude of 
relationships between a multitude of individuals -  that is, algorithmic complexity-  receive 
a meaning -  i.e. reflexive complexity- and are organised in such a way as to constitute 
stable communities and societies -  that is, organisational complexity. In every instant, 
some relationships deteriorate, whilst others strengthen. Despite this continuous process 
of selection and transformation, society does not disappear but conserves its identity while 
changing.
It follows that the task of the social sciences is to understand how human societies 
change in the unceasing flow of relationships and, in doing it, they need simplification. The 
nexus between free human agency and historically and geographically embedded social 
structures is well known in the social sciences as the “structuration issue”. The process of 
structuring synthesizes many of the questions that social scientists pose about the subject 
of their enquiry. Is there a relationship of determination between society and the economy? 
Can territories and communities, crossed by uncontrollable flows of goods and capital, 
influence their own destiny in some way? How do the continuity and stability of social 
structures co-exist with the endless drive towards change intrinsic to historical 
transformation?
As we have said, each individual is at the centre of an inextricable network of 
places, people and organizations that represent his world, the world in which he formulates 
desires and plans action. The constitution and maintenance of a society implies the 
consolidation of a set of relationships which defines the common heritage of the individuals 
of which it is composed, the context to which self-perception and perception of the world 
refer. A society can, in practice, be underpinned by a constitution or by simple routines. 
Moreover, the formation of a society can be interpreted as the expression of a fundamental 
need of man as a “social animal”, or as the mere result of utilitarian and individualistic 
desires. In this context, however, it is not the form taken by the society or the reasons that 
determine its formation that matter, but the process through which complexity is organised 
to give a relatively stable output, society.
In general, while individual’s experience is composed of all the relationships that 
he/she build around him/herself in lifetime, the identification of the social is possible only 
by starting from a selection of the infinitive relationships between individuals. The relational 
bulk that form the foundations of a community or society must, in contrast to reciprocal 
individual relationships, possess a number of characteristics: they must, first of all, be 
shared by the members, but must also be stable, so as to reduce the uncertainty of those 
who are part of it, and defined, in order to fix boundaries and exclude actors and
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relationships which do not belong to it. In other terms, structuration can be interpreted as a 
process of both complexification and simplification. Passing from individual relationality to 
social relationality implies an increase in complexity at different level:
(i) algorithmic complexity, as the multiplicity of individuals enhance the 
exponential growth of possible relationships which become active;
(ii) organisational complexity, as the levels of organisation are multiplied by the 
circular causality between the increased number of components (individuals);
(iii) reflexive complexity, as the same events receive different meanings and 
interpretation.
At the same time, this complexity must be reduced, that is, simplified: an order-  
i.e. sharing a stable and sustainable organisation of the constitutive relationships -  
must emerge. When a social science defines its object, it does nothing other than 
express its judgment about which of these relationships really count in order to identify 
the society it intends to consider. It makes a fundamental simplification, choosing and 
reducing the multitude and wealth of bonds and relationships between individuals. This 
is a process of evaluation of the relationships considered to be significant; they are 
artificially isolated -  as they are not in the real world -  from other relationships and 
variables judged to be emotional, marginal, residual, insignificant or distorting.
3 .2 .1 Theories as simplification: the legacy of reductionism.
This observation leads us to consider how our knowledge cannot be taken for 
granted, but must be some how deconstructed in order to assess the extent of the 
relationship between these two main components of reality: entities and relationships. 
Paradigms and epistemologies are always built on some kind of balance between these 
two elements and, most of the times, focusing on the one rather than the other.
To a very general extent, reductionism can be defined as a methodology which 
privileges components’ features over relationships in explaining the formations of social 
structures. Better put, reductionism admits that a given reality can be divided in simple 
elements and that analysing the features and the behaviours of these components we can 
subsequently come back to the explanation of the overall system. It is important to notice 
that reductionism works on a double set of hypothesis:
(i) the first hypothesis is exactly that the components are simpler than the whole, 
i.e. that individuals are simpler than society -  it is clear that, in our framework, 
this hypothesis works as a reduction of organisational complexity. Also this 
hypothesis is usually accompanied by the corollary that the components
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share some common features, or even that they are identical, reducing 
therefore algorithmic complexity, in that we reduce the number of possible 
conditions that the elements can assume. This first set of hypotheses leads to 
the possibility to fully describe and understand the features of the 
components which are consequently perfectly known;
(ii) the second set of hypothesis refers to the relational organisation that links the 
elements identified at the previous step. Here reductionism is mainly aimed to 
reduce organisational complexity, putting some basic hypothesis about how 
relationships are established between components in order to reconstitute the 
lost whole. Typically, the main reductionist hypothesis here is the linearity of 
the causal chain and the one-directionality of input-output relationships25. In 
the case of social science, some hypotheses are also due to reduce reflexive 
complexity, excluding meaning and intentionality from the explanation of 
social phenomena. Usually this goal is achieved in two different, but related, 
ways: excluding intentionality from the model26 and hypothesizing the 
existence of the God’s-eye observer -  the scientist. Through this double 
exclusive movement, reflexivity is pushed away from the system.
Methodological individualism (Ml) is probably the currently most well established 
and diffused form of scientific reductionism in social sciences, particularly in Economics. If 
we roughly, but meaningfully, define Ml as the belief that we can explain the formation of 
an economic system
(i) focusing on the characters of the individual economic actors,
(ii) hypothesising -  more importantly -  that the multiplicity of actors can be 
brought back to a common model of behaviour -  homo ceconomicus -  and
(iii) assuming that the relationships between individuals are stylised through a 
narrow set of rules -  maximisation, rational behaviour etc -  subject to be 
modelled in formal equations, then
25 Here, “input-output relationships” must be interpreted in a cybernetic meaning rather than economical 
and it refers simply to the predictability of the output given the input.
26 This is typically the case of the hypothesis of “revealed preferences” in Mainstream Economics: no 
matter how needs and desired are produced and possess a meaning, what really counts is that they are 
expressed in a consistent and elegant set of clearly defined and unambiguous preferences. The world 
itself, “preference”, avoid any reference to the realm of meaning and motivations, to focus just on the 
capability to choice and therefore establish a linear order in individual’s actions. In other terms, 
preferences are given -  reduction of reflexive complexity -  and ordered -  reduction of organisational 
complexity.
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it becomes clear that Ml is a powerful and attractive way of reducing social and economic 
complexity.
Moreover, we have to notice that hypotheses and assumptions under point (iii) are 
not the key issue here: neoclassical economists -  just to quote the main representative of 
Ml in contemporary science -  are no doubt involved in a serious attempt to make their 
hypotheses more “realistic”, introducing for instance sub-optimal behaviour and bounded 
rationality in the models. This attempt is nevertheless meaningless for the purposes of 
dealing with complexity as it is mainly concentrated in technical improvement of their 
calculation skills. To use the language of complexity, we might say that at its best 
Neoclassical Economics can deal with some aspects of algorithmic complexity, but not at 
all with organisational and reflexive complexities. We can exemplify this point with 
reference to two of the main issues which are often contested to Neoclassical Economics. 
The first one is the “general equilibrium obsession”, which drives a huge research 
mainstream within contemporary orthodox economic thought: apart from the criticism 
about the unrealistic pretension that all the markets can be simultaneously on equilibrium 
and maintain it, it is enough to introduce some elements of organisational complexity -  
such as feedbacks and circular causation -  and it will become impossible to satisfy all the 
necessary conditions for general equilibrium to happen and if it happens -  as a sort of 
temporary chaotic order -  it would be unpredictable. The second example we can consider 
is the question of innovation and creativity. One of the main criticism to mainstream 
Economics refers to its difficulties in addressing how creativity plays a role in shaping 
economic processes and, specifically, how innovation arises in a given economic system. 
In most of neoclassical theories innovation is either purely exogenous or is a linear, simple 
consequence of some economic behaviour, that is, innovation is function of the amount of 
investments which economic actors allocate in each period. This failure can be traced 
back to methodological individualism or, in other terms, to the focus put on elementary 
units (individuals) rather than on relationships: if one assume that the behaviour of the 
whole economic system can be explained with exclusive reference to the characters and 
the behaviours of atomised components, therefore he misses the relational dimension of 
innovation, that is the fact that creativity and innovation arise from a rich humus of 
relationships and interactions27 (Antonelli, 1999a). Translated in complexity language, this
27 Quite surprisingly the same criticism can be moved against Schumpeter’s account of creativity and 
innovation, which is often assumed as a starting point of non-neoclassical account for innovative 
processes. Nevertheless, if it is true that Schumpeterian theory of innovation question the possibility of 
such a thing like general equilibrium, it is as much true that his emphasis on the entrepreneur’s creativity 
as engine of innovation and economic development is no doubt methodologically individualist and neglect 
the relational dimension of innovation. For a more detailed account of Schumpeter’s reductionism and 
“physicism", see Hodgson (1999, pp. 131-136). On the opposite, we might reconsider Hayek’s supposed
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inability to grasp with innovation and creativity can be interpreted as the impossibility to 
reconcile methodological individualism and the property of emergence which characterises 
complex systems.
It is fundamental to get what really matters: the point here is neither the 
quantification nor the “modellification”. The point here is how the reduction of 
complexity, which is somehow necessary, happened. The need for a reduction does not 
advocate reductionism. The aim of the following analysis is to consider to what extent 
we can reduce complexity without being reductionist or, in other terms, howto maintain 
complexity without going post-modern.
3.2.2 Reducing complexity in social sciences.
The methodology of reductionism can be spread -  at least on the theoretical level -  
in two different processes:
(i) the invention of abstract relational spaces, that introduce a progressive 
separation of the different types of relationships, each of which is studied and 
analysed separately from the others. This turns out mainly in a reduction of 
algorithmic complexity;
(ii) the annihilation of time and space, in which human relationships happen 
incessantly, to make them the stage of linear causation and direct 
determination, in order to reduce organisational and reflexive complexity.
Before proceeding to consider how System Theory can provide an alternative 
framework in order to reduce complexity -  that is, make it intelligible -  avoiding the 
reductionist trap, we need to consider how reductionism works when dealing with 
spatiality.
3.2.2.1 Reducing complexity I: inventing abstract relational spaces
In their attempt to move closer to the “exact” sciences, social scientists identify 
abstract spaces where various types of relationships occur and can be analysed. There is 
thus an economic space, where the economic relationships between individuals are 
artificially isolated from other human relationships. Similarly, there are social, cultural, 
family and political spaces in which the different individual relationships are placed. 
Although the breakdown of human agency into separate fields facilitates analysis of an 
otherwise complex and composite reality, this entails, nevertheless, numerous difficulties.
methodological individualism and atomism, above all if we consider the latest period of his intellectual
production (Hodgson 1999, pp. 131-136; Lawson, 1997, ch. 10).
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Each individual acts simultaneously, in fact, in all these relational spaces, but this 
simplification does not capture the unitary nature of the action, in that the relationships 
between different spaces are almost never considered, if not marginally. Splitting human 
agency in different realms is, no doubt, the foundation of the disciplinary division of social 
sciences, in that any layer defines the object of enquiry of a specific academic discipline: 
Economics, Sociology, Political Science, Anthropology and so on. Of course this 
separation, in simplifying the interaction between different levels of relationships enhance 
the possibility of treating social complexity in a more simple and predictive way, but it 
poses some problems in explaining the process of structuration of societies, which is an 
outcome of all the levels.







In the case of neo-classical economics, the simplification has been particularly 
serious and definitive, establishing a net separation between the economic and the other 
layers and fixing somehow a hierarchy among those relational spaces, with the 
superimposing of economic. The only relationships considered are those that happen 
within a market where perfectly rational and informed individuals make the choice to 
maximize their utility in a context of perfect competition. At the centre of reflection is, in 
fact, the economic actor, described purely on the basis of its internal characteristics, 
without making reference to the many concrete relationships in which it is involved. It 
follows that the passage from the microeconomic dimension to a general interpretation of 
society (macroeconomics) appears more a question of mathematical mastery than of 
socio-philosophical thinking.
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Thus, if reality can be seen as a weft of overlapping relational spaces, the orthodox 
economic vision limits itself to considering only the level made up of market relationships 
and completely ignores the fact that each economic agent is at the same time involved in a 
network of relationships of other kinds (Figure 3.1).
In this sense, the separation of economic relationships from the broader set of links 
which build up social structure, even if it has been the most obvious and powerful 
simplification used to explain reality, it is not enough to explain the complexity of social life. 
Focusing on economic ties only, in fact, works out as a reduction gear for algorithmic 
complexity, trimming down the number of interconnections which are relevant for the 
explanation of social and economic phenomena. Although reducing algorithmic complexity 
we also downsize the potential for organisational and reflexive complexities, reductionism 
in social science goes far beyond just cutting the number of bonds, working directly on the 
organisation and meaning of relationships.
3.2.2.2 Reducing complexity II: breaking down space and time
What holds the different relational spaces together is geographical space and 
historical time, in the sense that the different relationships co-exist because they occur at 
the same time and in the same place. In order to master reality, it is also necessary, 
therefore, to control space and time, and conceptualise them in abstract and closed forms. 
From the point of view of the individual actor (whether an individual or a company), space 
and time are continuous. The actor in fact moves without breaks in time and space in a 
continuum that goes from the instant of its birth to that of its death. This continuum defines 
the bio-geographies of each actor and these can also be represented graphically as paths 
in time and space (Hagerstrand, 1970 and 1982; Thrift, 1983).
This restless floating has always been in contrast with a second simplification 
which tends towards selected breaks in time and space, identifying periods and scales. 
The historical period and the geographical scale set temporal and spatial limits in which 
the individual bio-geographies are contained and can be interpreted clearly and 
unambiguously. In other terms, period and scale present unvarying and common 
characteristics that allow social scientists “to say something” about human agency without 
being forced to reconstruct the single spatial-temporal paths of individual actors.
Think of the division of human history into great astrological eras in which the 
domination of given astral influences constitutes the time of the destiny that it contains and 
gives a sense to the individual destinies that occur in the measurable time of bio­
geographies. Or we could think of the geological eras that identify long periods within 
which the single movements of the earth’s crust can be interpreted.
The same procedure of dividing space and time applies to social sciences. One 
example is the division into periods of capitalist development by Kondrat'ev and
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Schumpeter. The history of capitalism is divided into long cycles lasting approximately 45- 
60 years, each of them inaugurated by an epoch-making technological innovation which 
leaves its mark on both the organization of production and that of the territory and society. 
According to this perspective, it is not necessary to reconstruct the existential development 
of individual actors in order to understand the history of capitalism. It is enough to define 
the general features of the cycle in which the individual actor operates.
In a similar way, the concept of Fordism identifies a period and a scale within which 
common laws are valid that suspend the flow of time and the unceasing movement in 
space of individual destinies. In this case, the period lasts about forty years (roughly from 
the great depression to the seventies) while the scale is represented by the nation state. In 
this period, it is thus assumed that a predominant system of accumulation existed, based 
on economies of scale, mass production and the functional and spatial division of labour. 
Corresponding to this is a specific form of social regulation, based on the intervention of 
the nation state to guarantee an adequate level of social welfare and to prevent inevitable 
social tensions.
In this way, period and scale define a portion of time and space that it is possible to 
analyse and interpret leaving out of consideration the individual biographies and destinies. 
This also implies that for each period and each scale a main scientific discourse asserts 
itself, entrusted with defining the major features and laws of the various historical cycles.
From the geographical point of view, the processes through which a meaning is 
attributed to the territory (territorialisation) have been studied with reference to some 
preferred scales. For example, Peter Taylor identifies three main scales to which capitalist 
modernity has attributed particular significance, the home, the city and the nation state 
(Taylor, 1999). Moreover, the theme of the spatial heterogeneity typical of the process of 
capitalist development has been analysed essentially on the regional scale, with the 
creation of fictitiously homogeneous scales, such as the dualism between the Italian 
“industrial triangle” and Mezzogiorno or between the Sunbelt and the Rustbelt. For a long 
time this impeded observation of their composite and differentiated nature in single places. 
Similarly, the problem of uneven development has been tackled by turning to the contrast 
between two macroscales, opposing the North and South of the world in a dialectic 
between centre and periphery where local identities and differences were hidden.
3.3 A typology of geographies .
By crystallising time and space we can reduce organisational complexity in that we 
introduce repeatability, reversibility and therefore predictability -  all features that, as we 
have argued in the previous sections are antithetic to the notion itself of complexity. Figure
3.2 tries to summarise who different economic theories can be arrayed in a typology 
according to their treatment of temporal and spatial complexity.
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We can, in fact, distinguish a continuous growth of complexity in both space and 
time, from a condition of full predictability to the other extreme of the impossibility of 
accurate forecasting. The lowest level of complexity is given by the total annihilation of 
time and space, which become absent from the scientific explanation in social sciences. In 
this atemporal and aspatial spaces, relationships are reversible and therefore the laws that 
social sciences discover can be assumed to be universal, that is, valid in any time and in 
any place. Also according to what we said in the previous pages, canonical Neoclassical 
Economics can be assumed as the main example of this kind of scientific enquiry, as it 
ignores largely the complex organisation of ties which build up uniqueness in time and 
space.
On the other extreme, we have the maximum of complexity when we consider the 
existential value of time and space, that is the full set of relationships which are unwrapped 
during the lifetime. In this phenomenological perspective, every instant of time in space is 
unique and the life is made by the continuous flow. Here all the three kinds of complexity 
are at their zenith:
(i) algorithmic complexity, as we assume as fundamental the whole succession 
of experiences (i.e. of relationships) which make the uniqueness of individual 
experience;
(ii) organisational complexity, as in such an overlapping and intertwining of ties it 
becomes impossible to detect clearly the organisation of relationships, that is 
the plot of circular causation and feedbacks that tie the economic with the 
social, the cultural with the political and so on;
(iii) reflexive complexity, as we are now dealing with the fact that this skein of 
bonds and links make sense only to the individual who lives (in) it, who gives 
a meaning to that succession of events in time and space -  and sometimes 
he cannot even. In other terms, psychic complexity is here maximised as 
there is no room for an external observer which can make sense of this 
reality.
The main example of geographical approach dealing with existential time and 
space is, probably, American Cultural Geography as it has been developed in the 70s by 
scholars like Yi-Fu Tuan (1977) and Relph (1976) and which is still represented in the work 
of Robert Sack (1997).
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The main output that Phenomenological Cultural Geographies have achieved in 
terms of time-space complexity is no doubt the concept of place, which is a unique 
combination of individual and collective meanings that time and space receive through 
experience at different level of reflexive complexity -  personal daily meaning, cognitive, 
mythical, mystical and so on. Therefore place is something unique, something that we can 
interpret only ex post, as it does not present regularities and orders which are recurrent 
over time and space. As a consequence Geography is not based on analysis, but rather 
on synthesis and even on intuition, sensitivity, as the task is to suggest and evoke rather 
than describing. The real essence of place can be grasped only through experience and it 
is difficult to codify it in a consistent scientific language. Tuan’s major work seems to 
suggest us that there are better languages which can give us back the meaning of place: 
poetry, mythology, art, psychoanalysis and religion all concur to catch something of a 
place essence and identity. The geographer’s work -  or geographer’s art -  is to collect 
these fragments of meaning and bring them together in a hint rather than an explanation of 
space.
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In the between we can find a somehow “average” account of time-space 
complexity, what we could term respectively the “historical” and the “spatial”. Although 
there is not a perfect symmetry between these two categories28, in our account of social 
complexity, these concepts indicate a situation in which we introduce time and space, but 
in such a way that there is some room left for prediction and simple -  or, better put, 
simplified -  order. According to the various degree of relational complexity which is 
attributed to time and space, we can place in this framework the different social theories. 
Just limiting to a few examples of some interest for geographers, we can consider for 
instance Hagerstrand’s and Thrift time-space geographies as an account of complexity for 
many aspects closed to that diffused in Phenomenological Cultural Geography, but still 
maintaining some room for the definition of shared patterns and therefore for comparison 
and some degree of generalization.
To move closer to our interests, we can consider how New Economic Geography 
and New Industrial Geography remain in this meta-theoretical frame. There are some 
analogies between NEG and complexity theories, above all in the use of the QWERTY 
effect and in the concept of path dependence. Both complexity theories and NEG 
advocate the sensitivity of the “final" order to initial conditions. Nevertheless this similitude 
is superficial and does not sustain a deeper analysis. The main difference is that NEG 
account regards initial conditions as taken for granted, exogenous, that is, they are not 
internalised in the explanation. This has a series of severe consequences that get NEG 
further from complexity theories. First, initial conditions are treated as simply as they were 
a random distribution of playing card, before starting the game. This means that, after 
setting initial conditions, we can play thoughtlessly according to the game’s rules, which 
can be reductionism and oversimplification of reality. Second -  and consequently -  NEG’s 
account for time is actually assuming history as “prehistory”: if history is something we can 
learn by, initial conditions for NEG are prehistorical, in that they lay beyond the rules which 
manage the game: as initial conditions are randomly given they do not really contribute to 
tuning the process which produce the final order. The third and most important 
consequence is that, while the importance of initial conditions in complexity theory leads to 
unpredictability, NEG still maintain an ambition to define universal spatial laws and rules 
about location and agglomeration. These are the reasons why NEG can be placed in a 
position which is still much closed to aspatial and atemporal Neoclassical Economics, 
even if we must acknowledge that it marks at least an attempt to introduce space and 
history in mainstream Economics, slightly increasing explanation complexity.
28 In fact, space is much more “reversible" than history. Nevertheless, both share the opinion that there is a
clear and identifiable meaning in human events. This takes the form, respectively, of teleology and spatial
determination in many social theories, mostly of Marxian matrix.
71
As far as NIG is concerned we can easily recognize that it has represented an 
important step in introducing complexity -  albeit in a rather unconscious manner -  in 
Economic Geography. One of the main features of NIG is, in point of fact,
(i) its relational nature (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2003), that is,
(ii) the awareness that economic behaviours leading to good performances are 
embedded in a broad set of relationships (Grabher, 1993)
(iii) which are interconnected trough processes of mutual causation, many of 
those have not an economic nature and establish untraded 
interdependencies (Storper, 1995).
What it is more important in our account of complexity is that NIG has been quite 
successful in establishing as a domain for economic inquiry a specific spatial realm that we 
might name the territorial/local. These two concepts will be developed in next chapter 
when trying of build up a systemic and institutional interpretation of geographical 
investigation. For the time being it is enough to note that the concepts of territorial and 
local must be thought in our framework as something intermediate between NEG’s 
abstract space and existential place which characterized the work of cultural geographers. 
When NIG refers to the concept of territory (and similar concepts like local or regional 
economy, localities etc.) it usually means a geographical entity that is:
(i) more complex than space, in that it is made by specific relationships which tie 
together the economic and the non-economic. In other terms, the concept of 
territory implies an higher degree of organizational and reflective complexity 
which, as we noted earlier, is incompatible with Neoclassical reductionism;
(ii) less complex than place, as it is used in the cultural tradition within 
Geography. Territories are characterised by a kind of order which is less 
unique than the experiential order of place, where only the experienced 
individual(s) - that is, the dwellers -  can attribute a meaning (whether 
personal or collective).
In other terms, the concept of territory leaves some room for soft generalisation: 
though in territories development is not fully reversible and predictable like in space, NIG
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recognises that there are some forces above places which allow recognising some 
ordered structure in the organisation of industrial and economic relations29.
At present, nevertheless, New Industrial Geography is made of a quite broad set of 
influences and sources, which ranges from Economic Sociology (e.g. the concepts of 
embeddedness and network) to the Economics of Innovation (national and regional 
innovation systems), to managerial organization (learning organization and knowledge 
based economy). Even if these blocks of theoretical contributions show some clear points 
of contact -  we might say that they share a relational nature - ,  NIG still seems to be a 
quite chaotic and messy overlapping of concepts and labels, lacking the consistent meta- 
theoretical background which NEG, reversibly, possesses -  Neoclassical Economics and 
its strong connection to Classical Physics’ epistemology.
The issue in this chapter is to define a paradigm, alternative to that of reductionism, 
which allows a systematic comprehension of the issues arisen by NIG and somehow able 
to counterbalance the powerful Physics-derived epistemology of NEG.
3.4 An introduction to System Theory.
Systems theory is a new methodology that enables the organization of knowledge 
in view of higher effectiveness of action”, setting itself up as an alternative but also a 
complement to the traditional analytical reductionist approach. As we have seen in the 
previous pages, reductionism is epitomised by a cognitive strategy based on the reduction 
of reality to simple elements, which can be analysed separately from the whole to which 
they belong. This also entails the division of knowledge into different disciplinary areas. 
The systemic approach responds to this “reductionist” and simplifying strategy with the 
idea of the whole, assuming phenomena as elements in reciprocal interaction. The 
systemic approach is therefore a combination procedure (or methodology), aimed at 
organising knowledge and the object of knowledge itself. Talking of “system", the 
reference is to both the way in which the phenomenon is observed -  which cannot be 
explained by the use of a predetermined and objective model -  and to the phenomenon 
itself. The latter, assumed as a reality composed of a high number of elements and of 
relationships between these elements, cannot be broken down or simplified, without losing 
sight of its essential feature, complexity.
More in particular, by defining a system starting from its essential components -  
the elements (i.e. a set of objects, but also of concepts, characterised by their own 
properties and attributes) and relationships (flows of energy and/or information between
29 Of course, by “industrial relations" we just mean the set of generic relationships that constitute a
production system, whether individual (the single firm) or collective (e.g. the cluster). In other terms, it does
not refer specifically to the relationship between labour and capital.
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both the elements of the system and between the system and the environment) -  a 
leading role is given to the dynamic and complex character of reality, which could not 
reasonably be inferred from the functionalist cognitive schemes.
Following Ahlemeyer (2001, pp. 60-61) we can identify three features which 
characterise complex systems:
(i) “a system is complex for an observer when it is neither in a state of complete 
order not of complete disorder, that is to say it represents a mixture of 
redundancy and variety”. Redundancy plays a major role in making an order 
to emerge, through repletion and reproduction of peculiar relationships, while 
variety guarantee the emergence of novelty within the system and therefore 
making impossible to rely on forecasting. This is to say that even in presence 
of complexity is meaningful to speak about organisation and structure, which 
will be two of the main concepts we will introduce in the next pages;
(ii) “a system is observed as complex when it contains more elements than can 
be connected completely. This imply that only some elements can be bound 
to some other elements by specific relations”. The consequence is that the 
status of the system is contingent, that is, the selection of ties which came 
into existence is only one set of the possible ones. In other terms, even if the 
evolution of the system is path-dependent, in that as we saw it is highly 
sensitive to initial conditions, there is not only one development pattern for the 
system, but a plurality;
(iii) “complexity is a notion without a difference. There is no longer a 
counternotion to complexity, such as simplicity or transparency. Today 
everything can be recognised as complex. You only have to look close 
enough”;
Before defining out interpretation of complexity and system theory, it might be 
useful clarify two main ambiguities which often hamper the comprehension of systemic 
thought. The first is the tie that connect system theory and functionalism, while the second 
is the question whether systems are real objects or a mere framework constructed by an 
observer.
3.4.1 The ambiguous legacy o f Functionalism.
The emergence of Functionalism in XX century represented an important novelty 
as a method of scientific enquiry. In contrast to the simplifying method so in vogue in the 
19th century, aimed at breaking down reality into increasingly simpler elements on which 
to then proceed with detailed investigations, an attempt was now made to explain society
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as a set of elements and relationships. Reality is, in other words, represented as an 
organism, and explained by taking the scheme of physiology as a model. And as for 
biological systems, a social system is seen to operate for the satisfaction of collective 
needs. It follows that the various members possess, by extension, a common system of 
values which reflects the values present in the society.
The organism -  society -  is thus seen as a structure, an organic whole, or a set of 
roles (or functions) linked to each other by communication flows (Boulding, 1972): it 
follows that the organization and transformations of society will be explained by starting 
from the position that the various elements occupy within society itself.
The roots of this style of thinking are found in the British cultural anthropology of 
Redcliffe-Brown and Malinowski and, above all, in the work of one of the 20th century’s 
most influential sociologists, the American Talcott Parsons. It was the latter, in particular, 
who was responsible for the representation of the social system as structured in a set of 
relationships. Its life -  the continuity of a social structure, in the same way as for an 
organism -  is preserved thanks to its functional continuity, i.e. the activities and 
interactions that are activated between human beings and the organised groups of which 
the society is composed. In extreme synthesis, functionalism appears as a logical scheme 
aimed at explaining social structures, not on the basis of their historical origin or their 
geographical particularity, but because of the different functions which jointly confer on the 
system its proper working order understood as the achievement of collective goals.
In reality, the functionalist proposal possesses significant ideological contents. The 
assumption of an adequate social order cannot be separated from the inspiring principles 
of strategies and policies aimed at correcting the mode of functioning of modern society, 
which finds cohesion in the efficiency of the state, in the Fordist corporation and in 
appropriate economic planning activities. To grow, the system demands an order in which 
roles and functions can be clearly identified and planned and where disturbing social 
factors can be eliminated through appropriate social engineering.
Extending these concepts to economic and territorial sciences, space is thus . 
represented as a set of relationships: a city, a region or a country-system are explained in 
terms of a space whose cohesion depends on the relationships that connect the elements 
of which it is composed. A spatial system will thus be a rationally structured “whole” whose 
elements, reciprocally linked by more or less close-knit relationships, assume the meaning 
that is attributed to them by the functions that they play in relationship to a vaster space. It 
follows that the terms “spatial structure” and “spatial system” adequately express the 
geographical transfer of Parsons’ structural functionalism.
The (regional, national) space is thus interpreted in terms of relationships between 
the parts, which become complementary to each other, integrated into a more or less 
ordered and cohesive whole. It follows that its structuring depends not on its intrinsic
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features (social-historical and physical-environmental) but on the complex play of bonds 
and complementarities between its elements. Spatial order will depend on the “natural” 
play between the parts (between core and periphery, between “strong” regions and “weak” 
ones), while the pole, through its driving, propulsive and dominating function, will integrate 
and organise all the elements of which it is made up.
Functionalism is relevant here not only because it had a large influence in the 
conceptualisation of space and territories, but -  more relevant here -  it can be interpreted 
as the epistemological breakpoint between methodological individualism’s reductionism 
and system theory, in that it introduces some of the main features - both strong and weak 
points -  of systemic theories, while maintaining a scent of reductionist simplification. The 
relationship between functionalism and system theory need therefore some clarifications, 
as very often the two approaches are confused. Functionalism marks, in fact, the passage 
from the use of physical metaphors to biological ones in social sciences, introducing the 
concept of organic whole and therefore the notion of a social structure which goes beyond 
individual agency. In other terms, interactions between the elements of the system are not 
as simple as in physical reductionism, as some organisational complexity is introduced 
which bring together the parts in an organic whole which is more than the sum of the parts. 
At the same time, functionalism still shares some of the features of reductionism, in 
particular when it put forward the hypothesis that the links between the parts are dictated 
by the functions that each part holds in the overall organisation of the system. In other 
terms, the complexity of possible relationship among the elements is reduced to the set of 
given functions which pledge the functioning of the social “organism”.
Moreover this mix of reductionism and organicism leads to some unintended 
consequences, specifically the accusation of teleology which is often addressed against 
systemic approaches to social rather than natural entities. In other terms, the interpretation 
of functions within an overall organism can lead to introduce some finality or necessity in 
the organisation society. Hence the accusation of conservatism which have been often 
addressed to Luhmann’s application of system theory to sociological studies (Zolo, 1992).
In order to solve the question of teleology we must answer to the question whether 
systems are real objects or subjective construction of an observer.
3.4.2 Realistic and constructivist System Theory.
It is, in fact, possible and necessary to tackle a fundamental distinction that 
characterises the systemic approach, breaking it down into two different interpretations, 
realistic and constructivist.
According to the first interpretation, a system is an object of knowledge with certain 
characteristics. In this light, a system is an analytical instrument of representation of 
reality, yet very different to the objects and phenomena dealt with by traditional
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mechanistic science. As a “concrete totality”, a system can be broken down into parts 
which will also be systems themselves, in turn organised in sub-systems whose complexity 
will be equal to or higher than that of the system they belong to. This is a fundamental 
methodological principle and not a metaphysical thesis: if reality is of an irreducible 
complexity, for cognitive purposes a system cannot be dismantled into elements (and thus 
simplified), but only into other systems. To explain certain observed phenomena or facts, it 
will be possible to analytically distinguish different systems which will not, however, be 
concrete parts of the “whole", but abstractions made by the observer with his own 
cognitive ends and needs (Morin, 1977, p. 139). In this perspective, systems exist apart 
and independently from the observer.
This introduces the constructivist meaning, according to which the system is 
nothing other than a mental construct created by an observer of an object, a phenomenon, 
a concrete case. In this light, the systemic approach is a unifying and integrating scheme 
of knowledge. The systemic approach opposes the reductionism of the traditional 
analytical method with a holistic approach, as Le Moigne says, “a unitary conception of the 
world [...] a general theory of the universe” (Le Moigne, 1977, p. 59). In this sense, 
systems theory is a general framework (or General System Theory, in Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy’s insight), which envisages a breakdown of knowledge that transcends the 
division between sciences. It springs from the following consideration: if it is impossible to 
uphold the existence of a single theory of the universality of phenomena, it is however true 
that all phenomena have something in common that can be traced back to a conventional 
scheme (the General System) which analyses each phenomenon individually. The system 
is not, therefore, an objective concept, but an instrumental cognitive concept aimed at 
integrating many dimensions of reality: as Morin states, systemic thought has established 
itself in order to explain complexity.
What is important is that, in the practice of everyday scientific research, 
distinguishing “real” and “constructed” systems is not an easy task and it is not a 
fundamental one, as we can use system theory as a constructionist framework to analyse 
entities, regardless the fact that the object is “really” a system or it is simply “constructed” 
as a system by the observer. More precisely, because of reflexive complexity it might 
happen frequently that we cannot evaluate the “systemicness” of the object of our inquiry, 
but it might be useful nevertheless to treat it as if it were a real system, in a heuristic way. 
This leads us to two major considerations. The first one is that any teleology is in 
observer’s eyes rather than in the system. We can use teleology and self-organisation as 
metaphors or as analytical tools, but we must keep in mind that they are constructed by 
our description and therefore must be subject to critical revision. The second reflection is 
that reflexive complexity is also present, even when we are considering “natural” and 
biological system, and not only social ones. The epistemological impact is explosive. The
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construction of knowledge thus belongs to the observing subject, in permanent interaction 
with the phenomena perceived and conceived: the cognitive process will thus be given by 
a circular relationship between reality and subject, which becomes an active and 
inseparable part of the process of construction of knowledge.
We are therefore able to summarise the main theoretical and operational 
consequences underlying a systemic epistemology:
(i) with the rejection of the postulate of pure objectivity of the positivist tradition, 
knowledge is no longer conceived as predetermined, but is understood to 
develop from the interaction between the subject and object of knowledge;
(ii) this leads to the challenging of the idea of a linear progress of knowledge and 
based on what Isabelle Stengers defines as the “reassuring function” of a 
neutral and privileged point of observation, given by a defined set of laws, 
assumptions and methodologies;
(iii) the idea of a unitary and neutral scientific language thus disappears. Reality 
is, in fact, multidimensional, made up of a plurality, if not an infinity, of 
relationships and dimensions, and for this reason it cannot be fully known;
(iv) it will thus be the observer-subject, according to its own decisions and points 
of view, that breaks down observable reality (the system). In conclusion, the 
object of knowledge does not exist as an autonomous reality, but only as part 
of a system that also contains the subject.
We have defined all the epistemological tools we need to introduce the concept of 
autopoietic systems, which will constitute the skeleton of our systemic interpretation of 
territorial competitiveness to be outlined in next chapters.
3.5 Autopoietic complex systems.
This theory of autonomous systems, already suggested in the post-war cybernetics 
by N. Wiener (1956) and later reformulated by H. Atlan (1972) and H. von Foerster (1982), 
owes its most mature structuring to Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980 and 
1987. See also Varela, 1979). The two Chilean neurobiologists are recognised as having 
had the merit of introducing the concept of autopoiesis: this indicates the capacity of the 
system to plan and reproduce itself through the reproduction of its components.
The starting point is the clear distinction between heteronomous and autonomous 
systems, on which we need to pause briefly in order to understand better the overall 
theoretical structure. The former are characterised by an evolution according to the 
structure of the external world and are capable of moulding the internal organization of the 
system. Autonomous systems are, instead, endowed with organisational closure, where
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the external world acts purely as a factor of disturbance. They thus appear independent of 
the forms of the outside world, with the exception of the flows that assume importance for 
the self-reproduction and survival of the system. The inputs to which the system is 
subjected thus constitute disturbances which induce modifications in the structure of the 
system without changing the logic and the dynamic of its organization. The relationships of 
reciprocal interaction between the system and the environment (with other active systems) 
are defined in terms of co-evolution, which is achieved when the system, because it is 
closed from the organisational point of view, selects the disturbances from the outside, 
continuously modifying its own status. Autopoiesis thus expresses a circular process which 
reproduces the elements and the relationships between elements by modifying them.
3.5.1. Autopoietic systems at work: organisation and structure.
In order to understand how an autopoietic system works, we have to recall a 
fundamental distinction which is central in Varela and Maturana's account of systems 
theory, that between structure and organisation. To distinguish more clearly the 
organization of the structure, we can turn at this point to the valuable lucidity of Maturana 
and Varela:
Organization is understood as being the set of relationships that must 
exist between the components of something such that it can be considered as 
belonging to a particular class. By the structure of something, we mean the 
set of components and relationships which, in practice, constitute a particular 
unit in the realisation of its organization (Maturana and Varela, 1987, p. 62).
The structure is the set of elements and relationships between the elements which 
have a special characteristic, feedback, aimed at describing a situation in which an 
element (or a system or subsystem) influences itself. The structure of a system (the set of 
elements and relationships between elements) is, in other words, subject to continuous 
modifications through feedback processes. On its own, however, it is not enough to make 
a system intelligible. It is, in fact, organization which defines the set of processes 
described above.
Only introducing the concepts of organisation and structure it is possible 
understand of two of the main features of autopoietic systems, that is the fact that they are 
structure-determined and organisationally closed. Structural determination means that the 
actual changes that the system undergoes depend on the structure itself, that is to say that 
any change must refers to the structure rather than to the organisation.
In general then, everything that happens in a composite unity is a structural 
change, and every structural change occurs in a composite unity determined at 
every instant by its structure at that instant. [...] It follows from all this that
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composite unites are structure determined system in the sense that everything is 
determined by their structure. (Maturana, quoted in Mingers, 1995, p. 30)
The fundamental point here is whether and how the changes in structure affect the 
organisation of the system: according to autopoiesis theory, if there are changes in the 
organisation subsequently to a change in the structure the system cease to exist or, at 
least, to be the same entity. For instance, when a caterpillar develops into a butterfly or an 
egg into a chick we are facing a structural determined change -  there is a physical 
transformation in the caterpillar which is determined by caterpillar's structural features 
themselves -  which turns out into an organisational change: the butterfly and the chick are 
“another thing". Maturana and Varela address the question of the relationship between 
structural change and organisation through the concept of organisational closure. This 
concept refers to the fact that the system is closed with reference to the maintaining of its 
organisation, that is, that the activity of the system generates more activity. Better put, 
organisational closure means that the autopoietic system is closed on its organisation: the 
organisation re-produce the organisation itself. In other terms, an autopoietic is not an 
input-output system: the organisation is not determined by external input and it does not 
produce output. The input are produced by the system itself and its output are directed to 
reproduce the organisation itself. As we shall see in the next chapter, this means that the 
organisation is also closed “against” the observer and therefore it is very difficult to 
observe, describe and explain the organisation: what we observe is generally the structure 
of a system, that is its phenomenology. Of course, the fact that the autopoietic systems are 
operationally closed does not imply that they are completely isolated from their 
environment and from other systems. As this is a common misunderstanding, it is 
worthwhile spend some words about how autopoietic system cope with the surrounding 
environment.
Before proceeding, we must settle a precise use of the terms “organisation” and 
“structure" as codified by Varela and Maturana’s theories. Organisation can in fact denote 
at least three differently concepts, all referring to relationships, so that we will use the 
following terminology:
(i) "institution” to indicate organisation as a set of relationships ordered into a 
process. When we talk about industrial organisation we point out simply an 
order among subsequent activities which lead to configure a production 
process. Also when we talk about institutional proximity we mean this 
meaning of “organisation”;
(ii) “Organisation” -  with capital “O" -  will be used only in a systemic meaning, to 
indicate the set of relationship which define the identity of a system: this is the
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meaning of organisation that we have been developing in the previous 
chapter with reference to autopoiesis theory30;
(iii) “organisation” will indicate a set of relationship which are formally established
through a collective subject (Mingers, 1997). A club, a church, a State, a firm 
are all examples of organisations.
The use of adjectives deriving from the term “organisation” will follow an analogous 
distinction: as it is referred in the common sense to any generic institution or organisation 
we will prefer to use “institutional” or "organisational" (institutional proximity, institutional 
learning), using instead “organisative” when referring to autopoietic Organisation.
The concept of “structure" raises analogous problem as it has a long history in 
social sciences. In general terms, both in social and natural sciences, “structure” refers to 
a relatively stable set of relationship, but it also gets specific meanings, like the Marxian 
concepts of structure and superstructure or the interaction between structure and agency 
in many of contemporary sociological theories. Here, "Structure" will be used only in a 
systemic connotation, as the set of relationship which express the contingent forms of the 
system’s Organisation, while "structure" will apply to the other sets meanings that this 
word connotes.
3.5.2 The system and its environment: coevolution and structural coupling.
Different views and perspectives are so numerous and controversial in systems 
theory that any attempt at systematisation would impoverish the problem excessively. 
Nevertheless, if we want to understand how autopoiesis theory treats the fundamental 
question of the system-environment connection, we must distinguish at least three 
possible situations.
The first concerns closed systems -  closed with respect to their environment. In 
line with the principles of classic 19th century thermodynamics, a closed system has no 
exchanges of either energy or matter with the outside. It inevitably evolves towards a state 
of equilibrium, so there will be no net incoming or outgoing flow of energy or matter. This 
means that a system evolves from more or less complex states of organization to 
increasingly simple states and, at the most, to equilibrium. The second revolutionary stage 
started out from the work of an Austrian biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy. The basic
30 We might solve the dilemma naming autopoietic Organisation “identity”, but it might lead to some
misunderstanding as the usual sense of identity implies emergent properties like self-consciousness,
willing, reflexivity, responsibility etc., which are not actually meant by systems theory. As one of the main
issue is whether territories posses such a thing like “personality” -  even just in a metaphorical sense -  and
therefore an identity, it seems to be advisable to generate such a confusion assuming identity as a given
and taken for granted feature of territories and territorial systems.
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concept is that of open systems which evolve along a temporal trajectory and are 
transformed in their constant relationship (openness) with the environment and in 
relationship to the objectives they set: this is thus a conception of reality in evolutive and 
teleological terms. The object of the General System Theory (Bertalanffy von, 1972) was a 
reality described and imagined in terms of holistic systems, i.e. conceived globally in their 
relationships with the outside. The organism is thus a system, in other words a “dynamic 
order of [complex and partly unknown] parts and processes in mutual interaction”. It 
follows that the object of the discourse is no longer the causal relationship on which 
Cartesian logic was founded, but the Structure, i.e. the complex play of relationships 
between the elements that, according to its objective and the relationships with its 
environment, produces the behaviour and the evolution of the system.
Thirdly and finally, systemic thought in the last decades of the 20th century aspired 
to the elimination of the duality between closed systems and open systems. More in 
particular, starting from the distinction between passive open systems, dependent to some 
degree on the environment, and active open systems, capable of regulating their own 
exchanges with the outside, contemporary systems theory radically modifies the 
construction created by von Bertalanffy. Autopoiesis theory, with its concept of 
organisative closure, represents probably the most successful attempt to keep together 
closure and openness. The environment is represented by other systems, with respect to 
which a system is more or less open (or more or less closed). It is obvious, in fact, that an 
entirely closed or entirely open system can only be an extreme concept: the first could not, 
in reality, be an object of knowledge, it would be a box in which nothing enters and nothing 
leaves; the second would not be identifiable or separable from its environment. The 
openness of a system is defined by the degree to which the system itself acts on other 
systems and reacts to their action. The interaction between different systems is manifested 
in flows of matter, energy and information which stimulate its internal processes, providing 
the resources it needs, or on the contrary, disturbing its organization and creating 
constraints. Therefore instead of input/output it is more correct to talk about a 
perturbation/compensation model, where the environment continuously solicit the system 
and the system react through changes in its Structure according to its Organisation.
To put in other words, we can say that the system is autonomous rather than 
isolated. In its relationships with the environment, a system can, at a first glance, be 
represented as a whole that embraces incoming flows and from which outgoing flows 
depart. However, these can not be assumed indiscriminately, in that the system does not 
allow the entry of everything that arrives from the environment. To the degree to which it 
selects the disturbances of exogenous origin, an open system will also be relatively 
closed. The concept of autonomy therefore refers to the fact that the processes internal to 
a system do not produce only outgoing flows towards the environment, but also flows
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within the system itself and its own organization. This means that a system is both open 
and closed at the same time. It is open to the extent to which the system is not, as we 
have seen, independent of the environment. However, it is closed as it selects constraints 
and disturbances that arrive from the environment, and reacts to them through internal 
organisative and re-organisative processes. Attention thus shifts to the capacity of the 
system, subject to incessant exchanges of energy and information with the outside, to 
conserve or develop its own identity.
All the theory here is built on the distinction between Organisation and Structure. It 
is not, therefore, only openness that enables a system to evolve, but the fact that the 
system has an "active” character, as it is capable of organization. In this case, the system 
will not be destroyed or disorganised, but will react to the stimuli from the environment: the 
system is, therefore, self-referential and self-organising. In this way, one of the 
fundamental concepts defined earlier, that of autonomy, becomes fully intelligible: 
autonomy refers to the closure of the system in an organisative sense, in that a system is 
responsible for its own behaviour. The recognition of the property of self-organization of 
systems is of vital importance. In fact, by introducing organization as an autonomous 
concept (and assuming that it is this that allows the identification of the system) it follows 
that the Structure, as the means of manifestation of the system itself, is susceptible to 
modifications in the course of its evolution over time. The invariability will thus belong to 
the organization, which reproduces the system’s identity and autonomy.
At the same time, autonomy does not mean separation or isolation, but rather 
coevolution. Each system coevolve together with the environment, and more importantly, 
together with other systems, the evolution path depending on both the Structure and the 
Organisation. Maturana and Varela refer to this process as structural coupling, that is to 
say that systems interact between them and with the environment modifying their Structure 
and more precisely sharing some features of their Structure, that is, creating some 
common structural overlapping The adaptation happens therefore among Structures, 
which adapt each other, and not between Organisations, which stay beyond coupling and 
somehow dictates the rules. Of course this is not to say that there is a spontaneous order 
which arise pacifically respecting reciprocal identity and Organisation: as everybody can 
notice the structural coupling between a virus and a cell or between a cancerous cell and 
the organism is everything but pacific and must end with the destruction of one of the two 
Organisations. Structural coupling has in itself some scent of power relationship which we 
must keep in mind when discussing the application of complexity and autopoiesis to social 
phenomena.
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3.6 Conclusion and aperture: System Theory and social sciences.
Moving from its application in biology, complexity theories and in particular 
autopoiesis have been assumed in this chapter meta-theoretically, that is, as the 
foundation of an anti-reductionist paradigm applicable to social systems to the extent to 
which they are self-organised systems. In reality, a human and social system (cities, 
companies, production systems, regions, countries etc.) has characteristics 
epistemologically analogous to those of other living systems: in other words, it is 
capable of reproducing and adapting itself, conserving itself either passively or actively. 
Asocial system possesses, in other terms, autonomy. Nevertheless, applying System 
Theory to social systems is not painless and it risks making most of social scientists 
dissatisfied:
(i) reductionism advocates will blame System Theory for its lack of forecasting 
power, also because predictability has some consolatory power and political 
appeal;
(ii) post-modern and cultural-turned scholars, on the opposite side, will reproach 
“systemic” colleagues fro being still lured by grand-theory overwhelming 
explanation.
Moreover, applying complexity theories in social realms implies some serious 
methodological problem. Some scientists advocate for a “homological” computational 
approach to complexity in social systems, developing a methodology founded on 
experimental computer-based models, like cellular automata and neural networks, capable 
to “imitate” the life of complex systems without reductionism, hence the term of Artificial 
Life. Others sustain a more “metaphorical” approach, just using biological complexity 
theories as a starting point and a reservoir of metaphors and images to substitute old 
physics-based ones (Hodgson, 1999). In next chapter, we will address some basic issue 
about a systemic interpretation of social realities, with specific reference to the question of 
the relationship between territories and economic activities.
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Chapter 4: Defining Territorial Productive Systems.
Chapters 1 to 2 have discussed in-depth the implication of the broader and broader 
debate in both Geography and Economics, struggling for a satisfactory conceptualisation 
of the relationships between firms' competitiveness and territorial one. Chapter 3 has 
been focusing on the theoretical construction of a system-based approach to social 
sciences, with specific reference to Varela and Maturana autopoiesis theory and to 
Luhmann’s application to sociology and political studies.
In this chapter, we will address the issue of systemic interpretation of territories, 
that is, whether or not territories can be interpreted through the lenses of systems theory. 
A system is an object which possesses a high degree of cohesion and organic oneness 
(represented by its Organisation), while even the simpler territory has manifold facets 
which are impossible to draw back to a univocal interpretation. More specifically, the 
territory, unlike a generic autopoietic system, is not the outcome of a limited set of internal 
processes that creates a sort of organic harmony among its components31: too many 
social, economic and cultural groups act within a territory in order to drive its 
transformation according to their rationalities, needs, desires and strategies. Hence, even 
if we can be influenced by the continuity in time of certain territories, to say that this 
continuity is prevailing over change and that it is produced solely by territory’s 
Organisation is a weird statement to be defended.
In order to overcome this theoretical constraint, the first question we are going to 
address is the role played by geographical proximity in economic systems genesis and 
evolution. Our position will be that considering proximity makes a difference in considering 
systems' behaviour, highlighting a specific systemic process that is territorialisation32.
31 This issue echoes the question whether or not territories have their own identity and how it can be 
detached from contingent internal and external events.
32 By territorialisation we mean a twofold process: on the one side, territorialisation indicate the fact that 
economic processes become territorial, on the other side, it denotes the fact that in becoming "territorial" 
economic agents contribute to build the territory itself. By embeddedness we refer to the outcome of a 
territorialisation process.
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Drawing on this role of differentiation, we shall see that we can conceptualise territories in 
a twofold systemic perspective: on the one hand, we can consider the territory as the 
simple outcome of structural coupling between systems, on the other hand we can imagine 
that sometimes interaction between systems and their environment goes beyond structural 
coupling, producing the emergence of a more complex systems, labelled Territorial 
Productive System (TPS), with a stronger relationship with the territory (section 4.1). 
Afterwards, we will see how this new kinds of systems can be conceptualised and 
operationalised in economic terms: we shall do it with reference to one of the main strands 
in New Industrial Geography, namely learning regions approach to productive 
agglomeration. To this purpose we shall see how our systemic standpoint allows us to 
consider two different kinds of embeddedness, a structural one and an organisative one 
(section 4.2). Third, we shall be considering the possible added value of the TPS approach 
in the debate about the relationships between territories and economic activities. We shall 
address this issue with reference to the issues of dynamic transformation of TPS and of 
the variety of systems that can coexist within a territory (section 4.3). Finally, we shall be 
introducing some methodological observations about using TPS as a framework for 
empirical research and, in doing so, we shall introduce the case study we are going to 
develop in the second part of the dissertation (section 4.4).
4.1. The role of proximity in systemic interaction.
Before introducing our systemic interpretation of territory, we must spend some 
words on the generic interaction between systems and the role that proximity plays in it. To 
this purpose we can assume that social actors can be represented as elementary systems. 
These systems vary in role, size and purposes:
(i) they can be individual or collective (people, groups of people, associations, 
firms, clusters of firms etc.);
(ii) they can be either private (firms and businesses of various kind) or public (e.g. 
the local administration) or a mix (like the education system or some 
development agencies);
(iii) some of them will be codified in organisations (e.g. trade unions, NGO, 
churches or entrepreneurial associations) while others are based on more 
informal institutions, like ethnic groups, sexual or social identities;
(iv) some elementary systems will be profit-maximising, while others can have 
different purposes (such as class struggle or unemployment reduction).
The main standpoint is that these elementary systems are always defined in terms 
of proximity. Proximity is what gives each system its own cohesion and make it distinct
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from other analogous systems. In this perspective, we can say that every system is a local 
system. This is equivalent to say that, as a system must possess an “inside”, it must be 
characterised by some form of proximity. Therefore all systems are logically local. The 
point is that this proximity can be institutional, geographical or both. Subsequently, “local” 
is not a synonym of “geographical” or “territorial”. Local is to be interpreted -  closely to its 
mathematical meaning -  as a property of a set which emerge from some sort of proximity 
which eventually can be only institutional and not necessarily physical/geographical.
Hence, systemic interaction can be observed without reference to its spatial 
dimension. In this perspective, a hierarchy can be interpreted as a system where the 
components (plants, sites and people) share some features of institutional proximity, even 
in absence of physical proximity, and are linked to each other by recursive loops of 
interaction. As a consequence of institutional proximity and organisative synthesis, we can 
argue that that a Transnational Corporation (TNC) possesses an identity33 which is not just 
juridical, but also cognitive and eventually emotional -  see for instance the broad literature 
about institutional learning (Nonaka, 1991) and the process of identification between 
Japanese corporation and the workforce they employ. Also some forms of network might 
be explained in terms of systemic interaction: the functioning of contemporary global stock 
market might be assumed as an example: different systems -  that is, different national 
financial systems -  have been so intensively tied in the last decades that the outcomes is 
a global system of financial exchange with its own Organisation and emergent properties. 
For instance, we might consider contemporary speculative financial crisis as an emergent 
property of global stock market.
In our perspective, nevertheless, we can understand to which systemic analysis 
can be useful in investigating socio-economic processes when we consider territorial 
proximity as a convergence of geographical and institutional proximity in a given territory. 
In this case, in fact, the concept of coevolution becomes a central issue (see section 4 in 
chapter 3). When geographical proximity comes together with institutional proximity, some 
questions become important. The fact that different systems evolve in the same bounded 
space, sometimes converging and sometimes diverging, is actually a central issue in 
Economic Geography. The point here is whether they simply evolve near each other, in 
some sort of aspatial and loosely relational process, or if they coevolve, together and with 
the territory where they are located. In the latter case, we are facing some sort of territorial 
coevolution that entitles us to talk about territorial embeddedness.
Our point will be that the distinction between Organisation and Structure is 
fundamental in order to distinguish territorialised systemic processes. In particular we will
33 The establishment of a Transnational Corporation like Ford which is organised in three different bodies 
with a larger degree of autonomy but at the same time deeply tied each with the others can be an example 
of this kind of interaction.
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introduce a two step process to introduce system theory into the conceptualisation of 
territory:
(i) in the first step, we shall consider the territory as the environment where 
different elementary systems intermingle and we will represent it as the 
outcome of this systemic interaction occurring between Structures;
(ii) as a second and more important step, we will consider the possibility that 
second level systems -  i.e. systems made of systems -  exist and that they can 
highlight some emerging properties of the interaction between economic 
activities and territories.
4.1.1 Structural territorialisation: the territory as environment.
The first possibility is that the elementary systems co-localised in a bounded space 
interact territorially -  that is, according to both institutional and geographical proximity -  
through a process of structural coupling34. When we are in presence of a location process, 
we can figure out that there is an ongoing process of structural coupling between different 
systems (one or more firms, the local labour force, the public administration etcT where
Organisation (like for instance labour system, education system or the public 
administration, local SMEs networks) while others can be based on disembedded forms of 
institutional proximity (international agencies, world-level research centres, transnational 
corporations, filieres etc.).
In order to operationalise this concept, we can imagine having four elementary 
systems -  DA, B, C, DQ. Each of these four systems is based on a set of relationships 
which guarantee the preservation of its Organisation and by another set of ties that 
represent its Structure. In order to coevolve together with the others, each of these 
elementary systems get involved in some structural coupling, that is, it shares part of its 
structural features with the other systems. For our purposes we can imagine the territory 
as the outcomes of many processes of structural coupling overlapping in time and space.
Figure 4.1 expresses only the spatial dimension of this process of multiple 
structural coupling, that is the Structure of structural couplings in a given moment /'. To get 
the full image of how territory emerges from inter-systems interaction we should add the 
temporal dimension of the process: structural change, in fact, occurs overtime in order to 
match stimuli to change with organisative closure of the system. As a consequence, as 
elementary systems' Structure changes overtime, also structural coupling will be changing 
following the mutations that tale place in the individual structures. Hence, also that 
particular structural coupling that produces the territory will be changing over time35.
If we accept this broad interpretation of territory as the output of structural coupling 
between different elementary systems, there is room for different theoretical and 
methodological approaches which will be in charge of opening and dismantling the 
systemic black boxes. For instance, some New Industrial Geography explanation of 
Marshallian and externalities and flexible specialisation, as well New Economic Geography 
models on agglomeration and urban economy, will offer useful insight about the structural 
coupling between economic activities and the other systems which are present in a given 
territory. Maybe the former will be focusing more on the relational institutions while the 
latter will draw attention to the role of market related institutional proximity. Hence this
35 This account of territory might show some superficial similarities with localities studies and specifically with 
Doreen M asse/s geomorphologic metaphor of territory as a stratification of different layers left as “tangible” 
residues of subsequent stages of capitalistic development (Massey, 1984). Nevertheless, differences are deep 
and more important than assonances. The most important dissonance is that in localities explanation there is a 
net prevalence on external influence -  specifically, territorial structures are determined by successive rounds of 
capitalist accumulation, by processes which are neither local nor territorial, except in their consequences. On 
the contrary, in our perspective, even if territories are not systems, nevertheless they are defined through the 
interaction of local and supralocal, territorial and aterritorial systems. Moreover, the proposed systemic account 
is also more dynamic, in that there is a continuous change in the boundaries and in the outcomes of 
territorialisation, with a process of reciprocal cross-fertilisation between the territory and the systems which live 
in.
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modality of territorial interaction covers a broad range of economic geographical 
processes, from the single firm's location choice to more structured agglomeration, like the 
different kinds of clusters spread over the economic and geographical literature during the 
last twenty years36. Typically a TNC’s localisation process reflects this kind of territorial 
interaction, searching for specific structural elements -  resources -  which are present in 
the territory and that the firm want to exploit. Also, most of the territorial competitiveness 
policies are comprised in this category: policies for the attraction of footloose FDI -  like the 
creation of a call centre or an assembling plant -  are just aimed to find some sort of 
structural coupling with international capital flows in order to temporarily reduce some local 
emergencies. This structural coupling is what the local administration will call “low 
unemployment” and the TNC managing board “low cost of labour". Also more network-like 
of unsophisticated cluster, such as Markusen's hub-and-spoke districts and sateiiite 
industrial platform might be interpreted in terms of structural territorial interaction 
(Markusen, 1996): in these cases the relationships between the economic agents and the 
territory are richer and stronger than in the case of the single footloose TNC, but 
nevertheless they do not move beyond the limits of structural coupling. This point will be 
further developed in next sections of this chapter, when considering the added value of the 
proposed systemic approach, but we can start to suggest that most of the literature about 
territorial embeddedness might be more precisely defined in terms of structural coupling 
(structural embeddedness).
4.1.3 Organisative territorialisation: the territory and TPS.
We can imagine that, in some cases, the interaction takes place involving both 
Structure and Organisation and with reference to both institutional and geographical 
proximity. It is the case when different systems mix their Organisation to the extent that 
you could difficultly establish clear boundaries between them. In this case, besides and 
together with the structural territorialisation, there is a second process of systemic coupling 
where Organisation -  and not only Structure -  is somehow mixed together producing a 
more complex system, that we shall name Territorial Productive Systems (TPS).
If we think about our initial set of systems DA, B, C, DD, we can imagine that among 
a subset of them DB, C, DD there is a process of organisative synthesis. In other terms, the 
three systems become involved in some sort of organisative interaction (figure 4.2), 
bringing to the emergence of a second order system (the TPS). A is still part of the 
population of the territory -  it is structurally embedded in the territory -  but it does not
36 For a comprehensive debate about different typologies of agglomerations/clusters see: Markusen, 1996; 
Martin and Sunley, 2003.
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share any feature of its Organisation with the newborn TPS. For instance, we can suppose 
that:
(i) “A” is a TNC;
(ii) “B” is a cluster of small and medium enterprises Db1t b2... bnD;
(iii) “C” is the local pool of labour force and
(iv) “D” is the local higher education system (secondary schools and university).




= structural territorial loop 
= organisative territorial loop
When we say that the sub-set of systems DB, C, DD is organised into a TPS, we 
mean that a synthesis occurred among the single systems’ Organisations and that this 
organisative synthesis leads to the Organisation of a new system, the TPS. What it is 
important to notice is that we do not have to think that the single systems DB, C, DD ceased 
to exist or that they lost their autonomy, neither can we say that the TPS’ Organisation is 
determined by its components. In both cases we would not be facing systems. Also we 
can more properly imagine that a given TPS can survive as a system even in presence of 
changes in its elements. For instance, a given TPS might continue to exist even if part of 
the system of SME “B” delocalise part of the production. What is more important is that we 
do not have any a priori guarantee that the TPS will survive dramatic change in the 
interaction between the composing systems. At the same time, we have to consider that 





involved in other processes of systemic interaction, for instance getting involved in some 
structural coupling with system “A": the cluster of SME can be a supplier of the TNC 
localised in the territory, the labour system will supply workforce and the education system 
will contribute to train TNC’s workers. This is a fundamental point that we shall be treating 
more in-depth in next section, when considering the issue of systemic boundaries.
Among the well-known categories of agglomerations and clusters, Industrial 
districts, learning regions and milieux innovateurs37 are probably the closest to what we 
mean by TPS. In such agglomerations, institutional and geographical proximity are so 
strictly tied that we pass from mere structural coupling to organisative synthesis. For 
instance, in an industrial district, the network of firms’ Organisation becomes narrowly 
related to the Organisation of the labour system: in that context, social mobility ceases to 
be an element of structural coupling between capital and labour and becomes an 
emergent property of the Organisation of a different system, namely the industrial district.
Before defining in details the dialectic between Organisation and Structure, we 
have to make some general statement about the relationship between the elementary 
systems and the TPS and between the TPS and the territory:
(i) TPS is neither a cage nor a sect there is not any form of exclusive belonging 
linking the elementary systems and the TPS. Each of the elementary systems 
maintain its own Organisation and Structure as differentiated from TPS' ones. 
The fact that some SME are clusterised into a TPS does not imply that they fully 
loose their possibility to enter in some structural coupling with other systems 
which are not part of the TPS, for instance supplying a TNC located in the same 
territory or being part of a global supply-chain;
(ii) TPS is not the territory: there is not an exclusive relationship between TPS and 
territory, While a TPS is defined with respect to the fact that some organisative 
synthesis is happening within a territory, the opposite does not apply. In some 
cases, like Italian industrial district, the TPS is a good proxy of the whole 
territory. In other cases, the territory is too complex to be simply represented 
through a single TPS.
In other terms, TPS is not an exhaustive representation of the relationship between 
firms and between firms and territory. It is rather an interface between economic activities 
and territories, a prism through which we can read some features of the ties linking firms 
and territory. As a prism, of course, the image we shall get will depend on the standpoint
37 More generically, the reference here is to the kind of clusters that Gordon and McCann (2000) name 
“social networks”, when different realms are intertwined and therefore we are facing something more than 
mere geographical proximity.
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we are looking from. These caveat will return time by time during our presentation of the 
TPS framework, particularly when dealing with the issues of TPS boundaries (section 
4.2.2), the variety of the territory and its resistance to categorisation (section 4.3.2) and 
finally the methodological aspects and the choice of the case study (section 4.4).
4.1.3 Territorialised learning as Organisative territorialisation.
Introducing autopoietic systems theory in the previous chapter, we have seen that 
a system is made of components and relationships. In particular, the Organisation is made 
only by relationships, while the Structure is composed by both relationships and 
components.
(i) Organisation = { relationships)
(ii) Structure = {components; relationships}
With reference to our conceptualisation of the TPS we can say that it is made by 
different components (the elementary systems) tied to each other by several relationships 
(territorial interactions). Some of these territorial interactions are purely structural (that 
means they are the outcome of structural coupling processes), while other are inherent to 
the TPS Organisation (they are the outcome of organisative synthesis). Across process of 
territorialisation there is some like a threshold where territorial interaction passes from 
being mere structural embeddedness to being organisative embeddedness. It is important 
to notice that the difference is neither quantitative nor qualitative, but ontological; the 
passage from structural coupling to organisative synthesis depend neither on the intensity 
of the relationships, nor on some quality the relationship possesses but on a different 
nature of the interaction. We cannot say that a more intense cooperation or the presence 
of trust mechanically produce organisative embeddedness38. The point here is exactly to 
understand which might be the nature of this ontological shift allowing us to jump to a 
higher degree in territorial interaction and systemic complexity. The first thing we know 
about organisative interaction is hence that it relies on a different kind of relationships than 
structural interaction, and noton a mere intensification of territory-bounded relationships. 
Hence we can write that:
(iii) Organisation = {organisative territorialisation)
(iv) Structure = {elementary systems; structural territorialisation)
38 This issue will be in-depth addressed in section 4.3 when dealing with the issues distinguishing TPS 
from other NIG approaches.
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Another feature we can derive from previous discourses, is that such processes of 
organisative interaction must be somehow recursive and cumulative, in the sense that 
PTS' Organisation reproduces itself over time. This also means that organisative 
interaction is dynamic, as it reworks incessantly its previous states in order to maintain 
some sort of internal consistence. Structural territorialisation on the contrary is more static, 
as it simply produces the contingent condition, in a given space and a given time, for the 
Organisation autopoietic process.
(v) Organisation = f  (Organisation | Structure)
Merging (iii)-(v) we might say that organisative territorialisation is a function that 
produces Organisation working on some previous process of structural territorialisation. In 
other terms, we can imagine that the emergence of a TPS start with some process of 
structural territorialisation among the elementary systems co-localised in the same 
territory. Starting from this primitive Structure, the eventual process of organisative 
territorialisation produces the Organisation and consequently the emerging TPS.
(vi) Organisative territorialisation = f  (Organisation | structural territorialisation)
In order to understand organisative territorialisation we are hence forced to start
with clarifying the process of structural territorialisation. From our previous statements (see 
section 4.1.2), structural territorialisation can be defined as the process through which 
different elementary systems interrelate to each other and to the territory by sharing some 
features of the territory where they are localised (territorial endowment, or territorial 
assets):
(vii) Structural territorialisation = g (territorial assets)
Hence, proposition (vi) can be rewritten as follows:
(viii) Organisative territorialisation = f  [ g (territorial assets)]
The function f, which is now our central point, can be interpreted, in our perspective 
as some forms of territorialised learning, that is the reproduction of a peculiar knowledge 
that is proper of a given territory and that is continuously reworked by the TPS in order to 
maintain its Organisation. This solution mirrors Luhmann’s approach to social systems but 
with a fundamental difference: while in Luhmann the main content of social systems was
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information and therefore the autopoiesis consists in a communication process, in the case 
of TPS the organisative substance is knowledge and the process is therefore learning.
The main point in distinguishing between structural territorialisation and 
organisative learning is that it immediately suggests that the TPS is both about continuity 
and transformation: through a continuous territorialised learning, TPS can maintain its 
Organisative over decades and sometimes over centuries, passing through a long series 
of contingent structural territorialisation processes. More specifically, organisative learning 
will guarantee some from of duration and continuity to the Organisation, while producing at 
the same time new territorial assets which will be suitable to generate new structural 
embeddedness. More important, in the case of Organisation, continuity does not imply 
staying identical, but keeping a link, a file rouge with the past39. As an example, we might 
consider Porter’s narration about how competitive advantage changed in Sassuolo’s 
industrial district (Porter, 1989): tiles production, in fact, started in pre-modern times and 
evolved mixing local knowledge produced within the TPS with epochal innovation such as 
engine and electronic. Not only the traditional knowledge has been preserved, but it also 
has been used to create a competitive advantage in emergent sectors, like the production 
of machine tools related to tiles production. Hence, territorialised learning (re)produce the 
TPS' Organisation by (re)producing the some set of knowledge which is inherited from the 
past, melting it with contemporary technological knowledge.
The point hence is which kind of knowledge is the object of territorialised learning? 
The answer depends essentially on the kind of TPS we have constructed, that is, the 
perspective from which we are observing a given territory and the questions we are 
asking. If we are investigating the pre-modern Siberian sciamanic community, the 
knowledge in question will be likely a sort of magic gnosis about the relationship between 
mundane and super-mundane realities. On the contrary, if the object of the analysis is a 
manufacturing system like an Italian industrial district the knowledge in question might be 
some technical know-how mixed up with aesthetic values inherited by the past. If instead 
we are grasping with a milieu innovateur, we will be probably interested in identifying a mix 
of scientific high-tech knowledge and know-how competences. This implies that 
organisative learning is not an exclusive concept, but an inclusive one. It is not simply 
about hi-tech fantasies (Massey, 1992), but neither it is concerning exclusively traditional
39 Our account of continuity is sympathetic with Braudel's notion of longue dur6e (Braudel, 1979), where 
some common features of a territory are reworked along time in order to reproduce some sort of continuity 
with the previous age across an unceasing process of historical transformations. For a theoretical account 
of contemporary implication of Braudel’s systemisation, with particular reference to the concept of “longue 
dur6e”, see the most recent Wallerstain’s work “The Uncertainties of Knowledge” (Wallerstain, 2004) 
where Braudel’s account of duration is reinterpreted in the light of complexity theorist Ilya Prigogine’ 
thought.
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obsolete knowledge dating back to Italian flourishing Renaissance. The major point is that 
the relevant knowledge which is reproduced through territorialised learning can be 
identified only case by case, according to the historical and the present features of the 
territory we are interested in. Nevertheless, some general statements and categorisation 
can be made about knowledge and learning -  such as the importance of tacit knowledge 
or the role of social habits and routines in enhancing collective learning within a territory. 
Organisative knowledge is always characterised by a strong component of tacit 
knowledge, implicit in routines and habits and therefore not fully expressed in codes and 
texts (Polanyi, 1958 and 1967). As it has been largely recognised by NIG, it is the tacit 
dimension which keeps this knowledge rooted in territories and impede the direct and 
exclusive appropriation by individuals and organisations (Amin and Wilkinson, 2004; Amin 
and Cohendet, 2004; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Malmberg and Maskell, 2006). Tacit 
knowledge plays hence a twofold role in the organisative learning. On the one side, it roots 
the learning process in the territory as it depends on the sharing of procedures and it can 
be produced mainly through face-to-face interaction across time. In this sense, tacit 
knowledge is related to the issue of continuity exactly because it takes time to be 
synthesised. On the other hand, tacit knowledge works as a sort of protection for the TPS, 
as it cannot be easily codified and transferred across distance and the actors which do not 
belong to the TPS can be excluded from access to local tacit knowledge. Also, in this 
sense tacit knowledge is related to the issue of continuity, in that it helps in maintaining the 
TPS competitive advantage over time, producing some sort of imperfect competition and 
making imitation more difficult, albeit not impossible (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999).
4.2 Operationalising the Territorial Productive System.
Before considering the overall implications of this systemic view on the debate 
about economy-territory links and territorial competitiveness, we must define in a better 
way how to operationalise the concept of TPS. In a simplified way, questioning how a PTS 
comes out from different elementary systems implies addressing two fundamental issues:
(i) when observing contingent territories and agents within them, which behaviours
can be referred to TPS' Organisation and which to its Structure?
(ii) which is the geographic scale fitting the best to the possibility of observing TPS
behaviour?
4.2.1 Distinguishing structural and organisative embeddeness.
Since the 80s a broader renewed interest in firm-territory emerged, by the 
consciousness that firms boundaries cannot offer a full explanation of competitiveness 
dynamics in OECD countries. Californian school of Geography, dealing mainly with
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transaction costs and flexible specialisation (Scott, 1988; Storper and Walker, 1989), and 
Granovetter's conceptualisation of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) have been 
probably the turning points, opening a new era in Industrial Geography. A few years ago, 
the interest in the spatial and territorial dimension of economic behaviours spread largely 
also among other disciplines, like organisation studies (Porter, 1990) and mainstream 
neoclassical economics (Krugman, 1991a).
This debate has produced a comprehensive, albeit conflictual40, understanding of 
the embeddedness of economic activities, that is the relationship between territorial assets 
and firms' competitiveness, varying from the more neoclassical explanation to more 
relational and cultural views. Nevertheless, most of the analysis about territorial 
endowment is simply about structural territorialisation and structural embeddedness. Only 
occasionally, within the learning regions literature, the distinction between structural and 
organisative territorialisation is somehow implicitly outlined . For instance, Cooke and 
Schienstock notice that:
It is therefore useful to distinguish between the knowledge structure and the 
learning capability of the system, where the knowledge structure is determined by 
examining the region's knowledge potential in terms of science and technology 
infrastructure, educational and training system and research capacity. On the other 
hand, the learning system represents the cluster structure of regional industry, 
production system, institutions and organizations generating and transferring 
knowledge and the innovation support infrastructure. (Cooke and Schienstock, 
2000, p. 274)
Also Malmberg and Maskell (2006) keep a clear distinction between localized 
capabilities and interactive learning: while the former are mainly interpreted as territorial 
assets (or territorial endowments, or location factors) and therefore might be more referred 
to our notion of Structure, the latter is clearly a dynamic cognitive process, where 
knowledge is produced and re-produced through local relationships and interaction.
Despite this implicit distinction, the difference between Structure and Organisation 
is blurred into generic discourses, where it is not clear where to cut between territorial 
assets and territorialised learning, i.e. between structural embeddedness and organisative 
one. The main purpose of this section will be hence to try to operationalise the difference 
between TPS' Structure and Organisation. Despite, the TPS is a quite general idealtype 
that can be fully operationalised through its empirical assessment, we can nevertheless 
trace a sketch of its main features.
40 See chapter 2 for a general overview of the NEG versus NIG controversial debate.
97
In our account we shall consider the relationships between firms and territorial 
endowments as expression of structural embeddedness, independently from their nature. 
Hence, we can envisage three main groups of territorial assets:
(i) pecuniary, that is all those externalities which can produce a direct reduction in 
firm's costs (infrastructure, availability of cheap estates, labour costs, local 
taxes, availability of credit and venture capital, etc.);
(ii) institutional, that is the set of relationships with local public and private 
organisations (association, consortia, trade unions, public administration, 
development agencies, chambers of commerce, etc.);
(iii) relational, that is all those externalities which come from the establishment of 
relationships with other local subjects (customers and suppliers, labour force, 
universities).
Although relational territorial assets can also be interpreted in terms of reduction of 
transaction costs and therefore, in firm view, they are pecuniary as well, we are most 
interested in their cultural dimension. This category, in fact, is something like a bridge 
between structural embeddedness and organisative embeddedness. In other terms, being 
embedded in vertical relationships with other local firms or establishing cooperation with 
local universities is a first step toward establishing interactive learning processes. To this 
respect, it is important to notice, as we mentioned above, that most of both the NEG and 
NIG literature are somehow unified under the flag of territorial assets and structural 
territorialisation: of course the explanations are quite different between the two, but 
nevertheless they share the idea that embeddedness (or simple agglomeration in NEG 
account) relies on a set of well-established territorial characters that enter in some kind of 
relationships with economic agents.
When it comes to organisative embeddedness we shall distinguish three levels of 
territorialised learning which represent an increase in learning intensity. The first degree of 
territorialised learning is buzz. Following Storper and Venables (2004) and Malmberg and 
Maskell (2006) occasional and informal exchange of information between acquaintances is 
a fundamental source of localised interactive learning.
Buzz thus refers to the information and communication ecology created by 
numerous face-to-face contacts as people and firms within the same industry 
collocate in the same city, district, or region. This buzz consists of specific 
information and continuous updates of this information; intended and unanticipated 
learning processes in organized and accidental meetings; the application of the 
same interpretative schemes and mutual understanding of new knowledge and
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technologies; as well as shared cultural traditions and habits, which taken together
make interaction and learning less costly (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006, p. 7).
Buzz is of course the less structured and systematic form of territorialised learning, 
because of its character of occasionality and extreme informality. More precisely, buzz is 
more about information exchange than knowledge reproduction and, in this sense, it works 
out as a sort of interface between structural and organisative embeddedness.
The second step in territorialised learning is inter-firm cooperation. We can imagine 
that, sometimes, buzz evolves toward a more structured and long-term form of mutual 
commitment and cooperation. This is clearly a higher form of interactive learning as it 
stabilizes the whole learning process, enhancing both the exchange of information and 
their transformation into new knowledge, suitable to be transformed into a competitive 
advantage. Inter-firms cooperation can be both informal, problem solving, cooperation and 
formalised, contractual, interaction (such as joint venture, consortia or EU projects). Also 
cooperation can involve a set of different tasks, e.g. getting joint orders from some shared 
customer, lobbying in order to protect common interests, or pursuing joint research and 
development tasks.
It is clear that cooperation is somehow a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the last and higher level of territorialised learning, which is cognitive synthesis, being 
established. This is highest level of territorialised learning, where cooperation is so strict 
that the new knowledge is not any more produced within single firm's boundaries but it is 
synthesised in the territory and controlled through the territory. The point here is to focus 
on cognitive process through which a knowledge rooted into a place-specific 
manufacturing tradition is socialised generation after generation and renewed through the 
hybridization with codified knowledge produced inside or outside the TPS. Know-how and 
learning-by-producing is hence central, but the real focus is learning-by-interacting, 
involving a broad range of actors: skilled workers, academic researchers, trained 
technicians and Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are all part of the territorialised learning. 
Another fundamental methodological point, here, is that we can only refer to the generic 
operational process which constitutes cognitive synthesis, we cannot specify the contents 
of the learning process once and for all TPS. The point here is procedural, that is to define 
the broad character of the territorialised learning: what the learning is about is something 
that can be defined only respect to the specific historically and geographically 
contextualised TPS. Either it is an ancient gold-working tradition or a hi-tech sophisticated 
engineering process, we cannot define a priori the object of the cognitive synthesis: it must 
be identified case by case, basically through an in-depth historical assessment of the local 
industrial tradition.
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4.2.2 Identifying TPS' boundaries.
The second issue concerns the geographical scale to which the TPS can be 
identified and analysed. This question, in our analysis, is twice important, as it has a 
systemic relevance and a geographical one. On the systemic side, the definition of the 
boundaries of any system is essential for the existence of the system: the idea itself of 
system implies that it must be possible to distinguish it from the environment and other 
systems, establishing a principle which controls the processes of inclusion and exclusion -  
i.e. the belonging -  into and from the system. Every time we hear talking about proximity, 
the issue of borders squats in the forefront. At the same time, when talking about a 
territory, identifying the scale of social and economic phenomena -  that is the boundaries 
within which such events happen and, hopefully, can be explained -  is one of the 
fundamental questions Geography is dealing with since its foundation as a modern 
science. This is not, of course, the place to discuss the endless literature about scale, 
territory and place41. For the purpose of our work, the issue of boundaries assumes two 
specific meanings:
(i) material boundaries: there must be a bounded area within which the TPS 
spreads its Organisation and Structure and behind which systemic 
Organisation looses its control over territorial structuration;
(ii) immaterial boundaries: as we have seen, territorial proximity encompasses 
both institutional and geographical proximity, which are not perfectly 
overlapping. In other terms, dwelling within the material borders of a TPS 
does not automatically implies being part of it. At the same time, elementary 
systems participating to a given TPS do not necessarily exhaust their 
relational life within the geographical boundaries of the territory where the 
TPS is embedded.
In other terms, even is we define a methodology to identify TPS material 
boundaries, we cannot affirm either that such a system is completely bounded or that the 
mere location within these boundaries implies belonging to the TPS. In a different way, we 
can say that identifying material boundaries is necessary, but not sufficient to identify the 
TPS. Let us start with the first issue.
41 W e shall just limit to give some indication about the most recent reflection on these concepts. For an
account of how scale can highlight our conceptualisation of places and regions, see Paasi (2004). For a
general account of how the concepts of place and territory have been treated in Anglo-Saxon Geography
see respectively Creswell (2004) and Delaney (2005). For a discussion on the plural meanings that the
scale assume in geographical debate see Sheppard and McMaster (2002). Finally, the theme of how scale
is continuously rebuilt and reconceptualised by hegemonic actors is broadly considered by Brenner (2004).
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When dealing with the issue of local economies, the problem of defining their 
boundaries is a crucial one, in that from this it follows the identification itself of the object to 
be analysed42. The idea is that traditional fixed scales of political geography are not 
suitable for the understanding of economic phenomena43 and that the boundaries should 
emerge from within the locality and not be imposed from above44. Hence, we have paid 
attention to a growing set of studies devoted to the classification of boundaries using 
functional methods,
that is, those methods which are specifically designed to create boundaries from 
the analysis of datasets on commuting migration flows, or other forms of interaction 
between areas. (Coombes 2000, p. 1502, original emphasis)
Functional methods offer the scholars the advantage of an exhaustive 
regionalisation at the sub-national scale -  no territories are left behind -  which emerge 
from some characters or phenomena “really happening” in the locality (like the commuting- 
to-work flows). Also, it is a variable geometry method, in that localities boundaries can be 
calculated again when new data become available. Nevertheless there are some features 
which make functional methods hardly applicable to the definition of TPS’ boundaries. 
Apart the obvious limitation that commuting flows approach neglects other important 
features45 -  like demographic, institutional, cultural and economic ones -  there are at 
some specific constraints when it comes to TPS, and they depend on the importance of 
immaterial boundaries.
The main issue is that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between TPS and 
territory, in that, as we mentioned above, many TPS can coexist in the same territory. 
Hence, functional methods can identify the boundaries of a TPS when we are in presence 
of relatively simple territory, where there is likely only one TPS. This is the reason why 
“local labour market areas” have been working properly for the identification of Italian 
industrial districts: because, as we have seen, in industrial districts TPS tend to be 
identifiable with the territory itself, therefore commuting relationships come out to be a
42 The sensitiveness of the boundaries issue came at the forefront in 90s with localities studies (Massey, 
1984).
43 Although it cannot be discussed here, recent works by Neil Brenner show how the concept of rescaling 
can be helpful in linking together traditional scales like the national and emergent scales of power 
restructuring (Brenner, 2004).
44 For a complete review of the locality boundaries definition see Coombes, 2000.
45 Coombes (2000) has recently proposed a more complex and complete approach keeping together
different aspects (institutions, demography, economy, facilities and landscape): although this perspective
represents a completion of traditional functional methods centred on commuting flows, it does not solve the
theoretical problems arisen in defining TPS’ boundaries.
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good proxy for the TPS. In more complex situation, like metropolitan areas, it is difficult to 
. hypothesise that we can ascribe the flows to a specific TPS.
Moreover, functional approaches are obsessed with spatial continuity that is, 
building an exhaustive patchwork of territories, including each squared foot of land into a 
locality and at the same time avoiding overlapping among systems. This put some 
constraints on the adopted algorithm which are meaningless in our systemic perspective. 
The point of view is in fact internal to the system and therefore we are not really interested 
in the fact that when a TPS ends, immediately another one begins. More important, some 
of the systems localised in the territory also belong to other TPS and therefore boundaries 
are overlapping46.
The third issue is that TPS are characterised by continuous structural change also 
the boundaries of its Structure change without ending. Therefore, even if we accepted that 
commuting flows are a good proxy, we should be able to calculate the boundaries of the 
systemic Structure in the precise moment when we are going to observe the TPS and not 
once out ten years when the census data become available. As far as Organisation is 
concerned, it is true that some longue dur6e guarantees continuity over time of the TPS, 
but it becomes hard to sustain the idea that physical commuting alone is a good proxy for 
territorialised learning processes.
Hence we can say that the inadequacy of any standard definition depends on two 
simultaneous rescaling processes of the networks of relationships that make the TPS:
(i) on the one side, some learning networks are longer than any given territory's 
boundaries, in that they involve other systems localised elsewhere;
(ii) on the other side, some learning networks are somehow "shorter", in the sense 
that they involve only certain elementary systems present in a given territory.
The first issue is well known in learning region literature and we might say that 
over the last years it came to the forefront. Most of NIG literature agrees on the fact that 
interactive learning is not an exclusive property of regionalised clusters but that it entails 
as well an important supra-local dimension. For instance, Boschma points out that there 
are many kinds of proximity playing a role in learning dynamics and that spatial proximity is 
"neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for learning to take place" (Boschma 2005, 
p. 62). Gertler (2003) has sketched three problems influencing the effectiveness of tacit 
knowledge (howto produce it, howto find and appropriate it, howto reproduce or share it), 
claiming that some of these processes take place partially independently from territorial
46 This is of course a quite naif deviation from biological systems theory, where boundaries are seen as 
certain and unique.
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assets and geographical proximity. Analogously, in Amin and Cohendet (2004) 
territorialised learning is just one out of several forms of building knowledge architectures. 
Also Asheim pointed out the challenge that temporary organisations can move to the 
embeddedness of territorialised learning processes (Asheim, 2002). Recently, Malmberg 
and Maskell themselves, together with Bathelt (Bathelt et al., 2004), have been focusing 
on the learning processes which take place through long distance in absence of 
geographical proximity, using the metaphor of the global pipeline.
All these warnings have been extremely important in avoiding the hyperlocalism 
trap: it is clear that the boundaries of whatever territory cannot contain the whole of the 
learning process. Nevertheless, they have been shifting the attention from what happen 
between different scale, underestimating the variety of the process that are taking place 
within given scales (the shortness of territorialised learning). If it is common sense to admit 
that any cluster's boundaries are always fuzzy toward the outside in that a territory cannot 
exhaustively contain all the relationships going on, our point is more striking. We claim, in 
fact, that the boundaries are blurred not only at the external borders of the TPS, but also 
internally. Around a more or less clearly identifiable bulk of territorialised learning there is a 
broad grey zone where other processes happen and which are not taken into account by 
most of the NEG and NIG literature. This is a fundamental issue that we shall try to 
address in next section, when dealing with the specific added value that our systemic 
account of TPS-territory link can offer to the ongoing debate in Economic Geography.
4.3 When (and if) TPS makes a difference.
In the previous sections we have outlined the main features of an ideal typical TPS, 
saying that it simultaneously relies on both structural and organisative territorialisation. We 
have also claimed that some of the more sophisticated conceptualisation of clusters, such 
as industrial district, milieux innovateurs and learning regions, can be considered as very 
closed to this abstract idealtype (see section 4.1.2). Following, we have identified as the 
main feature of organisative territorialisation the process of territorialised learning, which 
allows the TPS evolution while maintaining some form of continuity with a set of basic 
knowledge inherited by the past (see section 4.1.3). This standpoint have also somehow 
enhanced the familiarity of TPS with the three fundamental strands in NIG mentioned 
above: actually, all these approaches (industrial district, milieux innovateurs and learning 
regions) are to a different degree claiming some sort of synthetic cognitive dimension of 
the territory:
(i) Italian industrial district literature is mainly about how a centuries old set of
knowledge and competencies have been reworked through local traded and
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untraded interdependencies in order to maintain a competitive advantage on 
globalised markets;
(ii) milieux innovateurs scholars explicitly assume the presence of industrial 
tradition and of cognitive interaction as cornerstones of the definition itself of 
milieu;
(iii) learning regions approach is self-evidently centred on the process of interactive
learning within regional boundaries as main engine for enhancing local
development processes.
Finally, in section 4.2.1 we have highlighted how the NIG debate, and signally 
learning regions approach, can offer a fruitful insight to distinguish between structural 
embeddedness and organisative embeddedness.
What is still to be considered is the specific added-value that systemic 
conceptualisation can offer to the debate in Economic Geography47. Does the TPS have 
some emergent property or it is simply ordering and bringing together different approaches 
in NIG? While developing the subsequent arguments, several passages have suggested 
that actually there are deep divergences from some of the main assumptions of the new 
orthodoxy of NIG. In the following pages we will try to address this question with reference 
to two fundamental questions:
(i) the relationship between homogeneity and plurality, that is the variety of the
territory;
(ii) the relationship between continuity and change that is the dynamicity of the
territory.
4.3.1 The unbearable variety o f territory.
One of the main points which run across all our analysis is what we might call the 
unbearable variety of territory. Most of the literature in contemporary Economic 
Geography, both on NEG and on NIG side, has been concerned with the categorisation of 
different kinds of interaction between economic activities and territory, trying to 
systematise the relationships between territorial endowment and firms' performances. This
47 Some explicit reference to system theories within learning regions related literature have been made
over the last years, in particular with reference to Cooke's work on localities and learning processes
(Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Cook and Schienstock, 2000 and Cooke, 2001) and to French school of
GREMI -  Group the Recherche Economique sur les Milieux Innovateurs (Maillat et. a/., 1991; Maillat et
Perrin, 1992; Maillat etal., 1993 and Maillat, 1995). Despite these efforts, the consequences of a systemic
approach in terms of methodology have never been consistently developed.
104
classification is managed to a high simplification of territorial complexity, which can be
articulated in four steps:
(i) the first step is the identification of standard categories for the description of the 
territorial organisation of production. The massive use of the term "cluster" with 
all its ambiguities is a good example of this process. Cluster became a sort of 
shortcut toward regional development: clustering firms seemed to be the fastest 
way to improve both firms' and regions' competitiveness. Of course this misuse 
arose numerous criticisms, addressing the cluster issue as a chaos (Martin and 
Sunley, 2003). This turned into some classification effort (Markusen, 1996; 
Gordon and McCann, 2000) which tried to distinguish between different kinds of 
cluster;
(ii) subsequently, such categories can be easily converted into a classification of 
different territories according to the type of cluster that they were hosting. The 
case of Italian industrial district is somehow emblematic of this process: the 
rediscovery of Marshallian industrial districts by Becattini and his fellow scholars 
passed quickly from its original neo-braudelian narrative interpretation to more 
systematic attempts to statistically standardise their features (e.g. through the 
concept of local labour system), ending in a legal normative definition of which 
territories are industrial districts (the so called legge Bersani, from the name of 
the minister who enforced the new law)48. In this process, what was a feature of 
the cluster become a character of the territory;
(iii) in order to work, this schematisation of the territory ends by assuming some 
degree of homogeneity in the territory. If this homogenisation process is clear in 
NEG approach, where it expresses through the typical neoclassical statement 
about hypotheses that applies within a bounded space, it is nevertheless at 
work in NIG studies, although in a more subtle and implicit, but deeper, version. 
Most of NIG theorisation, also those closer to our TPS approach, share some 
belief that territories possess relational and cultural features according to a 
binary distribution: either they have them, or they do not. This leads to consider 
important territorial assets, such as social capital, trust, routines as if they were 
equally distributed within a given territory. Very often, the emphasis put on 
"sharing" simply hides a desire for describing the territory in terms of cohesion, 
uniformity, homogeneity and finally some sort of collective agency;
48 This made some bad luck for some of the historical Italian districts: a simple increase in some of their
structural feature (like the ratio of SMEs) withdrew them from the list of legally recognised industrial
districts, preventing them from the benefits that have been thought expressly for them.
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(iv) the fourth simplification, probably the most important, is that most of both and 
NEG and NIG literature operates a dramatic simplification of the territory, 
establishing a series of dicothomic images which try to fix the territory's 
unceasing flow. As far as NEG is concerned, its dicothomic approach is quite 
clear in Krugman and Venable's famous models of cumulative development, 
where the question is whether monopolistic competition and increasing returns 
lead to a centre-periphery polarisation between two or more regions. When it 
comes to NIG, we find an even richer set of dual oppositions and divides: 
between virtuous learning regions and those trapped in obsolete lock in, 
between institutionally thick places and almost empty ones, between Fordist 
hierarchies and flexibly specialised networks.
To this regard, both NEG and NIG frameworks turned to be powerful tools for 
territorial analysis, namely inter-territorial analysis, highlighting the variety of territories, 
although it might be questionable the extreme manicheisation of territorial differences: on 
the one side, virtuous territories, if possible flexibly specialised, SME thick, trustful and 
cohesive: on the other side, Fordist, heterodirected, TNC dominated and exploited 
territories. More radically, within NIG schemes it is not easy at all distinguish between 
organisative and structural institutions. Is the presence itself of trust enough to pass from 
structural to organisative embeddedness? Which intensity of untraded interdependencies 
is required to produce an industrial district or a milieu innovateur, rather then a mere 
agglomeration?
Of course, many criticisms have arisen against the excessive emphasis on local 
homogeneity and the possibility that this uniformity turns into some competitive advantage 
(Amin and Tomaney, 1995; Hudson, 2003). Nevertheless, this scepticism is usually 
produced by the consciousness that ongoing supra-local processes will somehow disrupt 
territorial cohesion and/or interrupting the virtuous linkage between territorial assets and 
firms' performances49. This argument is somehow similar to the one we have considered 
about TPS' boundaries: uncertainty and menaces come from the outside and are not 
generated by processes internal to the territory.
As a consequence, what stayed largely unexplored was the variety within a given 
territory. Hence, this is the main point where our systemic account of firms-territory 
relationship diverges from the other NIG interpretations. Since the very beginning we have 
questioned the possibility of considering the territory as something monolithic50, with a 
limited set of nuances within its boundaries, strictly dependent on its cluster structuration,
49 For an interesting account of supra-local relationships can be managed through multiple 
embeddedness, with specific reference to the evolution of Italian industrial districts, see Zucchella, 2006.
50 This is what, in chapter 2 and 3, we called the issue of juridical personality of territories.
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packed in some clear category. As we have highlighted before (section 4.1.2), in our 
systemic approach the preservation of variety within a territory is guaranteed by a two 
main points.
The first is that the belonging of a system to a category is not exclusive. For 
instance, the presence of a TPS does not exclude that in that territory there are ongoing 
processes of mere agglomeration or even simpler footloose localisation: a TNC might be 
interested in localising in an industrial district just to try to take advantages of some 
resources locally embedded. It is also possible that a TPS is part of a Global Commodity 
Chain or buy raw materials rather than specialised services on the market without 
entangling in an organisative interaction with those other systems. Also we can imagine 
that some elementary systems manage simultaneously systemic interactions in many 
realms. Let us think to a global player like Motorola: they can buy intermediate goods 
directly on the market -  like silicon, microchips and software -  or locate manufacturing 
plants in a developing country to take advantage of cheap labour, enhancing some 
territorialised learning into Silicon Valley TPS without loosing its corporate identity.
Even more important, here, is the relationship between TPS and territory. The TPS 
is not of course the territory, as in the territory there are other systems which are not 
involved into the TPS. At the same time, TPS’ Organisation can be assumed as a good 
proxy of the territory as it is characterised by emerging properties which are territorial, 
which is defined in terms of both geographical and institutional proximity. We have to 
notice that there is not a two way identity between a given territory and a TPS: every TPS 
identifies a territory, but a territory can host more TPS, either coexisting or in competition 
among them. Therefore, in our inquiry of territorial competitiveness, we have shifted 
radically our focus: we are not questioning if a territory as whole can be assumed to 
possess its own competitiveness, but how specific TPS do. As we have argued in the 
previous sections, there is not feasible way to theorise rigorously such a thing like a 
territory as an autopoietic system, because it is actually too complex. Take for instance 
Prato and London. As the former is small enough and relatively less complex, we might 
assume that just considering one TPS (the industrial district) may be a good proxy for the 
whole territory, that is, we might accept the simplification that comprehending Prato’s 
industrial district we also grasp the wholeness of Prato itself. In the case of London, it is 
evident that its complexity is so high that we cannot reduce its “identity” to particular 
processes ongoing for instance in the City or, conversely, in Brixton. Better put, the City— 
i.e. one single London’s TPS -  is not a good proxy for the whole city.
Hence, what really connotes a TPS is not its eventual internal homogeneity, but 
rather of being more complex than the elementary systems that live in the territory, but 
less complex than the whole territory. In other terms our aim is to build up an analytical 
object which is a not-exhaustive representation of the territory, but possessing some of the
107
features that refer to the territory and that cannot be found in the elementary systems 
which are located into the territory. The possibility to have, within the same territory, many 
configurations of firms' relationships -  many kinds of "cluster" -  shifts our attention to 
internal processes rather than to external oppositions -  the territorialised cluster versus the 
globalised markets, local tacit competencies versus global codified knowledge, 
homogeneous community versus rootless disaggregating capitalistic values, etc. As we 
shall see in next section, this attention paid to internal variety also allows to address in a 
different way one of the more problematic issue in contemporary Economic Geography, 
that of transformation and change.
4.3.2 Path dependence and change: the limits to specialisation.
As a second main point we have to address the character of path dependence, 
which is traditionally associated with agglomeration and competitiveness, considering how 
it interacts with the ideas of emergence and novelty which are central in complexity and 
systemic epistemologies. We will argue that the shortcut to explain the coexistence of both 
continuity (that is, path dependence) and emergence (that is, invention of new paths) is 
given, once more, by the distinction Varela and Maturana introduced between 
Organisation and Structure. More precisely the application of autopoiesis to social systems 
and territories allows us to distinguish two kinds of path dependence, a structural one and 
an organisative one:
(i) structural path dependence refers to the concept of structurally determined 
change, that is, the fact that the changes in a system are change in the 
Structure which depends on the previous states of the Structure itself.
(ii) organisative path dependence, that is, the fact that the TPS maintain 
continuity in the basic set of relationships which define its identity. In other 
terms, organisative path dependence can be assumed as a synonym of 
organisative closure
At the same time, both Structure and Organisation can change over time, but in 
different ways. More precisely, the Structure has a broader range of possible variation, as 
along as the Organisation stays relatively still and maintains its internal consistency. In a 
theoretical perspective, we might admit that also the Organisation changes over time 
without substantial alterations. Nevertheless, in practical terms, it is very difficult to set a 
boundary after which the TPS has changed so much its Organisation that it becomes 
something different. Therefore, we can hypothesize that the Organisation either changes 
dramatically and catastrophically -  and therefore the TPS becomes something completely 
different -  or it stays mainly unchanged over time.
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This systemic account of emergence and path dependence, allows us to address 
some of the open questions we inherited from the literature. We can shortly consider here, 
two of them: Krugman’s account of history and path dependence and the problems of 
lock-in, inertia and creative destruction.
Krugman’s interpretation of path agglomeration and path dependence mainly refers 
to the Structure of a TPS, in that he focuses his explanation on the two concepts of 
increasing returns and monopolistic competition, which are actually features of the 
contingent Structure, rather than the immanent Organisation. Even more explicitly, 
Krugman has repeatedly claimed that softer and fuzzier elements like spillovers and 
knowledge flows, essential to our comprehension of territorialised learning cannot be 
modelled within the NEG epistemological framework. As a consequence, NEG seems to 
fail in addressing long term continuity, which is (un)explained as QWERTY effect (David, 
1985) or pure chance. In a systemic perspective, what is seen by Krugman as chance is 
instead a specific learning process with a relatively clear beginning and development. Of 
course at the very beginning, we agree that a random fortuitous event might be the spark 
which led to TPS' birth, but focusing on the learning organisative core rather than just on 
structural mechanisms might help us in shifting the boundaries of our interpretation and 
comprehension.
The main important point, where NEG converges with NIG, nevertheless is the 
worry about the lock-in trap. Krugman insisted on the fact that path dependence and 
continuity, as well as the role of tacit forms of knowledge, imply, in fact, a certain degree of 
inertia which might prevent the adaptation of the economic system to changing times51. A 
similar analysis applies to the issue of specialisation -  probably the main form of path- 
dependency we can find in regional economies -  and how it is treated by learning region 
literature. Evolutionary economics has broadly reflected on path-dependence, highlighting 
how knowledge production is a largely cumulative process, where different stages in 
knowledge clearly rely on the previous ones (Nelson and Winter, 1977 and 1982; Arthur, 
1994). In the learning regions approach, path dependence assumes both a positive and a 
negative meaning. On the one side, it is the very base of any learning process as it takes 
the form of continuity with past knowledges and it is embodied in routines, habits, formal 
and informal norms. On the other side, like Krugman, also Maskell and Malmberg 
underline the risk for regional lock-in:
Normally, a region gradually develops its physical, social, institutional and cultural 
structure in correspondence to needs of existing industries. Even if we assume that 
each round of building new institutions or improving the old is based on , and
51 Hence, the revival of the Schumpeterian emphasis on “creative destruction” as part of the innovation 
process which keeps capitalism alive.
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perfectly adjusted to, the most advanced technological, organisational or market 
knowledge available at the time, there is always a risk that the resulting institutional 
endowment in the long run will become an obstacle to future development and 
perhaps even develop into a regional lock-in. [...] Thus, not only do firms 
experience difficulties when they face the need to un-leam successful routines, but 
in regions the process of un-learning will often necessitate the disintegration and 
removal of formerly important institutions which now hinder new development. 
(Maskell and Malmberg 1999, p. 178-179, emphasis added)
In our systemic perspective, the impossibility of solving the issue of regional lock-in
descends from the emphasis that both NEG and NIG scholars put on specialisation. In
most of the related accounts, first come specialisation (the needs of existing industries)
and the organisation of territorialised learning follows. Without doubt, this must be the case
if we are just considering structural embeddedness, as specialisation is actually part of the
TPS' Structure and, in particular, it expresses the way the TPS couples with local and
supra-local markets. If we shift our attention to the organisative synthesis, the situation
significantly changes: in this case, Organisation (should) come first and Structure -  and
hence also specialisation -  follows. If it is true that a TPS cannot rely simply on the
reproduction of its Organisation, without some effective structural coupling with other
systems and with the environment, it is also true that organisative consistency precedes
adaptation. In other terms, the external environment somehow offers a range of
possibilities in terms of variety and diversification, it imposes some constraints with
reference for instance to market evolution and to technological trajectories, but in a TPS it
is the Organisation that dictates the development path of the system.
We cannot anyway exclude a priori that a TPS can face such a deep crisis that
even its Organisation is at risk of becoming obsolete. This might be the case that, in
systemic terms, there is no possible structural coupling with the fast changing
environment, so that this particular Organisation will implode. Nevertheless, this
represents the extreme case and it would imply the implosion of the TPS itself. Actually,
not only the TPS approach does not exclude catastrophes, but its emphasis on variety
implies a greater sensitivity to changes and challenges, even in smaller localities like
Prato. Consider, as an example, the consequences of huge immigration flows from China
into all major Italian industrial districts. At first, this immigration has been somehow
integrated in the basement of TPS’ Structure, being functional to the price-competitiveness
of the district without altering substantially the systemic Organisation of the industrial
district. Later, these expatriate communities seemed to constitute autonomous TPS, with
their own Organisation and Structure, representing now a challenge from the within of the
industrial district. It can happen that a bag and leather wholesaler in East London is going
to buy low-quality-low-cost bags and wallets from Chinese communities which are settled
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near Florence, without any connection being made with the original TPS hosting these 
enclaves. Therefore, it is likely that in Prato or Valenza52 there are now at least two TPS, 
each of those with its specific Organisation and structural coupling with that particular 
territory. If we go on considering the identification between the TPS and the territory in 
industrial districts, we will never understand what is going on. For instance we could not 
grasp why, after many claims that the tacit dimension of districtual knowledge was the 
founding of their competitiveness, now the focus is shifted towards forms of codification -  
for instance establishing brands and trademarks which secure the originality, the 
recognisability and the uniqueness of local production. The fact is that the challenge is not 
just from overseas imitating competitors, but it is internal, by embedded vanguards.
4.4 Introducing the empirical case study.
In the previous sections we have argued that the way we built the concept of TPS -  
and in particular the distinction before Structure and Organisation -  allows us to address 
some of the open question unanswered by both NEG and NIG. In particular we have 
claimed that the variety within a given territory cannot be oversimplified by postulating 
some degree of homogeneity and a substantial correspondence between the territory and 
a particular form of productive setting.
4.4.1 Why Turin?.
The second part of the thesis will attempt to empirically operationalise the TPS 
concept with reference to a specific case study. To this purpose our attention has been 
focusing on Turin manufacturing fabric, not only for biographical reason53.
In many ways, Turin is the ideal example on which to check the hypotheses put 
forward in the course of this work. In the 20th century, the presence of Fiat and its capacity 
to organise and profoundly structure the local territory gave Turin its most well known 
image. Overtime, the identity of Turin was condensed into that of a car-producing city, the 
city of Fiat (Volpato 2004). The name Turin evokes Dickensian scenes and arouses 
comparisons with the grey centres of early industrialisation, such as Manchester, Liverpool 
or Lyon.
52 Valenza, in Piedmont, is probably the most important industrial district worldwide for jewellery making. 
Recently, many producers and association have reported about a growing Chinese community 
progressively becoming autonomous from the original district and competing on design imitation jointed to 
cheap prices.
53 Actually researcher's biography has some important methodological implications. In fact, a methodology 
based on a mixture of historical analysis and more synchronic qualitative and quantitative view needs 
some sort of embeddedness to mobilise different sources of information and turn them into a consistent 
tale about local production fates.
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Despite the mythology built upon Agnelli's travelling to Detroit in the 20s and the 
30s, the influence of Ford was rather an inspiration than an applied model. At least during 
the first half ox XIX century, the car production in Fiat and Turin was still much close to the 
pre-Fordist era, with a central role played by handicraft production and by the presence of 
important competitors.
The years immediately following the Second World War were crucial for the future 
development of Fiat. Working in a rapidly expanding market like the Italian one, without 
any significant import penetration and with few local competitors, Fiat focused its market 
strategy on small and medium-sized models. It also organised production in a way which 
paid little attention to R&D, planning or scientific activity. Fiat’s entire strategy was directed 
towards quantitative expansion, both in terms of employment and productive capacity, 
paying little attention to its internal organisation. These technological and product 
decisions were accompanied by a spatial strategy which deliberately enhanced the relative 
advantages of concentration and mass production. This had two main features: the 
concentration in the north-west of the country and in the city of Turin in particular; and 
concentration of production in a few large, vertically integrated, factories. In the Turin area, 
Fiat has in fact found, produced or has seen others produce (the public administration) a 
large part of those “territorial conditions” which marked the establishment of the system of 
mass production (Castronovo, 1971; Gabetti, 1977). As a consequence, Fiat’s industrial 
investment was identified with the boundaries of the Turin agglomeration: this area not 
only contained the entire car production cycle (in 1968, about 1,300,000 out of 1,550,000 
cars came from the Turin area), but Fiat also participated in the whole range of production 
based on the internal combustion engine, involving a close-knit network of small and very 
small supply companies, often completely dependent upon Fiat.
It is important to notice that, despite the presence of vertically integrated plants, a 
broad and capillary supply-chain also spread over Turin metropolitan area: while at the 
end of the 1960s there were over 125,000 employees working in Fiat’s Turin factories, at 
least an equal number worked in production units which directly or indirectly were part of 
its network of subcontractors. In reality, it has never been possible to delimit exactly the 
boundaries of this network because its composition was in a state of constant flux, 
especially as regards the smaller suppliers. Fiat drew on around 1,200 direct contractors, 
about a third of the 3,500 units (often small and very small) linked in some way to the 
automobile industry. Under these conditions, despite the high internal integration, during 
the 1960s Fiat acquired on average over 50% of its total turnover from external 
companies, of which about half were located in the Turin agglomeration.
As a result of the automobile industry’s strategy towards indefinite output 
expansion and a consequent, and sometimes uncontrolled, enlargement of production 
capacity, the Turin area became one of the most sectorally specialised regions in Europe,
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comparable to just a few other international examples such as Detroit and the West 
Midlands. It is in this context that Turin has been rightly seen as representing the model of 
the factory town, albeit with its own specific features and connotations. It is no surprise that 
even in international literature Turin has been a favoured area of study for the relationship 
between industry and the city in the era of the second industrial revolution (Gabert, 1964; 
Jalabert and Gregoris, 1987).
Starting in the eighties, Fiat’s strategies have led to a gradual bifurcation between 
the corporation and the changes in Turin’s manufacturing system. In that period, Fiat's 
strategy radically changed, due to several contingent reasons: the opening of Italian car 
market, the increasing pressure of international competitors, mainly from Japan, and the 
consequent worldwide reorganisation of the whole automotive sector. This deep 
transformation in both the location -  with the opening of new plants in Southern Italy, 
Eastern Europe and Latina America -  and organisation -  with the dramatic restructuring of 
the local supply-chain and the entry strategy of global components producers-has indeed 
produced a deep crisis in Turin’s manufacturing fabric.
Massive unemployment, unceasing firms' failures, negative demographic trends, 
the agreement with General Motors and, last but not least, the death of the two leading 
figures of the ownership, Giovanni and Umberto Agnelli, with the consequent rise of a new 
management spread over the are the fear that an era was finishing, that Turin's fate was 
divorcing from the fortune of its more representative firm. Turin was not any more Fiat's 
town, Turin was not any more a one-company-town, Turin was something else but it was 
not clear at all what it was. It is easy to imagine that such an identity crisis has produced 
an intense debate about the productive restructuring process that was going on. Basically 
two strong positions have been sustained in the public and academic debate: the first one 
affirmed that the automotive specialisation was becoming a sort of lock-in, that some 
forgetting was necessary and that a new post-industrial identity had to be found: on the 
contrary, the second one has been keeping Fiat's presence -  at least with the 
headquarters and its more strategic functions -  as central for the destiny of the area and 
that the question was just facilitating the passage to new organisation of the production, 
namely a kind of "automotive industrial district".
This short tale might help in highlighting some of the interest reasons that Turin 
case raises with reference to the TPS model and clarifying the research hypothesis we are 
going to address in the second part of the dissertation. Our main task is to verify if the 
application of the TPS framework to a specific case study would confirm our hypothesis 
about systemic added value, with reference to our capability to understand territories 
without excessive simplification of the diversity that a place entails and to keep the balance 
between continuity and change.
113
In this perspective, the main issue is that the Turin area is characterised by a set of 
knowledge clearly identifiable with an engineering and electrotechnical tradition which 
maintained strong relationships with the pre-Fiat age. As we shall see in chapter 5, Fiat 
rose at the end of XIX century from a pre-existing set of core competencies, deriving on 
the one side from the royal arsenal and the coach manufacturing, and, on the other side, 
from the Savoia kingdom policy of developing a strong research basis in the field of 
applied technologies. This specificity will turn out to be fundamental when it comes to 
recognizing the emergence, permanence and evolution of place-specific learning 
processes. More precisely, we shall claim that automotive specialisation was simply the 
contingent structural evidence of a more underground territorial learning process.
Hence, we shall try to challenge the consolidated image of Turin as a one- 
company-town, arguing that not even during the climax of its Fordist age Turin could be 
reduced to such oversimplified image. In our perspective, this a good example about how 
a territory can be roughly identified non even with a sector or a cluster, like in the case of 
industrial districts, but just and simply with a single firm, although the biggest Italian firm. 
Hence our first task will be deconstructing this monolithic image of univocal identification 
between territory and firm, considering whether it would have been more correct to talk 
about a Fiat-centred TPS. In order to do so we will be focusing not only on Fiat but also on 
its supply chain, highlighting how a number of different actors was actually playing a co­
primary role in Fiat's big tale.
Third, we will try to argue that, even in the case that a homogenisation of some of 
the main features of a territory effectively happened and it led to the emergence of an 
encompassing representation of that territory -  like in the case of the one-company-town 
-  we can still assume that a degree of variety is still at work in that space. For this 
purpose, the enduring presence of an highly hierarchical organization such Fiat has 
probably contributed to the imposition of certain territorial endowments over others, not 
only with reference to vertical customer/suppliers relationships, but also to more cultural 
attitude toward social capital and community shaped factors, such as trust, spillovers and 
cooperative attitude. Hence, in our perspective, this feature might be helpful in keeping our 
categorization of TPS largely independent of a communitarian standpoint. In other terms, if 
social capital is more or less ubiquitous in the territory, we can better test our hypothesis 
that TPS might be distinguished only in terms of territorialised learning processes, without 
needing a strong reference to the social production of shared meaning and values.
Finally we will be dealing with the issue of change and continuity. The 80s and 90s 
restructuring has set free a dramatic amount of resources: many workers and, more 
importantly many firms, have been ousted from Fiat’s environment, hence searching for a 
new market position and a new productive identity; local public and private institutions 
have been called to invent a new development path, as well as a new image for the city-
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region and the surrounding Province; universities and research centres have been 
expected to foster a deeper involvement in local industrial fate; TNCs, once attracted by 
the possibility to serve Fiat supply-chain, have been forced to consider new (de)location 
dilemmas, hence rethinking the deeper reasons fro their staying. This framework 
represents a good playground to consider how the Fiat centred monolith has been either 
preserved or split off in diverse systems, with significantly different patterns of both 
structural and organisative territorialisation.
4.4.2 Methodological implications.
The main issue, when it comes to methodology, is the longue duree character of 
the TPS Organisation which is difficult to assess through normally available diachronic 
datasets, even in the case of the most important Italian firm in the XX century where 
archives and data go back to the turn of the past century. Most if not all of the historical 
series we can find is, in fact, referred to variables such as specialisation, firms' size and 
ownership, performance indexes (such as ROI, employment and productivity), labour 
market size and characters, etc. Also we can easily get information -  sometimes even 
data -  about the modification of input-output regional framework, allowing us to analyse 
the change in the vertical customers-suppliers asset, which is a fundamental component of 
territorial embeddedness. The issue is that such variables can express, at best, Structure 
dynamics, but they have little to say about territorialised learning. Despite existing 
information can highlight some aspects of structural embeddedness, mainly those related 
to pecuniary externalities, the more relational dimension of structural coupling (such as 
untraded interdependences or institutional endowment) and, above all, organisative 
synthesis (that is to say territorialised learning) lay down in the shadow. On the contrary, 
more qualitative methods, such as focus groups, meeting with key-observers and 
structured questionnaires, can give a peculiar synchronic insight into the embeddedness 
process, allowing investigating both structural coupling and organisative synthesis through 
direct observation of the elementary systems composing the TPS. At the same time, it is 
very difficult to get from qualitative methods a clear perception of the longue duree 
processes underlying TPS organisative dynamics.
As a consequence we must adopt a twofold approach, an historical one and an 
analytical one. Historical analysis, based mainly on existing literature and previous 
analysis can offer some perspectives on the diachronic evolution of the TPS, making at 
least intuitive the main features of structural and organisative embeddedness across time. 
Subsequently, an analytical approach, base on structured interviews to firms localised into 
the TPS, will give more precise and updated information about the way the system's 
behaviours and its relationships, on the one hand, with firms' competitiveness and, on the 
other hand, with the territory where the TPS is localised.
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Chapter 5 will address the main historical questions, in particular in identifying the 
main bulk of knowledge which can be assumed as the object of Turin territorialised 
learning and challenging the monolithic idea of Fiat-centred clustering, advancing the 
hypothesis that it might be more fruitfully interpreted as a TPS. In chapter 6 we shall be 
focusing on the effect of Fiat's crisis on the SME fabric, highlighting some processes of 
diversification and change within the primary TPS: the chapter will end with the hypothesis 
that more than one TPS came into existence in the second half of the 90s. Finally, in 
chapter 7 we will move our stance to the present situation and, on the basis of original 
empirical observations, we shall evaluate how different processes of structural and 
organisative territorialisation are at work in Turin at the turn of the millennium.
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Chapter 5: Interpreting Fiat-Turin relationship in the 
prism of Territorial Productive Systems.
In this first chapter devoted to the case-study, we will attempt to assess to what 
extent and in what terms Fiat-Turin relationship really tells us the story of a one-company 
town, or it can be more meaningfully interpreted through the concept of Productive 
Territorial System. Contextualizing Turin’s economic history in systemic terms, in fact, is 
the first step towards understanding the manufacturing dynamics and current stance of the 
area’s economy, ensuring a reliable basis of comparison between the past and the present 
and, consequently, enabling us to evaluate the images and analyses that scholars and 
public players have put forward in recent years.
5.1 Methodological questions.
For this purpose, certain necessary simplifications regarding theTPS’s morphology 
and operation will be made both in this chapter and those that follow. Specifically, the first 
set of assumptions concerns the definition and nature of the subsystems considered as 
components of the TPS. To limit the number of interrelationships which come into play, 
and In accordance with the examples given in the first section, we will restrict ourselves to 






This is an admittedly partial and subjective attempt at outlining the taxonomy of a 
TPS, and, as such, presents a number of significant gaps and simplifications. The two
54 In order to simplify reader’s task, in this chapter, we shall call "subsystems" the elementary systems,
while with the word "system" we shall refer to the TPS itself.
117
most important of these omissions are the educational and training system, and the 
research and innovation system. Both of these systems have a central role in the process 
of producing and reproducing knowledge that stands at the very core of the TPS’s 
organization. On the one hand, in fact, the educational system expresses how and when a 
system (re)produces the human resources it needs in order to function: thus, the 
transformations and reforms in professional education can be seen as a true litmus test of 
the production system’s changing needs. On the other hand, the research system 
furnishes the TPS with the scientific and technological skills that are required to take the 
knowledge inherited from the past and adapt it to the needs of today’s markets. 
Nevertheless, as including these two elements as independent subsystems of our TPS 
would have entailed a number of insoluble problems, we decided to take a different 
approach. Accordingly, the educational system is organized, at least in its broad outlines, 
on a scale other than the local, as it is normally one of the spheres for which central 
governments claim responsibility. If it is true that professional training is to a certain extent 
more flexible and better attuned to the changing and changeable demands of the 
productive fabric, it is no less true that the educational system is almost completely 
untouched by the trends at work on the urban or regional scale. For this reason, the 
educational system’s participation in the more general TPS will be interpreted restrictively 
as a single component of the relationships that link the labour market to the other 
subsystems taken into consideration. In other words, the educational system as seen as 
being instrumental to the processes whereby the workforce is reproduced inasmuch as it 
plays an important role in the dynamics of the Productive Territorial System. For the 
research and innovation system, the problems that arise are greater. The rationale for 
excluding this important subsystem lies in the fact that it is only since the 80s that 
outsourcing of R&D work has shown significant growth, and the scientific literature has 
become aware of the importance of the ties that bind industry and the academic world. In 
this sense, and as seen from the perspective of a medium-long term diachronic analysis -  
spanning, in our case, around one hundred years -  this system is difficult to consider as 
an independent subsystem which participates explicitly and with a role of its own in the 
process of forming a TPS. The problem of how to incorporate it in our model remains: the 
approach that was preferred in the context of this analysis was to equate R&D work with 
other corporate services, i.e., to regard it as an economic activity like the others, whose 
task is to provide the market with skills that have their own economic value. Case by case, 
the players engaged in research and innovation will be considered as part of the 
subsystem of transnational corporations or that of local enterprises, depending on their 
prevalent character. This approach poses certain problems in dealing with public
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universities and research centers55, which can be regarded as economic entities only in 
part. Though an alternative would be to regard this system as part of the “formal 
institutions” system, this option was rejected for reasons that can be grouped under the 
following two headings:
(i) Identifying formal institutions, such as the public administration, as a separate and 
independent subsystem would mean homing in on the purely political dimension of 
the process whereby a TPS comes into being. Here, the presence of agencies or 
consortia who promote innovation is entirely consonant with the PA subsystem’s 
operation, whereas universities and research centers are not sufficiently “political” 
in character.
(ii) Historically, the relationships between public research and the private sector have 
intensified as an Anglo-Saxon, and largely American, model of university 
governance has gained ground. In this model, research institutions habitually do 
work for economic and manufacturing interests: work from which they derive a 
sizeable proportion of the resources they need for their activities. The fiscal crisis 
of the Western state and the dearth of public funds have encouraged the spread of 
similar practices in continental Europe. As a result, putting a public research center 
on a par with a capitalist enterprise is no longer such an unbreakable taboo.
A further methodological clarification must be made regarding the composition of 
the elementary systems we have identified. Clearly, the complexity of the real world is 
such that they cannot be taken as uniform, homogeneous systems without unacceptable 
oversimplifications: the labour market offers a staggering array of job types, skills, 
compensation levels and ideological attitudes, just as two transnational corporations are 
very unlikely to be organized in the same way. Similarly, local enterprises can have a 
multitude of different relationships, both structural and organizational, with transnational 
corporations and with each other: supply and purchasing agreements, strategic alliances 
and competition are only a few of the ways that contribute to making each enterprise in the 
subsystem different from the others. Likewise, it is probable that the subsystem of local 
enterprises associated with a given TPS -  the automotive TPS, for instance -  will in turn 
belong to different sectors and value chains that, to varying extents, will influence their 
dynamics and behaviour. The same is true for the public administration which, on a 
different scale, will exhibit strategies that are not always, and not necessarily, centered on 
the TPS in question: different levels of local government may be working towards restoring
55 If we consider that private research institutions often work intensively for the public sector, to the extent 
that they are largely dependent on the tatter's decisions, the picture that emerges is even more complex 
and difficult to assimilate.
119
the Turin's automotive industry to competitiveness and, at the same time, be implementing 
policies designed to broaden the region’s production base, orienting it towards other areas 
of specialization such as ICT or cultural tourism. In a setting like this, it will thus be 
necessary to make appropriate distinctions within the four elementary systems which 
reflect the diversities within the TPS, and which could well prove to be the forces behind 
the system’s evolution -  or even its dissolution.
Our approach to classifying the subsystems involved also has an appreciable 
impact on the types of learning process that we can assume as expressions of the TPS’s 
organization. Earlier, in conceptualizing the TPS, we defined its organization as consisting 
of cognitive learning processes which preside over the (re)production and evolution of the 
knowledge and skill sets that distinguish this system from its surroundings and from other 
systems that are similar to it, either in territorial location or in the sector they specialize in. 
Given their complexity, these cognitive processes are not readily modeled or quantified in 
an empirical analysis. Hence, it must be freely admitted that our point of view is 
necessarily somewhat parochial or place-oriented, as it were, and can make no claims to 
objectivity. Out of the host of cognitive processes that can take place in a territory (with its 
production of cultural identities of various kinds, be they based on ethnic origin, class, 
gender or religion), our chosen purview is restricted to the processes of production and 
reproduction of those types of technical and organizational knowledge that can be said to 
be most directly linked to industrial and economic competitiveness. In this sense, we are 
more closely concerned with the many issues surrounding the knowledge-based economy 
and learning regions, than with what we referred to in the first section as the "cultural turn" 
in economic geography.
One last clarification is in order: as our investigation focuses on the relationship 
between enterprise competitiveness and territorial competitiveness, the TPS must 
necessarily be observed from a specific vantage point which will provide us with a basis for 
interpreting the organizational and structural relationships. This vantage point will be that 
of the production activities on which the TPS under analysis hinges. In analyzing the TPS 
that hinges on Fiat, this means that the relationships that make up the system will be 
construed in the light of the behaviour of this strategic player, not because it is in fact 
central, but rather because it can be viewed as a kind of “vanishing point” around which we 
can arrange our interpretation of the behaviours and dynamics at work inside the system.
In line with the foregoing considerations, this chapter will attempt to conceptualize 
the past existence of a TPS centering on the presence of Fiat in the Turin area, analyzing 
the operation of this system from four standpoints:
(i) the strategies of the major player
(ii) the relationships between Fiat and the subsystem of local enterprises
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(iii) the relationships with the labour market
(iv) the relationships with the formal institutions
In analyzing these four themes, our goal will be to shed light on the learning 
relationships that can have constituted a fully fledged Productive Territorial System in the 
course of the twentieth century. In order to describe all of the transformations that this TPS 
has undergone over the years, we will divide our discussion into two main periods, where 
the first will span the time from the system’s foundation to the Seventies, and the second 
goes from the Seventies and Eighties to the present day. The chronological organization of 
this representation of the automotive TPS is centered on two hypotheses, which stem, if 
you will, from two metaphors, one which likens it to a set of photographs, and one that 
sees it as cinema:
(i) the first hypothesis is that the TPS’s Fordist territorialisation reached its zenith and
its nadir in two specific decades, viz., the Fifties and the Nineties respectively: our 
construction of the idealtype of the TPS -  the photographs of our metaphor -  
centers essentially on the form the system took in this two moments;
(ii) the second hypothesis, which is closely linked to the first, is that in both periods
there was a pronounced cognitive delay between the time organizational 
innovations were introduced and the time they became fully manifest. In particular, 
we will attempt to demonstrate that though the scientific organization of work was 
introduced in theoretical form early in the twentieth century, it was fully deployed 
only from the Fifties onwards. Similarly, many of the processes which were to lead 
to the TPS’s de-territorialisation that became clear in the Nineties actually began in 
the Seventies.
In other words, our method will be based on a two-pronged approach: a 
comparison between two moments, frozen in time, in the rise of Turin’s automotive TPS, 
and an analysis of the processes that seem to proceed in slow motion, or to be in some 
way out of synch:
(i) the very fact that the Fordist system was built up implies that a substantial portion 
of Turin’s epic as a one-company town unfolds against an essentially pre-Fordist 
organizational backdrop;
(ii) by contrast, the Fordist system’s de-territorialisation began shortly after all of the 
pieces finally fell into place.
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We could go so far as to say that the Fordist TPS existed, really and truly, for the 
merest handful of years -  no more than a couple of decades out of a history that was over 
a century long -  and that in order to establish itself, it had to build on the very elements -  
such as the development of an extended supply chain or the marginalization of highly 
skilled labour -  which would later prove to be the seeds of its undoing.
5.2 From rootedness to rootlessness.
Before plunging into an analysis of the relationships between Fiat and the other 
subsystems that gave Turin’s automotive TPS its shape, some attention should be focused 
on the strategic behaviour and choices of location that Fiat has exhibited in its hundred 
years of history, in an attempt to highlight the signs of rootedness and rootlessness that 
surface in the two historical periods we mentioned earlier. Thus, this section will examine 
Fiat’s locational decisions in relation to its strategies and how they evolved. In other words, 
we will proceed with a diachronic analysis of the structural coupling between Fiat and the 
Turin area in pre-systemic terms: rather than taking other subsystems and relationships 
that lead to organizational synthesis into consideration, we will take a look at how Fiat’s 
creation of its own structure was superimposed on the Turin area through a series of 
locational choices.
5.2.1 The Age o f Rootedness.
Briefly stated, the history of the early decades of Fiat (founded in Turin on July 11, 
1899) was played out entirely in the Turin area: from the first factory employing a few 
hundred skilled workers, up to the construction of Fiat’s two major plants at Lingotto (1916- 
1926) and Mirafiori (1939) and the later expansion throughout the Turin metropolitan area, 
the company’s strategic decisions centered in its home area. Suffice it to say that the 
number of Fiat employees in the Province of Turin went from slightly more than 3,000 in 
1911 to over 100,000 sixty years later.
The dynamics whereby Fiat struck root in the Turin area cannot be separated from 
the history of its expansion, i.e., of Fiat’s policy of diversification and differentiation. This 
policy can be divided into two stages.
During its first cycle of acquisitions, Fiat policy concentrated on differentiating the 
main product along with a moderate diversification, though always remaining in sectors 
with links to motor vehicle production. Starting in the Twenties, Fiat grew rapidly, taking 
over all of the car makers of any size then operating in Italy, one after the other: SLPA -  
Societa Ligure Piemontese Automobili in 1926, SCAT -  Societa Ceirano Automobili Turin 
in 1932, Autobianchi in 1960, Lancia (which specialized in GT cars) in 1969, and Alfa
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Romeo, Italy’s legendary sports car maker, In 1986, followed by Ferrari (1988) and 
Maserati (1993) in the supercar segment56.
The first cycle of diversification also brought Fiat a striking measure of success: in 
the second decade of the twentieth century, less than twenty years after it opened its first 
car factory, Fiat started mass production of trucks, buses, and streetcars. The company 
entered aircraft production -  setting up Fiat Aviazione -  in 1908, and built its first trains in 
1917, followed by its first tractors in 1919. If this diversification proved so positive, it was 
largely because of two fundamental factors: it had a strong manufacturing bias, and, 
though Fiat entered many operating sectors, car-making retained its decisive role. This 
twofold process of diversification and differentiation, then, strengthened Fiat’s roots in the 
local productive fabric: almost all of the acquisitions and diversifications, in fact, were 
concentrated in the Province of Turin or, to a lesser degree, in the remainder of Piedmont. 
At most, we can say that this stage expanded the group’s local territorial base, pushing it 
to extend its manufacturing activities beyond the confines of the city. And not only: some of 
the areas that were ventured into as part of this diversification are now the fulcrum of Fiat’s 
competitiveness and of what remains of its manufacturing roots in Piedmont: Iveco, one of 
Fiat’s few motor vehicle divisions to come through the recent crisis unscathed, still has 
much of its production and research work in Turin57, while the Avio aeronautical division -  
which recently moved its headquarters to the former car plants in Rivalta on the outskirts 
of Turin -  maintains its core manufacturing and research in the Turin area58.
5.2.2 Fiat’s decisions and delocalization.
There can be no doubt that first unmistakable sign that the automotive TPS was 
severing its roots came from the strategies that Fiat started fielding in the Eighties in order 
to pull itself out of the social and manufacturing crisis that engulfed it in the Seventies. 
Here, the events that are of particular importance to our analysis include:
(i) the new wave of product diversification that took place, as contrasted with
(ii) Fiat’s attempt to increase production capacity in its core automotive sector.
This time, diversification chiefly involved moves into new non-manufacturing 
sectors, both by the Fiat Group and by IFIL, the holding company controlled by the Agnelli
56 Ferrari bought the Maserati brand from Fiat in 1997, and in 2002 Fiat sold around 34% of its 
shareholdings to Mediobanca.
57 Alongside its major production and research centers in Brescia and Ulm (Germany).
58 In addition, the birth of a small but technologically significant nucleus of highly specialized suppliers 
gravitating around Fiat Avio and Alenia -  Italy’s state-run aerospace industry -  is one of the major factors 
in the regeneration of the learning processes associated with the metalwork manufacturing and electronics 
sectors in the Turin area.
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family via the latter’s I FI. A number of businesses were thus acquired which not only had 
nothing whatsoever to do with motor vehicles, but were also completely extraneous to the 
manufacturing industry in general. These new ventures included forays into publishing, 
paper products, wholesale distribution, tourism and the hotel industry.
To reorganize and strengthen its production capacity, Fiat embarked on two 
concurrent strategies that involved:
(i) relocating production operations, first to Southern Italy and later to developing 
countries, a trend that was to pick up speed with the passage of time; and
(ii) combining forces with other major OEMs, both by buying out competitors and by 
entering into joint ventures and strategic alliances.
5.2.2.1 The move away from Turin
The relocation of major production operations to Southern Italy that started in the 
Seventies was the first aspect of Fiat’s growth strategies that had a negative impact on the 
group’s presence in the Turin area: in quick succession, manufacturing facilities were 
opened for automobiles (Termini Imerese in Sicily in 1970, Cassino in Lazio in 1972, 
Pomigliano d'Arco in Campania in 1987, Melfi in Basilicata in 1994), trucks (Atessa Val di 
Sangro in Abruzzo in 1981) and engines (Termoli in Molise in 1973). In addition, other Fiat 
group companies made investments in component manufacture, research, aeronautics, 
etc.
Table 5.1 -  OEM employment In Piedmont and Italy
1971 workforce 1981 workforce 1991 workforce 2001 workforce
Piedmont 102,283 97 ,396 65 ,536 25,368
100 95 64 25
Southern Italy 9,391 35 ,134 30 ,318 25,012
100 374 323 266
- Lazio 124 9,760 8,171 5 ,184
- Abruzzo 0 2 ,232 3 ,549 4,663
- Molise 0 3,203 3 ,003 0
- Campania 8,417 16,421 12,452 7 ,816
- Basilicata 0 0 35 5,227
- Sicily 850 3 ,518 3 ,108 2,122
Source: Istat, 1971,1981,1991, 2001
As can be seen from Table 5.1, Fiat’s shift southward was particularly pronounced 
in the Seventies, when the total number of jobs in the Italian automotive industry 
increased. Starting in the Eighties, employment in Southern Italian plants dropped in 
absolute numbers but grew in relative terms, i.e., by comparison with employment in 
Piedmont: in 2001, date of the last manufacturing census, jobs stemming directly from 
motor vehicle production in Italy were distributed more or less evenly between Piedmont
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and the South. In other words, the Piedmont/South ratio went from 1 to 10 to one to one in 
forty years.
This replacement of Turin by Southern Italy is even clearer if we look at data that 
are more strictly qualitative than employment figures alone. If we take production volumes, 
for instance, we will see that in the Nineties Turin’s Mirafiori and Rivalta59 plants saw their 
share of total production cut in half, dropping from over half a million to around 250,000 
vehicles. By contrast, production in the rest of Italy rose by 31%.
Table 5 .2-  Auto production and manufacturing employment in the Province of Turin
1993 1997 2001 2002 2003 1993-2005
Auto Production, Turin 571,472 568,368 374,379 306,000 250,000 -56.25%
Auto Production, Italy 593,128 1,059,232 897,384 819,769 776,454 30.91%
Piedmont/Italy (%) 49.07% 34.92% 29.44% 27.18% 24.35% -50.38%
Workers at Mirafiori, Rivalta 40,061 31,399 25,285 21,909 15,695 -60.82%
All workers in Turin (province) 880 879 916 912 924 5.0%
Mfg workers in Turin (province) 309 306 292 297 288 -6.8%
Source: Whitford and Enrietti, 2005 , p. 778
Additionally, we can look at the breakdown of total investments in fixed assets 
made in the periods 1982-1989 and 1990-1997 (table 5.2): the figures leave no doubt that 
investments were chiefly channeled into Southern Italian plants, rather than to the group’s 
long-established facilities -  which were mostly in the province of Turin and, in the case of 
Alfa Romeo, in Lombardy).
Table 5.3 -  Breakdown of investments in fixed assets 
______________________________________1982-1989___________ 1990-1997
South 33%  48%
Rest of Italy 59%  34%
Outside Italy 8%  18%
Source: Mariotti and Treves, 1999, p. 309
This process of shifting production to Southern Italy took place in two fairly distinct 
periods:
(i) in the Seventies, we see an increase that was above all quantitative, with the 
number of employees rising from slightly over 10,000 to more than 35,000. At the 
same time, manufacturing locations spread over virtually the entire South (in 1971, 
90% of all workers in the Southern regions were concentrated in Campania, 
whereas by 1981 sizeable numbers are also to be found in Lazio, Abruzzo and in 
Molise).
59 Production was discontinued at the latter facility in 2005.
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(ii) from the Eighties onwards, the replacement effect makes itself felt in relative terms;
above all, the Turin area’s marginalization as regards investments in process 
innovations becomes clear. This process will culminate in 1994 with the opening of 
the “Toyotist” plant in Melfi, which we will discuss in greater detail later.
Again starting in the Seventies, Fiat took this shift to Southern Italy one step further 
and began moving manufacturing operations offshore:
(i) in 1973, Fiat Automoveis was set up in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. In 1993, 
this plant employed some 8,000 people and production had reached 270,000 units.
(ii) in Argentina, Fiat began to establish a manufacturing presence during the Fifties. 
After a series of ups and downs, the situation stabilized with the establishment of a 
component production and assembly plant in Cordoba which in 1993 turned out
150,000 vehicles and 187,00 engines, providing jobs for almost 9,000 employees.
(iii) with Tofas, a joint venture set up in 1968 between Fiat and the local Koc Group, 
Fiat established a presence in Turkey, where the numbers are similar to those for 
Brazil and Argentina (9,000 employees and 200,000 vehicles produced in 1993).
(iv) and finally, Poland, site of Fiat’s major move offshore: dealings with Poland date 
back to the Twenties, and intensified in the Sixties when several popular models 
like the “126” were produced under license. Fiat’s presence in Poland reached its 
peak with the 1992 agreements that called for initial investments of approximately 
900 million dollars, to be followed by an additional 960 million over the next seven 
years, with an output of over 250,000 vehicles per year.
The milestone event in this process of internationalization, however, was “Project 
178” for worldwide production of a series of models based on a world-car platform. In its 
original form, the project called for investments in no fewer than ten developing countries: 
Brazil, Argentina, Turkey and Poland would be joined by Morocco, India, Russia, Egypt, 
South Africa and China, with an overall capacity of more than one million vehicles per year 
and total expenditures in excess of 1.4 billion dollars. Project 178 was Fiat’s most 
important strategic challenge in the last twenty years, and its failure, largely as a result of 
sluggish market conditions in many of the countries involved, is unanimously 
acknowledged to be one of the causes of the recent crisis. As a consequence, the project 
fell far short of expectations: though it got off to a good start with the 157,000 cars 
produced in Brazil in 1996, and the annual output of cars based on the 178 platform had 
shot up to nearly 450,000 only one year later, the numbers soon began to decline. By 
2001, production stood at only 350,000-odd units, as against the million called for in the 
original plans. Geographically, moreover, the hoped-for expansion was not achieved, and
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Fiat’s worldwide range remained substantially unchanged: in 2001,77% of production took 
place in Brazil, as against the 40% contemplated in the plans, the plant in Venezuela was 
shut down in 1999, those in China and Russia were never built, and manufacturing 
operations in Argentina were suspended in 2002 as a result of that county’s financial 
crisis60.
As can be seen, the internationalization of Fiat’s manufacturing operations had 
already begun in the days when the Fordist TPS was in full flower, but -  and this is what is 
most important for our purposes -  its effects in terms of deterritorialisation became plain 
only starting in the' Nineties. The question, obviously, is not one of straightforward 
substitution in terms of production volumes: as producing vehicles in Turin for export to 
Latin America or Eastern Europe would simply not be feasible, the jobs gained in the 
developing countries are not jobs lost in the Turin TPS61. As highlighted by Table X, the 
point, rather, is that we are dealing here with a strategy that sees the Turin TPS’s role in 
production as residual, and cuts investments in process innovation accordingly. We will 
return to this “technological-geographic replacement effect” in the section devoted to 
human resources.
5 2 .2 .2  Intensifying the relationships with other OEMs
Alongside its process of relocating and internationalizing through greenfield 
investments in Southern Italy and the developing world, Fiat has since the Fifties made 
efforts to increase its critical mass by means of acquisitions and strategic alliances. There 
were three key moments in this endeavor62:
(i) The 1968 agreement with Citroen
(ii) The 1985 agreement with Ford
(iii) The 2000 agreement with General Motors
In 1967, Fiat disposed of its holdings in Simca in order to free up the energy and 
resources needed to take up a significant equity interest in Citroen, where Fiat’s holdings 
reached 26.9% in February 1970. However, the boost that Fiat planned to give to this
60 Though there were a number of important market factors over which Fiat management had no control in 
the latter case, it should be noted that Volkswagen and Citroen have already resumed production, gaining 
a “first-strike advantage" and carving off ever-larger slices of the Argentine market.
61 In this sense, and from a purely territorial standpoint, the Turin TPS’s real competitor is to be found in 
Fiat’s plants in Southern Italy. This is clear from the events of the last two years, with the two areas fighting 
a sort of “turf war” over their respective allotments of domestic production.
62 In addition to these three main agreements, we should for the sake of completeness mention the
acquisition of Spain’s Seat (from which Fiat withdrew in 1981, and was replaced by Volkswagen as
majority shareholder) and the 1998 bid for Volvo, where Fiat lost out to Ford.
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partnership, pooling research and manufacturing efforts and integrating the two brands’ 
product lineups, met with stiff resistance from the French side: a resistance that was 
motivated by economic and strategic considerations (viz., the desire to maintain the 
Citroen brand’s identity, and the specter of increased competition on their home markets 
raised by both Peugeot and Renault), as well as by national pride (De Gaulle saw the 
French maker’s takeover by a foreign company as little short of a slap in the face). As a 
result, convergence between the two OEMs deadlocked, and in 1973 the agreement was 
terminated63.
The next development was the start of negotiations for a merger between Fiat Auto 
and Ford Europe. Initially, the agreement on the table called for rationalizing the two major 
European automakers’ supplier portfolios and, at most, making a few cars in common. As 
soon as the parties realized that the savings thus achieved would not justify the operation, 
the stakes were upped to a full-scale merger between the two car divisions. Here as with 
Citroen, the talks fell through because of a total inability to agree on who would control the 
merged company: Ford proposed that Fiat would take charge for seven years, after which 
management would pass permanently to Ford. The Italians, however, refused.
Finally, March 2000 saw the important agreement between Fiat Auto and GM. This 
accord, which was widely touted as decisive for the future of the Italian automotive 
industry, merits discussion in some depth. In exchange for 20% of Fiat Auto, the latter 
acquired a 5.7% stake in GM, becoming the largest single stockholder in the world’s 
biggest automaker with holdings worth 2.5 billion dollars. The agreement also provided for 
a put option giving Fiat the right to sell the remainder of its automotive division to GM in 
January 2004. Despite this agreement, which was intended to achieve major cost savings 
and rationalize the design and production processes, Fiat saw its sales plummet in the first 
years of the new millennium, with disastrous repercussions on the group’s finances. Debt 
continued to mount, with the ever-present risk that the lending banks would convert the 
amounts owed by Fiat into equity in the company, resulting in a change in its ownership 
structure. In these conditions, while Fiat’s right to exercise the put option was practically a 
bankable asset, GM was struggling under the weight of the crippling cash problems and 
poor credit ratings triggered by its disappointing market performance in both Europe and 
the United States, and was also faced with an uncertain future should it be dragged 
against its will into restructuring Fiat. The Detroit group thus found itself penalized by 
falling share prices at the same time that the rating agencies had downgraded GM’s credit 
in expectation of just such a denouement, making it all the more costly to raise new 
money. In March 2005, Fiat’s own problems pushed the group to turn its holdings in the
63 In 1973, Michelin was to sell its Citroen holdings to Peugeot, respecting that "national preference” so 
dear to the hearts of French politicians.
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US maker into ready money: desperate to scrape together the cash needed to pull itself 
out of debt, Fiat sold its stake in GM for 1.16 billion dollars64. This was less than the 
amount it had invested only two years before, but enough to get out from under the sword 
of Damocles represented by the bank’s three billion euro convertible loan facility, at least 
for the time being.
From the strategic and manufacturing standpoint, the Fiat-GM alliance could have 
had major repercussions on Fiat’s local ties and those of its supplier pool, particularly as a 
result of setting up the two joint ventures contemplated by the agreement:
(i) GM-Fiat Worldwide Purchasing BV, headquartered at the Opel facilities in
Germany and run by an American CEO, and
(ii) Fiat-GM Powertrain, with headquarters in Turin and an Italian CEO.
While the reforms in procurement and supply policy will be discussed in the next 
section, it should be noted here that the convergence in engine and transmission types 
brought about by the second joint venture would have entailed a reorganization of 
powertrain manufacturing operations whose impact on production in the Turin area was 
never estimated in any detail65. Nevertheless, the total number of powertrain systems 
would have dropped from 32 (16 made by Fiat and 16 by GM) to 19 once the partnership 
was up and running at full steam, saving the two makers 2 billion euros in 2005. Clearly, 
then, certain Fiat engines would have seen an increase in their production while others 
would have been abandoned, but the question of which geographical areas would have 
ended up as winners and which would have lost out was never openly addressed.
5.2.2.3 Conclusions
The separation into two distinct periods that we have taken as the basis for our 
interpretation is clear from an analysis of Fiat’s strategies: a first period of strong structural 
coupling between Fiat and the Turin area was followed by a second stage of 
delocalization. This process is perfectly recognizable from the group’s corporate tactics as 
a whole. As a result, in fact, the policy of diversification, differentiation and expansion 
embarked on in the mid-Seventies and stepped up in the Eighties and Nineties inevitably 
loosened Fiat’s ties to the local productive fabric, though without solving the automaker’s 
productivity problems or helping it become more competitive:
64 The full scope of this “divorce” between Fiat and GM, and its connotations as a “new departure” for the 
Turin-based auto maker, has been effectively summed up as “the major event of the new year” (Bemacchi, 
2005,a).
65 Now that the agreement has fallen through, the question of impact is irrelevant as well as unverifiable.
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(i) diversification extended into sectors that were far removed from Fiat’s core 
business and the Turin area, sapping their learning processes of their strength and 
draining away resources that could have been used to reorganize the automotive 
value chain;
(ii) the Turin plants’ share of production has dropped steadily, and not even the launch 
of new models between 2004 and 2005 halted the move away from the area. As 
can be seen from Table X, the aftershocks of Italy’s shrinking motor vehicle 
production were largely felt in the Province of Turin, while in the rest of Italy -  
thanks in part to the special tax concessions for manufacturing facilities in 
Southern Italy -  output remained substantially unchanged;
(iii) as we will see in the following section, the rationalization of production platforms 
and purchasing arrangements that resulted from the General Motors agreement 
weakened the links -  shaky enough to begin with -  between Fiat and its Turin-area 
component supply chain.
5.3 The creation of the automotive TPS.
In this section, we will attempt to identify the relational dimensions that led to the 
emergence and consolidation of an automotive TPS between Fiat’s foundation and the 
end of the Seventies. As part of this effort, we will discuss the points of contact -  and of 
friction -  between this system and the Fordist production organization that for so many 
years was the dominant image that Fiat projected onto the Turin area. In this connection, 
our attention will center chiefly on Fiat’s relationships with its suppliers, a focus motivated 
by two sets of reasons:
(i) the first is that the literature on learning regions is unanimous in viewing the close 
customer-supplier relationship as one of the main mechanisms whereby territorially 
embedded learning processes come into being and tacit knowledge is fed into the 
network;
(ii) the second is that, faced with the complex array of variables that a systemic 
approach would have to take into consideration, our analysis must be “placed” by 
using a standpoint which -  given the predominant role that the relationships 
between enterprise competitiveness and territory have in our investigation -  is 
necessarily that of the enterprises belong to the TPS.
At this stage, we will make no distinction between the subsystem of multinational 
corporations and that of the local enterprises, as the trends that involve both can never be 
entirely unraveled from the overall trends in which outsourcing as such is caught up.
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5.3.1 Relationships with suppliers.
If we hope to understand how Turin’s automotive system can be regarded as a 
TPS, going beyond the overworked image of the one-company town, we cannot ignore the 
relationships that Fiat has maintained with an assemblage of small and medium 
enterprises which continued to hold together even in Fiat’s Fordist heyday. In particular, 
we postulate that:
(i) the localized learning process distinguishing the automotive TPS would not be 
conceivable only in terms of Fiat’s own management of cognitive and innovative 
processes, but must be contextualized in a productive fabric consisting of a 
multitude of players who interact in a complex web of relationships: suppliers, 
competitors, competitor-suppliers, enterprises doing business in similar sectors, 
and so forth;
(ii) even in the years when the “Fordist orthodoxy” was at its peak, the fact that there 
continued to be a plurality of enterprises, however much they may have differed in 
competitiveness, entrepreneurship and independence from Fiat, made it possible 
to reassemble and reorganize localized knowledge into structures that -  and this 
will be a hypothesis we will address in the subsequent chapters -  that were 
different in nature.
Here, we would like to direct attention to how the web of local SMEs played a 
fundamental role in making the Turin area an automotive TPS, and not simply a one- 
company town.
In this connection, it can be instructive to return to the analysis that Cristiano 
Antonelli (1999) conducted of the relationship between technological innovation and an 
undertaking’s growth. From a perspective that is purely -  and programmatically -  
microeconomic, Antonelli attempts to offer an explanation of why there is a positive link 
between factor productivity and output growth that goes beyond the traditional 
macroeconomic and microeconomic explanations formulated by Kantor and Penrose 
respectively. Antonelli’s theoretical stance hinges on two basic concepts, that of 
replacement costs and that of localized knowledge. As Antonelli puts it:
Replacement costs can be defined as the costs of changing the firms’ existing 
production process and organization with a given technology because of the 
indivisibility, interdependence and incompatibility of different inputs generated by 
dimensional combinations other than those that were originally planned (Antonelli, 
1999, p. 344).
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Antonelli’s thesis is that, when replacement costs are particularly high, firms may 
find that it is advantageous to maintain the same set of inputs while striving to increase 
their efficiency through technological innovations centering on localized knowledge:
In this context, particular relevance attaches to the process of accumulating tacit 
knowledge based on learning from experience, and more in particular on learning 
by doing, learning by using, learning by interacting with customers, and learning by 
purchasing. Here, learning is understood as a product which is closely associated 
with the production process, and takes on all of the features of joint production. It 
is, in other words, a highly focused activity based on the specific skills gained by 
each individual player acting in his own market setting and technological 
environment (Antonelli, 1999, p. 345).
This approach, which at first glance might appear to be consistent with our 
assumptions concerning TPSs, in reality restricts its attention to the localized 
knowledge held by the dominant firm -  Fiat in this case -  and does not, in the light of 
fact, consider learning by purchasing, i.e., the role that suppliers and component 
makers have had in influencing Fiat’s competitiveness and that of the Turin area’s 
manufacturing system.
The question that remains open here concerns why we are unable to explain 
certain moments of discontinuity in the history of Fiat’s relationships with the surrounding 
territory. In particular, it is not clear why, just when it was severing most of its relationships 
with its small-to-medium sized suppliers in the Turin area, Fiat decided to embrace new 
forms of organization based on lean production by opening a new plant in Melfi, far from 
Turin. In other words, the question is: why did Fiat accept huge replacement costs 
(construction of a whole new factory), rather than introducing innovation by using the 
localized knowledge it already had at its Turin plants? As we will see in the second part of 
this chapter, this decision can be better explained as part of a conscious, deliberate 
process of moving away from Turin, a process which relied heavily on systematic cuts in 
Fiat’s supply arrangements with SMEs in the Turin area.
Another limitation of centering an interpretation on the microeconomic scale of the 
enterprise consists of the fact that regarding only the localized tacit knowledge found 
within the boundaries of the single major firm as important does not explain the continued 
existence and survival of the many fundamental firms -  all “independent” of Fiat -  that 
have had a crucial role in the history of the automotive TPS. I refer here to the 
bodybuilder-designers who made Turin one of the world’s capitals of automotive styling. If 
it is true that Antonelli is right to say that Fiat is the only automaker in Turin or in all of Italy 
to survive independently for more than a century -  and thus to assign major importance to 
the cognitive processes at work within the company -  it is equally true that bodybuilder-
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designers like Pininfarina, Bertone, Giugiaro, Stola and others have always maintained a 
certain independence from Fiat as styling centers in their own right and, what is even more 
important, as bodywork producers and assemblers for other car makers who compete with 
Fiat. In this sense, even though these firms do not produce or market cars of their own, a 
number of factors66 make them Fiat’s quasi-competitors. As a result, the microeconomic 
explanation centering on Fiat alone is not entirely adequate.
If we look at the data for the Province of Turin between 1971 and 1981 (Table 5.4), 
we will see that all of the sectors that are in any way connected to the automotive industry 
saw a sharp rise in the number of local units
Table 5.4 -  Number of local units in the Province of Turin, 1971-1981 
Sector
34 - M O TO R  V E H IC LE S , TR A ILE R S  A N D  S E M ITR A ILE R S
(S)
C 25 -  R U B B ER  A N D  PLA STIC  A R TIC LES0  c
1  26 -  N O N M E TA L M IN ER A L P R O D U C T S
o
°  28 -  M ETAL P R O D U C TS ; EXC LU D IN G  M A C H IN E R Y  A N D  E Q U IP M E N T
29 -  M EC H A N IC A L E Q U IP M E N T  A N D  M A C H IN E R Y
c/>
o  3 0 -  IT  S Y S T E M S  A N D  O F F IC E  M A C H IN E R Y  o  
o>
5  31 - O T H E R  ELEC TR IC A L E Q U IP M E N T  A N D  M A C H IN E R Y
a  ro
°  33 -  M ED IC A L A N D  P R E C IS IO N  E Q U IP M E N T
*1 9 7 1 = 1 0 0
Source: Istat 19 7 1 ,1 9 8 1
The data show that between 1971 and 1981 there was a significant increase in the 
number of enterprises making up the local manufacturing system. With a distinction as 
made in Porter’s diamond model of competitive advantage, we can divide the firms that 
are linked in various ways to the automotive TPS into two groups: component 
manufacturers and capital goods producers.
For component manufacturers, or in other words that part of the local production 
fabric that is directly involved in the vehicle value chain, growth in the motor vehicle, trailer 
and semitrailer sector amounted to 32% in this one decade alone. Growth was even
66 For example, all of these bodybuilder-deslgners present prototypes that they have developed and 
patented under their own names, rather than simply as suppliers to major auto makers, at motor shows 
around the world. Nor is it a coincidence that these firms work in the coachbuilding sector, i.e., the setting 
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stronger in the areas of rubber and plastic articles (68%) and metal products (52%), two 
sectors that, while not working exclusively for automakers, nevertheless represent a 
sizeable portion of the firms that depend on them in some way, and particularly of the 
second and third tier suppliers that are not statistically classified as part of the auto sector.
The important thing that should be recognized here is that this growth in the areas 
depending directly or indirectly on the auto industry did not take place in a period when 
Fiat was increasing its competitiveness and output, but against the backdrop of market 
stagnation that followed the worldwide oil crisis and labour unrest that culminated in the 
strikes staged during the so-called "hot autumn” of 1968. The decision to outsource part of 
production as the first step in the deverticalization of the Fordist-Taylorist setup thus 
stemmed from a deliberate effort on the part of management to make the group’s 
organization more flexible along two fronts, viz., those of:
(i) labour relations, as most of the newborn firms had very low levels of union
membership, and
(ii) production, by shifting the burden of technologies, costs and scheduling -  and
hence the enterprise risk -  onto medium-small suppliers.
Seen in this light, we can say that this wave of outsourcing took place in a context 
of high structural coupling -  imposing a hybrid relational field between hierarchy and 
market that will have important consequences on the fortunes of the entire TPS -  between 
Fiat and those who could be considered to all intents and purposes as “outside units” or 
mere job shops. From the standpoint of organizational synthesis, by contrast, the links 
were extremely frail: the fledgling suppliers took no part in territorially embedded learning 
processes of any kind, were not involved in Fiat’s engineering decisions and could not -  
both because of their own organizational and cultural limits, and because such were the 
dictates of their sole customer -  do business on the open market, diversifying their 
customer portfolio. This does not mean that cognitive learning processes did not take 
place within this web of small and medium enterprises, but only that these forms of 
learning were unlikely to result in the systematic production of new codified knowledge, 
and tended to stress innovations in processes (necessary in order to survive each new 
turn of the screw by Fiat), rather than in the product. In other words, the knowledge 
generated in this subsystem did not come into contact, or did so only sporadically, with the 
TPS’s broader cognitive processes, which centered on Fiat as the dominant player. 
Despite this ingrained flaw, and as we shall see in the following sections, once these 
enterprises had weathered the Eighties, they were able to play an important role in 
converting learning processes in new sectors and new areas of specialization.
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Two types of supplier warrant specific attention: the major component 
manufacturers controlled by the Fiat group, and Turin’s bodybuilders and body designers. 
Though co-design as such did not burst on the scene until the Eighties, the contribution of 
these two categories of supplier to the cognitive processes operating in the Turin area has 
always been crucial to the TPS’s competitive dynamics. As we mentioned earlier, most of 
the area’s bodybuilders and designers sprang directly from the same primordial ooze that 
gave life to Turin’s motor vehicle industry, in the same state of near-perfect competition 
between hundreds of carmakers that preceded Fiat’s rise to dominance. Pininfarina started 
business in 1930, Bertone as long ago as 1912, producing horse-drawn carriages, Stola in 
1919. And even if they are less venerable, Turin’s other big names in automotive styling 
were founded well before the first major wave of outsourcing in the Seventies67: Itca in 
1951, Coggiola in 1966, Giugiaro’s Italdesign in 1968. Above all, they are all firms that 
originated in the pre-Fordist (or artisanal) days of the automotive industry, when European 
producers normally offered their more expensive models in chassis-only versions, letting 
customers go to the custom coachbuilder of their choice68. These companies played an 
essential role in reproducing the engineering knowledge underlying the automotive TPS, 
and continue to do so today. They conceived, and even more importantly, built the most 
important models in Italian automotive history, from the first Isotta Fraschinis to the latest 
Ferraris, as well as designing and styling the majority of the cars turned out by the Fiat 
group. As for the major component manufacturers, it should be noted that most of Fiat’s 
suppliers in the period preceding the upheavals of the Eighties were small and medium 
enterprises. The most significant exceptions were firms with two fundamental 
characteristics:
(i) a long history in the Turin area: Riv was founded in 1906, Magneti Marelli in 1919, 
Teksid, though a latecomer who arrived on the scene in 1978, was a spinoff from 
Fiat’s foundry operations which date back to 1917 with the acquisition of Ferriere 
Piemontese and Industrie Metallurgiche Torinesi, while the Gilardini group (part of 
Magneti Marelli since 1995) was formed in the Fifties from a merger with a flexible 
tubing manufacturer founded in 1921, the Compagnia Italiana Tubi Metallici 
Flessibili;
(ii) a deep-seated organizational contiguity with Fiat: Magneti Marelli was set up with a 
direct investment by Fiat, Teksid was an offshoot of Fiat’s metallurgical business, 
the Gilardini group was sold to Fiat in 1976, and Riv came into being at the direct 
initiative of Fiat’s founder, the elder Giovanni Agnelli.
671.DE.A, established in 1978, is the only exception.
68 Coachbuilders like Coggiola still have skilled craftsmen who make the bodywork for the Rolls Royces of
emirs and princes “by hand”, with drop hammers and wooden forms.
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As regards the second major subsystem, i.e., that of capital goods producers, all of 
the sectors considered saw skyrocketing growth in the decade between 1971 and 1981 
(mechanical equipment and machinery rose by 42%, electrical equipment and machinery 
by 59%, and measurement and control equipment by an astounding 250%). Here, there 
can be no doubt that the most direct link with the automotive system is Comau (the Italian 
acronym for Machine Tool Consortium), an association formed in 1973 to manage the 
commercial activities of the Turin area producers who were involved in setting up Fiat’s 
Togliattigrad Vaz plant in Russia, and which morphed into a true corporation in 1978, 
through the merger of such historic names in machine tool production as MST, Morando, 
IMP and Colubra Lamsat, who had in their own time snapped up any number of firms 
operating in Turin and Piedmont since the Thirties. The most important point that should 
be noted is that Comau belonged to the Fiat group from the outset, and its position in the 
local production system is a somewhat ambiguous one. On the one hand, Comau is 
integrated to all effects in the Fiat Group and is thus part of the Turin-based multinational’s 
hierarchical organization, following it on the road to globalization by opening plants near 
Fiat’s new facilities around the world. On the other hand, Comau has gradually 
transformed itself from a machine tool manufacturer into an automotive production system 
designer and integrator for all of the major car makers. This transformation provided a 
major impetus to the growth of Turin’s capital goods industry by multiplying the supply 
opportunities open to local SMEs, who thus became very much a part of the processes for 
learning, reproducing and extending technical knowledge in the area. In this sense, it could 
be claimed that this network of capital goods producers gained entry to Turin’s motor 
vehicle TPS not just through a process of structural coupling (supply arrangements, 
external economies, and so forth), but also through a process of organizational synthesis 
whereby they were able to access cognitive pathways that, as we will see, will prove to be 
so decisive after 1980.
In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the local firms specializing in mechanical 
components and, to a certain extent, those specializing in electronics, have played a 
fundamental part in the creation of an automotive TPS in the Turin area, extending the 
reach of those cognitive processes that make up a Productive Territorial System well 
beyond the confines of the corporation that expresses the system most forcefully.
5.3.2 Relationships with the labour market.
Relationships with the labour market are fundamental to an understanding of the 
Productive Territorial System, first because we must not forget that whenever a TPS is
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formed, it is always founded on positive externalities69, and that the quantity and the 
quality of the labour market has traditionally ranked alongside the presence of the kind of 
specialized suppliers discussed in the preceding section as one of the chief foci of any 
attempt to come to grips with external economies. And not only: labour market pooling is 
one of the major points of contact between the interpretations of externalities proposed by 
the NEG and NIG models. The point, in the economy we are dealing with here, is one of 
understanding the specific contributions that relationships with the labour market have 
made in the formation of an automotive TPS and, consequently, in bringing about certain 
learning processes -  i.e., in terms of Organization and not sipnply of Structure. In this 
connection, it should be noted that the role of the labour market in the TPS goes far 
beyond the stereotypes of the one-company town, which oversimplify the Ford-Taylorist 
(Amin, 1994) relationships between capital and labour in the scheme in a number of 
respects:
(i) the deep divide between unskilled workers, skilled workers, engineers and other 
technical specialists, and white-collar employees;
(ii) the differences in levels of union membership and in employers’ attitudes towards 
labour organizations;
(iii) the decisive influence that production outsourcing has on trade union organizations 
as well as on technical learning processes.
In this context, two aspects are especially relevant to us here:
(i) the relationship between production organization and learning processes, and
(ii) the relationship between learning processes and how industrial relations are 
managed.
Though these two aspects can in theory be separated, the links between the two 
dynamics are in reality strong and indivisible, given that Fiat has traditionally pursued its 
corporate growth goals through combined strategies that blended production organization 
with management of industrial relations in an apparently seamless whole.
Any analysis that hopes to clarify the role of the labour market subsystem in 
training and development must start from the context -  and the skills -  where Turin’s 
automotive industry arose and took its first steps. Already by the end of the nineteenth
69 Clearly, a TPS differs from simple agglomerations or qualitatively more sophisticated types of grouping 
like clusters of industrial districts in that the presence of external economies is a necessary condition, but 
is not in itself sufficient. These externalities, in fact, must have consequences in terms of Organization and 
not just in terms of Structure.
137
century, the electrical and mechanical industries had largely replaced textiles -  i.e., silk 
and cotton processing -  as the drivers of economic growth in Piedmont, gradually 
attracting more and more local capital in the latter’s search for new and more profitable 
investments. On the one hand, the Turin area had a class of highly skilled metalworkers 
drawn from the tradition of the House of Savoy’s royal arsenals and from bicycle and 
carriage making. And from the mid-nineteenth onwards, Turin could boast a number of 
institutions providing the highly specialized technical education70 needed to produce 
engineering-literate middle managers for the new sectors spearheading the second 
industrial revolution. As Rugafiori writes:
[...] the decisive factor for the new Fabbrica Italiana di Automobili (author’s note: 
Fiat) was precisely that the local system offered exactly those resources -  financial 
and entrepreneurial, as well as technical, manual and cultural -  in exactly that 
critical moment, when the firm could still get under way without being too far behind 
its competitors in Italy and, especially, those outside the country, or at least not so 
far behind that it would be unable to catch up. (Rugafiori 1999, p. 179)
This was a core of knowledge that reproduced itself over the approximately 150 
years of industrial history in Turin and Piedmont through a territorially embedded learning 
process, and through a continual cross-fertilization of codified knowledge-represented by 
the area’s engineering schools and the like -  and tacit knowledge -  as embodied in a 
class of skilled workers whose descendants can still be found today in the workshops of 
the great car designers and prototype makers. In other words, this is something very close 
to what we identified in the previous chapters as the primary feature of the TPS’s 
organization. The very fact that this knowledge has been translated over the years into so 
many different, specialized, forms of production -  weaponry, carriages, bicycles, motor 
vehicles, capital goods and machine tools, robots and measuring instruments, office 
machinery, electronics, telecommunications and so forth -  is a confirmation of the 
systemic hypothesis that sees a TPS as characterized by an organizational continuity (a 
cognitive process) that only later finds an opportunity to translate itself into a given 
specialization and a given structural setup. We will return to the centrality of the learning 
processes in the mechanical and electrical industries -  skills that later spilled over into 
electronics -  in the next chapter, when we will attempt a reformulation of the Turin
70 The area’s first engineering school, the Scuola di Applicazione per Ingegneri -  which became the Regio
Politecnico di Turin in 1906 -  started operating in 1860, first with a degree program in civil engineering,
followed in 1879 with a degree program in industrial engineering. The first institution devoted to
electrotechnical education, the Scuola Superiore di Elettrotecnica directed by Galileo Ferraris, was
founded in 1888, becoming the Istituto Elettrotecnico Nazionale Galileo Ferraris in 1934.
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Productive Territorial System -  or systems -  in the light of exactly these cognitive 
processes.
At this point, however, our analysis will concentrate on the relationship between the 
TPS revolving around Fiat and the knowledge base that supports Turin’s manufacturing 
tradition and is incarnated, as it were, in its workforce. In particular, what we want to 
emphasis is the ambiguity of the relationship -  one of dependence, but also of antagonism 
-  that has linked the area’s automotive TPS and its human resources.
Though Fiat will be forever associated with the introduction of Ford-Taylorism, its 
embrace of scientific management principles was in reality far less direct and by no means 
all-pervasive: while the dominant view of history71 emphasizes the trips that the elder 
Giovanni Agnelli made to Detroit in 1906 and 1911, his admiration for the Model T -  an 
admiration that inspired the launch of the Fiat Zero, a car that cost 7,000 lire as opposed to 
the sixteen or seventeen thousand lire sticker price of the other Italian mid-size autos of 
the day -  there is no lack of contrary evidence. Volpato argues convincingly that we 
cannot speak of mass production before the Thirties: thus, the first car that Fiat aimed at a 
wider market -  the 508 Balilla -  did not come out until 1932, and it was only in 1936 that 
the first true economy car72 bearing the Fiat brand made its appearance -  the 500, 
nicknamed “Topolino” because of its fancied resemblance to Mickey Mouse (Volpato, 
2004).
At the Lingotto plant, for example, "Topolino" production was organized into 
departments, with assembly proceeding on three parallel lines, one for the engine, 
one for the chassis, and one for the body. Among its other features, the vehicle 
had a true chassis frame, on which the driveline components, engine and 
bodywork were installed in sequence by work “crews”. These crews are a typical 
feature of an organization that still relies on craftsmanship, as opposed to the 
individual work stations we see in fully fledged moving assembly line mass 
production. Each crew was made up of workers with a whole range of 
qualifications: the foreman in charge, followed by skilled workers, semiskilled 
workers, unskilled laborers and apprentices. These categories were subject to the 
typical rules of the craft trades: to move from one rung to the next, for example, an 
aspirant had to produce proof of his skill (the “masterpiece”), a demonstration of 
ability that Fiat still required in the Seventies (Volpato 2004, p. 41)
This thesis is borne out by the figures for productivity, measured as the number of 
vehicles produced per worker per year, which stayed at around 2 for approximately forty 
years, right up to the mid-Fifties. At that point, it began to grow exponentially, reaching and
71 See, for example, the comprehensive history of Fiat produced by Castronovo (2005).
72 The Balilla, in fact, cost more or less as much as a small city apartment.
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then exceeding seven vehicles per worker in 1960. In other words, it would not be going to 
far to say that throughout the first half of Fiat’s manufacturing history, production was still 
anchored in its craft origins, and the skills and values (“doing the job right”) that were 
traditionally rooted in Turin’s workforce have had a substantial role in the evolution of the 
area’s automotive TPS73. The first major break with this tradition came in the Sixties, when 
increasing standardization in production -  once limited to assembly procedures -  began to 
affect machining operations as well. Machine tools were redesigned to process a single 
type of workpiece, carrying out a single operation, with a single cutting tool. In other words, 
the skills required of a machinist -  once capable of performing several processing 
operations with different tools -  were drastically scaled back, reducing his chances for 
professional advancement and social mobility within the factory. Where the “crew” was 
once a many-faceted organism bringing different skills and job qualifications, it is now a 
harshly polarized dichotomy: on the one hand, we have the generic, one-size-fits-all 
workman, often hailing from Southern Italy and equipped with very little in the way of 
technical training, engaged in numbingly repetitive routines. And on the other hand we 
have the foreman, no longer bringing his own specific skills to the job, but mostly just 
keeping tabs on the amount of work his team is able to put out. This was a recipe for the 
tension between capital and labour that was to have such negative effects from the 
Seventies onwards:
(i) sharp contrasts between generic workers and foremen;
(ii) steady erosion of the know-how available at the factory;
(iii) growing dissatisfaction with the quality of their jobs among workmen, and even
among the aristocracy of skilled workers.
The most striking result of this process was the rise in absenteeism, which by the 
early Seventies led to a loss of 18.88% of all working hours: in absolute terms, this means 
that in the first seven months of 1973, an average of 19,500 people out of a total of 
200,570 failed to show up for work on any given day.
For the purposes of our analysis, it is important to recognize two specific aspects of 
this widening gulf between management and the workforce. The first concerns how 
industrial relations were systematically used since the first decade of the twentieth century 
to bring the aspirations of the better-qualified workers back down to earth. Until the 
Seventies, when work crews were finally abandoned, labour relations had much more at 
stake than higher wages or better working conditions: to a very real extent, disputes
73 Note that the importance of craftsmanship and the kinds of production organization based on it was
even higher in the truck industry and in the aeronautical and marine sectors.
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centered on who was to wield authority at the plant. Fiat workers, most of whom came 
from small-scale sectors such as carriage and bicycle production with high levels of 
craftsmanship, put up a spirited resistance to the introduction of scientific management 
principles: emblematic of this resistance was the defence of piecework contracts -  
characteristic of production organizations that allowed workers to work at their own speed 
and paid them according to the quantity produced -  that marked the majority of the labour 
disputes in the first forty years of the twentieth century. The attempt to reduce reliance on 
piecework, and tie it in with the worker’s acceptance of Taylor-inspired reforms in work 
organization, that took place midway through the Twenties with the introduction of the 
Bedaux system74 gave rise to numerous conflicts that concluded with the latter system’s 
abolition in 1934. As a result, piecework earnings in 1936 came to 90-95% of traditional 
wages. Essentially, what lay at the heart of the matter were not the usual wage claims and 
so on, but a combination of class consciousness and the workers’ awareness of their own 
technical skills -  a combination aided by the fact that, with production booming, 
mechanization still in its nonage, and methods of organization that continued in the main to 
be those of the artisan’s workshop, the labour supply found that it had a relative advantage 
over capital. This process pushed the more highly skilled portions of the workforce to the 
forefront of the labour movement, leading to a period of turmoil and strikes that culminated 
in the occupation of Fiat’s plants in 1920. Fiat took many steps in the course of its history 
to weaken the more militant arm of the workforce, so many that we are unable to discuss 
them all here. We will thus limit ourselves to two sets of seemingly contradictory measures 
that are of particular relevance to our analysis. Through these measures, Fiat:
(i) introduced new training methods, and;
(ii) filled its plants with massive influxes of unskilled workers.
In the first area, Fiat founded its first training center, the Scuola Allievi Fiat, in 1921, 
with enrolment largely restricted to employees’ children and close relatives. In its second 
line of action, Fiat hired enormous numbers of poorly educated workers, first from the 
Piedmontese countryside and later from eastern and southern Italy: a effort it capped with 
the mass hiring of 15,000 workers in 197875. Though these two types of measure would
74 "The Bedaux system was presented, not as a simple piecework pay scale, but as a scientific method for 
measuring the amount of physical energy expended by the worker, and expressed this effort in terms of a 
unit that represented the standard amount of work to be performed in one minute” (Musso 1999, p. 185).
75 As Bonazzi (1999) notes, Fiat scraped the bottom of the labour barrel on this occasion, when most of
the new hires were women and young people who were entirely innocent of even the most elementary
technical credentials. The effect was in many ways devastating: the new employees had none of the class
consciousness of the previous generations, but were nonetheless prone to claim a full complement of their
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appear to be at odds with each other, they had the combined effect of reducing the 
importance of skilled labour. The Scuola Allievi Fiat, in fact, set out to produce technical 
specialists and supervisors cast in the Ford-Taylorist mould who could replace the 
foremen drawn from the ranks of Turin’s metalworking elite, while the flood of unskilled 
labour watered down the workforce, leaving its fervently unionized, anarcho-syndicalist 
elements high and dry. These hirings, in any case, took place in periods of market growth, 
and were regularly followed by wholesale layoffs, particularly of the more politically active 
skilled workers. By ensuring turnover, they thus became a way of reshaping the workforce 
into more amenable form. As we mentioned earlier, this process was to take over thirty 
years to reach completion, as the work crews still retained pre-Fordist organizational 
structures at the beginning of the Fifties, and piecework had not yet disappeared.
The second aspect of the deepening rift between capital and skilled labour that is 
important to our analysis concerns the fate of those skills that, as could be expected, did 
not vanish into thin air. From the end of the war onwards, there was a complete turnaround 
in the relations between Fiat and that section of the labour market that embodied the 
knowledge we have identified as central to the learning processes that are the hallmark of 
Turin’s productive system. From the time Fiat was founded until the Fifties, skilled workers 
saw being taken on by Fiat as the crowning moment of a process of empowerment that 
often began in smaller metalworking factories or with other carmakers. This sense of 
privilege did not stem only from the fact that wages were higher at Fiat and the company 
offered better opportunities and a plumper benefits package: above all, it was because 
being hired by Fiat was an acknowledgement of the worker’s excellence -  as witnessed by 
the proofs of skill that we have seen governed advancement in the hierarchy of the factory 
floor. Steadily and inexorably, the spread of scientific management -  cutting into the 
leeway workers had to organize their own time and social contacts at the plant -  the 
isolation or firing of the more politically-minded workers, the ill-feeling towards the new 
unskilled hires from the South76, and the foreman’s transformation into little more than a 
clipboard-toting stopwatch operator, if not indeed into a species of policeman and stool 
pigeon rolled into one, all caused workers to view their jobs at Fiat with deepening 
dissatisfaction. This change in attitude sparked an exodus of the more highly skilled 
workers towards other parts of the metalworking sector, and in particular towards the small 
and medium enterprises that were then springing up in response to the first wave of 
outsourcing, as well as towards machine tool and capital goods manufacturers and 
companies specializing in design and prototyping. In a certain sense, we can say that
social rights and free time at the workplace. The de-skilling of the craftsman and his supervisors was thus 
brought to completion, but at the cost of a substantial loss of control over the shop floor.
76 On the significance of the migratory flows that affected the TPS and the city as a whole from the Fifties 
onwards, see Fofi (1964) and Negri (1982).
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these skills fell into slumber after the Fifties: though they were to play an important part in 
guaranteeing the flexibility of the SMEs that depended on Fiat for a livelihood and could 
survive its monopsonistic demands only through the know-how of generations of able 
workmen, but their direct involvement in the Fiat automotive TPS would necessarily be 
limited. They were to reawaken after the Eighties, when a growing awareness that the Fiat 
TPS was cutting its moorings to the Turin area prompted observers and policy makers to 
raise questions about the other structures - or in other words, the other areas of 
specialization -  that were also repositories of the mechanical and electric knowledge 
underlying the system.
In the picture we are attempting to outline -  one depicting the Turin’s automotive 
industry at its Fordist pinnacle as a TPS -  we can thus conclude that the relationship 
between Fiat and the labour market evolved from the Fifties onwards largely in terms of 
structural coupling, applying the eminently Taylorist tenets of hiring poorly qualified labour 
and marginalizing the more highly skilled portions of the workforce. Throughout this 
evolution, two processes rode in tandem: the "scientific” reorganization of production, and 
the strategic manipulation of labour relations. Above all, the demands of this structural 
coupling between capital and labour -  on the same baldly contractual basis as any other 
exchange of goods -  were to have a profound effect on the structure of the city, inundated 
by thousands of unabsorbed workers housed in immense bedroom communities on the 
outskirts of town. The tradition of "doing the job right” expressed by the learning processes 
that were the foundation of the organizational synthesis between capital and labour in the 
first years of Fiat’s life was pushed further and further aside. This is by no means the same 
as saying that Fiat was nothing more than an empty shell, all its technical skills drained 
away. Nevertheless, though the more dedicated sections of management and a class of 
technicians and engineers worked steadfastly on, swinging between triumph and crisis, it 
is also true that, from the Fifties to the Eighties, they did so in a rigidly organized work 
hierarchy which permitted a bare minimum of strictly codified interaction and involvement 
in learning processes that was a far cry from the German and Japanese approach to 
worker participation in decision-making.
5.3.3 Relationships with the public administration.
As for the last aspect that we must analyze, viz., the contribution that the “public 
administration” subsystem made to the creation and evolution of the Turin area’s 
automotive TPS, we can start by simplifying the complexity of the relationships between 
Fiat and political power. Here, then, it is not unreasonable to say that it was in Fiat’s 
dealings with the public administration that the traditional canons of Fordism were applied 
most directly and explicitly to the Turin area. The public administration’s attitude towards 
Fiat, in fact, was essentially one of submission, as it limited itself to the “Keynesian”
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function of supporting the growth of the area’s -  and the country’s -  largest enterprise. 
Translating this into systemic terms, we can say that the relationship between the public 
administration and the automotive TPS bore the unmistakable stamp of structural coupling, 
in the sense that the PA did no more than guarantee that the system was provided with the 
functional structure that was indispensable to the rise of a Ford-Taylorist model (industrial 
areas and housing sites, regional infrastructures, transportation, professional training, 
etc.), without ever making significant forays into the learning processes that gave the TPS 
its identity. The fact that one of the major bedroom communities built in the Seventies to 
house the torrents of immigrants arriving from the South77 was named "Le Vallette" after 
Vittorio Valletta, Fiat’s celebrated chairman and the man who did more than anyone else to 
whip the company into Fordist form, is perhaps the most telling expression of the 
workaday usefulness that linked local politics to the automotive system. By the same 
token, an elementary morphological reading of the infrastructural system in Piedmont and 
Turin could reveal the geography of the functional relationships between Fiat’s plants and 
the metropolitan area with exceptional precision. Not even the election of the communist 
Diego Novelli as mayor of Turin, an office he held from 1975 to 1985, during the so-called 
“leaden years” which were perhaps the most difficult period in the city’s political life, was 
able to bring about substantial changes in the relationships between the PA and Fiat78.
5.4 The transformations of the automotive TPS.
The crisis of the Seventies wrought deep-seated changes in both the structure and 
the organization of the Productive Territorial System, in a process that then picked up 
unprecedented speed in the Eighties and Nineties. Our aim in this section is to 
demonstrate how the relational foundations under the TPS we outlined in the previous 
pages began to crumble, shifting irretrievably towards a gradual but inescapable de- 
territorialisation of all relationships, be they tangible (structural coupling) or intangible 
(organizational synthesis).
5.4.1 Relationships with suppliers: the shakedown.
Without doubt, the decisive event that struck to the heart of Fiat’s relationships with 
the local production system was the decision, which took shape in October 1989, to adopt 
Total Quality Management. To this end, Fiat fielded a number of specific projects whose 
goals involved a reassessment of the very principles underlying the company’s structure in 
order to restore its competitiveness. With the worldwide motor vehicle industry dogged by
77 Turin doubled its population in this period, going from around 600,000 inhabitants to over a million.
78 To understand how little local politics counted in Fiat’s strategic decisions, we need only note that of the
15 mayors who ran the city after World W ar II, Novelli is the only one to figure in the index of names
appended to the major monograph on Fiat’s history (Castronovo, 2004).
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financial woes and balky markets, Fiat Auto’s priorities lay in cutting costs, renewing its 
product lineup, stepping up its globalization strategies, boosting quality and reestablishing 
Italy’s preeminence in design as a means of setting Fiat’s products apart from the crowd 
and sharpening their competitive edge. Projects were thus drafted for shortening time-to- 
market, rationalizing and reducing management costs, forging better relationships between 
the automaker and its network of suppliers, improving quality in product distribution and 
after-sales service, and implementing a new approach to organizing work at manufacturing 
facilities. One of the first things to be borne in mind in this connection is a trait that has 
long been typical of the Italian component industry: its fragmentation. Thus, though Italy 
has twice as many automotive suppliers as Germany or France, their average size is far 
smaller. In 1990, at the beginning of the “new route” inaugurated by Fiat, Italy’s automotive 
industry was served by around one thousand suppliers, as against 600 in Germany and 
400 in France (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 -  Size classes of European car component makers.
□  Italy
M France
□  Germ any
100 101-500 501-1000 >1000
Source: AMMA data
In terms of average number of employees, however, these suppliers were only one 
third as large as their French counterparts, and a quarter the size of those in Germany. 
Considering the increasing percentage that components represent out of the total value of 
a car, and the need to devote ever-heftier chunks of the R&D budget to them, this figure 
testifies to the true extent of Italy’s handicap in this area, and the pressing need to do 
something about it.
Another point to be borne in mind regards Fiat’s ability to develop a significant level
of vertical integration, which for decades hinged on two factors: first, Fiat’s position as
Italy’s only large automaker until the end of the Second World War, and second, the
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technological backwardness that marked the Italian mechanical industry for much of the 
early part of the twentieth century. This development model changed radically in the area 
of interest to us here after Fiat Auto’s strategic decision to outsource many components 
and systems from suppliers who would be able to close this technological gap and bring 
costs down to the levels enjoyed by competitors on the one hand, and to streamline the 
production process and improve product quality on the other79.
But Fiat’s dealings with independent suppliers were also scrutinized in an effort to 
reduce the level of vertical integration and clear the way for a new type of partnership. In a 
few short years, Fiat Auto sharply increased its component purchases and, even more 
importantly, had more and more of its component development and design work 
performed by outsourcers. The goal behind this decision -  making sure that everything 
that is bought-out is also designed-out -  has now been reached, as more than 70% of the 
parts in Fiat’s cars are both designed and produced outside the company80. Accordingly,
The changes in the nature and structure of that group of enterprises that makes up 
the automotive value chain have been such that where we once had a loose 
assortment of suppliers and subsuppliers to the auto industry -  or rather, to Fiat— 
we now have a system. In other words, we have gone from a situation where 
suppliers depended on Fiat not only as a market outlet, but from the technological 
standpoint as well, given that design was largely concentrated at Fiat, to a situation 
where the end producer’s performance is heavily dependent on the behaviour of all 
the firms in the chain. This, then, marks a change from a relationship of 
domination/subordination to one of cooperation between automaker and suppliers 
(Enrietti and Lanzetti, 2002, a: 18).
As a result, Fiat passed from being a vertically integrated manufacturer, to 
increasing reliance on outsourced production, services, and even design (Table 5.5). 
Table 5 . 5 -  Fiat Auto’s vertical disintegration (percentage of outsourced production and 
design)
1982 1987 1992 1996 1998 1999 2000
Production 50% 52% 65% 70% 70% 73% 72%
Design 30% 30% 45% 59% 70% 73% 72%
Source: Whitford and Enrietti 2005, p.783
79 In this context, mention should be made of the Guidelines for Cooperation between ANFIA Vehicle 
Manufacturers and Component Suppliers issued by ANFIA, the Italian National Association of Automotive 
Industries, in 1990. Founded in the idea that customer satisfaction is the basic goal pursued by vehicle 
manufacturers and component suppliers alike, the Guidelines established the fundamental principles on 
which cooperation between the two groups is based, aiming at continuous improvement through Total 
Quality Management.
80 While 30% of the components used in Fiat’s 1983 Uno were designed by outsourcers, the percentage
rose to 45% for the 1993 Punto and 60% for the new Thema in 1995.
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This process, which is by no means over, has involved a series of mutual 
adaptations which have not only called for an ability to innovate, but have also entailed 
risks -  in the form of new investments -  and sacrifices, as costs have continued to come 
down. At the end, however, they have provided a small group of elite suppliers -  chosen 
for their demonstrated “loyalty” to the carmaker, as well as for their growth capacity -  with 
an opportunity to prosper, increasing their know-how, size and economies of scale. And 
this, by making them less dependent on Fiat, has enabled them to increase their sales to 
other areas81.
5.4.1.1 Reduction in the number of direct suppliers
If we look at the same process from the supplier’s viewpoint, the first thing we see 
is pronounced trend towards concentration. Some of these firms -  those to whom Fiat 
channels more and more of its purchases -  have become Tier 1 component suppliers, 
charged with coordinating their second-tier compeers. Through this process, Fiat has 
made an all-out effort to cut the number of its direct suppliers, which dropped by over 40% 
in only a few years (Table 5.6).
Table 5 . 6 -  Direct Fiat Auto suppliers
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Number 1200 998 865 1200 1050 990 723 670
% 100 83.2 72.1 100 87.5 82.5 60.3 55.8
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2001
Number 560 520 410 380 370 350 367 330
% 46.7 43.3 34.2 31.7 30.8 29.2 30.6 27.5
Source: reworked from Volpato 2004, p. 283
Obviously, the figures shown in Table 5.6 do not imply that 70% of Fiat’s suppliers 
have been expelled from the TPS, but simply that:
(i) The outsourcing hierarchy has been reorganized, reducing the relational 
complexity immediately upstream of Fiat by cutting the number of direct suppliers.
(ii) Subsuppliers are grouped around the Tier 1 supplier, who is responsible for 
designing systems and modules, managing input from second and third tier 
suppliers, assembling integrated systems and performing final inspection.
81 Surveys by the Turin Employers’ Association and API, the area’s small and medium enterprises 
association, have shown that Fiat Auto’s partners in that period depended on the carmaker for an average 
of around 45% of their revenues.
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This process of rationalizing procurement is even clearer if we look at the number 
of suppliers per product line: in 1989, each product line was served by an average of 8.5 
suppliers82, a number that had been halved only two years later, and then dropped to 
slightly over 2 in 1996 (Volpato, 2004, p. 282-284). The reasons for having so many 
suppliers in the first place lie in Fiat’s desire to retain the upper hand and increase its 
bargaining power by setting up a competitive mechanism among potential suppliers, 
maintaining control over technologies, scheduling, quantities and prices. In this sense, we 
can say that though buying out was always an option, the corporate hierarchy was -  at 
least until the end of the Eighties -  the predominant institution, and turning to the market 
was seen as the merest formality. In addition, having a large number of suppliers for each 
product line was a sort of insurance policy that protected Fiat if suppliers were caught up in 
labour unrest, as
(i) Work stoppages at any one component supplier could be readily compensated;
and
(ii) Multiplying the number of suppliers effectively limited their growth, putting them
less under the sway of the labour unions.
At least on paper, these quantitative changes were necessarily accompanied by 
improved relations along the entire value chain, establishing a true spirit of partnership 
with suppliers. This, as we have said, was the result of an extensive assessment of 
suppliers’ current and prospective capabilities as regards the goals to be achieved, and 
not simply in terms of value for money as in the past. Above all, it resulted from a program 
of “Guided Growth” that was intended to spark processes that would improve quality 
across the board (from design to flexibility in responding to orders) and keep costs down. 
This Guided Growth process was organized by setting up “roundtables” with Fiat Auto 
personnel, specialists from Isvor53 and supplier management. The operational stage began 
as soon as a diagnostic method had been developed for identifying sources of waste and 
inefficiency, opening “test sites” at a number of suppliers for trying out ways of increasing 
productivity and the quality of intermediate products.
At the end of this process, a significant number of suppliers (around 50% of the 
pool) had qualified as partners and were awarded multi-year supply contracts. The next
82 As we will see in the conclusions to this chapter, when we will attempt to reconstruct an image that 
reflects the changes that took place in Turin’s automotive TPS, the reduction in the number of direct 
suppliers per product line is one of the basic features of the transition from a Fordist approach to dealing 
with suppliers to an approach influenced by Japan’s Keiretsu networks, though we are not yet dealing with 
a complete Toyotization.
83 Isvor is the Fiat Group training center.
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important measure was to authorize suppliers to self-certify their own output: an essential 
step in being able to implement just-in-time deliveries, as self-certification eliminates the 
need for acceptance inspection, and parts delivered by suppliers can be sent directly to 
the assembly lines. The progress that was made in this area is documented by the fact 
that all supplies to Fiat are now self-certified, with the result that by 2002 the number of 
parts that failed to comply with agreed standards stood at an eminently commendable 5 
per million.
While it is true that this process of reorganization was largely successful in meeting 
its twofold goal of simplifying dealings with suppliers and improving component quality, the 
aspect that is of greatest interest for our analysis is the radical rearrangement of the TPS’s 
internal hierarchy that it produced:
(i) As regards Tier 1 suppliers, it should be borne in mind that a significant proportion 
are branches of multinational corporations, while many of the remaining nationally- 
based independent suppliers belong to corporate groups that often have an 
international dimension of their own.
(ii) The second- and third-tier suppliers, who have closer links to their home region, 
have seen an increase in their products’ importance in recent years. These are the 
suppliers who have borne the brunt of Fiat’s rationalization programs and cost- 
cutting measures.
(iii) The largest group is found at the lowest level: small enterprises with extensive 
experience in some specialized area and an approach to running their businesses 
that is more that of the engineer than the manager. To be competitive, they rely 
heavily on factors such as low product cost, flexibility and responsiveness to 
changes in plan and the demands of just-in-time delivery, and quality that the 
customer sees as acceptable, though not outstanding. The fact, however, that they 
depend on the technical and manufacturing skills of a single entrepreneur can 
make these firms vulnerable when they are called upon to shoulder design 
responsibilities and guarantee quality through product and process controls 
(Enrietti and Lanzetti, 2002, a: 19).
Finally, it should be noted that the procurement rationalization process also 
extended to the so-called captive component supplies, i.e., those by firms owned by the 
automaker. In this area, Fiat’s position is something of an anomaly on the OEM scene, and 
has been ever since it was founded, when its chosen strategy was to make virtually all 
components in-house. Table 4 shows how the Fiat Group was in a certain sense one of its
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own biggest component suppliers, at least in terms of production variety84 (Table 5.7). At 
the end of the Seventies, captive production accounted for around 46 component families 
out of the 60 then in existence: a number far above the 27 families produced by the 
second-largest supplier, Lucas. In addition, Fiat’s component output also included a 
sizeable share (61%) of the families featuring low-to-medium technological content.
Table 5 . 7 -  Component families and suppliers
Producer Number of component families Percentage of output featuring
produced low-to-medium technological
content







AC Delco 18 50.0%
GKN 13 0.0%
TRW 10 50.0%
Source: Volpato 2004, p. 190
In this period -  the late Seventies -  captive component production was a 
flourishing scene, with around 60 plants nearly all of which were located in Italy, 37,200 
employees, and total revenues of 1,460 billion Lire (approximately 730 million euros). 
Some ten years later, in 1987, component production was in the hands of three large 
groups: Magneti Marelli (electromechanical equipment), Gilardini (mostly rubber and 
mechanical components) and Teksid (metallurgical products)85.
5.4.1.2 The creation of codesign platforms
In the reform of component supplies, one of the greatest breakaways came with the 
gradual involvement of suppliers in creating innovation and developing new products and 
processes. The Fiat-supplier relationship of the Sixties and Seventies was largely limited 
to contract processing, especially in the case of SMEs. At the beginning of the Eighties, 
however, Fiat’s need to improve the quality of its cars was transmitted all the way down 
the component manufacturing value chain, where efforts were made -  or at least planned
84 In terms of volume, the Fiat Group’s importance is less striking, despite the efforts that the Group has 
made since the Eighties to encourage its captive suppliers to increase the proportion of their sales 
revenues from other OEMs.
85 As mentioned earlier, this is not in fact a three-way split, as the group of suppliers also includes Comau,
the capital goods and production systems manufacturer established in 1978.
150
-  to help suppliers deal effectively with quality issues. In this process of extending quality 
control back down the line, development assignments played a fundamental role.
As can be seen from Table 5.8, a conspicuous amount of New Product 
Development (NPD) work was already being delegated to suppliers in the early Eighties. 
This trend continued throughout the decade, which ended with nearly 400 development 
assignments awarded in 1989 alone. In reality, though, if we look at the value of these 
NPD assignments, we see that they averaged around 250 million lire each (approximately 
130,000 dollars): pitifully little set against what it takes to run a serious R&D program in a 
sector like the automotive industry. It should be noted, moreover, that the average value 
rose only in the first five years of the decade (peaking at 345 million lire per assignment in 
1985), and had already started to drop back down to initial levels in 1986.
Table 5 . 8 -  Relationships with component manufacturers
Development assignments contracts
Number Billions (lire) Average value (million lire) Billions (lire)
1980 29 6 207 NA
1981 34 8 235 NA
1982 38 9 237 300
1983 41 12 293 353
1984 48 15 313 420
1985 58 20 345 470
1986 80 27 338 730
1987 155 45 290 970
1988 261 75 287 1600
1989 377 101 268 1750
Source: reworked from Volpato, 2004, p. 194
Nevertheless, the growing number of outside development assignments takes on 
an entirely different meaning if we interpret it in the light of the process of vertical 
disintegration that got under way towards the end of the Eighties, and which we discussed 
in the previous sections. Until the mid-Nineties, as Table 5.9 demonstrates, there was a 
yawning gap between the percentage of components that Fiat Auto bought from 
outsourcers and the percentage of these parts that were also designed outside the 
company.
As can be seen, the principle that production and design should be bundled 
together reached fulfillment in the second half of the Nineties, when the semi-jobshop 
status that had branded the majority of component suppliers finally became a thing of the 
past.
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Table 5 . 9 -  Vertical integration and component design
1987 1992 1997 2000
Make 38% 35% 30% 28%
Buy 62% 65% 70% 72%
- buy captive 14% 18% 17% 17%
- buy non captive 48% 47% 53% 55%
Outsourced design 24%1 30% 70% 72%
Source: reworked from Volpato 2004, pp. 280--281
5.4.1.3 In-house outsourcing
The third factor in the radical transformation in customer-supplier relationships was 
in-house outsourcing (IHO), or in other words, the near-deverticalization of certain 
production activities, which are assigned to specialized suppliers but carried out at the 
OEM’s plant, under the same roof.
Under-the-same-roof outsourcing is emerging as an important novelty in the 
governance of transactions. Specialized suppliers are called on to contribute to the 
production process of the focal company within the physical boundaries of the focal 
plant. Specialized suppliers undertake their own specialized activities in the same 
plant alongside the activities still carried on by the focal company -  or by other 
specialized companies -  within a broader production process that is designed, 
monitored, implemented and eventually changed by the focal company. Spatial 
proximity becomes a basic ingredient to coordinate the activities of the specialized 
supplier and to make them transparent and open to scrutiny and control by the 
focal company. (Bonazzi and Antonelli 2003. p. 578-579)
In this sense, in-house outsourcing can be a way of going beyond the standard 
make or buy tradeoff, since it has certain features that bring this form of organization 
closer to the network, viz.:
(i) The incomplete contract approach, and
(ii) The need for coordination activities.
As Bonazzi and Antonelli maintain:
According to the incomplete contract approach, transactions can be performed in 
the market place also when sequential redefinition of the terms of trade and the 
mutual obligations of the parties involved is possible within dedicated contractual 
specifications. Incomplete contracts are stipulated between parties that agree upon 
the conditions and the procedures by which future obligations are assigned. [...] 
Second, for IHO to be implemented substantial coordination activities need to be 
performed. The outsourcing firm closely monitors the actual performance of the
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tasks assigned to the external specialized supplier. As a rule, when outsourcing is 
sequential, monitoring in the focal company follows bureaucratic criteria. When 
outsourcing is interdependent, both partners are expected to rely on mutual 
understanding and cooperation based on "good will". (Bonazzi and Antonelli 2003, 
p. 579)
At Fiat, IHO has chiefly been applied to four processes: managing presses and 
wheel assembly units on the production side, and managing logistics and plant 
maintenance on the services side. Here, the findings of an empirical analysis conducted by 
Bonazzi and Antonelli are of interest, as they suggest that IHO operations can be 
classified into four categories (Table 5.10).
As the table shows, market rules are sufficient for operations whose complexity is 
low. As complexity increases, as it does for logistics and maintenance, hierarchical forms 
of agreement will come into play alongside these rules.
Table 5 . 1 0 -  Cross-referenced operations at Fiat Auto
Sequential
Low Complexity Presses (market)
High Complexity Logistics (market and hierarchical
agreements)
Source: Bonazzi and Antonelli, 2003, p. 590
An even more interesting point is that reciprocity -  i.e., the give-and-take typical of 
networked organizations, with their interdependence and mutual reliance -  is applied to 
two specialized suppliers (Magneti Marelli for wheel assembly and Comau for plant 
maintenance) who are both part of the Fiat Group. In other words, informal arrangements 
such as exchanges of favors and micro-negotiations between UTEs (the so-called 
Elementary Technological Units responsible for each self-contained segment of 
production), arise only where there is a close formal link -  the fact of belonging to the 
same group -  upstream of any incomplete or open contract. Obviously, it is not possible to 
determine whether reciprocity depends on this latter factor, but the suspicion remains that 
common ownership facilities communication and fellow-feeling between customer and
j
supplier, since any losses that might occur in either partner’s market will be canceled out 
once they move up to the Group scale.
From the standpoint of our analysis, IHO is interesting for several reasons. 
Ostensibly, it is a way of managing outsourcing that is based on close physical proximity 
(with operations “under the same roof’) and thus puts territorial constraints on the process 
of deverticalizing production. In addition, IHO would appear to encourage the replacement 
of the hierarchical organization marking Fiat’s dealings with its suppliers in the FordistTPS
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Interdependent
Wheel Unit (market and approved 
reciprocity)
Maintenance (market, hierarchical 
agreements and disapproved 
reciprocity)
with a hybrid cross between the market and the network. Looked at more closely, 
however, this process is largely incomplete, given that:
(i) two of the four suppliers involved belong to Fiat, and are thus bound by the same 
strategies as the OEM: in other words, the process of under-the-same-roof 
decentralization would not appear to be capable of creating interdependencies that 
can stand in the way of delocalization;
(ii) as we have shown, informal reciprocity appears to apply only where there are 
formal relationships that are far firmer and more “reassuring” than incomplete 
contracts can offer. In this sense, the same thing that we have seen happen with 
co-design seems to take place with IHO: though relationships of mutual 
dependence and shared decision-making processes appear to emerge, they in 
reality mask tremendous staying-power on the part of the Fordist TPS’s traditional 
hierarchical organization.
5.4.1.4 Penetration by foreign groups and processes of concentration
Another far from unimportant point concerns the relationships between Italian and 
non-Italian suppliers. When change first began to sweep through the system in the early 
Nineties, most Italian suppliers were located in the Turin area and, a few exceptions aside, 
were somewhat underdeveloped technologically (as we have seen, this was due to the 
lack of other carmakers and the high level of vertical integration in Fiat Auto’s design 
work). As an inevitable consequepce, Fiat turned to foreign suppliers at the same time that 
it introduced Guided Growth programs for local vendors:
Opening the doors to foreign suppliers was a means of compensating for the 
weaknesses of the Italian firms, though there can be no doubt that the latter were 
more flexible. Unlike Italian suppliers, the foreigners could rely on more sources of 
knowledge because they had more customers. And they had more highly 
developed R&D structures, because even if their customers -  our [German] 
competitors -  did less co-design than we do, they demanded higher levels of 
technology. And so we decided to bring foreign suppliers into Italy (interview with a 
Fiat Auto manager in Caputo and Zipoli, 2001).
Many of the big European component makers benefited from this reorganization 
(including, for example, Plastic Omnium, GKN and Valeo). But a large slice of the market 
went to US suppliers, who took advantage of the opportunity extended by Fiat to break into 
the European market or expand their presence on it. This had far-reaching repercussions 
on the sector and on the destinies of many Italian firms, who thus had to choose between 
diversifying their customer portfolio and selling to carmakers other than Fiat, becoming
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subsuppliers, or specializing in the service parts market. The result, as we have said, was 
a pyramidal procurement structure, where Fiat Auto and every Tier 1 supplier all had more 
than one supplier and more than one customer.
Finally, we must not forget the agreement that Fiat and GM signed in March 2002 
(and terminated in 2005)86 to set up two joint ventures to handle the two groups’ 
purchasing and powertrain design and production operations in Europe and Latin America. 
In essence, this agreement merged all procurement activities for Fiat and GM, who 
undertook to use a single channel for all their component purchases. This was a move that 
further disturbed supply equilibria in Italy. Though Fiat suppliers’ potential sales multiplied, 
so did the number of their competitors, which almost doubled when GM’s suppliers -  and 
GM itself, with its own component design and manufacturing divisions -  erupted onto the 
scene. Even though the agreement has since been terminated, it had an abiding influence 
on how outsourcing is organized, since Fiat introduced the APQP (Advanced Product 
Quality Planning) system required for certification to the US’s QS9000 quality standard as 
part of its preparations for setting up the GM-Fiat Worldwide Purchasing joint venture. As 
this system obliges suppliers to comply with rigidly codified parameters for engineering 
performance, quality, cost and service, it is likely that the reduction in the number of 
suppliers and the expulsion - whether total or partial -  of local firms from the TPS 
centering on Fiat will continue in the years to come.
5.4.1.5 Conclusions
In conclusion, we can say that Fiat’s reorganization of its outsourcing operations 
has brought major changes to local firms in the Turin area, who have emerged both 
strengthened and weakened:
(i) Strengthened, as the deverticalization of NPD processes and the spread of co­
design practices has involved an increasing number of firms in the TPS’s 
characteristic learning processes.
(ii) Weakened, since the reduction in the number of Tier 1 suppliers and fact that 
many of them are now supralocal firms specializing in worldwide component 
production is marginalizing a growing number of SMEs who were direct suppliers in 
the Eighties.
Restating this in a systemic formulation, we can say, roughly, that:
86 See pages 12-13.
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(i) In terms of structural coupling, links have weakened: a fair number of components 
still come from the Turin area, but are made by multinational groups, who have 
located in the region essentially because of the need to supply the Mirafiori plant.
(ii) In terms of organizational synthesis, the links have been selectively strengthened, 
as the greatest increases in involvement in learning processes are being made by 
those firms that have specific skills in component design and engineering.
Looking more closely, however, the process of organizational synthesis also gives 
cause for concern. First, the massive influx of multinational component suppliers has 
appreciably narrowed the range of R&D activities carried out in the area: generally 
speaking, this kind of work tends to be redirected to the parent company’s research 
centers, which are usually outside Italy, leaving the more mundane tasks of product 
engineering and adaptation to the needs of the end customer -  Fiat, in other words -  to 
Turin. Two further aspects, one negative and one positive, of outsourcing’s reorganization 
will be dealt with more explicitly in the following sections. The first is the close link between 
the (re)organization of the relationships outside Fiat and the (re)organization of production 
inside Fiat’s plants: deverticalizing procurement is part of a process of radical change in 
the manufacturing process carried out under the banner of lean production and new forms 
of integration at the factory. Now, as we will see in the next section, these dynamics are at 
work only marginally in Fiat’s plants in the Turin area, and are concentrated in the plants in 
Southern Italy. And on the other side of the coin, as we will see in section 5.4 -  over and 
above the changed status of local firms, and SMEs in particular, in the automotive TPS -  
the spread of co-design, the strengthening of managerial expertise and capacity for 
innovation, and the dwindling number of job contracts from Fiat have all played a 
fundamental part in reducing local SMEs’ dependence on the Turin area’s monarchical 
OEM, opening up new prospects for growth which we examine later in our analysis.
5.4.2 Relationships with the labour market.
Like the other systemic relationships discussed above, relationships with the labour 
market have changed drastically from the Eighties onward, both as regards how work is 
organized and in terms of industrial relations. In the latter area, one date stands out as the 
true turning point: October 14,1980 (Castronovo 2005, pp. 693-698). On that day, Fiat 
supervisors organized a demonstration in favor of the "right to work", hoping to put an end 
to the picketing and strikes that had brought production to a near-standstill for 35 days87. 
The demonstration went well beyond expectations -  the organizers had thought that only 
around 3,000 people would show up -  and ended with an impressive number of
87 The strikes had been called to induce Fiat to reconsider its planned job cuts, which would have resulted 
in almost 15,000 layoffs, mostly in the Turin area.
156
supervisors, middle managers, office workers and ordinary citizens marching through the 
streets. Over and above the unlooked-for number of participants88 and the effect it had on 
negotiations89, the protest’s real significance was political, as it expressed the discontent 
and dissatisfaction, not so much of the white-collar workers, but of the supervisors, or in 
other words, that section of the highly skilled working class whose status had suffered 
most over the years, caught as they were between the rock of scientific management and 
the hard place of the labour unrest spearheaded by the masses of poorly qualified 
immigrant workers. As Castronovo writes, the supervisors:
... had in the last few years been saddled with the most thankless tasks, as well as 
the heaviest responsibilities, involved in dealing with both management and the 
shop stewards. They had do everything from keeping the lines running, to making 
an unruly workforce somehow do what the company had planned. In addition, they 
had become one of terrorism’s prime targets, and the union had done nothing, 
either to protect them or to systematically isolate whoever had threatened or 
attacked them, or even to try to maintain certain standards of professionalism. 
Indeed, the supervisors had been penalized by an over-egalitarian collective 
bargaining approach that sought to iron out wage differences and reduce 
mechanisms for taking merit and experience into account (Castronovo 2005, p. 
694)
Paradoxically, we can say that in many ways the real intent of the march of the 
forty-thousand was more to affect organizational practices at Fiat than to reform industrial 
relations. Though it did not fail to have profound effects on both of these aspects, they did 
not take the direction the march’s organizers had mapped out. True, the dynamics of work 
organization versus labour relations did in fact change, reducing conflict at Fiat’s plants 
and easing Ford-Taylorism’s strictures. But it is also true that the skilled workers in the 
Turin area were not the chief beneficiaries. As we will see in this section, the real factors in 
reducing disgruntlement about working conditions were technological innovation and 
automation, not some heralded return to the craftsman’s practices and his respect for 
“doing the job right”.
With automation as with so many other changes, the transformations began when 
motor vehicle production was still in full Fordist swing. At the beginning of the Seventies, 
eighteen Unimate welding robots were introduced at the Mirafiori plant, followed by the 
Digitron system in 1974 and the Robogate system at the Rivalta and Cassino factories in
88 Estimates ranged from 20,000, according to the police, to 40,000: hence the name “march of the forty- 
thousand" popularly assigned to the protest.
89 Immediately after the march, the unions signed an agreement whereby Fiat would forego its planned
layoffs, and 22,000 workers would draw state-funded unemployment benefits for a period of two years.
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1978. Though these first experiments in automation were made in the Turin area, this must 
not distract our attention from the fact that almost all of the subsequent changes in work 
organization took place alongside Turin’s marginalization and were instrumental in bringing 
it about, helping de-territorialize the area’s automotive TPS. Fiat’s conversion to 
automation culminated with the idea of the Highly Automated Factory or HAF, an idea that 
became reality, not close to home at Mirafiori or Rivalta, but at Termoli in 1983 and at 
Cassino in 1987.
Undeniably, these innovations reduced the stress and fatigue associated with many 
factory jobs, introducing ergonomic improvements and moving a high proportion of the 
workforce away from tiring manual tasks and into indirect control and maintenance 
functions. On balance, however, their real upshot was not to untangle, but to add to the 
technocentric contradictions of scientific management. The interpretation advanced by 
Volpato is of interest here:
Tum-of-the-century Taylorism was riddled with problems from the standpoint of the 
relationships between the technological setup and the organizational setup: many 
more problems than it has today, since it could only make headway by breaking up 
the old structure of craftsmens’ qualifications. Nevertheless, it gained ascendancy 
because its power to create efficiency was enormously higher than that of craft 
production (seen as a sort of socio-technical “golden age”), and this higher 
efficiency largely offset the organizational conflict it engendered. [...] Conversely, it 
seems clear to me that if the technocentric paradigm is pushed to the limits of its 
current potential, critical problems will inevitably emerge that creative, proactive 
socio-organizational approaches would be able to solve much more simply and 
economically than any system that is totally reliant on purely technical solutions. 
(Volpato 2004, p. 263)
The need to overcome the contradictions inherent in technocentric production 
organization by restoring the balance between its technical and social components spurred 
Fiat’s top management to develop the concept of the Integrated Factory (IF), touted as the 
end of the Ford-Taylorist era and the dawning of a new “Italian” approach to just-in-time 
and Toyotism. The aspect of the integrated factory which is of greatest interest to us here 
is the Elementary Technological Unit, or UTE in its Italian acronym, which Fiat 
documentation defined as:
The basic organizational unit governing a measurable elementary technological 
subsystem which carries out prevention, variance compensation, self-inspection 
and continuous improvement activities in order to meet the firm’s goals for quality, 
productivity and service (quoted in Volpato 2004, p. 270)
The UTE introduced new professional roles to oversee shopfloor workers:
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(i) the UTE supervisor, who combines the duties formerly assigned to the shop 
foreman with additional responsibilities for costs, quality and service. Above all, the 
reform laid the emphasis on the proactive rather than the reactive or adaptive 
dimension, shifting the focus away from the mechanical application of rules 
established by the higher-ups, to cross-functional procedures that allow a good 
deal of individual discretion and independent decision-making;
(ii) the "integrated process team leaders" (CPIs) and "integrated process operators" 
(OPIs) who are responsible for teaching shopfloor workers the “right way to do 
things", and thus ensure that quality goals are achieved. To a certain extent, they 
are allowed to use their own discretion in performing their duties.
Volpato’s conclusions in this context would appear to be convincing:
The attention to detecting and interpreting the “weak signals” that can provide 
advance warning of operating problems, the emphasis on problem-solving, the 
right/duty to show creativity in exercising their own judgment, all make the role of 
the CPIs and OPIs very different from that of their predecessors, the deputy 
foremen and skilled workers. The CPI/OPI is not the UTE shopfloor workers’ 
hierarchical superior, but a functional coordinator whose standing is legitimized by 
his effective ability to find positive-sum solutions. [...] In my view, Fiat’s biggest 
conquest as a learning organization lies precisely in the relationship between the 
CPI/OPI and the shopfloor operative. When it comes down to it, both the role of the 
UTE supervisor and that of the team can perfectly well be seen as another way of 
implementing decentralization in the technocentric organization and driving a 
wedge between those who make the decisions and those who carry them out. [...] 
it is only with the CPI/OPI that we finally have a figure who is expected and paid 
both to “work” and to “think” and, above all, to “train”. (Volpato 2004, pp. 272-273)
Aside from the question of whether introducing the UTE did in fact meet social and 
organizational expectations rather than simply satisfying the demands of production and 
efficiency, what we want to make clear here is that it can to a certain extent be interpreted 
as a return to that sense of responsibility for “doing the job right” that the skilled worker 
had at the dawning of Turin’s automotive TPS, and which was deliberately undermined by 
the forced introduction of scientific management. In this sense, we can indeed speak of a 
learning organization. What remains to be determined is the effect that these 
transformation have had on the TPS qua learning region. The point to be underscored 
here, and which justifies the emphasis put on this reform, is that the introduction of the 
Integrated Factory was not preceded by trials or pilot projects of any kind at Turin’s plants,
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which thus lost some of their standing as test beds and “laboratories”. Above all, it should 
be noted that choosing where the IF would be introduced called for an elaborate and 
complex decision-making process that excluded the Turin area a priori. And though it is 
true that the radical nature of the innovation was better served by a greenfield plant, the 
choice of peripheral areas with no significant manufacturing tradition was indicative of the 
dim view that Fiat’s top management took of the Turin area. As the IF was very much an 
attempt to apply the principle of the learning organization to the production structure, the 
decision to rule out exactly that area that had Italy’s highest concentration of automotive 
knowledge was tantamount to admitting, more or less implicitly, that the thoroughgoing 
application of Ford-Taylorism had redrawn the entire cognitive scene surrounding the Turin 
TPS. Just how radical this decision was is confirmed by Bonazzi, who found that the UTEs 
at Turin’s Mirafiori plant spent more time in getting production back on track than on 
improving productivity. Bonazzi thus suggests that there is a bifurcation between the UTEs 
that are more successful in carrying out the imperatives of the Integrated Factory, and their 
poor relatives, the UTEs in and around Turin, who are still caught up in Fordist stopgaps 
and fire-fighting. Further proof can be found in the fact that the decision to build an IF in 
Melfi did not stop with the plant alone, but included a research center and a training school 
that would instill the principles behind the new factory in the employees who were hired to 
work there.
As a result, we can conclude that the reorganization of production at Fiat’s plants 
marks an increase in the organizational synthesis between the firm and the market, but 
that this reorganization:
(i) produced effects that were little more than fallout at the plants in the Turin area, 
where worker participation in the cognitive processes that make a TPS competitive 
was held back by old Ford-Taylorist habits; and
(ii) ended by weakening the structural coupling between Fiat and the local labour 
market, as opening new plants in Southern Italy reduced job opportunities at the 
factories in Piedmont.
5.4.3 Relationships with formal institutions.
The final aspect to be considered is that of the relationships with our last 
subsystem: the public administration and other formal institutions (agencies, trade 
associations, etc.) that act as enablers for the processes of structural coupling and 
organizational synthesis between the various subsystems in the TPS.
In this relational framework, the structural dimension retains its importance despite 
major changes in nature and intensity. In the first stage, as we have seen, the public 
administration and trade associations such as AMMA, the Italian metallurgy and
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metalworking manufacturers’ organization, work chiefly as structural enablers, or in other 
words provide the material conditions whereby structural coupling between Fiat and the 
Turin area was able to meet the dominant player's need to produce and be competitive. In 
the second stage, the stakes have changed: it is no longer a question of supporting Fiat at 
home by building infrastructures and providing social mediation; now, the problem is how 
to soften Fiat’s exit strategy and take some of the sting out of abandonment and its more 
macroscopic manifestations. For Turin’s municipal administration in particular, this new 
need has meant determining how to reuse the industrial spaces vacated by Fiat’s 
discontinued manufacturing operations. The first wave of such initiatives took place in the 
Eighties, when the problem arose of finding a fitting use for one of the “crown jewels” of 
Turin’s industrial Inheritance from its days as a one-company town, Fiat’s historic 
headquarters at Lingotto, now shorn of any role in production. Masterfully renovated by 
Renzo Piano, Lingotto thus became the lynchpin of an ambitious urban renewal program 
which, as might be expected, is almost a case-study in tertiarization: the hundreds of 
thousands of cubic meters that once symbolized Fordism in all its glory are now home to 
an exhibition center, a major shopping mall, cinemas, hotels, a branch of the Politecnico, 
and the management offices of a number of companies, Fiat among them. More recently, 
this functional rethinking has been extended from the individual “monument” -  the factory 
-  to the entire district that takes its name from the factory, expanding its railway station 
(slated to become Turin’s major transport hub) and locating many of the venues for the 
recent Winter Olympics in the area. Since 2005, a second wave of functional conversion 
has been rising around Fiat’s other major factory in Turin, Mirafiori, an area four times 
larger than the historic city center, where recent closures have already vacated large 
tracts. Here, however, the trend would seem to be towards converting these areas to new 
uses in manufacturing as part of a process of concentrating operations that are now 
spread across the region.
Together with this interest in giving a new lease on life to Fiat’s former sites in 
Turin, the area’s manufacturing identity is attracting close scrutiny from a number of newly- 
formed agencies and other players, most of which are public-private partnerships, that 
take a proactive role in supporting local development processes. Here, attention is directed 
both towards the TPS’s structural dimension (e.g., by attracting new businesses or setting 
up sophisticated material and telematic infrastructures) and its organizational dimension, 
where efforts are being made to strengthen the territorially embedded learning processes 
that underlie the competitiveness of area’s co-located firms. In the last two decades, the 
number of institutional players who are striving to establish to establish a relationship of 
organizational synthesis with the Turin area’s automotive TPS (or in other words, to 
address its territorially embedded learning processes directly, without limiting themselves 
to the structural dimension) has multiplied. These new players include groups involved in
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analysis and investigation (the Observatory for the Italian Automotive Components 
Industry established by the Turin Chamber of Commerce, or the Labour Market 
Observatory set up by the Province of Turin) as well as groups who formulate and 
implement policies designed to make Turin area firms more competitive, like the From 
Concept to Car program organized by the Chamber of Commerce together with other 
institutional players90.
At times, these initiatives are rooted in the automotive TPS and attempt to unite the 
structural and organizational dimensions. This, for example, is the case of the Automotive 
Engineering degree program set up jointly by Fiat and the Politecnico di Turin in 1999, and 
housed -  emblematically -  in Fiat’s former paint shop at Lingotto. More often, however,
(i) The new institutional players do not limit their sphere of action to the automotive 
industry: for example, ITP (Invest in Turin and Piedmont), the regional agency 
dedicated to attracting domestic and foreign investment, has five areas of interest 
in addition to motor vehicles (ICT, life sciences, nanotechnology, aerospace and 
logistics);
(ii) Even when programs center on the automotive industry, as in the case of From 
concept to car, the links with the Fiat TPS are marginal, as these are initiatives that 
exist precisely because Fiat has slackened its ties to the Turin area.
6. A synthesis.
To conclude our attempt to describe the genesis, operation and transformations of 
the Turin area’s automotive TPS, we will offer a synthesis that summarizes the system’s 
major features, highlighting the relationships that Fiat has established over the years with 
the four subsystems that we have identified as the main components of a Productive 
Territorial System.
This synthesis can be represented graphically as a relational space (Figure 5.1) 
whose four parts are the relationships between Fiat and:
(i) The subsystem of multinational automotive enterprises who have operations in the 
Turin area
(ii) The subsystem of SMEs and, more generally, the local firms who do business in 
the automotive industry or adjoining sectors
(iii) The subsystem of the local labour market
(iv) The subsystem of institutional players
90 The program will attempt to promote internationalization and contacts with OEMs and international 
buyers for around 200 component manufacturers in the Turin area selected on the basis of their design 
skills and capacity for technical innovation.
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For each of these relational sub-areas, we can also Identify the two processes that 
are fundamental to the systemic interpretation of the relationships between the territory 
and the economic activities that take place in it, viz., structural coupling and organizational 
synthesis. As will be recalled, structural coupling refers to all of those material and formal 
relationships that contribute to determining the system’s territorial structure, while the term 
organizational synthesis is used to denote those processes that identify the TPS’s 
organization. In other words, the first process is where we find the contractual market 
arrangements, the hierarchical relationships and, in general, all of the more or less 
territorialized functional relationships that support Fiat’s competitiveness, whereas the 
second is chiefly of interest for its territorially embedded learning process that allow us to 
speak of a true TPS.
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Thus, Turin’s automotive TPS as it was at the height of its Fordist organization can 
be concisely represented as shown in Figure 5.2:
(i) The relationships with other MNEs in the Turin area and doing business there 
chiefly take the shape of supply arrangements with captive component makers, 
i.e., companies belonging to the Fiat Group, or, to a lesser extent, with 
multinationals who have long been located in the Turin area and traditionally are on 
good terms with Fiat. These relationships show a high degree of structural coupling 
(given that most of the components are produced near Fiat’s plants) and a medium 
level of organizational synthesis: though codesign had not yet reached the agenda 
in the TPS’s Fordist days, the close organizational and geographical proximity of 
the MNEs who supply Fiat encouraged a certain measure of cooperation to be 
extended to the cognitive learning processes.
(ii) The relationships with the local SMEs who supply components share a high degree 
of structural coupling with the first group, though it is accompanied by a rather low 
level of organizational synthesis: as we pointed out in section 5.2.2, most of the 
impact of the first major wave of outsourcing was felt by small firms who were
was to provide the system with low-cost flexibility rather than to interact with their 
major customer and the other SMEs in territorially embedded learning. The only 
relationships that do not fit into this picture are those with capital goods producers 
and bodybuilder-designers: firms that are bigger than the local component makers 
or have highly specific skills, and can accordingly show a higher level of interaction 
with Fiat, sharing in the production and synthesis of new knowledge.
(iii) In the TPS’s Fordist period, relationships with the workforce showed, obviously, an 
intense degree of structural coupling, given that the Turin area’s labour market 
provided the overwhelming majority of all of Fiat’s employees in Italy for over 
seventy years, consistently accounting for nearly 90% of the total. Even as this 
structural coupling intensified, however, workers’ participation in the learning 
processes continued to drop. Though the TPS grew from the craftsmanship of a 
core of highly skilled employees, and the piecework payment systems that 
rewarded this craftsmanship were still widespread in the postwar period, once 
scientific management began to be systematically applied in the late Fifties, the 
whole idea of “doing the job right” that prevailed on Turin’s shop floors -  and the 
know-how it took to do it -  were gradually but relentlessly swept aside.
(iv) Finally, the relationships with the institutional subsystem can be said to have been 
purely functional, with the public administration limiting itself to guaranteeing the 
material underpinnings required for production (infrastructures, mostly) and for 
keeping class conflict from flaring up (by building low-income housing projects, for 
example), but never attempted to take an active part in organizational synthesis 
through policies designed to support learning processes.
To complete this picture, we must also consider the hierarchical character of the 
relationships: by its very nature, the Turin area’s automotive TPS is necessarily centered 
on one major player, Fiat, whose strategic decisions have fueled all of the changes within 
the system. The system’s top-heavy hierarchy means that the vertical relationships 
between Fiat and the various subsystems are incomparably more powerful than the 
horizontal relationships between the elements that make up the TPS. Indeed, the only 
horizontal relationships that exist are weak ones, and derive from the fact that many of the 
SMEs are also suppliers to the larger component manufacturers, and that some of the 
more highly skilled workers who left Fiat for jobs that were more congenial to their abilities 
ended up with the smaller component makers and capital goods producers, where they 
were in some cases given entrepreneurial responsibilities.
In conclusion, we can say that the early days of the motor vehicle industry in Turin 
produced a weak form of a Productive Territorial System, as:
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(i) structural coupling prevails markedly over organizational synthesis. Consequently, 
the system that emerges from this process shows a weak systemic identity (given 
the weakness of its territorially embedded learning processes), and
(ii) it would hardly seem appropriate to speak of an autopoietic system when the 
evolution of both structural coupling and organizational synthesis hinges on the will 
and the strategies of the dominant player, rather than on the dynamics between the 
subsystems.
The image we can draw of the changes that have occurred in the system since the 
Eighties and have marked a substantial retreat from Ford-Taylorism is quite different 
(Figure 5.3):
(i) Relationships with multinational enterprises have intensified from the standpoint of 
collective learning processes, thanks to the new role assigned to them by Fiat’s 
outsourcing policies and the spread of codesign practices. At the same time, 
however, Turin’s participation in the structural coupling between Fiat and its global 
suppliers has lessened, since these multinational component makers relocated 
their own manufacturing operations to follow their main Italian customer’s moves.
(ii) In principle, the same is true for those local suppliers who survived Fiat’s drastic 
cuts in procurement from the Turin area, though the two phenomena do not 
operate on the same scale as they do for the MNEs: on the one hand, in fact, the 
structural coupling between SMEs and Fiat has weakened as a result of the almost 
75% reduction in the number of first-tier suppliers91, while on the other hand, the 
local firms’ more modest technological capabilities have given them less access to 
the collective learning practices that Fiat encourages in its supplier partnership 
program. The other important change concerns the exit strategy -  which we will 
discuss in detail in the next chapter -  developed by the capital goods producers: 
the growth of Comau (the captive supplier of production systems and technologies) 
as a global buyer, whose operations are increasingly oriented towards integrating 
components, machine tools, robots and control and measurement systems 
purchased on the international marketplace, has significantly reduced the 
percentage contribution that capital goods manufacturers make to the automotive 
TPS’s end product. By contrast, the role of design and styling is as well-rooted in 
the system as ever -  if not indeed more so -  in terms of both structural coupling 
and organizational synthesis.
91 As we will see in the next chapter, this weakening in the structural coupling between Fiat and Turin-area 
suppliers can also be seen from the increase in the latters’ revenues from other OEMS and after-market 
sales as compared to those from Fiat.
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(iii) As for relations with the labour force, the introduction of the Integrated Factory and, 
in particular, of the UTEs helped inject new life into the processes of organizational 
synthesis between the TPS and workers, even though -  as we have seen -  these 
practices were not implemented in full at the Turin-area plants. Conversely, the 
level of structural coupling has undeniably dropped, as witnessed by the 
approximately 75,000 jobs lost to Fiat’s plants in and around Turin between 1971 
and 2001.
(iv) The relationships with institutional players have also undergone profound changes. 
Structural relationships are still important, though their intensity and aim are no 
longer the same: the role of the public administration is no longer that of 
guaranteeing the prerequisites for production and social consensus, but rather, to 
help work out an exit strategy that can make the social impact of Fiat’s move away 
from Turin less devastating. This has meant a reduction in structural coupling (now 
limited to finding a new use for the “industrial voids” left vacant by Fiat’s erstwhile 
operations in the city) and a slight increase in organizational synthesis, as shown, 
for example, by new industrial and cultural policies for getting the Turin-area 
component and design industries back on their feet.
Alongside these wide-ranging transformations, there has been another 
fundamental driver of change: the fact that the traditional vertical relationships that 
continue to link Fiat to the TPS’s various subsystems have been joined by a wider
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range of horizontal relationships within and between the subsystems, with less and less 
mediation by the Fiat hierarchy. Looking at the two stages in the history of the 
automotive TPS in their entirety points to yet another interpretation. Thus, as Figure 5.4 
shows in broad outline, three processes have taken place simultaneously:
(i) The organizational dimension has come to predominate over the structural 
dimension, as territorial learning processes have strengthened and structural 
coupling within the system has loosened.
(ii) Delocalization in manufacturing activities has been intense, both on the part of Fiat 
(as shown by the layoffs at its plants in the Turin area) and of the. major 
multinational suppliers (particularly those who supply modules, followed by 
systems suppliers), who have had to move their operations in order to adapt to 
Fiat’s geo-economic strategies.
(iii) Major diversification and differentiation has taken place both within the subsystem 
of local firms, who have had to find new markets and new settings, and in the 
institutional subsystem, which has made efforts to attract investments from a wider 
range of sectors and drafted local development policies that are less and less 
dependent on Fiat’s presence in the area.
Just where these processes will lead is unpredictable: the existence of a TPS 
implies a balance between the structural and organizational components, and in the 
history of the Turin area’s automotive TPS, this equilibrium has always been unsteady. In 
the first stage, the system expressed itself as a Fordist one-company town, with a strong 
structural coupling dictated by Fiat’s production requirements, and thus with a hierarchical 
order that not only hindered the rise of organizational synthesis processes, but even went 
so far as to quash any form of collective learning by marginalizing the more highly skilled 
workers and either absorbing or expelling the other OEMs in the Turin area. In the second 
stage, by contrast, a revitalized, more challenging collective learning process arose, but 
the forfeit it inevitably paid was the expulsion of firms and workers from the TPS and the 
steady withdrawal of Fiat and supplier plants from the area. In a certain sense, we could 
describe this transformation as the transition from a “weak” TPS (one lacking in any 
intense organizational synthesis) to a “fragile” TPS: fragile because it risks a further loss of 
structural elements.
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Here, only one thing is certain, and that is that there is less uncertainty about Fiat’s 
future presence in the area: the consensus in both political and business circles is that Fiat 
is likely to shift all of its manufacturing operations away from Turin in the coming decades, 
while the “quaternary" activities -  management, research, styling and design -  will remain. 
The automotive TPS thus stands at a crossroads: will it disband, leaving nothingness and 
dust, or will it reorganize into a multi-centered network in which Fiat, first among equals but 
monarch no more, will doff its outworn crown? Most interpretations -  and most policies -  
are moving in precisely this direction. Nevertheless, if we are to address this question 
effectively, we must proceed with a closer analysis of what has happened to the Turin-area 
firms that are involved in any of the manifold aspects of motor vehicle manufacturing and, 
more specifically, of what position the various clusters have taken up in recent years with 
respect to the knowledge that is the foundation of Turin’s manufacturing tradition. These 
are the twin topics we will tackle in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 6: Beyond Fiat.
In the previous chapter we tried to reconstruct, through the integrated use of 
historical and statistical sources, the evolution of the automotive-based PTS and, more in 
particular, the Fiat universe, along its hundred-year history. One of the most significant 
dynamics that has emerged seems to be undoubtedly the restructuring of the system 
headed by Fiat and, above all, the recurring level of exit options in the course of this 
process. Whether these are partial exits (diversification and differentiation of the client 
and/or product portfolio) or total exits (bankruptcy or abandonment of the automotive 
industry), it is still of fundamental importance to reconstruct these centrifugal processes 
and, especially, to evaluate the consequences on both the automotive PTS and on Turin's 
production fabric founded on its engineering and electro-technical tradition. To this end, we 
will briefly examine the transformations in the manufacturing fabric that was once 
superficially identified as "Fiat suppliers". We will then go on to evaluate what synthetic 
images have been suggested to represent the changes underway and, thus, formulate 
hypotheses that will guide the last stage of empirical research.
6.1 The local manufacturing fabric re-acquires competitiveness.
In the previous chapter we saw how the relations between companies that 
characterised the PTS of the Turin automotive sector have profoundly changed since the 
eighties with the reorganisation, both qualitatively and quantitatively, of outsourcing. 
Before attempting a synthetic recomposition of the overall transformations undergone by 
the PTS in the course of its hundred-year history (with particular reference to the 
hypothetical formation of an automotive district), it appears necessary to consider how the 
transformation of the relations between Fiat and the local fabric of engineering and electro­
technical companies has influenced the performance of the latter. To this end, our analysis 




(ii) producers of capital goods;
(iii) designers, engineers and other specialists involved in the process of automotive 
design and engineering.
6.1.1 The strategies of the components sector.
If we look at the performance in terms of employment in the Italian components 
sector between 1971 and 2001, we can see that the geographical distribution of 
employees in this sector (Table 6.1) does not follow the same trend as automotive 
production (Table 5.1). While in the case of the final production of vehicles employment in 
Piedmont has been reduced to one quarter of the original figure and has essentially been 
reached by jobs in the southern regions, employment in components in Turin has 
remained at roughly the same levels92.
In addition, Piedmont has maintained its role as the leading region in components, 
with almost double the employment compared to the total figure for the regions of the 
Mezzogiorno.





E m p lo yees
1991
E m p lo yees
2001
Piedmont 30839 32231 31544 31360
100 105 102 102
Mezzogiorno 1362 6201 7474 17414
100 455 549 1279
- Lazio 809 1401 1334 3179
- Abruzzo 275 1580 2706 3435
- Molise 14 10 135 2767
- Cam pania 160 2639 2643 5239
- Basilicata 0 189 179 2334
- Sicily 104 382 477 460
Source: Istat, 1971,1981,1991, 2001
92 The data examined is obviously not indicative of all the automotive components supply chain, as only 
those employed in the Ateco sector directly linked to the production of components were taken into 
consideration. This classification therefore neglects the second and third tier supply that is normally 
classified in line with the type of production (engineering, rubber, plastics etc.) with reference to the 
destination of the output. This also explains why, as things stand, fully reliable and consistent estimates 
are not available on the real size of the automotive sector in Piedmont. One estimate made by the 
Osservatorio talks of 46,000 employees in Piedmont, against about 100,000 employees in the whole of 
Italy.
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In this section, it could be useful to discuss briefly the roads taken by supplier 
companies to tackle the repercussions of the Fiat crisis on their competitiveness. On this 
question, the strategic choices of the PTS have been particularly diversified. Leaving aside 
the exit option, in other words the abandoning of the automotive sector, which is 
progressively being used less and less93, the two main strategic options are undoubtedly 
the differentiation of the client portfolio -  especially In terms of OEMs -  and the so-called 
after-market, i.e. the market for non-original parts94.
Table 6 . 2 -  Production value of components in Italy, by destination (figures in million €)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total OEM 10, 591 12, 110 13, 156 14, 217 15, 879 15, 866 14, 362 14, 516 15, 118
-  Italy 7 ,6 4 1 8, 792 9, 351 9, 994 10, 864 1 0 ,4 1 5 9, 014 8, 617 8, 205
- foreign 2, 950 3, 318 3, 805 4, 223 5, 015 5, 451 5, 348 5, 899 6, 913
Total After 
Market 6, 887 7, 490 7, 922 7, 186 8, 089 7, 542 7, 802 7, 758 8, 715
- Italy 2 ,1 8 9 2, 281 2 ,1 5 9 2, 228 2, 336 2, 389 2 ,4 4 9 2, 506 2, 584
- foreign 4, 698 5, 209 5, 763 4, 958 5, 753 5 ,1 5 3 5, 353 5, 25 2 6 ,1 3 1
Tota l
co m p on en ts 1 7 ,4 7 8 1 9 ,6 0 0  2 1 ,0 7 8 2 1 ,4 0 3 23, 968 2 3 ,4 0 8 2 2 ,1 6 4 2 2 ,2 7 4  2 3 ,8 3 3
(1996=100) 100 112 121 122 137 134 127 127 136
%  O EM 61% 62% 62% 66% 66% 68% 65% 65% 63%
- Italy 72% 73% 71% 70% 68% 66% 63% 59% 54%
- foreign 28% 27% 29% 30% 32% 34% 37% 41% 46%
%  After 
Market 39% 38% 38% 34% 34% 32% 35% 35% 37%
- Italy 32% 30% 27% 31% 29% 32% 31% 32% 30%
- foreign 68% 70% 73% 69% 71% 68% 69% 68% 70%
Source: author's calculation on O C V I figures, 2005
The figures published by the Osservatorio sulla Componentistica Veicolare Italiana 
in its annual report are fairly clear on this point (OCVI, 2005). Out of a sample of over 800 
Italian companies interviewed, 80% stated that less than 25% of its turnover stemmed 
from sales to the Fiat Group or its suppliers and about 16% stated that its main outlet lay in 
the after-market. It should be noted, however, that if we consider the companies that have 
a turnover of more than €50 million, the percentage of companies dependent on Fiat 
(>50% of turnover) rises to about half of the sub-sample. It should also be noted that these 
OEMs, on which employment in the sector largely depends, have seen their operating 
margins drop significantly in recent years and they have been absorbed into rigid supra­
93 The situation is different compared to the 1980-90s, in the first phase of the restructuring of the Fiat 
supply system when there were numerous bankruptcies (for first and second tier suppliers) or changes of 
sector/supply chain (for sub-suppliers or contractors offering generic processing).
94 Original parts are obviously distributed by the OEMs or first tier suppliers.
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national hierarchies, characterised by decision-making processes essentially external to 
the Turin area and, more in general, Italy. This is why it is not possible to rule out the fact 
that the gradual downscaling of Fiat production in Italy and Piedmont may have in the 
future further side effects on the components industry.
Beyond the risks linked to the deterritorialisation and globalisation of Fiat's 
strategies, it should in any case be noted how the Italian components industry, especially 
in Piedmont, shows a strong export trend. In 2004 the Italian components industry 
recorded exports for €12,800 million (+12.2%), against €6,800 million for imports, with a 
positive and constantly growing balance (+25% between 2000 and 2004 and +60% since 
the mid 1990s). Again in March 2005, an increase of 16.7% was recorded compared to the 
same period of the previous year, taking the share of components out of total national 
exports from 3.7% to 4.1%.
If we observe the composition, we see that the ratio between the OEM and after- 
market has stayed around 1.5:1, with the significant exception of the central period when, 
presumably, the presence of incentives for the purchase of cars shifted turnover to the 
OEM sector. The difference between the OEM and after-market is even more marked if we 
consider the geographical division of sales: while the after-market was characterised for 
the whole decade by the clear-cut prevalence of international markets over the domestic 
market (with a stable ratio of around 7:3), the OEM market looked abroad only gradually, 
passing from a share of 28% to a maximum of 46% in 2004.
If we focus attention on the sample of Piedmont companies in the study by the 
Osservatorio, we see how they maintain a share of around 30% of all Italian exports.
Table 6.3 -  Share of Piedmont's exports out of total Italian exports
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Italian exports 7,648 8 ,527 9,568 9,181 10,768 10,604 10,701 11,151 13,044
Piedmont exports 2 ,274 2 ,553 2 ,806 2 ,748 3 ,149 3 ,190 3 ,275 3 ,517 3 ,873
% Piedmont 30% 30% 29% 30% 29% 30% 31% 32% 30%
Source: author's calculation on O C V I figures, 2005
This figure assumes even greater significance if we consider that the percentage of 
Piedmont companies dependent on the Fiat PTS is still considerably higher than the rest 
of Italy (15% against 6% in the rest of Italy). If we assume a more qualitative perspective 
and consider the results of a questionnaire that surveyed about 800 Italian components 
manufacturers, the figures from the Osservatorio show how the competitiveness of 
Piedmont's producers is significantly higher than the rest of Italy in terms of R&D 
expenditure (18.2% of Piedmont's companies dedicate more than 5% of their turnover to 
R&D, against 15.8% in the rest of Italy), export orientation (57.7% of exporting companies 
against 46%), the presence of innovative products (28.6% against 23.2%). In contrast,
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Piedmont companies seem less confident about the competitiveness of Italian 
components, a feeling that is borne out by the worrying fact of the trend towards 
relocation: in 2004, of the 23 new sites created in Italy, less than half were due to the 
initiatives of companies rooted in Piedmont, while the percentage rises to 80% if we 
consider the opening of foreign plants (12 out of 15).
To understand better the differences between Piedmont's and Italy's components 
producers we can use the division into five categories proposed by the Osservatorio:
(i) design and engineering (D&E): specialised in the design, engineering, prototyping 
and testing of new products, with reference to both the overall vehicle concept 
(mainly styling and engineering) and the design of components;
(ii) systems manufacturers: these are first tier suppliers specialised in the design and 
production of systems (for example, air-conditioning, suspensions, safety etc.) with 
a high innovative and technological content;
(iii) specialists: these are suppliers of complex parts, often with a high-tech and 
innovative content, but that often do not have a business structure capable of 
competing on international markets;
(iv) sub-suppliers: these are second and more frequently third tier suppliers, often 
involved in generic engineering and electro-technical processing, with a low degree 
of innovation and complexity;
(v) module producers: these are first tier suppliers, like the systems providers, but that 
produce "modules", i.e. they pre-assemble parts to be assembled on the 
production lines.
As emerges from Table 4, the structure of Piedmont's components industry differs 
significantly from the national picture: against an average concentration in Piedmont of 
28% in terms of companies and of 42-44% in terms of turnover and employees, we see 
that for design and engineering the share of the region's industry rises to 47.5% and 60%. 
The same trend is true for module and systems producers (at least when referring to the 
number of companies). Piedmont's share of sub-suppliers and specialists is, instead, 
slightly below the national average.
The overall positioning of these categories varies enormously in terms of 
competitiveness, use of local knowledge and potential.
(i) design and engineering: the Turin companies specialised in D&E occupy an
oligopolistic position shared with few other specialised clusters (mainly the 
Californian one) and make intense use of long-standing local competencies,
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starting from that of bodywork companies95. This means that they are subject to a 
low risk of relocation;
Table 6 . 4 -  Composition of components companies in Italy and Piedmont
Firm s T u rn o v e r E m p lo ym en t
Ita ly  P ied m o n t % Ita ly P ied m o n t % Ita ly P ied m o n t %
Design and 
engineering 99 47 47 .5% 1,373 828  60 .3% 9,262 5 ,573 60.2%
Systems
manufacturers 8 5 62.5% 2,240 1.050 46 .9% 8,569 4 ,000  46.7%
Specialists 370 97 26.2% 7,340 2 .696  36 .7% 2 8 ,677 11,137 38.8%
Sub-suppliers 1,198 308 25.7% 9,668 3.687  38 .1% 4 5 ,724 18,401 40 .2%
Module producers 40 19 47 .5% 3,179 1,751 55 .1% 13,222 7 ,265  54.9%
Total 1,715 476  27 .8%  23 ,800 10,012 42 .1%  105 ,454 46 ,376  44 .0%
Source: author's calculation on O C VI figures, 2005
(ii) systems manufacturers: there is a small number of companies, extremely 
important in terms of turnover and employees (they represent less than 1 % in 
terms of the number of companies but account for 9.4% of turnover and 8.3% of 
employees in the Italian components industry). These are almost always Italian 
branches of major multinational groups that occupy an oligopolistic if not 
monopolistic position, working with virtually all the OEMs. From the point of view of 
cognitive processes, they are characterised by a blend of codified knowledge 
(normally produced by the parent company) and tacit knowledge (embedded in 
Piedmont). Although their location in Italy and Piedmont derives from the presence 
of Fiat, the low cost of transport and the high degree of territorialised knowledge 
make them relatively insensitive to Fiat's location decisions;
(iii) specialists: these are companies that work mainly for the domestic market and
have a considerable capacity for innovation, above all in term of products (less in 
terms of processes), that they draw from intensive use of the knowledge rooted in 
the Turin area. For good or for bad, they are, together with D&E, the most direct 
heirs of the original engineering and electro-technical tradition, of which they 
maintain, on the one hand, the traditional organisation of production and the pursuit 
of a "job well-done", and on the other, a limited level of enterprise and poor access 
to codified forms of knowledge. As a result, this group is positioned in a higher 
range of relocation risk compared to D&E and systems producers96;
95 As was said earlier, the two identities still coincide even today, especially for larger companies.
96 The outcome of the process will depend essentially on the strategies of these categories of company: if
the strategy of focusing on labour costs and the proximity to the national client prevails then it is likely that
in the next few years we will see an intense relocation process. If instead adequate policies are introduced
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(iv) sub-suppliers: these undoubtedly represent the weak link in the value chain of the 
Turin components industry. Given that they operate chiefly in production with low 
added value, they appear particularly vulnerable to both the competition of 
manufacturers in countries with low labour costs and to the location choices of 
module producers. Although they also show significant elements of continuity with 
the manufacturing tradition, their ability to draw on this skill pool is limited to 
adjusting their organisation and processes to ensure them the flexibility and 
respect of costs demanded by clients -  normally the components makers of a 
higher level. It follows that this is a group with a high risk of failure or relocation. On 
the other hand, their generic specialisation could, compared to the other groups, 
facilitate their differentiation by easing the adoption of exit strategies from the 
automotive sector and re-orientation towards other industrial sectors;
(v) module producers: the module producers share some features with the systems 
manufacturers (for example, the strong presence of multinational groups and the 
use of a blend of tacit and codified knowledge), but diverge considerably in that 
their work of pre-assembly makes them particularly sensitive to transport costs. 
This means that they are the players most subject to relocation, given that they are 
tied to operating close to the OEM plants, when not actually "under the same roof', 
as highlighted in section 5.3.2.3 on in-house outsourcing.
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If we consider the composition of the Turin components industry with these five 
categories, we can see how Piedmont is characterised by a greater specialisation in
to encourage embedding (facilitating, for instance, access to relations with important local producers of
codified knowledge, such as the Polytechnic of Turin and the Fiat Research Centre (CRF).
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operations with a low risk of relocation (thanks above all to the presence of designers and 
engineers). As far as the highest risk activities are concerned, we note that Piedmont is 
more exposed for both for the module producers and the sub-suppliers: this probably 
means that the Turin area and Piedmont will have to face a further fall in employment 
following the repositioning of the main module producers in the proximity of Fiat plants, but 
research and development activities that depend on co-design with Fiat will in all likelihood 
continue to be located in Turin.
Table 6.6 -  The composition of the components industry in Italy and Piedmont
Italy Piedmont Italy Piedmont Italy Piei
Low Risk 6.2% 10.9% 15.2% 18.8% 16.9%
- design and engineering 5 .8% 9.9% 5.8% 8.3% 8.8%
- systems manufacturers 0.5% 1.1% 9.4% 10.5% 8.1%
Average Risk (specialists) 21.6% 20.4% 30.8% 26.9% 27.2%
High Risk 72.2% 68.7% 54.0% 54.3% 55.9%
- sub-suppliers 69.9% 64.7% 40 .6% 36 .8% 43.4%
- module producers 2 .3% 4.0% 13.4% 17.5% 12.5%
Source: author's calculation on O C V I figures, 2005
6 .1.2 Capital goods and the mechatronic plain.
Activities linked to the production of capital goods emerged in studies into the Turin 
manufacturing sector in the course of the 1980s following a joint Ceris-lres study that 
highlighted a strong concentration of companies (more than 200) in the Turin area (Ceris, 
1990; Rolfo, 1993) that outlined what the Ceris researchers defined as the "mechatronic 
plain".
Far from being a recent feature, this set of companies dates back to the 
industrialisation of Turin and it appears to have re-conquered a role that the “automotive 
culture” dominant in the course of the century had effectively made marginal, or at least 
secondary. It is obvious that there has been a radical renewal in this group: while the 
leading companies with the longest tradition are those specialised in the production of 
machine tools, those operating in the fields of robotics and electronic components have a 
more recent origin.
As the role of Fiat as the client for products diminished bit by bit, the companies in 
the sector gradually established growing independence that, through reorganisation, led 
them to specialise and on these foundations conquer increasing shares on the 
international market. The customisation of products on the basis of customer needs is, in 
this light, a strong point of the Turin system, and is thus, in reality, more robust than might 
appear at first glance: from the organisational point of view, this is a goal that has been 
pursued through the decentralisation of production and the maintenance within the
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company of core functions: design, production of fundamental components, software, 
assembly and technical assistance.
This change in relations with Fiat and the automotive system has demanded an 
adaptation of the system to the new situation: it responded essentially to three closely 
linked processes:
(i) the first is deverticalisation: in contrast with competing industrial companies, 
characterised by a high level of vertical integration, the Italian machine tools sector, 
and especially the Turin sector, is marked by the presence of a broad and complex 
network of companies specialised in specific segments of the production cycle;
(ii) the second process is represented by the internationalisation and specialisation of 
the chief local producers, which have increasingly oriented their operations towards 
product customisation on the basis of customer needs;
(iii) finally, the third process involves the growing independence that some companies 
specialised in mechanical components have won, above all thanks to their 
penetration of international markets and the conquest of clients outside the Turin 
area.
Further confirmation of the importance of the production of capital goods emerges 
from the statistical analysis of sectors which, in different ways, can be viewed as belonging 
to Turin's mechatronic sector.
Table 6.7 shows an estimate of the number of employees in the production of 
capital goods97, comparing the employment trend in the province of Turin with the other 
provinces of the "industrial triangle"98 where these industries are traditionally located.
As can be seen, employment in the sector of the production of capital goods grew 
in the period of 1971-2001 in the province of Turin by about 4,000, equal to 16.6%, 
keeping the Turin area in second place amongst Italy's north-western provinces after Milan 
(where, however, jobs fell by 10% against macro-regional growth of 22%) with around 13- 
14% of total employment.
97 For this purpose, the following ATECO codes were aggregated: Manufacturing of machines for general 
use; Manufacturing of machine tools and parts; Manufacturing of other machinery for special uses; 
Manufacturing of medical equipment, Manufacturing of measurement and control equipment, 
Manufacturing of equipment for the control of industrial processes.
98 The term "industrial triangle" indicates the economic region within the three traditional points of industrial 
development in Italy since 1945 (Turin, Milan and Genoa). The need for a comparison over a mid to long­
term period (30 years) made it preferable to not consider the so-called Third Italy.
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Table 6 . 7 -  Employment In the production of capital goods
Employees 1971 Employees 1981 Employees 1991 Employees 2001
015  - Milan 72 ,823 69 ,094 70 ,439 65 ,415
41% 37% 33% 30%
001 - Turin 24 ,507 26 ,937 28,371 28 ,577
14% 14% 13% 13%
016 - Bergamo 8,175 11,047 16,071 19,687
5% 6% 8% 9%
017 - Brescia 11,565 13,214 15,529 17,781
7% 7% 7% 8%
012 - Varese 14,526 15,304 15,836 15,353
8% 8% 8% 7%
018 - Pavia 11,866 7 ,022 8 ,587 8,244
7% 4% 4% 4%
Total North-W est 176,136 186,467 21 0 ,429 216 ,237
Source: Istat, 1971,1981,1991, 2001
A similar situation can be found for the production and delivery of energy -  which 
can be assumed as a good indicator of activities rooted in electro-technical competencies 
(Table 6.8). In this case, faced with a notable reduction in employment in the North West (- 
12,000 employees, equivalent to 9%), we can observe that the province of Turin actually 
increases its share of employment in the sector, rising from 14% to 16% of employment in 
the sector in the industrial triangle. The importance of this performance is even more 
evident if we consider that the province of Milan, while keeping top position, sees its own 
share fall from 51 % to 38%: in other terms, while in 1971 one worker in two in the electro­
technical sector was employed in the Milan area, in 2001 this proportion had dropped to 
little more than one in three.
Table 6 . 8 -  Employment in electro-technical manufacturing
Employees 1971 Employees 1981 Employees 1991 Employees 2001
015 - Milan 73 ,696 83 ,575 65 ,738 50,022
51% 46% 44% 38%
001 - Turin 19,478 30 ,715 24 ,082 20,329
14% 17% 16% 16%
016 - Bergamo 5,994 8,758 9,661 10,294
4% 5% 6% 8%
012 - Varese 6 ,126 9,827 8 ,199 8,273
4% 5% 5% 6%
010 - Genoa 10,617 13,461 6 ,617 6,353
7% 7% 4% 5%
Total North-W est 143,951 181,536 150 ,052 131,020
Source: Istat, 1971,1981,1991, 2001
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Research conducted again by Ceris in 2002 (Ceris, 2003) identified 257 companies 
operating in the production of capital goods in Piedmont on which an in-depth assessment 
was made of the competition dynamics, starting from data in their financial statements. 
Given that the 257 companies selected accounted for a total of about 18,000 jobs (against 
the approximately 28,000 in the "statistics" in Table 7) and given that the Ateco codes also 
contain activities not entailing direct production, such as installation and maintenance, we 
can consider that the Ceris sample gives a satisfactory reflection of the behaviour of the 
entire sector. Of particular interest is the comparison between the companies located in 
the province of Turin and those located in the rest of Piedmont: the analysis of the financial 
statements shows, in fact, how companies located outside the province of the regional 
capital have a decidedly higher performance compared to those in Turin.
Table 6 . 9 -  Indicators of Piedmont's specialised engineering industry
Net industrial ROI Net technical capital 
investments
2001 2000 1999 1998 2001 2000 1999 1998
Turin
Engineering C.
7.9% 8.7% 4.5% 7.2% 1,677 1,595 1,491 1,482
A. 8.4% 9.0% 4.5% 7.2% 1,591 1,514 1,491 1,482
Other
sectors
C. 10.0% 12.7% 15.7% 15.4% 3,689 3,567 3,029 2,906




15.6% 16.0% 14.2% 15.8% 2,142 1,991 1,709 1,626
A. 16.8% 17.4% 14.2% 15.8% 1,992 1,811 1,709 1,626
Other
sectors
C. 10.2% 10.6% 12.8% 12.8% 3,346 3,307 2,760 2,681
A. 12.4% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 2,996 2,898 2,760 2,681
Source: Ceris (2003)
Notes: 1 Figures in thousand €
C  = current; A  = adjusted
Table 8.9 clearly shows how Turin's mechatronic sector has a ROI considerably 
lower than the rest of Piedmont (7.9% against 15.6% in 2001). The same is true for net 
technical capital investments. In 2001, these came to an average of €1,677,000 for Turin 
companies and €2,1242,000 for companies located in the other provinces. In the 
comparison with a sample of about 1,200 companies belonging to other sectors, the 
Turin/rest of Piedmont dichotomy is even more obvious:
(i) on the one hand, it is clear that the portfolio of Turin companies belonging to other 
sectors is perfectly in line with that of the rest of the region -  even technical 
investments are clearly higher in the Turin area;
(ii) on the other, there is an evident positive dynamic of mechatronics outside the Turin 
area, that out-performs the sample from other sectors (15.6% against 10.2%).
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If we look at the dynamics of the main performance indicators (Table 10) we can 
note how the divergence between Turin and the rest of the region is clearly confirmed, to 
the evident disadvantage of the Turin production fabric, where:
(i) the positive indicators (turnover, investments and employment) grow less strongly 
than in the rest of the region;
(ii) the indicators that express a weakness in the business fabric (financial 
dependency and net working capital) grow more rapidly.
Table 6 . 1 0 -  Trends in the main performance indicators in 1998-2001
Turnover Investments Employment Jpendenie ^ c ^ te l '" 9
Piedmont 17.9% 15.3% 9.6% -0.4% 7.2%
- Turin 11.9% 7.3% 3% 1.7% 16.5%
-Other provinces 24.3% 22.5% 16% -2.7% 2.8%
Source: Ceris (2003)
A further indication comes from Economic Value Added analysis (EVA), which is 
based on the comparison between the ROI rate and the weighted average cost of capital" 
(WACC). On the basis of this comparison, companies can be split into value "creators" and 
"destroyers" (Table 6.11).
Table 6.11 -  Creation and destruction of value in Turin's mechatronics industry
2001 1998
Creation Destruction Creation Destruction
Other sectors 43% 57% 46% 54%
Mechatronics 42% 58% 50% 50%
- Turin 34% 66% 45% 55%
- Other provinces 51% 49% 54% 46%
Source: Ceris (2003)
The figures show how mechatronics in Piedmont has moved from a positive 
condition compared to other sectors (in 1998,50% of Piedmont's mechatronic companies 
created value against 46% of companies belonging to other sectors) to a substantial 
convergence around a figure of 43-42% of value-creating companies. At the same time, 
however, we should note how this result can essentially be attributed to Turin companies, 
amongst which only 34% create value (a full 11% lower than in 1998), while in the other
99 In the case of the Ceris study, the WACC used was the one calculated by Mediobanca adding a spread 
of 3.5% to the return on mid to long-term state bonds and the result was: 7.1% in 1999, 7.9% in 2000 and 
8% in 2001.
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provinces substantial stability is found (with the percentage of value-creating companies 
falling from 54% to 51%, in any case above the threshold of 50%).
On the basis of these figures, we can conclude that the production of capital goods 
in the province of Turin, despite an improvement (although being lower than in the rest of 
the region, both the ROI and net investments increased in the four-year period considered 
by the analysis), remains clearly less competitive compared to companies located outside 
the province. For certain aspects this is not an unexpected result: the profound 
restructuring of the automotive PTS, especially linked to Fiat, has probably conditioned the 
performance of Turin's mechatronics industry compared to the rest of the region, where 
the ties with Fiat have always been weaker, if not actually non-existent.
6.1.3 Design and engineering.
The third group of activities traditionally linked to the automotive PTS for which 
focused examination is worthwhile is that of design and engineering, already partly 
analysed in section 5.4.1 with reference to transformations in the components industry. In 
addition to what has already been said, in this context we would like to develop some 
thoughts on the progressive configuration of design and engineering. In particular, D&E 
has gradually assumed a dual role:
(i) firstly, D&E was the first sub-system of Turin's automotive industry and assumes
an increasingly autonomous position with respect to Fiat and the related PTS,
establishing right from the fifties regular collaboration with other OEMs;
(ii) secondly, it has progressively detached itself from specialisation in just the 
automotive sector, increasing its own component of "industrial design" in the 
broadest sense: for example, Pininfarina Extra was founded in Turin in 1986, a 
spin-off of Pininfarina specialised, as the name suggests, in industrial design.
In this sense we can say that D&E is both a central element within the PTS of the 
Turin automotive industry and, potentially, a PTS itself, whose activities are not necessarily 
applied in the Turin area. In fact, while it is true that automotive-related design and 
engineering has traditionally been linked to manufacturing operations located chiefly in the 
province of Turin, it is equally true that the more strictly industrial design activities -  which 
cover a vast range of products, from household goods to the production of furniture, 
textiles and clothing -  are often performed in collaboration with companies located outside 
the province and region. In contrast, a whole series of Piedmontese product sectors, 
outside the province of Turin, which over time have adopted a district organisation (for 
instance, textiles around Biella, taps and household goods production in eastern Piedmont 
or goldworking in the Valenza district), have often set up links with designers and
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engineers in the Milan area, rather than with Turin's extensive D&E fabric. In a certain 
sense, it appears fair to say that non-automotive industrial design found itself out of phase 
between design and production, precisely in the sense that:
(i) Turin designers often work for companies located outside the province of Turin and 
often outside the regional scale;
(ii) Manufacturing companies in Piedmont with a high intensity of design and 
engineering have often drawn on design skills from outside the territory of 
Piedmont.
In addition, three fundamental characteristics that make Turin's D&E particular 
should be borne in mind, in other words its special position within the learning processes 
of the Turin manufacturing sector. Firstly, it should be noted that the main companies 
operating in this sector have their roots in the Turin engineering tradition, in particular in 
the production of bodywork: it follows that, as already observed in the previous chapter, 
the great Turin design brands are still today bodywork producers. The second element is 
that D&E is not limited to the phase of product concept, but covers the complete range of 
technical processes that go from concept to modelling, from process development to 
prototyping, and from testing to the launch of short production runs. This entails the 
presence of a comprehensive spectrum of competencies that create an indissoluble bond 
from the concept stage to later phases of engineering and the start-up of production. 
Thirdly, in recent years Turin's D&E has seen a rapid process of composition and 
integration between traditional tacit knowledge -  such as the "hand-made" production of 
models -  and codified knowledge available on the global scale -  such as Computer Aided 
Design (CAD) and Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM).
As a consequence, D&E is a sort of laboratory that concentrates the engineering 
and electro-technical traditions, traditional and tacit knowledge with technologically 
codified knowledge, from concept to production. For these reasons, given the systemic 
approach adopted, D&E assumes a dimension that we could define as meta-sectoral. As it 
probably represents the nucleus that has maintained the greatest continuity with the 
technical knowledge traditionally present in the Turin area and that has managed best to 
develop in a process of territorialised learning, the relations that different "pieces" of the 
Turin manufacturing fabric have with D&E represent, in a certain sense, a litmus test to 
evaluate the impact of different cognitive processes. In other words, if we identify the 
organisation of a PTS in terms of cognitive learning processes starting from traditional and 
locally-rooted knowledge, D&E, precisely because it is a direct and clear expression of this
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knowledge, becomes a central element in the differentiation of the learning processes of 
the various PTSs present in the Turin area100.
its inclusion among the competitive systems of the Turin economy appears, 
therefore, as a fundamental passage in the understanding of the possible industrial 
scenarios that will characterise Turin in the coming years. Design and engineering, 
increasingly identified as advanced and prestigious functions, vital to the product 
production cycle, have their roots in the city's manufacturing tradition, in the extensive 
practical skills that can traditionally be traced back to the previous strategic clusters of the 
Turin system.
To understand the structural dynamics of the cluster we must distinguish between 
automotive design from industrial design in the strict sense. Automotive design is divided 
into two levels: on the one hand, the local Turin manufacturing system includes leading 
designers that work for the world's largest producers; on the other hand, a significant 
supply sector of small and medium-sized designers has developed that work for the major 
designers and first tier Fiat components suppliers. In the eighties and nineties we saw a 
considerable expansion of both levels, with the development and rooting of strong 
competencies. The growth of the system's automotive component is closely linked to the 
changes in the relations between the final vehicle producer and its suppliers: in fact, the 
involvement of suppliers in the design of components and the consequent increase in 
investments has meant that specific competencies, once developed within the final 
manufacturer, has spread and become rooted in the local territory, thus constituting the 
bases for the autonomous existence of a design and engineering cluster. As regards the 
relations between design and production, it is important to remember that this activity 
developed starting from the competencies of local bodywork companies, the historic “panel 
beaters” that represented the elite manual workers in Turin (Brosio, 1994). Most of these 
companies still continue to produce bodywork.for the top segment of the market alongside 
design and engineering activities. This very close link between creativity and 
manufacturing is one of the special features of Turin's know-how and has undoubtedly 
facilitated the integration of first tier suppliers into co-design platforms.
As far as industrial design is concerned, this involves almost exclusively small craft 
firms, often without employees. It has a lower penetration of CAD and service activities 
and follow individual projects: prototyping is often conducted close to the client or at 
suppliers that are able to provide special types of processing, not always present in the 
Turin system. The industrial designers are also characterised by their strong specialisation 
and customer loyalty, in the sense that the relationship between designer and client aims
100 This aspect will assume key importance in the next chapter, to which reference should be made for 
some in-depth considerations.
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to give continuity and exclusiveness to the collaboration. As far as relations within the 
sector are concerned, this specialisation and customer loyalty mean that, in contrast to car 
design and engineering, there is neither strong competition nor frequent collaboration 
between the various studios.
Despite representing an area of unquestioned importance in Turin and Piedmont's 
economic fabric, D&E has been the subject of a limited number of studies and analyses. At 
the time of the Torino Design show (1995), one of the few studies available identified 146 
studios operating in Piedmont, 104 of which engaged specifically in the field of industrial 
design (thus excluding visual communication, construction, clothing and textiles). First and 
foremost it emerges how the design and engineering studios are strongly concentrated in 
the province of Turin (80 out of a total of 104 and 60 out of 78) and are small (64 
companies out of 78 employ 1 to 5 designers).
If instead we consider the entire D&E supply chain, limiting it to the automotive 
sector, the literature to refer to is probably the research conducted by the Gruppo Dirigenti 
Fiat association (2003) [the Fiat managers' group] on behalf of Torino Internazionale, the 
agency responsible for the internationalisation of Turin and its production system. The 
analysis in question identified a universe of about 200 companies (193 to be exact) that 
cover the eight phases of the Product and Process Development Plan (Piano Sviluppo 
Prodotto e Processo, PSPP): definition of objectives and general planning; concept and 
style; modelling; engineering of the electrical, electronic and telecommunications systems; 
development of the product and process plan; prototyping; testing; production start-up. 
The estimate for total employment in D&E linked to the Turin automotive industry is about 
10,000, mainly concentrated in small and medium-sized companies (only 13 companies 
have more than 100 employees, but they provide 40% of jobs in the sector).
Table 6 .1 2 -  Share of contracts and turnover by type of client
S hare  o f co n trac ts  S hare  o f tu rn o v e r
Final manufacturer 28%  74%
Main contractor 35%  12%
T ype
Components producer 33%  9%
O ther 4 %  5%
Turin 4 0 .6 %  47%
Italy 17 .4%  12%
O rig in  Europe 23%  22%
Am ericas 8 .9%  10%
Far East 10 .1%  9%
Source: Gruppo Dirigenti Fiat (2003), p. 47.
The in-depth study conducted on a sample of 57 companies confirms the central 
role and vitality of Turin's D&E: it should be enough to note that around 40% of the
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companies interviewed was founded, through spin-off processes, between 1992 and 2002, 
in other words in a period characterised, as was seen in the previous chapter, by a drastic 
re-sizing of the Turin components industry. The analysis made by Torino Internazionale 
brings out at least two other pieces of information of great interest for this general picture 
of the dynamics within the Turin D&E sector.
The first interesting issue concerns the relationship with clients. The fact that 
emerges from Table 6.12 shows a situation of change and transformation not yet 
completed:
(i) on the one hand, there is, in fact, an intensification and differentiation of contractual 
relations (highlighted by the fact that relations with final manufacturers account for 
less than one third of the client portfolio) which could lead one to think of a network 
and polycentric reorganisation of the supply relations with a variety of actors;
(ii) on the other hand, the relations with the final producers sustain a fundamental role 
for the survival and competitiveness of D&E companies, if it is true that 3/4 of the 
sample's turnover depends on contracts with final producers, confirming, and 
partially contradicting the previous point, the maintenance of the organisational 
structure of hierarchical dependency that has traditionally characterised the Turin 
automotive PTS.
This last point is partly corrected by data that show how the geographical origin of 
clients sees a substantial alignment between the percentage regarding turnover: for 
example, the relations with Italian clients (including those in Turin) accounted for 58% in 
terms of number of contracts and 59% in terms of turnover. This means that the 
dependency on final producers does mean dependency on Fiat, but also rather more. It is 
significant to observe a sort of bifurcation in the scale of relations with clients, if we 
consider that over 40% of the sample's turnover comes from contracts with foreign clients 
and 47% from clients located in the Turin area. Relations with suppliers are much more 
deeply rooted in the local territory which see a minimum presence of relations with the rest 
of Italy and Europe, while supply contracts with companies located in Asia and the 
Americas are almost totally absent. In terms of location/relational dynamics, we can 
therefore conclude -  and this is the second interesting element -  that D&E has an almost 
optimal structure in terms of rooting, thanks to the simultaneous presence of three nuclei 
of well-established relations:
(i) a solid portfolio of local clients, with which the economies of agglomeration can 
facilitate the triggering of learning and co-development processes;
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(ii) a broad supra-national network of clients, which represents both a substantial part 
of turnover and privileged access to sources of supra-local knowledge;
(iii) an upstream fabric of supply relations essentially self-contained at the local scale, 
capable of favouring, at least in theory, the dissemination of spin-offs on the 
provincial and peri-urban scale.
6.2 Towards a Turin automotive district?
Starting in the 1990s, the "automotive district" has been one of the most successful 
images in the minds of the specialists. As can be imagined, the image suggests that a 
system is being formed of Turin SMEs specialised in various phases of the production 
cycle linked to the automotive industry, sharing at least some of the strong features of 
Marshallian district organisation as it has emerged in the experience of industrial districts. 
The basic idea is that the fabric of companies located in the Turin area -  mainly in the 
metropolitan area but also in the rest of the province -  has now made itself largely 
independent of supply to Fiat and/or that it can become so without suffering fatal effects, 
maintaining its own specialisation in the automotive industry. Although this progressive 
expansion of the client portfolio is now unanimously acknowledged in almost all studies of 
the sector, when, to describe this situation of specialisation without dependency on the 
main client, use is made of the metaphor of the "industrial district", in reality some not 
insignificant implications arise that concern the organisation of the system as such. In 
particular, the assumption of the Marshallian district as the key to interpretation goes 
beyond the structural fact-the maintenance of automotive specialisation in the Turin area 
-  to assume organisational elements that cannot be assumed a priori, but must be verified 
in terms of the organisation of the system.
On this point, the hypothesis that the PTS of the Turin automotive sector has 
reorganised itself as an automotive district must be verified with respect to two possible 
falsifications:
(i) the compatibility of the district model with the characteristics typical of the 
automotive industry;
(ii) the compatibility of the district model with the contingent characteristics of the Turin 
automotive industry.
On this, we will focus our analysis of the district proposal on the relations between 
suppliers and assemblers, largely ignoring here the discussion of the role of the other two 
sub-systems considered, i.e. the labour market and competition facilitators (public 
administration, local development agencies, trade associations, universities, research 
centres etc.). An article recently published in the international Journal of Operations and
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Production Management by Zirpoli and Caputo (2002) was dedicated to the nature of 
client-supplier relations and their role in co-design activities. Starting from the debate that 
contrasts keiretsu™\ the Japanese method of organising the value chain in the automotive 
industry, with the traditional "Fordist" forms based on the prevalence of hierarchical 
models in the management of relations between the OEM and suppliers, the authors 
identify six characteristics that determine the possibilities of translating co-design 
processes into New Product Development (NPD) processes:
(i) formation of the supply chain enhanced by the initiative of the OEM;
(ii) preference for a long term "obligational contractual relation” (OCT) instead of an
"arm's length contractual relation" (ACR);
(iii) dismissal of OEM's monopolistic power and use of techniques such as target 
costing, target pricing, value engineering and profit sharing;
(iv) a small number of suppliers providing each type of part (in order to reduce
transaction costs);
(v) potential competition between suppliers;
(vi) cooperation institutions (in particular vertical and horizontal sharing of knowledge, 
transparency of the operative conditions, elimination of information asymmetries);
(vii) reputation as discipline mechanisms.
Table 6.13 shows how these traits emerging in the automotive industry coincide or 
not with the organisational model of the industrial district and how they are expressed in 
the case of the Turin automotive PTS.
Table 6.13: Buyer-supplier relational features, industrial district, Fiat supply chain
Buyer-supplier relational features Industrial District 
Model
Fiat Supply Chain Model
OEM's initiative
Preference for OCT rather than ACR 
Dismissal of OEM's monopolistic power 
Small numbers of suppliers
Potential competition between suppliers 
Cooperation institutions
- vertical and horizontal sharing of knowledge
- transparency
- low information asymmetries 
Reputation










OCT substituting ACR  
Low




- just vertical sharing
- low transparency
- high information asymmetries 
Codified reputation
Source: reworked from Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002
101 Defined according to the case as Japanization or Toyotaism (Wood, 1991)
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The table shows how the model of relations between clients and suppliers that is 
emerging in the automotive industry does in fact demonstrate some points of contact with 
the industrial district model, in particular with reference to the re-sizing of the client's 
monopolistic power, to the balance between competitive and co-operative mechanisms 
and the role of reputation. On the other hand, some elements typical of the automotive 
industry remain that cannot in any way be associated with a "district" form: the OEMs 
necessarily keep the initiative as they remain the key players in the sector, just as the level 
of investment demanded and the nature of the co-design process require a greater degree 
of formalisation in contracts, incompatible with the prevalence of ACR typical of the 
industrial district, and the presence of few suppliers for each component. The most 
important fact that emerges from the analysis by Zirpoli and Caputo is, however, another 
one: the fact that the interpretation given by Fiat of the model of relations between client 
and supplier underlines precisely the elements that diverge the most from the district 
model. The management of outsourcing by Fiat does not seem, in fact, to lead to a 
downsizing of its monopolistic power, with the limited participation of suppliers in sharing 
profits and limited transparency in the management of the supply relationship. The 
management of the flow of knowledge does not appear to respond to the district criteria, 
either, with a low impact of horizontal relations of knowledge sharing and a substantial 
maintenance of the information asymmetry in favour of the OEM. The same is true for 
reputation: paradoxically, reputation played a greater role in the phase preceding the 
reorganisation of relations with the components producers, when a significant segment of 
the suppliers was linked to Fiat by more informal and arm's length relations. On the other 
hand, the entry of the major components multinationals has helped to spread within the 
system a more codified notion of reputation, i.e. linked to the possession of formal 
requisites (for example the specific certifications demanded by the French company Valeo, 
one of the world leaders in components, with numerous plants in Piedmont). It is no 
chance that Zirpoli and Caputo conclude their analysis by hypothesising that the 
transformation of the supply chain introduced by Fiat in the 1990s can be identified in a 
different model that the authors call "new adversarial":
In this model, co-design practices (modes and times of supplier involvement in 
NPD) are associated with relational practices not consistent with ones reported in 
the dominant literature. They can be summed up as follows: 
absence of cross equity stakes;
[...]
absence of formal and informal agreement of long-term supply relationships 
(beyond the life of the model); 
low level of trust between actors;
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strong pressure on cost cutting not always motivated by technical 
discussions;
absence of formal programmes of knowledge sharing between actors 
(Zirpoli and Caputo 2002, p. 1047).
It is easy to note how it is precisely the institutional characteristics that bring the 
keiretsu model closer to district organisation. This is what seems to be missing the most in 
the relations between OEM and suppliers in the case of Turin, making it difficult to talk 
explicitly of an "automotive district".
Finally, the full application of the district metaphor seems to be threatened by two 
further elements. The first is given by the presence in the territorial system of a substantial 
number of components multinationals which Fiat has turned to, not finding in its own 
portfolio of local suppliers the competencies necessary to implement its co-design and 
NPD programmes. Apart from the fact that the presence of multinational companies is a 
feature essentially extraneous to district organisation -  or, to put it better, there is no 
unanimity in the literature on districts about the effects of the penetration of MNCs in the 
local fabric -  it should be observed that the presence of these companies in the Turin 
area is linked mainly to the need to serve Fiat (thus making relocation possible) and that 
often their entry into the PTS has been followed by a concentration of R&D activities at the 
research centres of the parent company, further impoverishing the territorialised processes 
of the production of knowledge. Linked to this fact is the second element that comes into 
play: as noted by the Osservatorio sulla Componentistica Veicolare, the components 
industry can no longer be assumed as a single block of companies that exhibit the same 
competitive behaviour, but it is possible to distinguish between at least five types of 
supplier: module producers, systems manufacturers, designers, specialists and sub­
suppliers. As things stand, all five of these actors are present in the Turin area, giving the 
PTS the features of completeness and integration of the various phases of the production 
cycle that are effectively an important characteristic of the district model. However -  and 
this is the central point in the analysis made by the Osservatorio -  module producers and 
sub-suppliers are two categories with a high risk of relocation:
(i) the module producers because their exposure to high transport costs and the 
characteristics of their products mean that they must be close to the final 
assembler, giving an incentive to follow automotive producers in their location 
changes;
(ii) the sub-suppliers because their weakness in innovation, specialisation in relatively 
simple components and normally limited size expose them, on the one hand, to the 
strong competition of developing countries and, on the other, to the temptation to
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base their competitive advantage on lower labour costs that can be obtained 
through relocation.
In this way, the nascent automotive district would be exposed immediately to the 
risk of dissolution, given the likely disappearance in the coming years of the all-embracing 
territorial presence of the entire production cycle that represents one of the pillars of the 
Marshallian industrial district.
6.3 Towards a new interpretation of Turin TPS102?
Before considering some empirical evidence that emerges from a sample of over 
300 interviews with companies within the engineering and electronics tradition, it seems 
worth focusing our attention on previous research conducted by the author on the Turin 
manufacturing sector in the late 1990s. To examine the transformation of Turin’s 
manufacturing structure, a questionnaire survey of engineering companies was 
undertaken. The survey covered 150 companies operating in five local production systems 
in the province of Turin -  Turin itself, Avigliana, Pinerolo, Ivrea and Rivarolo. The 
engineering companies were producers of:
(i) industrial goods (44 interviews), including makers of machine tools and measuring 
machines, but also companies engaged in related activities such as the design and 
manufacture of industrial plant, and the design of integrated production systems;
(ii) vehicles (62 interviews), including specialist vehicle components producers and 
also producers of boats; and
(iii) non-specialist engineering products (44 interviews), some of whom have historical 
and geographical ties to car production, but who work for numerous firms in other 
sectors including household appliance manufacturers, aerospace companies, and 
machinery producers and companies making finished goods such as locks and 
handles.
The questions focused on:
(i) local/global relations and competitiveness- especially the internationalisation of the 
local manufacturing structure;
(ii) inter-company relationships - the continuing existence of hierarchical forms of 
organisation (particularly among multinational groups) and the formation of 
networked clusters of companies; and
102 This section was published in part in Conti and Giaccaria, 2001.
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(iii) learning processes - and the increasing importance of Turin’s designers and 
engineers and their relationships with engineering companies.





Presence of TN C s
Role of internal and external sources of
Inter-company relations
information
Role and intensity of informal 
communication
Role of untraded relations
Dependency on suppliers and customers 
Role of the local institutions and
organisations
Role of trust in supplier agreem ents
Learning process Linkages with suppliers and customers 
Existence of innovation networks
Relations with design and engineering  
Role of know-how and know-who
Table 6.14 shows the variables that have been used to analyse these three 
features of the local manufacturing system. The companies interviewed were asked their 
opinion on the role that traditional local factors play in determining competitive advantage: 
logistics and accessibility; the presence of other local agents; training; relations with the 
workforce; and institutional support. They were also asked their opinion on the local 
business environment and local “industrial atmosphere”.
6.3 .1 Competitiveness o f the local in the global.
The analysis of Turin’s engineering sector necessarily began by considering the 
competitiveness of the three groups into which it has been divided, taking three variables 
into account: the propensity to export, the type of competition (if based on the needs of 
one or few main customers) and the evaluation of whether there was any increase in 
competitiveness in the course of the 1990s.
The figures (Table 6.15) show fairly clearly how there is a clear-cut difference 
between the competitiveness of producers of industrial goods and that of companies 
belonging to the automotive sector. For example, 61.5% of companies that export more 
than 50% of their sales produce industrial goods. On the contrary, almost half (47.5%) of 
the companies that do not export belong to the automotive sector, demonstrating that most 
Turin companies linked to the car industry still maintain an exclusive bond with the Fiat 
supply chain. A confirmation of this indication is given by the type of competition: 60% of 
the automotive companies competes essentially by trying to satisfy the price standards of
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the main customer, a percentage that drops to 16.7% for the manufacturers of industrial 
goods.
Table 6.15- The competitiveness of Turin’s manufacturing industry
Propensity to export Type of competition





16Generic engineering 1 19 7 14
(3.9%) (31.1%) (23.3%) (20.9%) (24.3%)
Automotive 9 29 18 28 23
(34.6%) (47.5%) (60%) (41.8%) (34.8%)
Industrial goods 16 13 5 25 27
(61.5%) (21.4%) (16.7%) (37.3%) (40.9%)
Total (out of 150) 26 61 30 67 66
It can also be seen that 40.9% of companies showing an increase in 
competitiveness belongs to the cluster of industrial goods (27 out of 44 manufacturers of 
machine tools and similar have become more competitive in the last ten years).
Finally, the marginal position of generic engineering should be noted, both in terms 
of propensity to exports and in innovation capacity. This is explained by the fact that this 
category is made up of third or even fourth tier supplier companies, often small ones that 
play mainly a support function.
6.3.2 Networks and trust: the local organisation o f production.
The organisation of the manufacturing structure was assessed principally by examining the 
nature of the communication between the various local actors, assuming that the 
prevalence of formal communication (manuals, technical specifications, contracts) 
indicates a prevalence of hierarchical relations. On the contrary, the use of more informal 
means of communication (for instance, personal visits and the exchange of technical staff) 
has been considered as a sign of the presence of a network organisation. Similarly, trust in 
the technicians of the customers and suppliers has been considered an important factor 
for the creation of trust-based relations in the local system.
Again in this case, the companies belonging to the automotive sector are clearly 
distinguished from manufacturers of industrial goods. Two main conclusions can thus be 
drawn:
(i) the first concerns the producers of industrial goods and establishes a relation 
between the intensity of informal communications with customers, trust in 
suppliers’ technicians and competitiveness. In this activity, the local knowledge 
relationship that is the basis of competitive advantage seems to be of a strictly 
technical type. In other terms, local learning occurs upstream (in the supply 
relationship) through trust in the suppliers’ technicians, and downstream (in market
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relations) through the close collaboration between the producer’s technicians and 
those of the user of the product;
(ii) the second refers mainly to the automotive sector and underlines the intensity of 
supply relations (based on price) and its relations with competitiveness. In this 
sector, the learning process is still organised according to the hierarchy typical of 
Fordism, in that it connects the hegemonic company, its first tier suppliers and sub­
contractors in a hierarchy: the leading company transmits orders to those below 
through forms of communication that become more and more informal as one 
descends the tiers in the hierarchy. As this is a sub-contracting chain, the 
asymmetry between relations up and down stream may be surprising: the 
individual company seems to perceive its own relationship with its suppliers as 
more intense than with its customers. However, when it has to express the 
perception of its own relations with its main customer, it describes it in terms of 
relative dependency. This is typically hierarchical behaviour, in that there is a clear 
perception that the information and decision-making flow is top-down, from the 
main customer to the supplier, and from there in turn to the sub-contractors.
Thus, as we move down to the lower levels of the hierarchy, the use of informal 
methods of communication reflects the need of sub-contractors to adapt flexibly -  or, 
better, to bend over backwards -  to the highly codified flows of orders and information that 
arrive from above3.
6.3.3 Design, engineering and learning.
One of the principal hypotheses formulated about the transformation of Turin’s 
manufacturing structure is that D&E are fundamental to the definition of the identity of the 
local system. These are activities of great interest from the point of view of learning 
processes:
(i) because of the high level of tacit knowledge: although the growing importance of 
computer-based design and engineering tools (CAD, CAM) has introduced a 
process of codification of the knowledge required, D&E activities still depend on
forms of tacit knowledge, linked to experience and to the sharing of aesthetic and
technical understanding, reproducible only through intense personal relations of 
collaboration and apprenticeship4;
(ii) because of the close bonds with production: most of Turin’s historical designers 
combine design and engineering work with the production of special, high quality 
bodywork. The tacit knowledge immanent in D&E activity is thus easily codified in 
products that are exported worldwide;
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(iii) because of the immaterial and symbolic nature of design, which makes it similar to
the production of luxury consumer goods in the industrial districts. In both cases, in 
fact, tacit local knowledge is translated into style, taste and sophistication that 
confer a particular symbolic value on the products. In other terms, in the case of 
design, the transfer of knowledge between local and global, between the tacit and 
the explicit, occurs through the creation of sign-value.
It can be noted that it is the vehicle sector that uses design the most: 22.5% of 
companies in this sector regularly use more than three forms of design, against the 15.9% 
of producers of machine tools and equipment and just 6.8% of generic engineering (Table 
16).
Nevertheless, this relationship has a contradictory aspect. In fact, almost half the 
companies that do no design work (48.1 %) belong to the vehicle sector and only 14.8% to 
the industrial goods sector. We can thus say that the vehicle sector is the most design­
intensive in Turin, but it is also the one with the greatest number of companies that do not 
undertake any design work first-hand and is, therefore, in a situation of total dependency 
on the customer. In contrast, the production of industrial goods sees the use of design as 
an activity needed by almost all the companies in the sector, even if less intensively than 
the vehicle sector5: 75% of industrial goods manufacturers regularly undertakes one or two 
forms of design.
Table 6 .16- Intensity of design and specialisation
Specialisation Intensity of design (1)
None Average High Total
Generic engineering 10 31 3 44
(22.7%) (70.5%) (6.8%) (100%)
Vehicles 13 35 14 62
(21.0%) (56.5%) (22.5%) (100%)
Industrial goods 4 33 7 44
(9.1%) (75.0%) (15.9%) (100%)
Total 27 99 24 150
(18.0%) (66.0%) (16.0%) (100%)
Note: (1)D = 0.081
The difference between the vehicle and the industrial goods sector is clear even 
when considering the different ways in which the companies conduct their design work. It 
can be seen, firstly, that industrial goods producers usually maintain control of design, 
whether internally or delegated to external consultants (Table 6.17).
As far as autonomous and internal design is concerned, the difference is 
unequivocal: only 8 industrial goods producers out of 44 (18.2%) do not do design work 
internally, a percentage that rises to 43.5% for vehicles and 59.1 % for generic engineering. 
Again in the case of design entrusted to external studios and professionals, the industrial
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goods producers are the ones that use the tradition and skills of Turin designers most 
intensively (22.7% against 16.1% for vehicles and 6.8% for generic engineering).
Table 6 .17- Autonomous design and manufacturing specialisation
Specialisation Autonomous and Autonomous and Total
internal design (1) external design (2)
No Yes No Yes
Gen. Engineering 26 18 41 3 44
(59.1%) (40.9%) (93.2%) (6.8%) (100%)
Vehicles 27 35 52 10 62
(43.5%) (56.5%) (83.9%) (16.1%) (100%)
Industrial goods 8 36 34 10 44
(18.2%) (81.8%) (77.3%) (22.7%) (100%)
Total 61 89 127 23 150
(40.7%) (59.3%) (84.7%) (15.3%) (100%)
Note: (1) 0 = 0.00041
(2) 0 = 0.11
If we consider the design done by the customer, the situation is reversed: only 
6.8% of industrial goods producers works to customer designs, against the 21% of 
components manufacturers and 31.8% of companies operating in generic engineering6.
We can thus conclude that the production of industrial goods implies greater design 
autonomy and greater use of resources external to the company, but internal to the local 
system in which it is rooted. Naturally, the dependency of the vehicle sector on the main 
customer does not concern only the outlet market but also design.
6.3.4 When Fiat make the difference.
The empirical analysis has identified two different components of Turin’s manufacturing 
industry, characterised by their own production and competitive behaviour, the vehicle and 
industrial goods sectors. Before recomposing the results of this analysis into a new image 
of Turin’s manufacturing industry, it is however useful to look more closely at the vehicle 
sector.
The feeling of there being a radical transition in Turin’s vehicle industry is backed 
up by some profound transformations in the local manufacturing structure. The location of 
numerous components multinationals, the growing importance assumed by the quality of 
sub-contractors, the progressive involvement of suppliers in research and design, and 
significant symptoms of entrepreneurship shown by small and medium sized companies 
raised to the rank of first tier suppliers are all evidence that suggest a radical 
transformation of the vehicle sector. In particular, they suggest that this transformation has 
assumed traits of innovativeness, participation and competitiveness that justify talk of a 
full-scale auto district, of a post-Fordist organisation of the sector no longer guided by the 
hierarchical principle that saw the absolute hegemony of Fiat. In this interpretation, new 
economic actors (first tier suppliers, transnational companies, research centres, designers) 
are acquiring new significance. These are connected to each other by relations of co­
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operation and collective learning that confer new competitiveness on Turin’s vehicle 
industry.
Above and beyond the specific traits that the auto district assumes in the various 
interpretations, it is important to observe that they bear out in any case the hypothesis that 
the vehicle sector still represents a strongly homogeneous set of activities which, despite 
the profound changes of recent decades, possess a common identity. However, this 
hypothesis makes it difficult to explain some phenomena, the most important of which is 
the polarisation of the behaviour of companies totally dependent on Fiat and of those 
which had become independent of the hegemonic company. Among the former, the 
formation has been seen, for example, of a nucleus of small first tier suppliers that depend 
totally on the relationship with Fiat and which show little territorial embeddedness. Among 
the latter, instead, the conquest of autonomy has often meant abandoning OE production, 
with an orientation towards the vehicle after-market, and abandonment of the auto sector, 
with the consequent specialisation in the production of components for motorcycles, boats 
and agricultural machinery (Citta di Torino, 1998).
Table 6 .18 - Non Fiat vehicle sector and Fiat suppliers
Characteristic Non Fiat vehicle sector Fiat suppl
High propensity to export 10 0
(23.3%) (0%)




High intensity of design 5 7
(11.6%) (21.2%)
Total absence of design 7 11
(16.3%) (33.3%)
Customer’s quality standards 28 28
(65.1%) (84.8%)
Price competition for the customer 8 12
(18.6%) (36.4%)
Membership of a group 6 11
(14%) (33.3%)
Prevailing use of local information 11) 17
(25.6%) (51.5%)
Fundamental role of logistics 7 3
(16.3%) (9.1%)
Negative role of logistics 8 2
(18.6%) (6.1%)
Note: All relations are statistically significant (□ <= 0.1).
The most interesting aspect is that both of these types of behaviour have been 
translated into an increase in competitiveness: in the period 1990-1997 the growth in 
exports was high above all among companies that were no longer first tier Fiat suppliers 
and which, in contrast, had moved more decidedly towards supplying Fiat (Enrietti, 1999).
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At this point, the key question is to understand whether such a profound divergence 
of behaviour can be interpreted within a coherent framework, such as the one proposed by 
the image of the car district. Is there one car district or should we consider there to be a 
profound rift between the galaxy of companies that still orbits around Fiat and the vehicle 
nucleus that has tried different roads to independence from Fiat? Posing this question is 
the same as asking whether the vehicle companies dependent on Fiat and those that have 
become autonomous show different forms of behaviour that imply two distinct ways of 
organising production, embedding themselves locally and achieving competitiveness.
The absolute figure indicates how many companies possess a given characteristic, 
while the figure in brackets indicates the percentage of companies that possess the 
characteristic in question, taking 100 as the total companies belonging to the cluster.
To investigate these differences, the generic engineering companies were 
reclassified into two groups: companies integrated in the Fiat-centred PTS and companies 
extraneous to it. This division is obviously not intended as absolute: within this PTS there 
are companies which have tried to diversify their production, especially by increasing 
exports; vice versa, other companies extraneous to the Fiat supply chain may in the past 
have used relations with the Fiat-centred PTS to acquire knowledge and skills later used 
for their own purposes.
76 companies were identified in this way, 547 of which belonging to the vehicle 
cluster and 22 classified previously in the generic engineering group (of these, 9 belong to 
the hot pressing system of the Rivarolo local system). Table 9.6 summarises the 
differences between the two groups, with reference to some of the main characteristics of 
the vehicle cluster.
The comparison clearly brings out how the characteristics of the vehicle sector are 
in fact those of the Fiat-centred PTS. The first significant fact is that, despite the 
government incentives to trade in old cars, companies in the Fiat supply chain have not 
seen a significantly higher increase in competitiveness than others. This is particularly 
interesting if we consider that many of the companies which have left the Fiat orbit work in 
the after-market, a sector damaged by the trade-in incentives, as the incentives 
encouraged motorists to buy new cars rather than repair old ones. As far as the role of 
groups is concerned, we can see that it has been above all Fiat suppliers that have been 
the targets of takeovers. This fact underlines once again that the main reason for the 
presence of multinational groups is still access as a supplier to Fiat.
The processes of value creation also differ profoundly:
(i) the Fiat supply companies have an ambiguous relationship with design: on the one
hand, they are the companies that do most design; on the other, numerous
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companies depend entirely on Fiat for design ( one third of companies has no 
design activity);
(ii) the hierarchical production chain that binds each single firm closely to the main 
customer (on which it depends) and its supply chain is specific to the Fiat system, 
and not to the vehicle sector as a whole;
(iii) it is above all the companies of the Fiat-centred PTS that depend very much on 
local information, and they also show less propensity to export: these are two 
symptoms of the Fiat-centred PTS’s relative closure, but also of embeddedness.
The empirical analysis thus leads us to the fact that the Turin vehicle sector can no 
longer be seen as a cohesive set of activities and actors. Our hypothesis is, in contrast, 
that two different systems have formed within it, each of them characterised by its own 
behaviour. The Fiat supply chain, despite its important transformations, still appears as a 
hierarchically ordered system, within which positions of innovation and production 
excellence co-exist with situations of precariousness and dependency on the decisions of 
the hegemonic companies. The non-Fiat vehicle sector has instead gradually differentiated 
itself from the rest of the system, to the point of assuming an alternative identity: this, 
although not characterised by its own behaviour and perceptions as happens with the 
producers of industrial goods, can no longer, in our opinion, be traced back to the Fiat 
system. The next section will recompose these results in an attempt to offer a partially new 
image of Turin’s manufacturing industry.
6.3.5 Fiat-centred PTS and emerging Mechatronic PTS.
The empirical analysis highlights that the former Automotive PTS went through a 
schismogenesis process103 and now is split into three distinct sub-systems: an industrial 
goods system, a vehicle production system dependent on Fiat, and a vehicle system 
independent of Fiat (Figure 6.1).
Empirical evidence suggests that this schismogenesis process ended up with the 
reorganisation of these three systems into two separate Productive Territorial Systems, a 
post-Fordist Fiat-centred PTS -  the son and the heir of the original unique Automotive PTS 
-  and an emerging Mechatronic PTS, bringing together the capital goods and non Fiat- 
related automotive sectors.
103 Schismogenesis is a term used by Gregory Bateson (1979) to indicate a process of progressive
differentiation of norms of individual behaviour as the result of cumulative interaction between individuals.
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Figure 6.1 -  The transformation in Turin manufacturing
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6.3.5.1 The post-Fordist Fiat-centred PTS
The empirical analysis shows that the relationships in the Fiat-centred PTS have declined, 
questioning the traditional assumption that Turin’s manufacturing base pivots exclusively 
around automotive production in general and Fiat in particular. The hierarchical production 
system that remains is, however, typical of Fordist Turin.
The competitiveness of the Fiat-centred PTS still depends on companies having 
preferential relationships with major corporations, principally Fiat. It is true, nevertheless, 
that change has progressively empowered first tier suppliers. However, these relationships 
remain profoundly hierarchical, with decision-making and innovation flowing through 
various levels, from Fiat at the top to small and medium sized subcontracting companies at 
the bottom.
This continuity of Fordist organisation is particularly evident in four aspects of 
current relations. First, the relations between companies show the emergence of network 
characteristics in addition to the persistence of hierarchical features. On the one hand, this 
involves the transformation of the Fordist multinational, Fiat, into a networked transnational 
corporation (TNC). On the other hand, there are also signs that innovation is spreading to 
small enterprises as networks centred on Fiat develop to embrace design and engineering 
studios (D&E), first tier suppliers and Fiat Research Centre programmes. Nevertheless, 
dependency on Fiat remains. Second, hierarchical relationships still provide the frame to 
local and global interactions. Either Fiat or first tier suppliers mediate access for firms to 
international markets. But, the international groups that act as nodes in both local and 
supra-national networks are shown in survey responses not to be embedded at both
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scales, but now progressively to be less locally embedded as their exports expand. 
Indeed, the rise of national and international groups appears to diminish territorial 
embeddedness without bringing the benefits of connections to global markets. Third, the 
learning relations linked to design and engineering work are still channelled primarily 
through the companies’ main customer, Fiat. In this PTS, the use of D&E for product and 
process innovation is less frequent than in the system making industrial goods. Perversely, 
while components manufacturers linked to Fiat make greater use of D&E, many of them 
have no design and engineering activities and depend entirely on those of their customers. 
In this hierarchical decision-making chain, knowledge and information are in the hands of 
the dominant firms. Fourth, the final product of the PTS, the automobile, is sold on the 
customised mass market, which, as we have seen, has evolved from the Fordist mass 
market.
From this analysis of milieu relations, it is reasonable to conclude that the Fiat 
supplier system, despite continuing local bonds, is structured as an a-territorial economic 
PTS. The organisation of the Fiat-centred PTS appears to be in a process of transition 
from old Fordist arrangements to a post-Fordist identity that is still to be defined, but which 
is somewhere between the global and the local and between hierarchy and network.
The emerging post-Fordist Fiat-centred PTS is made up of various actors each 
following different trajectories of change and each of which will contribute differently to the 
system in the future. At the centre of the system is Fiat, which is becoming increasingly 
transnational, and assuming a global network form. Its territorial embeddedness in Turin is 
increasingly ambiguous and controversial. On the one hand, it is part of a network of local 
co-operation, especially for decision-making, innovation and engineering activities, 
because the designers and first tier suppliers it uses are strongly embedded locally in 
Turin. On the other hand, the locations of production plants are now seen in a global 
perspective, with little concern for Turin.
First tier suppliers appear increasingly to be on the borderline between hierarchy 
and network forms of organisation - between local embeddedness and a-territorial 
dependency. However, the inter-firm relationships of these enterprises are still evolving. 
Their progressive involvement in co-design networks with Fiat has increased their 
autonomy and facilitated the consolidation of network relations. But, their acquisition and 
take-over by multinational groups has meant that many first level suppliers have become 
part of a new hierarchy. Ambiguity can also be seen in their evolving relationships with the 
local area. While these networks embed companies in a close-knit fabric of untraded 
relations, it is still true that many of these companies are willing to relocate their 
manufacturing activities close to the new globally distributed plants of their main customer.
Subcontracting is the component of the system that most closely reproduces the 
characteristics of the old Fordist form of organisation. Subcontractors remain largely
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excluded from the restructuring processes of the Fordist hierarchy and are unaware of the 
birth of new relational networks with either first tier suppliers or other subcontractors. From 
a territorial point of view, subcontracting acts within a mainly local context in contrast to the 
findings reported in Chapter 4. These small firms can gain access neither to global 
production and innovation networks nor to foreign markets.
Finally, there are two other important sets of actors that “network” with Fiat and its 
first level suppliers. These are the design and engineering companies and Comau, the 
group controlled by Fiat that makes industrial goods for the holding company (especially 
robots and integrated production systems). In both cases, these are actors whose 
competitiveness and excellence are based on local factors which cannot easily be found 
outside the Turin area (tradition, know-how, experience, skilled personnel, trusted 
suppliers).
The image that emerges from this analysis is that of a system shifting towards the 
globalisation of the relations of production and, therefore, towards potential uprooting from 
the Turin milieu. The rooting of the PTS in Turin depends, in fact, on the balancing of two 
opposing forces:
(i) a centrifugal force, resulting from the strategic decisions of global actors -  the 
buying up of local suppliers by outside interests, and Fiat’s global decentralisation 
that encourages its suppliers to follow; and
(ii) a centripetal force, linked to specific localised knowledge-based processes, the 
most important of which is the close connection between D&E activities and 
production.
A balance between these forces has yet to emerge.
6.3.5.2 The Mechatronic PTS
The empirical analysis also underlines the emergence of another local system 
characterised by a stratification of local and global relationships which sets it apart from 
the system discussed previously. This is the PTS identifying those activities and sectors 
which, starting from the engineering tradition that is the heart of Turin’s know-how, have 
been able to activate the local factors (trust, personal acquaintance, sharing of values and 
skills etc) that play a fundamental role in supporting the competitiveness of local 
manufacturing systems.
The organisation of the Mechatronic PTS is a nucleus of relationships that link 
D&E, the manufacture of industrial goods and a close-knit network of companies 
specialised in micro-mechanics and information technology (IT). This is the first and 
principal element of the local value production system. The competitiveness of this system
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arises from its propensity to export and the increased competitive capacity of the firms 
involved in recent years. They tend to have a multitude of customers, rather than one or 
two key ones. They are highly specialised and globally market oriented. At the same time, 
they see the role of the local economic environment of Turin in a positive light in terms of 
“industrial atmosphere”, manufacturing tradition and so on.
The milieu of the industrial goods system derives from three aspects of the 
interactions between companies that define the identity of the local manufacturing system. 
First, companies are involved in networks of informal relationships, especially with their 
customers. Products are tailored to the highly specialised needs of customers who are 
mainly located abroad. As far as supplier relations are concerned, a distinction can be 
made between those with IT consultants (for software) and those with the micro- 
mechanics sector. Here, quality is a major issue, and more so than in the vehicle sector. 
Second, local/global connections are radically different to those of the Fiat-centred PTS. In 
the absence of major international groups, the link to the global network is through 
numerous small and medium sized companies that sell directly on international markets. 
Here, market access is not mediated through a few large actors. Most of the 
manufacturers and their suppliers of tools and components are export-oriented. The 
informal and co-operative nature of their commercial relationships facilitates the transfer of 
skills and knowledge and provides access to innovation. Third, inter-firm relationships 
involve learning through customer-focused transactions centred on co-design and co­
engineering. With customers located abroad, these are not entirely local learning 
processes, though firms in the PTS make intensive use of the D&E skills in Turin. Thus, in 
part, territorially embedded learning processes persist.
In the design and engineering element of the local value production system, firms 
are therefore strongly embedded in the local Turin context (Brosio, 1994). They draw their 
competitiveness from the continuity of the Turin manufacturing tradition, of which they 
have been able to build advanced and innovative competencies in micro-mechanics 
(especially in aerospace production), mechatronics and IT (Ceris, 1990; Rolfo, 1993).
A second element of the Mechatronic PTS centres on vehicle production activities 
not linked to Fiat. In some cases, firms have shifted to producing components for 
motorbikes and agricultural machinery, others to producing for the automotive spare parts 
market. The drivers of this transformation are medium sized and large internationalised 
companies, some of whom were formerly first tier suppliers to Fiat which have adopted 
diversification strategies. They have drawn around themselves significant parts of the Fiat 
supplier system, nurturing the formation of Turin’s third engineering system. From a 
territorial point of view, this engineering system has features half-way between those of the 
Fiat-centred PTS and the industrial goods system:
203
(i) relationships between companies remain fundamentally hierarchical;
(ii) however, they make greater use of information external to the local system, 
depend less on one main customer, are more market-oriented, export more, are 
more dependent on local logistics support and have fewer corporate groups in their 
ranks; and
(iii) design and engineering activities are in a phase of incipient diffusion amongst the 
companies in the system.
These characteristics make this vehicle segment (not linked to Fiat) one of the 
critical kernels of local development in Turin. The manufacturers of the industrial goods 
system and the Fiat-centred PTS possess their own clear development trajectories; the 
former based on embeddedness and the latter on globalisation. The situation is more 
critical for the vehicle segment not linked to Fiat. It appears to be in a delicate phase of 
transition in which the supportive network of personal and entrepreneurial relationships 
has not yet been formed. At the same time, the globalisation of the automotive sector and 
the desire of local entrepreneurs not to belong to the Fiat supply system are weakening 
their ties with the Fiat-centred PTS.
The Mechatronic PTS thus has two components. One comprises companies that 
constitute the industrial goods system, and the other comprises the firms of the non-Fiat 
vehicle system. In the first, businesses have a very local production perspective and are 
linked into networks based on trust and the sharing of specialist skills. They appear to be 
strongly embedded in the territory from which they draw the resources needed to maintain 
their own competitiveness in international markets. In the second, only some businesses in 
the system are strongly embedded locally. Others are not. This is an unstable component 
of the PTS, that is going through profound transformation.
Overall, the markets for the output of the PTS discussed here are highly 
specialised and serve personalised international markets, where networks of relations 
between producers and users are created that are decisive for the competitiveness of 
both. These are predominantly global markets: the vehicle spare parts market, the non- 
Fiat vehicle sector, and niche markets for consumer goods and intermediate goods.
Nevertheless, it is still clear that local markets remain important. The Fiat group 
and its suppliers have played a dual role. While they have created a large pool of demand, 
they have also functioned as a "technological incubator” in the sense that many new 
entrepreneurs are technicians or workers who have left the Fiat-centred PTS.
Obviously, the mechatronic PTS and the Fiat-centred PTS are not reciprocally 
closed systems. In addition to the market relations already mentioned, there are various 
other points of contact between the two. First, in recent years, Comau has progressively 
reduced its exclusive bond with Fiat, establishing itself as one of the world leaders in the
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design and manufacture of integrated production systems. Parallel to this, it has intensified 
its untraded relationships with local and global company networks. This transformation 
makes Comau a potentially important catalyst of knowledge creation and innovation in the 
Turin area, generating positive externalities for the local value production system. Second, 
the design and engineering studios, although based on skills profoundly rooted in the Fiat- 
centred PTS, are also important actors in the local value production system. Third, some 
first tier suppliers are gradually breaking free from Fiat and many small subcontractors 
who formerly worked exclusively for Fiat are now sometimes accepting contracts from 
these companies.
6.4 Conclusions.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Turin vehicle PTS has been exposed 
since the 1980s to centrifugal forces that have challenged its cohesion and, in a certain 
sense, its very existence. Looking at this in detail, it has been through two distinct phases, 
the first characterised by a strong structural coupling and weak organisational synthesis; 
the second, in contrast, was distinguished by an intensification of the organisational 
synthesis, challenged, however, by an evident process of destructuring. It has also been 
underlined how this destructuring was deliberately pursued by the hegemonic figure in the 
PTS, Fiat, through radical processes of relocation and reorganisation of the supply chain. 
In this chapter, our attention has been focused on the behaviour of those segments of the 
original PTS that have seen the gradual weakening of their relations, once privileged, with 
the centre of the system or even marginalised or expelled from the system. From this 
perspective we have noted how the three most significant segments of supply 
(components makers, capital goods manufacturers, designers and engineers), although 
characterised by rather heterogeneous competitive dynamics, are in a phase of transition:
(i) the components producers have begun a process of diversification and 
differentiation of their production which has led them to a relative, even if limited, 
autonomy from Fiat's strategic choices. In particular, it is possible to observe a 
bifurcation between some segments stably rooted in the Turin area in terms of both 
research and production, and other sectors that are more subject to international 
competition and/or the temptation of relocation;
(ii) the production of capital goods has in a similar way shown itself able to undertake 
a development path largely independent of belonging to the automotive PTS, even 
if with clear difficulties. In particular, it has been underlined how, in contrast to the 
components makers, on the regional and not only provincial scale there is a fabric 
of companies operating in the production of capital goods. At the same time, it also 
emerged how the competitive performance of Turin companies differs profoundly
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from that of those located in the rest of Piedmont, making it unlikely that we will see 
the formation of a Piedmont system of capital goods producers in which the 
different local and provincial situations are integrated;
(iii) finally, design and engineering, appears clearly as the most complex sector. On 
the one hand, D&E appears to be a fundamental element for the competitiveness 
of the Turin automotive industry while, on the other, it has begun processes of 
sectorial and geographical diversification and differentiation. Again in this case 
there is no shortage of elements of uncertainty and ambiguity: examples are the 
dependency in terms of turnover that still links automotive D&E to final vehicle 
producers, or the difficulties in creating links between design and production on the 
local and regional scale in non-automotive sectors.
Two alternative hypotheses of reorganisation and reterritorialisation were then 
considered. The first of these pivots on the transformation of the PTS centred on Fiat into 
an automotive district, in other words a different PTS characterised by:
(i) relations no longer rigidly hierarchical but mainly networked, in which co-operative 
relations assume considerable weight and in which:
(ii) the presence of Fiat is no longer the centre of gravity of relations but a sort of 
primus inter pares, meaning that:
(iii) the possibility for the automotive PTS to reproduce its own organisation even in the 
event of catastrophic structural changes, such as the total or partial relocation of 
Fiat.
The thesis of the automotive district has been questioned here in that there are 
clear incongruities both at the industrial level (i.e. regarding the compatibility of the district 
organisation with the automotive industry) and at the Turin scale (in other words, 
concerning the specific resilience that stems directly from the history of the Fiat-centred 
automotive PTS). More radically, we have attempted to demonstrate, on the basis of the 
results of previous research by the author, how the various "pieces" of the original Turin 
automotive PTS are characterised by radically differing forms of organisational behaviour. 
This led us to draw up an alternative thesis to that of the automotive district, that of the 
schismogenesis of the Turin automotive PTS. In other terms, the transformations driven by 
Fiat starting in the 1980s were to progressively open the road to differentiated behaviour 
within the various sub-systems, in particular within that of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. In other words, the emerging hypothesis is that the formation is underway of a 
number of Productive Territorial Systems which, although they show some points of 
structural coupling, are characterised by radical differences in the processes of
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organisational synthesis, i.e. in the processes of territorialised collective learning that 
define the organisation of one PTS compared to the others located in the same area.
207
Chapter 7: Toward the identification of Turin's TPS(s).
The previous two chapters have been respectively focusing on the historical 
reconstruction of the genesis and dynamics of the Fiat-centred automotive TPS and on the 
possibility that the radical transformations it passed through deeply changed not only the 
Structure but its Organisation as well. According to our conclusions about TPS approach’s 
added value, and its following methodological consequences, we might say that chapter 5 
and 6 have been concerned with both the issues of variety and change. In particular, 
starting from an assessment of the variety that characterised Turin manufacturing fabric 
even when it was alleged to be a pure Fordist town (chapter 5) our concluding remark 
suggested that some processes of divergence from the ideal typical Fiat TPS were at work 
at the end of the 90s (chapter 6). In particular, the hypothesis emerged that from within the 
original TPS two groups were now following different paths, with the conclusion that 
eventually two TPS were simultaneously at work, a mechatronic one and Fiat-centred one. 
Also the degree of differentiation between non-automotive firms (mainly specialised in 
machine tools production) and non-Fiat automotive firms was reducing. Finally a third 
demarcation was emerging within the Fiat-centred group, distinguishing direct suppliers 
from indirect ones. While the former were more and more merged into trans-national 
groups and hence involved both in global automotive supply-chain and in deep local co­
design processes with Fiat, the latter were forced to fit a dramatic re-organisation of the 
supply-chain. In particular, automotive SMEs met a double selection: on the one side, Fiat 
decreased the number of direct suppliers, pushing many firm either to second and third 
layers or even outside the Fiat system; on the other side, the entry of TNC into the local 
supply-chain forced local SMEs to face international competition and to adapt to more 
demanding standard, in terms of both quality and just-in-time capabilities.
In this chapter, we will try to empirically test this image about variety and change 
through the lenses of the Territorial Productive System. In order to meet this task, we are 
going to focus our attention to two scales of analysis, single firm behaviours and 
territorialised collective behaviours. At the first level we will try to distinguish different 
behaviours among groups, with reference both to firms' structural characters (size,
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performance, ownership) and their specific competitive behaviour. At the second level we 
will be focusing on the main hypothesis of our work, that is the possibility of distinguishing 
the territorialised behaviours that influence firms' competitiveness in terms of a twofold 
principle of embeddedness: on the one side, those generic endowments expressing a 
structural coupling among firms and between firms and the territory (structural 
embeddedness) and, on the other side, the place-specific learning processes which 
suggest the presence of organisative synthesis (organisative embeddedness).
This task will imply a change in the methodology we followed in chapter 5 to 
describe Fiat's environment as a TPS. We shall move, in fact, the focus from the 
interaction between a limited number of elementary systems to the attempt of building a 
microfoundation of the TPS. In other terms, we will try to make the TPS emerge from direct 
observation of the individual actors involved. In particular we shall focus the attention on 
the behaviours of individual firms belonging to the mechanical and electrotechnical 
tradition. This choice has been dictated by the need to assess the issue of indirect 
territorial competitiveness, that it the relationship between territorial processes and firms' 
competitiveness.
We will develop this line of argument in trying to address three research questions:
Question 1 -  Did the divergence process highlighted in the previous chapters lead to a 
greater degree of variety in the Turin manufacturing fabric?
In order to answer this question, we shall introduce in the sample two principles for 
classification within these categories, firstly with respect to firms’ proximity from Fiat and 
automotive (section 7.2) and secondly with reference to the sectorial belonging of the 
sampled enterprises (section 7.3). The point is that, theoretically speaking, any 
hypothetical TPS takes place to a scale which somewhere between the single firm and the 
territory (excluding of course the extremes) and this scale is not given once and for all. In 
fact, as we have seen in chapter 4, TPS' boundaries are fuzzy toward both the external 
otherness and the internal otherness. Hence cutting TPS' boundaries always takes place 
in a grey zone where topographical categories such as inside/outside are necessarily 
relative and ambiguous.
Question 2 -  Is the emerging typology effective in showing a clear correlation between 
firms' competitiveness and territorialised behaviours?
The point here is to evaluate whether this narrative about change and variety can 
also offer a further added value with reference to the issue of firms' competitiveness 
(section 7.4). We are asking whether the distinction between structural and organisative 
embeddedness can highlight some more general features about the relationships between
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economic activities and territories. In other terms, the issue is whether the concept of TPS 
can be displayed to analyse firms’ behaviours and performances.
Question 3 -  What kind of synthetic picture can we get from observing Turin 
manufacturing fabric through the lens of TPS?
The point is to consider how and why the TPS can offer a better overview of what 
has been going on in Turin during the last twenty years than traditionally oversimplified 
concepts, such as industrial district, cluster or one-company-town (section 7.5). In other 
term, we will be questioning if TPS offers a more satisfying image of Turin than other 
concurrent narrations. In particular, we will address the question of how the TPS can keep 
together the apparently diverging issues of variety and continuity
7.1 Methodological notes.
In order to get the information needed to cover the above issues, there was of 
course no chance of finding a ready-made dataset concerning a broad set of information 
about local firms' qualitative behaviour such as territorial embeddedness and territorialised 
learning. Hence the choice has been to collect directly the requested information through a 
questionnaire.
7.1.1 The sample and the questionnaire
A survey covering 400 enterprises have been made through face-to-face 
interviews. The sample has been generated random covering proportionally the main 
areas of specialisation which might considered the expression of traditional Turin 
mechanical and electrotechnical competencies. In particular we have identified five areas 
covering the main field of this tradition: machine tools; production services; 
electrotechnics; mechanics and metalwork; automotive. The sum of the ATECO codes into 
which such areas are split gives us a population of 9.773 plants, with an overall 
employment of 209.219 workers104. We defined a sample of 400 firms, equal to about 4% 
of the overall population, proportionally split among the five categories (table 7.1).
The only correction made to the sample was in relation to the geographical 
distribution: about 80% of the plants in the population are located in Turin metropolitan 
area, while our sample was more equally distributed across the Province territory (about 
55% in Turin metropolitan area and 45% in the rest of the Province), in order to grasp also 
dynamics and processes which were far from the geographical bulk of the FIAT-centred 
TPS.
104 W e have considered only full time long term employment. Despite the rise of flexible contracts, the data 
about temporary workers were not reliable.
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Table 7.1 -  The composition of the sample and of the population.
Sample Population Composition Employment
Machine tools 48 1.176 12,03% 34.576
Production services 128 3.121 31,93% 35.785
Electrotechnics 54 1.328 13,59% 27.710
Mechanics and metalwork 148 3.623 37,07% 41.368
Automotive 21 525 5,37% 69.780
Source: Istat census 2001.
400 9.773 100,00% 209.219
The population which the sample was drawn from came from the merging of two 
different databases; the first one is called AIDA, produced and managed by Bureau Van 
Djck, while the second one is the database of the Chamber of Commerce, in order to 
integrate the AIDA database105.
I have personally carried out about 40 interviews, while the others were conducted 
by a specialised marketing agency. The team was made up of about 20 graduate 
interviewers, whom I trained in a two day workshop about the main purposes of the 
research. In the end, out the 400 interviews made, 12 were excluded from the sample as 
the real activity of the firm was outside the set of competencies we identified as the main 
core.106
Table 7.2 shows how the sample can be split according to a Pavel and Pavitt 
inspired typology (Pavitt, 1984; Pavel and Pavitt, 1987) and, subsequently, with reference 
to the sectorial specialisation107. The most numerous group is represented by scale 
Intensive producers (184 firms, about half of the sample) and, within it, by car components 
producers (53, equal to 13,66%) and mechanical work firms (55). Exactly one hundred is 
the number of specialised suppliers, mainly machine tools and equipment (e.g. mould) 
producers. Finally we have 33 hi-tech (electronics, ICT equipment, nanotechnologies, 
aeronautics) and about 71 firms which are related to production services, either in ICT 
(mainly software for automation and control of industrial processes) or in design and 
engineering (D&E).
About 1/3 of the sample belong to a group which, in most cases, is Italian rather 
than foreign (roughly 2/3 and 1/3). 32% of the sampled firms have been created after 1990 
and only 5,7% before 1945. As far as the dimension is concerned, about 10% of the firms 
have less that 5 employees and another 10% has more than 250. Hence most of the
105 The two databases cover about 93% of the Istat evaluation of the population.
106 In particular, 7 firms were specialised retail and maintenance and 5 were architects workshops and 
interior designers.
107 Table 7.1 and table 7.2 do not match exactly each with the other, given a gap between the ATECO
description of the activity and the real production carried out by the firms. Hence, in the rest of our
analysis, we shall be referring to the "real" composition of the sample as showed in table 7.2.
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sample is concentrated in the between classes, with special reference to the "5 to 15" and 
to the "16 to 50" ones (25% of the sample each). The overall employment is a few less 
than 50.000, with a conspicuous growth between 1996 and 2004 (from 23.550 to 49.163 
workers). Although almost half of the sample does not export at all (42,5%), there is a 
consistent group (20%) of export-led enterprises (exporting more than 20% of their 
turnover).
Table 7 . 2 -  The composition of the sample.
Pavel and Pavitt Specialisation Sample %
Hi tech Hi tech 33 8,51%






Plastic and rubber transformation 34 8,76%
Metalwork 13 3,35%
Scale intensive Mechanical work 55 14,18%
Electronic components 29 7,47%
Car components 53 13,66%







The questionnaires have been realised through face-to-face meeting of about one 
hour length and it has been articulated on four main parts:
(i) structural characters;
(ii) competitiveness and strategy;
(iii) embeddedness in territorial assets;
(iv) involvement in territorialised learning.
Structural characters regards all those factors which can return an overall picture of 
firm's main features, such as location, specialisation, products, turnover, employment, 
export, ownership. For the purpose of our work, the investigation of competitiveness is 
clearly more important. First of all, we adopted a subjective measure of competitiveness, in 
that it has been asked if the firm experienced an increase in competitiveness over the 
period considered by the enquiry (1996-2004). The choice for asking directly to firm's 
manager or entrepreneur if they judge being more competitive than in the past is mainly 
due to two reasons:
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(i) the rest of the questionnaire is base on subjective assessment of the importance of 
different competitive factors;
(ii) it was extremely difficult to get precise information about quantitative facts, such as 
productivity or return on investments108.
Nevertheless, if we compare firm's subjective evaluation with some more objective 
benchmark we can notice that there is a significant positive correlation between the 
perception and the trends in both occupation and turnover (table 7.3).
Also it has been asked, in case of positive answer, which are the main firm’s 
strategies applied to get this result. For each of the following factors a score between 1 
(minimum) and 10 (maximum) has been asked the interviewed: suppliers' selection to 
different scales (local, regional, national and international); cooperation strategies with 
other firms; hiring specialised workforce; acquisition of innovation from outside (licences, 
machineries, patents etc.); quality certification; product innovation and process innovation.
Table 7.3 -  Relationship between perceived competitiveness increase and firm's 
performances109.
Occupation1 Turnover2
Growing Stable Decreasing Growing Stable Decreasing
Yes 49,1% 34,1% 16,8% 67,4% 15,0% 17,6%
No 27,8% 46,8% 25,4% 48,4% 26,9% 24,7%
Note: 1 a = 0,001
2a = 0,012
Following, we have focused our attention on the territorial assets, that is those local 
endowments which, according to the literature, are likely to influence firms' 
competitiveness, driving mere agglomeration into clusters or industrial districts. It is also to 
be remarked here is that, in our perspective, firm's embeddedness into such territorial 
assets also expresses the structural coupling process of the system. To ease the analysis 
of these elements we have distinguished three categories of territorial assets:
(i) pecuniary territorial assets, that can originate a direct and immediate advantage in
terms of costs: infrastructure; availability of space; availability of specialised 
workforce; labour cost; access to credit; availability of venture capital; local 
taxation;
108 This was both a matter of suspicion on the side of the firm and need to concentrate the attention onto 
more qualitative and strategic issues (such as territorial behaviours) on the side of the interviewer.
109 In order to evaluate the significance of the relationships we used mainly a contingency coefficient base 
on x2 as most of the variables are nominal ones. W e accepted as significant the relationships where a <= 
0 ,100.
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(ii) institutional territorial assets, which refer to the existence of virtuous relationships 
with local institutional actors: labour relationships; intermediation structures with PA 
(such as local development agencies); local industrial and development policies; 
local political stability; category association (e.g. entrepreneurs' association, 
chambers of commerce, consortia).:
(iii) relational territorial assets comprise both transaction costs related factors which 
are now more considered for their untraded relational dimensions (presence of 
long-term customers and of specialised suppliers, presence of universities and 
other public and private research centres, specialised fairs and expos) and more 
strictly "cultural" assets (manufacturing tradition, trust and cooperation among 
firms, environmental and social quality).
Finally we have to consider the territorialised learning behaviour of the firms. To 
this purpose we will adopt the three-parted classification introduced in chapter 4: buzz, 
formal and informal cooperation and cognitive synthesis. As these three steps into the 
territorialised learning implies a growing importance as well as a growing complexity, they 
present different degree of difficulties into translating these behaviours into variables that 
can be first asked and than systematically analysed.
As far as buzz is concerned we decided to move in two different directions, 
considering:
(i) the management of the supply-chain: we have considered the stability of the 
supply-chain (in terms of suppliers turnover) and the importance of informal 
routines in selecting new suppliers: personal acquaintances either with other 
entrepreneurs or with technicians and employees; suggestion of other trusted 
firms; spin-off; existence of previous friendship relationships;
(ii) the organisation of the information collection system: attention has been focusing 
on the collection of information through tacit knowledge oriented (workers from 
other firms, informal acquaintances with other entrepreneurs, formal and informal 
association among entrepreneurs, input-output relationships with other firms) as 
well as codified knowledge oriented (fairs and expos, specialised journal). Also it 
has been considered if such links are local or supra local;
When it comes to formal and informal cooperation we assessed two main strands 
of enquiries:
(i) the management of the inter-firm communication flows (focusing mainly on tacit
forms of communication, such as the exchange of technicians and frequent
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reciprocal visits, but only on explicit ones, like manuals and written instructions), 
with different kind of actors (customers, suppliers and competitors);
(ii) the presence of established cooperation networking (informal cooperation, 
participation to EU programmes, belonging to association and joint-venture), aimed 
to different purposes Q'oint purchase orders, research and development, training, 
export, stock exchange), and taking place to different scales (local, regional, 
national and international).
Finally we have to consider those behaviours which might express a cognitive 
synthesis process taking place between the firms of a given group. In particular, design 
and engineering activities have been considered with specific attention, assuming that, if it 
is true that these activities represent the most important element in terms of continuity -  
and at the same time of innovation -  with the manufacturing tradition of Turin, hence the 
presence of co-design and co-engineering relations can be considered as privileged 
means to transmit and reproduce knowledge. More specifically, there are three 
peculiarities which make it reasonable focus on design processes:
(i) design and engineering activities count a number of economic agents which at the 
same time possess a clearly recognised authority in global markets and at the 
same time are fundamental interlocutors for local firms;
(ii) co-design make the product and process innovation to arise from recursive 
cognitive interaction, till be extreme point that intellectual paternity -  although not 
the intellectual property -  does not belong to a specific firm;
(iii) co-design and co-engineering, more than other hi-tech and scientific research and 
development activities, are practices where technical codified knowledge interacts 
with technical tacit competencies into a problem-solving approach.
Furthermore, while loose forms of territorialised learning such as buzz and 
cooperation might be present in different territories with similar routines and institutions, 
the those expressing a cognitive synthesis should be more place-specific, as they are the 
closest to the deeper systemic Organisation of the TPS. Better put, we are not claiming 
that design and engineering activities are always and everywhere the best proxy to identify 
TPS Organisation, but that in Turin production fabric they do.
To this purpose, we have investigated two set of behaviours in order to get some 
information about cognitive synthesis:
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(i) design and engineering management: as a first step we have been monitoring how 
firms manage the D&E process, whether they do it internally and/or externally, with 
customers and/or suppliers or if they just get instructions from the customers;
(ii) participation to co-design and co-engineering networks: more importantly, we have 
considered the involvement in co-design and co-engineering long-term networks as 
the main evidence of the involvement into a territorialised learning process. To this 
regard we are also considering who are the partner participating to and the scale to 
which such networks take place.
7.2 Putting the variety to work: first empirical evidence.
In the previous chapters we have seen that the restructuring of Fiat's supply-chain 
has implied a dramatic reduction in the number of direct suppliers; about 80% of formerly 
direct suppliers, in fact, have lost their direct involvement with Fiat. This restructuring 
turned into at least three different options:
(i) failure, above all for the smaller firms, entirely dependent on Fiat orders and 
without a strong individual entrepreneurship;
(ii) shift to lower layers of supplying, forced by the changed nature of the production 
itself;
(iii) diversification and differentiation of the portfolio of customer, sometimes within the 
automotive sector, sometimes outside.
Nevertheless, the fact that some firms have been more or less voluntarily110 
involved in centrifugal processes is not by itself an evidence that different TPS came into 
existence. In fact, TPS are not defined according either to mere vertical relationships or to 
the "proximity" to Fiat decisional process, but exclusively with reference to territorialised 
learning. To express it in systemic terms, the exit of some actors from the previous TPS 
surely means that some severe alteration is structural coupling (i.e. structural 
embeddedness) is taking place, but it does not automatically means that this change is 
echoed by a change in territorialised learning in the primary TPS or that a new one is now 
operating within the same territory.
In the end of chapter 6, we have seen that some previous researches show that 
actually there was a demarcation process, highlighting significant organisative differences 
between several distinguished clusters of firms. The point here is to verify if about 10 years 
later this process continued and led to a consolidated different framework. To this regard, 
the first step is introducing into the analysis the four typologies identified at the end of
110 Not all the time the exit option was completely in the hands of Fiat: many cases occurred in which it was
a contractor's choice to disembed itself from Fiat's supply chain or, more rarely, from automotive sector.
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chapter 6: direct Fiat suppliers, indirect Fiat suppliers, non-Fiat automotive suppliers and 
non automotive firms. The first two categories share, as we saw, some higher proximity to 
Fiat’s environment, while the latter two are characterised by some sort of distance from 
Fiat’s decisional power.
7.2.1 Single firm behaviours.
If we consider the general features of the four groups, a clear correlation emerges 
between organisational proximity to Fiat and spatial proximity to Turin: direct suppliers are 
the most concentrated in Turin metropolitan area (70%), while non-automotive firms are 
the most dispersed (55% are located in the rest of the province area). Also the belonging 
to a group varies according to the typology we identified earlier: groups are mainly 
concentrated in direct suppliers (50% of direct supplier belong to a group) and non 
automotive (35%). Indirect suppliers are, on the contrary, the category where traditional 
Italian family-based ownership resists more (only 12,5% of the sub-sample belongs to a 
group). Also the presence of foreign groups seems to be a strong character only among 
direct suppliers, where half of the group are not Italian. Dimension seems to affect Fiat- 
centred TPS more than the mechatronic one: 50% of direct supplier have a turnover higher 
than 10 million Euro a year, while 50% of indirect suppliers sell products for less than 1 
million. Analogously 40% of direct suppliers have more than 100 employees, against 11% 
of indirect suppliers. Export is confirmed to be more important among mechatronic firms, 
above all among Fiat-independent enterprises, where about 1/3 of the sample exports 
more than 40% of their turnover.
Table 7 .4 -  Turnover dynamics over the 1996-2004 period
Decrease Stability Increase Total
Fiat direct suppliers 12 9 33 54
22,22% 16,67% 61,11%
Fiat indirect suppliers 18 12 25 55
32,73% 21,82% 45,45%
Non-Fiat automotive 5 12 40 57
8,77% 21,05% 70,18%
Non automotive 14 14 46 74
18,92% 18,92% 62,16%
Total 49 47 144 240
20,42% 19,58% 60,00%
Although there are not significant differences in the perceived competitiveness 
increase, we can notice that indirect suppliers underperformed the results of the other 
three groups in terms of turnover dynamics (table 7.4). Quite surprisingly the best
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performance is obtained by non-Fiat automotive cluster, where 70% increased their 
turnover and just 10% decreased them.
Also, when considering single firms' behaviour, the differentiation within the 
manufacturing fabric becomes more intelligible than from simply opposing firm-centred and 
mechatronic clusters. If we just consider statistically significant Anova in evaluating the 
importance of specific behaviours, we immediately notice that there is a clear distinction in 
terms of innovation strategies between direct suppliers and non-automotive firms, as the 
former emphasise the role of process innovation (7,52) while the latter consider more 
important product innovation (7,52). Also we can notice that direct suppliers estimate more 
than the other clusters the management of international supply-chain, a feature which can 
be easily understood considering the higher presence of international groups within this 
category.
Albeit the other differences are not significant, we can draw some interesting 
suggestion by a general view of the judgement expressed about firm related factors (table 
7.5):









Process innovation1 7,52 6,10 6,49 5,73 6,42
Trained workforce 6,24 5,32 4,63 5,56 5,44
Quality certification 6,05 5,08 5,43 4,41 5,20
Innovation from outside 5,09 4,09 5,07 3,81 4,48
Cooperation with other firms 4,52 3,60 3,37 4,23 3,93
international suppliers quality
4,30 2,74 3,38 3,09 3,35
National suppliers quality 4,25 4,09 3,13 3,91 3,85
Services utilisation 3,09 2,74 2,49 2,91 2,81
Local suppliers quality 3,77 4,43 3,07 3,38 3,66
Regional suppliers quality 3,25 4,04 3,31 3,34 3,49
Internationalisation 4,44 3,29 4,56 4,40 4,17
Product innovation3 6,75 5,94 6,27 7,52 6,65
Note: 1 a = 0,065
2 a = 0,071
3 a = 0,097
(i) the presence of TNC and groups among Fiat direct suppliers can explain the fact
that most of the firm-related factors show an average score superior to the sample 
mean: management of national supply chain, trained workforce, innovation 
acquisition from outside, quality certification, cooperation with other firms, service 
utilisation and, of course process innovation. This might be interpreted as a 
proactive behaviour spread among this category of firms;
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(ii) the only factors that indirect Fiat suppliers estimate higher than other groups do are 
those related to the management of local, regional and national supply-chain, while 
they show a more adaptive behaviour with reference to other more active 
strategies. This fact can be likely explained with reference to their smaller 
dimension and to their double dependency, on direct suppliers and ultimately on 
Fiat itself;
(iii) Fiat-independent firms show scores superior, albeit not significant, than the sample 
average with reference to some factors which indicate some sort of dependence, 
or at least of attention, to processes taking place outside the local scale, such as 
acquisition of external standard knowledge, certification quality, and 
internationalisation. This framework is also coherent with the fact they seem to 
evaluate less important the management of the local and regional supply chain and 
to their higher ratio of export. This behaviours can be easily understood 
considering that automotive firms which are not strictly linked to Fiat have only two 
main strategic option: serve the national and international aftermarket and/or enter 
the supply-chain of foreign car producers;
(iv) non-automotive firms express average value very closed to the sample mean, 
except for product innovation. This fact might be interpreted as an indication that 
the group is still too broad and that differences would emerge when splitting the 
cluster into sub-systems;
7.2.2 Territorialised collective behaviours.
When it comes to structural embeddedness we have a confirmation of the 
importance of Marshallian externalities: specialised workforce and suppliers, long-term 
customers, manufacturing tradition and trust are still the most important territorial 
endowments, cutting across all the four categories we are considering. There are some 
slight differences between the groups but they are not significant at all.
Some significant differentiation is instead more evident and statistically relevant 
with reference to minor factors, such as the local industrial and development policies and 
the presence of University and public research centres which are more important for direct 
suppliers (their mean is respectively and 4,55 and 4,48 against 4,12111 and 3,89112). This 
result can be interpreted in the light of what we have been saying in chapter 5 about the 
relationships between Fiat TPS and local institutional actors, such as Universities and local 
development agencies. Let us just think to the establishment of a BA degree in Automotive 
Engineering at the Polytechnic of Turin or the public-private agency "From concept to car", 
in charge of the promotion of a selected portfolio of the most prominent component
111 a = 0,036.
112 a = 0,081.
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suppliers working in Turin area. Also this result might mirror the effort of local Public 
Administration in the management of Fiat crisis, reaching its peak in 2006 spring by Fiat's 
decision to keep "Grande Punto" production lines in Mirafiori.
When it comes to buzz, there are few significant differences among the four 
clusters. For instance, indirect Fiat suppliers seem to pay less attention in the selection of 
suppliers to the suggestions from other enterprises (only in 8% of the indirect suppliers it 
takes place on a regular basis, while the percentage is about 20% in the rest of the 
sample113). In another case, it the informal networking among firms that appears to be a 
minor source of information for non-automotive firms (only 17% of positive answers, 
versus 30% in the other clusters114).











Fiat direct suppliers 29 6 29 53
34,94% 7,23% 34,94% 63,86%
Fiat indirect suppliers 12 3 28 47
12,24% 3,06% 28,57% 47,96%
Non-Fiat automotive 35 9 38 66
34,65% 8,91% 38,00% 65,35%
Non automotive 31 5 26 57
29,25% 4,72% 25,24% 53,77%
Total 107 23 121 223
27,58% 5,93% 31,51% 57,47%
Note: 1 a = 0,001
2a = 0,310 
3a = 0,198 
4 a = 0,043
More interesting outcomes emerge when considering the cooperation among firms 
(table 7.6). Albeit not all the differences are significant, we clearly get the impression of a 
sort of correspondence between Fiat direct suppliers and Fiat-independent firms, both 
showing a more intensive exploitation of different forms of cooperation among firms115. 
Nevertheless, this similitude is more apparent that substantial, in that it refers more to the 
intensity of the cooperation than to its qualitative features:
113 a = 0,044
114 a = 0,047.
115 Of course this does not mean that the same similarities apply between indirect suppliers and non­
automotive firms.
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(i) direct suppliers practise the first kind of cooperation on many scales, local, national 
and international (86% of the cooperation among direct suppliers is precisely 
aimed to this purpose116);
(ii) Fiat-independent firms seem more keen to cooperate in order to have access to 
foreign markets (21% versus 7%117);
Also, direct suppliers have better access to international research facilities, as 24% 
of the cooperation network they establish involve international R&D centres.
Also the local density of the respective cooperation network differs significantly: 
about 65% of direct suppliers' network is locally based (against only 29% among Fiat- 
independent firms118); more importantly 41% of direct suppliers' networks are 
multidimensional, that is they are aimed to successfully fulfil a multiple set of tasks.
As far as the two other groups are concerned, we can notice that:
(i) indirect suppliers are less involved into established cooperation network and, when 
they are, it is almost exclusively into local ones: for instance, regional and 
international cooperation are together just at about 20% of the whole networks. 
Also it is remarkable that 80% of their networks are aimed at getting joint purchase 
orders, mainly within the boundaries of the province;
(ii) in the case of non-automotive firms the situation is similar to the evaluation of 
territorial endowments: like grey cats in the night, they show a behaviour quite 
closed to the average of the sample, usually slightly below, without any strong 
characterisation.
Finally we have to consider the core of territorial learning processes, that is the 
design and engineering practices spread within the groups. Considering first the D&E 
management we notice again an analogy between direct suppliers and Fiat-independent 
producers (table 7.7). As we can see Fiat-independent firms manage the D&E process 
through a series of links with different actors: specialised design and engineering suppliers 
(both private and public), customers and suppliers.
116 a = 0,005.
117 a = 0,094.
118 a = 0,020
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Table 7 .7 -  Territorialised learning and inter-groups similarities.
Together with Together with Together with 
D&E suppliers 1 customers 2 suppliers 3
Fiat direct suppliers 28 61 27
33,73% 73,49% 32,53%
Fiat indirect suppliers 13 52 19
13,27% 53,06% 19,39%
Non-Fiat automotive 29 62 37
28,71% 61,39% 36,63%
Non automotive 18 58 32
16,98% 54,72% 30,19%
Total 88 233 115
Note: 1 a = 0,002 
2 a = 0,022
22,68% 60,05% 29,64%
3 a = 0,054
Nonetheless, when we consider more structured forms of co-design and co­
engineering, we can notice that the resemblance is not any more at work: 18% of non-Fiat 
automotive firms participate to such networks -  exactly the same share than non­
automotive and indirect Fiat suppliers -  while direct suppliers participation arises to almost 
45%119.
If we analyse which the partners are involved in this networks and their spatial 
distribution, we also find some interesting results, albeit not statistically significant120. The 
first evidence is that while in the sample co-design network are based on a firm-to-firm 
agreement within the same sector, a consistent number of direct suppliers' co-design 
network involve the whole range of possible partners: firms from different sectors (24,3%), 
D&E specialised firms (35%121), public research centres (21,6%), private research centres 
(16,2%122). As spatial distribution is concerned, we can observe a positive correlation 
between organisational proximity to Fiat and spatial concentration of co-design networks 
into Turin province, passing from the maximum among direct suppliers (81%) to the 
minimum among non-automotive firms (53%).
Despite the disaggregated data are not statistically significant, we can identify 
some roughly defined tendencies within our sample:
119 a = 0,000
120 For all these correlations 0,10 < a < 0,60. The fall in statistical significance is mainly due to the dramatic 
decrease in the sample size (only 91 firms out of 388 are involved into co-design networks) and its 
concentration into only one category (more than 1/3 are centred on direct suppliers). Nevertheless, we can
draw some intuitive evidence from the analysis.
121 The same ratio also applies to indirect suppliers.
122The same ratio also applies to Fiat-independent producers.
222
(i) Fiat-independent networks are more concentrated in the rest of Piedmont and EU- 
15 (38% each) and secondarily in Eastern Europe;
(ii) non-automotive networks seem to gravitate more intensively on Milan metropolitan 
area (32%) and the whole Lombardy (26%), but also toward EU-15 (32%), North 
America (26%) and developing countries (26%);
(iii) direct suppliers' networking moves on the twofold axe Turin-EU (respectively 82% 
and 32%) and only secondarily on Lombardy (21%);
(iv) indirect suppliers appear to be strictly dependent on local co-design networks (for 
instance only 6% of the sampled firm within this category participate to network to 
the Eu-15 scale, against a participation which is comprised between 32% and 39%.
7.2.3 Conclusions.
Applying the quadruple classification to our sample, we have highlighted some
interesting emerging features of Turin manufacturing fabric (table 7.8):
(i) a formal similitude between direct suppliers and Fiat-independent automotive firms 
became clear, concerning territorialised learning processes. It can be labelled as 
"formal" as it is based on quantitatively similar behaviours (management and 
intensity of cooperation with both suppliers and customers, management of design 
and engineering routines), hiding deeper qualitative differences (in terms of aims 
prosecuted through cooperation, partner involved in interactive learning, scales of 
territorialised learning);
(ii) the direct suppliers fit outstanding performances with reference to all the realms 
taken into account in our analysis, with reference to firms' strategy, structural 
embeddedness and territorialised learning;
(iii) as a consequence, indirect suppliers' eminence has been drastically reduced 
within Fiat-centred TPS: in particular, it is becoming more and more clear that their 
access to territorialised learning is limited and dependent on direct suppliers 
choices and behaviours;
(iv) non-automotive group can be considered, up to now, the "black box" of Turin 
manufacturing fabric: while Fiat-independent group has been getting a more 
definitive and sharp physiognomy along this section, non automotive cluster is still 
too much defined as a negative residual category ("all which is not related to 
automotive"). Hence the only clear elements that characterise this group are the 
highest vocation to product innovation, an average structural embeddedness and a 
strong capability to enter supralocal learning networks;
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Table 7.8- A  synoptic view.
Firm's Structural
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With reference to our starting issue we can answer affirmatively: the classification 
suggested at the end of chapter 6 is still valid ten years later, but with some meaningful 
alteration in its qualitative aspects. For instance, we can notice that, to some extent, direct 
suppliers are more structurally and organisatively embedded than we would have been 
expecting, given the results of the previous survey. At the same time, non-automotive 
group is till now the "great delusion", in that it did not confirm the great expectations it 
arose in the mid of the 90s with the image of the "mechatronic plain" (see sections 6.1.2 
and 6.3.5).
7.3 Sectorial behaviour.
The question we are addressing in this section is whether the articulation in four 
clusters/TPSs can be enriched by proceeding in the highlighting of different behaviours
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within the identified category. In particular, we have seen that deconstructing non­
automotive black box would require some further distinction within the cluster. 
Nevertheless, table 7.9 shows how actually all four the groups we used in the previous 
chapter are quite heterogeneous in terms of internal sectorial composition:
(i) direct suppliers mainly comprise scale intensive firms (59%) and production 
services (20,5%);
(ii) indirect suppliers and Fiat-independent automotive are principally composed by 
scale intensive producers (respectively 43,9% and 54,5%) and specialised 
suppliers (27,55% and 25,8%);
(iii) non-automotive group seems to be the more balanced one, with a prevalence of 
specialised suppliers (32%) and scale intensive manufacturers (35%), but also with 
many production services firms (23,5%).
Table 7 . 9 -  Sectorial composition within the four clusters.
Hi-tech Specialised Scale Production 
suppliers Intensive services
Fiat direct suppliers 4 13 49 17 83
4,82% 15,66% 59,04% 20,48%
Fiat indirect suppliers 11 27 43 17 98
11,22% 27,55% 43,88% 17,35%
Non-Fiat automotive 8 26 55 12 101
7,92% 25,74% 54,46% 11,88%
Non automotive 10 34 37 25 106
9,43% 32,08% 34,91% 23,58%
Total 33 100 184 71 388
8,51% 25,77% 47,42% 18,30%
Note: a = 0,028
As we can notice hi-tech manufacturers are spread along all the categories, making 
the sub-sets' size to small to give significant results. Hence we will first consider how our 
fourfold typology interacts with the three more numerous sectors, and than we shall 
develop a separate discourse about hi-tech.
7.3.1 The importance o f sectorial belonging.
Within each of the four potential TPS we have analysed how the sectorial 
belonging -  according to a rough a la Pavel and Pavitt sectorial classification -  influences 
firms' behaviour, with reference to the usual set of key factors: firms' strategies; territorial 
assets and territorialised learning.
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Table 7 .1 0 -  Sectorial differentiated behaviours: a synoptic view.
Specialised






Higher attention to 
pecuniary territorial assets.
High involvement in 
multiscalar cooperation and 
in R&D cooperation.
Strong participation to co­
design network, mainly 
inter-sectors.
Lower level of structural 
embeddedness.
Lower importance of buzz 
and local information 
collection.
Lower importance of 
cooperation networks, 
mainly local.
Strong participation to co­
design network, mainly 
intra-sector.
Higher attention to Higher impact of spin-off.
pecuniary territorial assets.
Higher importance of 
external sources of 
information.
Slightly lower participation 
to co-design networks, not 
to the local scale.
Highest importance of 
product innovation (8,05).
Average participation to co­
design network, mainly to 
the supra-local scale.
Higher importance of trained 
workforce and of codified 
knowledge acquisition.
Higher attention paid to 
relational territorial assets.
Highest involvement in 
cooperation networks, 
mainly to the local scale and 
aimed to collect joint 
purchase orders.
Higher attention paid to the 
presence of long-term 
customers.
Slight more intensive use of 
local tacit communication.
Slightly higher participation 
into cooperation networks, 
mainly to the local scale and 
for lobbying purpose.
Lower impact of design 
practices with suppliers.
Higher impact of spin-off.
Higher impact of spin-off.
Average participation to co­
design network, mainly to 
the local scale.
Higher importance of trained 
workforce and of codified 
knowledge acquisition.
Also higher emphasis on 
trust and cooperation.
Strong participation to 
multiscalar co-design 
networks.
High involvement in 
multiscalar cooperation, 
mainly aimed to R&D and 
joint purchase orders 
collection.
Crossing the categories emerged in section 7.3 with Pavel and Pavitt's 
classification some further evidences emerge123 (table 7.10):
(i) the direct suppliers group showed a clear internal divide in cognitive behaviour 
among the different sectors: in particular, scale intensive suppliers showed a lower 
degree of structural embeddedness as well a minor importance of "soft" 
territorialised learning, like buzz and cooperation. On the other side they proved to 
be the group the most embedded in local co-design networks.
123 In order to ease the reader's understanding we shall limit to present in table 7.11 the outcomes of the
cross-section analysis between the four categories we got from section 7.3 and the Pavel and Pavitt's
typology. All the detailed tables are nevertheless available in annexe 2.
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(ii) within direct suppliers, some nuances emerged between specialised suppliers and 
production services, with the former more connected to supra-local networks and 
to inter-sectors networking and the latter more engaged in local multipurpose 
cooperation. Nevertheless, such differences seem to be less deep than those 
opposing scale intensive producers to specialised suppliers and production 
services;
(iii) production services showed strong similarities among the different cluster they 
were split in, in particular with reference to the use of tacit form of communication, 
buzz and cooperative behaviours, mainly to the local scale. Also the presence of 
multipurpose cooperation suggests that these firms attained an higher degree of 
joint action to the local scale;
(iv) finally, we registered a substantial analogy between specialised suppliers and 
scale intensive producers within each of the three lasting categories (indirect 
suppliers, non Fiat-dependent automotive suppliers and non-automotive firms). 
More precisely, time-by-time, there are some emerging difference -  for instance, 
specialised suppliers are paying more consideration to firm level strategies, such 
as process innovation, and to pecuniary territorial assets, while, among scale 
intensive firms, spin-off and some sort of territorialised learning are more spread -  
but they do not seem to be enough strong to suggest further distinction among our 
categories.
If we briefly consider the behaviour of hi-tech firms we immediately notice that they 
differ significantly from the average behaviour of the rest of the sample. While structural 
data are quite similar, in terms of performance, ownership and dimension, there are 
important difference concerning both territorial Structure and Organisation.
Table 7.11 -  Hi-tech firms in front of relational externalities.
Hi-tech Rest of the sample Total
Specialised workforce 3,97 4,69 4,63
Manufacturing tradition 4,41 5,10 5,04
Trust and cooperation with other firms1 4,18 5,51 5,39
Specialised suppliers2 4,61 5,83 5,72
Long-term customers3 5,06 6,17 6,08
Universities and other public research centres 3,72 4,16 4,12
Note: 1 a = 0,012
2 a = 0,021
3 a = 0,054
For instance, considering the traditional set of Marshallian relational externalities, 
we can see that the average judgement expressed by hi-tech firm are systematically lower
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that the rest of the sample, and in many case these differences are statistically significant. 
For instance hi-tech manufacturers are less embedded in vertical input-output 
relationships and underestimate the role of local trust and cooperation (table 7.11). These 
differences are even more evident when considering territorialised learning to all three the 
level we have been considering in our analysis. If we consider the impact of spin-off on the 
creation of a new supply-relationship, we can notice for instance that this practice is 
frequent in only 3% of hi-tech firms (against 12% of the rest of the sample124).
The difference is even more striking when considering more structured forms of 
territorialised learning: the ratio of hi-tech firm cooperating with other firms is dramatically 
lower than among the rest of the sample (15% versus 33%125) and the same applies to co­
design (9% versus 25%126). This differentiation refers to a specific lower attitude toward 
cooperation and networking and not to a fault in the data structure caused by the small 
size of the hi-tech sample: in fact, for other forms of inter-firm linking, such as joint venture, 
consortia, and EU programmes the percentages are very similar for both hi-tech and the 
rest of the sample. Also it is worth noticing that the situation within the hi-tech cluster does 
not significantly change if we consider how the hi-tech firms intersect our classification in 
four groups, to confirm the impression that we are actually facing another cross-cutting 
category (like production service) which is not particularly significant to our previous 
categorisation.
7.3.2 Toward the status quo?
From our analysis we can reasonably claim that within mechanical and 
electrotechnical Turin's manufacturing tradition at least six clusters, or hypothetical TPS, 
can be identified:
(i) competencies core;
(ii) scale intensive direct suppliers;
(iii) hi-tech;
(iv) indirect suppliers;
(v) non-Fiat automotive suppliers;
(vi) non-automotive firms.
Table 7.12 shows in synoptic view the main features of each of them, whose 
genesis can be traced back to the different differentiation step we made.
124 a = 0,090.
125 a = 0,036.
126 a = 0,034.
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The competencies core is made by specialised suppliers which are also direct Fiat 
suppliers and by production service firms, regardless they belong or not to Fiat 
environment or to automotive environment. Taken together, these two groups represent 
quite well the two souls of Turin engineering tradition:
(i) specialised suppliers are mainly machine tools producers. To this respect we can
quite certainly affirm that they fully represent one of the most competitive heirs of 
Turin engineering tradition. This is witnessed, between other things, by the fact that 
this is the group assigning the highest average value to manufacturing tradition.
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When it comes to their participation to Fiat supply chain as direct suppliers, this 
implies that they are mostly robotics and automation related firms, a specialisation 
where Turin enterprises reached some important leadership positions -  e.g. 
Comau, Brown Boveri (formerly knows as Dea);
(ii) as productive services firms are concerned, although they are not manufacturers 
they can be nevertheless considered part of the heritage of Turin traditional 
knowledge. In particular they represent the outcome of some merging between 
traditional learning-by-producing (e.g. the cult for the well-done work) and more hi- 
tech knowledge, with reference to both mechanical (design, engineering) and 
electrotechnical (ICT, automation and control) know-how. In particular they have 
expressed the highest judgement about the importance of trust and cooperation 
and give importance to the presence of Universities and, in a lower measure, 
private research centres.





Direct suppliers scale intensive 12 25
24,49% 51,02%
Competencies core 42 28
51,85% 34,57%
Hi tech 5 3
15,15% 9,09%
Indirect Fiat suppliers 18 13
25,71% 19,40%
Fiat-independent automotive firms 30 14
37,50% 17,50%
Non-automotive firms 14 8
19,72% 11,43%
Total sample 121 91
Note: in both case a = 0,000
31,51% 23,95%
When it comes to territorialisation, we can notice that this group is strongly 
characterised by both structural and organisative embeddedness. As far as the former is 
concerned, it does not concern only the traditional externalities127 but also more 
sophisticated factors, such as manufacturing tradition (above all among specialised
127 Competencies core firms express the highest evaluation about the presence of long-term customers 
(7,14 versus average 6,08, a = 0 ,012).
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suppliers128) or the presence of universities and trust and cooperation (respectively 4,87 
and 6,29 versus 4,12 and 5,39 in the whole sample129). This strong structural 
embeddedness is mirrored by an intensive territorialised learning. 52% of the group entails 
cooperation with other firms, against a sample average equal to 31,5% and a minimum of 
15% among hi-tech firms. Also this group is second, after scale intensive direct suppliers, 
in terms of intensive participation to co-design network (34,6% versus 51 %130).
Also, it can be noticed that the firms belonging to the competencies core, when 
searching for new suppliers, rely more intensively on spin-off (21% does it on regular 
basis, against 11% of the overall sample and only 3% of the hi-tech firms131). This feature 
will be even more important in next section when considering the relationship between 
embeddedness and competitiveness. On the contrary, hi-tech firms and scale intensive 
direct suppliers rely more on codified forms of selection of the suppliers, like catalogues 
and fairs (respectively 28% and 24,5% do it on a regular basis, versus 18% in the 
sample132)
It is interesting to observe the difference between core competencies and scale 
intensive direct suppliers with reference to the territorialised learning processes (table 
7.13). As we noticed above, the latter are doubtless deeply involved into localised learning, 
but this takes almost exclusively the form of local co-design networking, strictly dependent 
on Fiat supply chain re-organisation in the 90s. On the contrary the show a more 
ambiguous relationship with territorial assets: if, on the one side, they evaluate very 
positively the presence of manufacturing tradition (5,38), on the other side they express 
more diffidence toward the role of trust and cooperation (5,04). This can be noticed also 
when looking to the lower role played by buzz and, more importantly, by cooperation 
networks: only 24,5% of them habitually entails informal cooperation with other firms, less 
then non-Fiat automotive suppliers (37,5%) and even than indirect Fiat suppliers (25,7%). 
Hence we might conclude that scale intensive direct suppliers define a borderline situation 
in which it is possible to have strong organisative embeddedness without-or with a lower 
degree -  of structural one. It seems that their competitiveness relies on a mix of structural 
assets (mainly colocalisation with customers and suppliers), supralocal resources and 
firms' strategy, outlining a lower degree of embeddedness into territorial assets. This is the 
category where there is the highest incidence of groups and foreign ownership and the 
stronger linkages with Eastern Europe and Southern Italy. Despite this minor structural
128 This group evaluate manufacturing tradition as more important (6,77) than the presence of customers 
(6,46) or suppliers (5,54) and even than the quality of labour force (5,62).
129 a = 0,011 and a = 0,044.
130 In both cases a = 0,000.
131 a = 0,025.
132 a = 0,043.
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embeddedness, they are deeply embedded In organisative learning, with the higher 
participation in local firm-to-firm co-design networks, strongly involving their local suppliers 
in learning process.
On the opposite side, we can probably collocate hi-tech firms, where all the 
indicators we have considered in the previous section suggest that we are facing a 
deterritorialised agglomeration, that is a group where firms do not rely strongly on territorial 
assets and territorialised learning in order to build up their competitive advantage.
Finally we have to consider the last three groups: indirect suppliers, non-Fiat 
automotive suppliers and non-automotive manufacturers. As we have seen in table 7.12 
the differences between these three groups are less outstanding. They only show a very 
partial differentiation with reference to some characters but this does not turn into a fully 
satisfactory account of the variety between these three clusters. If we group the firms 
involved in production services together with the core competencies cluster, the lack of 
differences among these three groups becomes even more significant. It is also worth 
noticing that, as a consequence, the difference between these clusters can be better 
interpreted in terms of firm related features and strategies. For instance we can see that 
product innovation gets the highest score among non-automotive firms. Analogously, non- 
Fiat automotive firms have stressed the importance of internationalisation in order to get a 
competitive advantage. As we shall see in the final section, this relative homogeneity in 
terms of territorial behaviours, together with variety in firms' strategies, is highlighted by the 
fact that these clusters sum together the firms which, more or less freely, have choosen 
some sort of exit strategy with reference to Fiat TPS since the 80s.
7.3.3 Conclusions.
With reference to our starting question, this represents our feasible state of the art 
of the representation of variety and change within the territory of the Province of Turin. 
What it is important to consider here is that we are not claiming to offer the ultimate 
identification of Turin TPS. This awareness relates to the inescapable fuzziness of TPS 
boundaries. More and different distinctions are certainly possible. Many grey zones get 
different tones, but are still difficult to interpret and classify: this is quite clear considering 
the non-automotive cluster which escapes a clear understanding of the embeddedness 
processes ongoing there. For instance, the fact that the non-automotive cluster has not a 
clear identity can be related to the way we described and built it a priori, as residual with 
reference to other categories which were better defined -  i.e. the Fiat and automotive 
firms. There are n more unidentified TPS to discover indeed: the only limit, hence, has 
been researcher's patience and data significance, dramatically reducing each time a new 
categorisation was introduced
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7.4 Firms' competitiveness and territorial embeddedness.
If we consider the last step, that is how this typologisation may highlight the 
relationships between firms' competitiveness and territorial embeddedness, we can draw a 
first conclusion.
While the fourfold classification has not showed a correlation between the 
classification and the increase in competitiveness, we can see that the current division in 
six groups exhibits some interesting emerging evidence (table 7.14):
(i) the three more directly automotive-related groups show a competitive dynamics 
very similar among them;
(ii) non-automotive firms perform slightly under the average, although probably not 
significantly;
(iii) core competencies TPS and hi-tech deterritorialised agglomeration have opposite 
performances, the former getting the highest ratio of positive answers (66,67%) 
and the former the lowest (42,42%).
Table 7.14 -  Taxonomy and competitiveness
No Yes
Direct suppliers scale intensive 23 25
47,92% 52,08%
Competencies core 28 56
33,33% 66,67%
Hi tech 19 14
57,58% 42,42%
Indirect Fiat suppliers 33 37
47,14% 52,86%
Fiat-independent automotive firms 37 44
45,68% 54,32%
Non-automotive firms 37 34
52,11% 47,89%
Total sample 177 210
45,74% 54,26%
Note: a = 0,163.
This result seem to suggest that structural and organisative embeddedness makes, 
at least partially, the difference, at least for the extreme cases, the competencies core and 
the hi-tech cluster. In order to get some clearer images of the relationship between 
structural and organisative embeddedness and firms’ competitiveness we are going to 
introduce some further analysis, based on logistic regression. The main methodological 
issue, here, is to get concise variables appropriate to synthesise the different territorial 
behaviours we have highlighted in the previous sections. To solve this problem we decided
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to reduce the number of independent variables through a factorial analysis, grouping more 
variables into a few primary components133. In particular, we run several factorial analysis 
in order to identify at the same time general behaviours -  such as a synthetic measure of 
territorial embeddedness-and/or more detailed and nuanced behaviours. This produced 
several new variables -  precisely sixteen -  not all of which were fitting our task to explain 
the relationship between firms' competitiveness and embeddedness. For instance, when 
we tried to get a single factor expressing organisative embeddedness we realised that it 
was not correlated in a significant way to firm's competitiveness, while the factors 
summarising specific aspects of the territorialised learning were more meaningful. Finally 
we built five new variables expressing structural territorialisation and seven referred to 
organisative territorialisation. As far as the former are concerned, we have:
(i) overall territorial embeddedness, expressing a synthetic measure of the role played 
by territorial assets, without any reference to their classification;
(ii) three specific variables dedicated to the single groups of territorial assets: 
pecuniary, institutional, and relational;
(iii) a fifth variable is referred to a subgroup of relational assets, signally Marshallian 
externalities.
With reference to the organisative learning we have built the following variable:
(i) three variables to express different forms of buzz, with reference respectively to the 
role of buzz in establishing and managing the supply chain {personal 
acquaintances and supplying spin-off) and to get useful Information from local 
sources {local information)',
(ii) two variables referred to cooperation behaviours, one centred on informal 
cooperation and one on formal cooperation',
(iii) two variables expressing interactive learning: one synthetic measure of design 
attitude and one referred to the role played by designing in cooperation with 
customers {design with customers).
Drawing upon these 14 factors we have run binary logistic regression, using the 
perceived increase in competitiveness as dependent variable and assessing how 
performance can be assessed with reference to the different independent variable. Tables 
15 and 16 contain the main outcomes of this exercise.
133 All the tables showing how these new variables have been built are in annexe 2.
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Table 7.15  -  Firm's competitiveness and structural territorialisation.




Overall sample 0,259(0,017) 0,326(0,003) 0,136(0,194) 0,206(0,050)














Starting from the relationship between structural territorialisation and firm's 
competitiveness we can notice that the positive correlation that emerges in the sample is 
mainly due to the two clusters more directly connected to Fiat, that is scale intensive direct 
suppliers and indirect suppliers. This outcome is consistent with our ongoing narrative 
about continuity and change: as the direct heir of the Fiat's TPS is some how normal that 
these clusters maintain a positive path-dependence through structural embeddedness. 
Apart this general trend, we can also draw some more detailed and nuanced 
consequences from the results in table 7.15:
(i) pecuniary territorial assets seem to play a more important role than institutional 
and relational ones, leading to a confirmation of NEG emphasis on pecuniary 
externalities over NIG focus on soft relational factors;
(ii) moreover, only direct suppliers seem to take advantage of institutional territorial 
endowment: this is largely confirmed by what we know from historical analysis and 
empirical evidence in previous sections. This behaviour can be explained by the 
fact that most of local industrial policies have been aimed to face the crisis impact 
on the first layer suppliers, addressing ad hoc policies and governmental support. 
The idea is that maintaining the localisation of direct suppliers impacts positively on 
the lower levels and it enhances the creation of knowledge spillovers;
(iii) hi-tech shows a significant negative correlation with territorial embeddedness, in 
particular within the context of relational territorial assets. This confirms our 
previous judgement about this group: not only is it less embedded in Turin tradition, 
but it also seems to be trapped in a structural lock-in effect. The firms that are more 
embedded in territorial assets are also those that perform worst. This somehow 
throw a positive light on disembedding: it is somehow clear that local continuity is
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low and it probably should be even lower in order to allow these firms to follow 
successfully their technological trajectory;
(iv) limited to Marshallian externalities also non-Fiat automotive suppliers show some 
sort of lock in, negatively correlating embeddedness and competitiveness. This is 
even more meaningful if we consider that in previous sections we highlighted some 
behavioural similitude between this group and Fiat direct suppliers. Actually we 
might conclude that the same behaviour can lead to very different outputs, 
stressing that while structural embeddedness is fundamental for Fiat direct 
suppliers, it might be dangerous for those firms that are not dependent on Fiat any 
more. In a way, the exit from Fiat's environment implied an exit from the virtuous 
circle of embeddedness, even if these firms still belong to both the sector and the 
territory.
If we move our attention to organisative embeddedness we can draw a more 
accurate picture of the ongoing processes (table 7.16). Starting from buzz we have first of 
all some evidence that contradict some of the NIG postulates. In fact we can notice that 
buzz is somehow counterproductive when it comes to managing the supply chain. For 
instance we can see that relying on personal acquaintances of either the entrepreneurs or 
the technicians is negatively correlated in the case of Fiat direct suppliers. This can be 
explained considering the direct suppliers have to compete in the globalised automotive 
supply-chain where quality standard are internationally defined. In such a context, 
personal acquaintances of suppliers does not offer enough guarantee to meet such 
standards. In this context it is interesting to note that firms belonging to the competences 
core are the only ones to show a positive correlation with personal acquaintances. Albeit 
the relationship is not statistically significant, this fact sounds meaningful, suggesting that 
some forms of buzz positively influence competitiveness when they take place in a broader 
and deeper context of organisative learning.
This inverse correlation between the use of buzz in managing the supply-chain and 
firm's competitiveness is even more evident if we consider the effect of supplying spin-off, 
that is the choosing as suppliers firms belonging to formerly employees or firms suggested 
by other entrepreneurs. In this case, the negative correlation with competitiveness spread 
also to other categories, such as non-Fiat automotive suppliers and non automotive firms.
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Table 7 .1 6 -  Firm's competitiveness and organisative territorialisation.
Buzz Cooperation Interactive
learning
Personal Supplying Local Informal Formal Design Design




-0,030 (0,778) -0,362 0,182(0,095) 
(0,001)



































Quite meaningfully, this form of organisative lock-in in buzz takes together the three 
clusters that are more exposed to international competition and to codified quality 
standards. Once again we might observe that sectorial change together with Fiat's 
restructuring did not cut off the links with the territory, but rather transformed some of them 
into traps. At the same time, other kinds of less pretending buzz, like collecting information 
from local sources, is confirmed to have a positive correlation with firms' competitiveness, 
as claimed by the NIG literature.
When it comes to cooperation, we can just add some nuances to our previous 
analysis. In general, informal cooperation is significantly correlated with competitiveness 
but it does not emerge as a peculiar feature of one cluster rather than another. We just 
would like to stress that it seems to be more important in the competencies core: albeit the 
correlation is not significant, it is anyway consistent the fact that this cluster is 
characterised by an higher degree of cooperation as foundation of its Organisation. More 
importantly, we can notice that formal cooperation (such as consortia, joint venture and EU 
programmes) are strongly and positively correlated only in the case of non-Fiat automotive 
suppliers: this result somehow confirms once again the impression that these clusters had 
somehow to compensate the loss of relationships with Fiat with something else and 
therefore that formal rather than informal links fit the case. It also might be interpreted as a 
loss of access to tacit informal network which are somehow substituted by more codified, 
probably supralocal, relationships.
Finally, we have to consider what we assumed to be the core of Turin territorialised 
learning, that is the interactive learning processes centred on the management of design 
and engineering activities and, particularly, co-design networking. The regressions largely
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confirmed that design-oriented firms get some sort of competitive advantage by being 
embedded in territorialised learning. If we consider the generic variable expressing the 
intensity of design and co-design (design attitude) we can notice that it is positively 
correlated with competitiveness in almost all the six clusters, with the exception of non-Fiat 
automotive suppliers and hi-tech manufacturers134. When we consider a more specific 
form of interactive learning like that facilitated by customer-suppliers relationships (design 
with customers) we find a last interesting outcome: managing the design and engineering 
process together with customers is positively correlated with an increase in 
competitiveness for three out of six categories of firms: indirect suppliers, non-Fiat 
automotive suppliers and non-automotive firms. What is striking is that these are the 
clusters where, in the previous sections, we have found a minor degree of involvement in 
design and codesign. This evidence leads us the meaningful conclusion that it is not that 
interactive learning is unimportant for those firms, but simply that it is becoming a "rare 
good". It is not by chance that all these groups are the ones that have lost, willingly or not, 
their direct access to Fiat co-design platforms. In other words, those who found a way to 
access co-design networks -  either with Fiat or more likely with other local subjects, such 
as other local customers, but also universities and research centres -  increased their 
competitiveness more than those which did not.
7.5 A synthetic image of contemporary Turin manufacturing tradition.
Throughout this chapter we have jointly considered the two main issues of 
continuity (i.e. long duree or path-dependence) and differentiation (i.e. variety), showing 
that these two processes are not in conflict with each other: TPS' continuity does not imply 
homogeneity and a variety of clusters/TPSs can take place in the same territory while 
sharing some common features. We also claimed and, to a certain extent, showed that 
territorial embeddedness alone -  that is a relationship with a territory mediated by 
territorial assets -  is not enough to distinguish different evolutionary patterns. We also 
need organisative embeddedness -  that is territorialised learning -  to fully explain how 
continuity and differentiation proceed hand in hand. This process leads us to distinguish 
six clusters, or potential TPS, coexisting at the turn of the millennium in Turin's province. 
All of them are characterised by some sort of continuity with the mechanical and 
electrotechnical manufacturing tradition, while being at the same time differentiated by a 
different blend of firms' strategies, territorial embeddedness and organisative one.
Drawing these conclusions, we would like to build an attempt to connect these 
different group into a synthetic picture, somehow summarising the main outcomes of this 
empirical assessment of how the TPS concept can be operationalised. This will lead us to
134 In both case the correlation is weakly positive, but statistically not significant.
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address the issue which is implicit since the first sections of this chapter: how many TPS 
are coevolving at present time in Turin area? Before answering this question, 
nevertheless, we have to set up an interpretation scheme apt to represent simultaneously 
all six the identified clusters. To this purpose, we adopt a graphic visualisation, 
distinguishing territorial from organisative embeddedness (figure 7.1).
In order to put our six groups into this typology, we cannot but consider the core 
competencies group as the closest to the ideal type of a TPS. In fact:
(i) it is characterised by deep roots in the territorial assets but also, more importantly, 
by an intense activity of territorialised learning;
(ii) it maintains important relationships with Fiat and other local long-term, but at the 
same time it is not strictly dependent on Fiat orders.
We might say that the core competencies TPS might be rather defined as post-Fiat 
than anti-Fiat: it somehow represent the outcome of a convergence process between the 
local champions independently from their proximity to Fiat. The firms belonging to this TPS 
can enter in relationships with Fiat's environment but their survival does not seem to be 
dependent on the presence of Fiat in Turin, as they have diversified not only their 
customers portfolio but also their territorialised learning processes. We might affirm that 
the competences core should guarantee the reproduction of Turin manufacturing tradition 
of the "well-done work" over future times.
It is also quite evident that scale intensive direct suppliers can be collocated on the 
bottom right of our scheme. Most of them are big, many belonging to international groups; 
they have a direct relationship with Fiat, without depending on Fiat's orders. They also 
show a lower degree of structural embeddedness which sometimes turns out into 
structural crisis -  plants closure, massive firing, social conflicts -  but such structural crisis 
does not seem enough strong or deep to cause a rupture in their organisative 
embeddedness and to make them footloose. To present time, in fact, they are deeply 
involved in co-design platforms which guarantee their embeddedness in localised learning 
processes. Despite the fact that they cannot be defined as footloose corporation, the risk 
that direct suppliers decide to move elsewhere is always possible. For sure, as long as 
Fiat keeps its design and engineering premises in Turin, direct suppliers organisative 
embeddedness is preserved. Nevertheless, production might follow definitively further 
Fiat's delocalisation, further weakening structural embeddedness and the virtuous links 
between territorialised learning and production process.
The third recognisable group is made by hi-tech firms which clearly seem to belong 
to a sort of pure agglomeration. All the analysis has shown that this is the group where 
both structural and organisative territorialisation are weaker. Finally we have a weakly
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differentiated space type where we can sum together indirect suppliers, non-Fiat 
automotive suppliers and non-automotive firms, with little possibility of differentiation. To 
this stage we might simply keep these three clusters together in what we might call the 
mechatronic galaxy, that is a relatively undifferentiated space where converged the firms 
which became extraneous to the FIAT system. It is interesting to note that, apart a 
conspicuous group of machine tool producers among non-automotive firms (approximately 
40% of the cluster), the mechatronic galaxy is mainly made by scale intensive firms 
specialised in generic metalwork and moulding activities (85% of this kind of firms belongs 
to the mechatronic galaxy). More importantly, as we noted above, this mechatronic galaxy 
is largely the consequence of the exit strategy applied by Fiat to the different levels of its 
supply chain. Their position in our scheme is some how intermediate between the core 
competencies cluster and the hi-tech firms. Also, this large group differs from scale 
intensive direct suppliers in that it seems to be more embedded in structural territorial 
assets than in territorialised learning processes. Finally we have to notice that, in figure 
7.1, the coordinates of the three clusters within the mechatronic galaxy are largely arbitrary 
in that, as we have seen, they do significantly differ from each other neither in terms of 
structural embeddedness nor in relation to organisative embeddedness.
At this point, trying to answer the question how many TPSs are now in Turin, we 
might say that only the competencies core has all the characters of a TPS. We might add 
that probably there is also a pseudo-TPS or a semi-TPS, that is the group of scale 
intensive direct suppliers, given its strong organisative embeddedness in co-design 
networks. We would have then have some groups following the path of a Porterian cluster, 
dwelling at the boundaries of the main TPS and of the pseudo-TPS, entering in some kind 
of structural coupling with them without being significantly integrated in the territorialised 
learning processes.
The point hence is to evaluate more exactly what is happening at the boundaries. 
To this purpose the evidences emerging from our assessment of the relationship between 
embeddedness and competitiveness can help us in highlighting what is moving in the 
fringe. The main outcome is that outside the competencies core there are three ongoing 
processes:
(i) some sort of competitive advantage seems to be enhanced by those firms 
(belonging to scale intensive direct suppliers, also indirect suppliers, non-Fiat 
automotive suppliers and non-automotive firms) which are closer to the 
competencies core -  i.e. they are able to balance organisative embeddedness with 
structural embeddedness can improve their competitive advantage;
(ii) another subset of firms, belonging to all the groups except competencies core, are 
involved in some kind of lock-in trap, in terms of either structural embeddedness or
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organisative one. In particular, hi-tech firms are not only the less embedded, but 
the ones that still are do not seem to get any advantage from embeddedness: in 
this case, territorialisation is rather a (lock-in) threat than an (learning) opportunity;
Hence, our inclination is to consider that there is a TPS’ bulk, where a consistent 
number of firms are involved into a cumulative loop between structural and organisative 
embeddedness, leading to positive effects on their competitiveness. The point is that, 
rather than simply questioning whether there are other TPS or simple clusters around this, 
it seems to be more fruitful to analyse the ongoing process without any obsession with 
cutting clear boundaries between groups. In other terms, instead of asking how many TPS 
there are in Turin, we should be questioning what is happening at the margins of the 
clearly identifiable one. To this purpose, it might be useful to distinguish at least two fringe 
spaces around the main highly territorialised paradise, which we might call the 
territorialised competitiveness purgatory and the territorialised lock-in limbo. The former 
denotes a relational space where we can collocate territorialised behaviours that are not 
as intense as those taking place in the competences core, but that nevertheless create 
some sort of proximity between the competences core and the other groups. The latter 
indicates the fact that some firms seem to be locked in the “wrong embeddedness”, 
overestimating for instance the importance of Marshallian externalities or excessively 
relying on buzz as a manner of managing economic relationships.
It is important to notice that such a framework keeps together the issue of variety 
within a territory and that of continuity. In our case, variety means that there are different 
groups characterised by some common behaviours, but is also means that variety also 
exists within each of these groups with reference to some sort of proximity to the 
territorialised bulk. Also variety is taken into account with reference to the effects of 
embeddedness, showing that virtuous pat-dependence and abysmal lock-in can co-exist in 
the same moment, in the same territory, among firms sharing some sort of common 
background. At the same time, this multifaceted explanation of variety needs an equally 
multifaceted account of continuity. Continuity is not related to homogeneity, but rather to 
different degree of proximity to a central bulk of knowledge which is reproduced over time 
and which makes sense of being embedded135.
135 In this meaning, we can probably think that, compared to the late 90s survey, some convergence-with- 












































The main purpose of this dissertation has been the rethinking of the relationships 
between territories and economic activities, with special reference to industrial production. 
In the introductory chapter, we addressed this issue starting somehow from the end, that is 
from the theme that assumes the deepest and most radical identification between the 
territorial dimension and the economic one, signally "territorial competitiveness". Any 
speech about territorial competitiveness cannot but assume an overwhelming narration of 
the territory itself in economic terms, as a sort of big, complex, multifaceted yet unique 
economic agent. Whatever is the geographical scale (national, regional, urban), claiming 
that a territory possesses a feature which is competitiveness against other territories 
forces us to grasp something extremely slippery. It is not just saying that there is a link 
between territorial and economic processes, but it is rather affirming that they share some 
common purpose: being competitive.
Hence talking about territorial competitiveness is not an innocent metaphor: to its 
extreme consequences, it implies that the whole territory is (or should be) organised in 
order to be competitive. There is also another implication, that is the possibility that the 
territory is something with clear boundaries and a monolithic identity within them, just like 
other economic actors, like a consumer or a firm. A successful economic actor must be 
consistent in its purposes and consistently organised in order to achieve them. This is 
what we called the "juridical personality" paradox, that is the extreme possibility of 
attributing to a territory some form of "collective agency". These features can explain why 
there is a large convergence about the importance of territorial competitiveness between 
heterogeneous groups, such a neo-liberal policy makers and local development 
advocates. The former find the competitiveness issue coherent with their overwhelming 
interpretation of economic interest as the engine moving and structuring human 
relationships, while the latter seem to be more attracted by the emphasis that territorial 
competitiveness puts on community, homogeneity and communality of purposes. 
Nevertheless, the idea that territories compete against each other shows to be a poor 
metaphor, in the eyes of both serious economists (sceptical about the fact that territorial
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competitiveness can be something more than a zero sum game) and aware geographers 
(concerned about the fact that a territory is not a monolithic consensus building machine 
and that territorial competitiveness actually favours particular groups of stakeholders). As a 
consequence, we preferred to put more emphasis on the concept of indirect territorial 
competitiveness, that is the idea that specific features of a territory can positively influence 
firms' competitiveness.
8.1 Assessing the limits of the current debate in Economic Geography.
This shift of perspective drove us to move back to consider more general issues 
about the firm-territory linkages, contextualising the issue of territorial competitiveness in 
the broader debate ongoing in Economic Geography, but also in other disciplines. In 
particular, over the last twenty years, the consciousness that economic activity involves a 
number of intermediate scales -  such a the city or the region -  between the single firm 
(micro) and the whole economic systems (macro) spread beyond the tiny boundaries of 
Economic Geography to invest mainstream neoclassical Economics. Within this broad 
process, the issue of territory, or at least of space, has come to the forefront to the extent 
that a new branch of spatial and/or regional Economics arose, signally New Economic 
Geography (NEG). In parallel, also a New Industrial Geography (NIG) met a renewed 
interest in its traditional themes, especially related to the location process and to regional 
development. In particular the rediscovery of small and medium enterprises got a deeper 
set of meanings being contextualised in encompassing broad narratives, such as the post- 
Fordist transition and the emergence of a flexible specialisation model.
Although almost coeval, NEG and NIG intellectual trajectories diverged since their 
very foundation. On the one side, NEG has always been focusing on themes that most of 
geographers perceived as the archaeology of the discipline, from the early classic location 
models to the search for spatial regularities. On the other side, NIG was dealing with the 
idea of a paradigmatic change in the conceptualisation of the economic realm and of its 
relationships with space, place and territory, drawing on narratives of dramatic change, 
such as "the second industrial divide", the regulationist school and the transaction cost 
model. On the one side, NEG was firmly rooted in the neoclassical mainstream tradition, 
explicitly claiming for the foundation of a new stream in Economics rather than a 
(counter)reform in Economic Geography. On the other side, NIG increasingly started to 
look to a broad set of "alternative" Political Economics, from neo-Keynesian to post- 
Marxist, from Veblen's Old Institutional Economics till the latter development of Hayek’s 
thought, the so called "second Hayek". Also NEG was emphasising the possibility of 
applying to the study of the spatial economy the set of robust and universal categories 
which made the good fortune of mainstream Economics, while NIG was, on the contrary, 
more keen to accept some cultural, post-structuralist, turn in its theoretical and
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methodological assumptions. Albeit it has an explicit empathy with the more geographical 
of the two streams, our TPS approach attempted some sort of bridging between NEG and 
NIG.
In the second chapter, we addressed the issue of how these two approaches offer 
two radical different, yet imitatively related, views of the interaction between economic 
activities and territories. We articulated this confrontation across four different standpoints. 
First we considered how NEG situates in its "natural environment", that is mainstream 
Economics, rather than Economic Geography. Second, we tried to match the different 
explanatory power of NEG and NIG, focusing on the lessons that industrial geographers 
can draw from NEG experience. In the third part of the chapter, we considered the failure 
of NEG in addressing fundamental issues in Geography, i.e. the idea of place and the 
concept of scale, claiming that the current cultural turn in NIG has its roots in a different 
meta-theoretical framework, which is not Neoclassical Economics, like in the case of NEG, 
but rather Old Institutional Economics. Finally, stressing the limits to the cultural and 
institutional turns in NIG, we have concluded claiming for something more than a meta- 
theoretical shift, precisely for a paradigmatic change. In particular, we have been forced 
into this step by the awareness that NIG was operating some radical simplification in its 
account of territory that was not less dramatic that the hypotheses-setting process typical 
of mainstream Economics and NEG. In other terms, our point was that in order to fully 
grasp the complexity of territories and consequently of their relationship with economic 
activities a new paradigm was to be developed and it was to be searched in biology rather 
than physics, which has traditionally been the main source of metaphors for mainstream 
Economics. The idea was to trace back the metaphor of territorial competitiveness to its 
very primary source, life sciences.
8.2 The systemic gaze: introducing Territorial Productive System.
Consequently, in chapter 3 we have addressed the issue of defining a "new" 
paradigm for Economic Geography, which would allow a conceptualisation of the territory- 
firm nexus avoiding the excess of simplification implicit in both NEG and NIG. This 
research has been orientated toward the co-called complexity theories, signally system 
theory, with particular reference to Varela and Maturana's account of autopoietic systems, 
formerly developed in the field of neurobiology. This peculiar standpoint has brought to the 
forefront some themes that would connote the reasoning across the whole dissertation. 
First complexity framework helped in contextualising the NEG versus NIG juxtaposition 
within the broader debate in Geography concerning the conceptualisation of fundamental 
concepts like space, time, place, territory. Second, it contributed to focusing our attention 
on how variety and continuity relate to each other. System theory puts a great emphasis 
on some continuity -  and hence on some form of identity -  within the bulk of the system,
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without denying the importance of change and variety, in the twofold meaning of evolution 
and emergence of new properties. Introducing Varela and Maturana's model, rather than 
on autopoiesis we have been focusing on their distinction between Organisation and 
Structure, where the former connotes the set of fundamental relationships that define 
system's identity and continuity, while the latter denotes simply the contingent set of 
components and relationships through which a system becomes contextualised in time 
and space. As we shall see the divide between Organisation and Structure represents the 
cornerstone of our systemic understanding of the firms-territory complex set of 
relationships.
The following chapter, number four, represents the core of the whole dissertation 
as it translates the notion of autopoietic system into the concept of Territorial Productive 
System, which is the central focus of the present work. The problem here is how to 
conceptualise the territory from a systemic perspective. Given the impossibility of 
formulating a holistic account of a whole territory as a system, we have followed an 
alternative path. Assuming that a given set of elementary systems happens to be 
colocated in the same territory, we have been questioning which kind of systemic 
interaction might occur between them. The first possibility is that they enter in some sort of 
structural coupling, which is the standard systemic interaction postulated by Varela and 
Maturana. In this case, the elementary systems coevolve through adaptation, simply 
sharing some features of their Structures while maintaining their organisative closure each 
against the other. In this case the elementary systems stay perfectly distinguishable 
between them and with reference to the territory, which is simply the material and 
immaterial outcome of this cumulative structural coupling. The second possibility is that 
these elementary systems, or at least part of them, enter into a process more complex 
than mere structural coupling, what we called organisative synthesis. In the latter case, the 
coevolution refers not only to the Structures but also to the Organisations. In other term 
interaction occurs at the level of the Organisation of the elementary systems, leading to 
the emergence of a more complex system, the Territorial Productive System (TPS). It is 
fundamental to remember that the TPS is not the territory, but it is rather a proxy of the 
territory. It might happen that, in less complex territories, the TPS can be considered "as if' 
it were the territory, but in most of the cases they are two different entities. The main 
implication is that in a territory more TPSs can coexist and coevolve.
Of course this is not a place where the complexity of the model can be entirely 
described. Nevertheless, it seems important to consider the main theoretical implication of 
the TPS. The fundamental point is that the distinction between Structure and Organisation 
allowed us to identify two different kinds of territorialisation of economic activities, leading 
to two separate accounts for embeddedness, respectively structural and organisative. On
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the one side, structural embeddedness is solely produced by a structural coupling between 
the TPS and a broad range of territorial assets, varying from pecuniary externalities to 
Marshallian ones, till embracing more cultural and institutional territorial endowment, like 
trust and cooperation. On the other side, organisative embeddedness implied a deeper 
degree of integration between the economic activities and the territory, related to some 
cognitive process taking place in the territory. More precisely, we identified the presence of 
territorial learning processes as the main evidence of organisative embeddedness, 
supposing that the reproduction and hybridisation of a set of traditional knowledge and 
competencies is the mechanism that make possible the reproduction of the Organisation 
itself. As we shall see when discussing the contribution that the TPS model can offer to 
geographical analysis, this distinction helps us in addressing two fundamental issues 
which are consistently addressed neither by NEG nor by NIG, that is the account of how 
variety is produced within the territory, even in presence of some share features and 
behaviours, and how continuity can produce a more diversified set of outcomes than the 
mere opposition between virtuous path-dependence and lock-in.
8.3 Putting TPS at work: empirical evidences from Turin manufacturing 
tradition.
The second part of the thesis has been dealing with the attempt of applying the 
TPS framework to a concrete case study, that is the transformation that occurred in the 
Turin manufacturing fabric. As we have seen in the end of chapter 4, the Turin area offers 
some features that make it an appropriate case to assess the validity and the originality of 
the theoretical framework we developed in the first four chapters. The main issue is 
probably the long lasting identification between Fiat and the whole territory, summarised in 
the metaphor of the one-company-town. To this regard our interest was dismantling this 
monolithic image that, after Fiat's crisis and delocation, was turning out to be meaningless, 
without, at the same time, falling in another all-encompassing oversimplified tale, such as 
the post-Fordist or another post-labelled narration. Another good point was that Turin is 
characterised by a quite recognisable bulk of knowledge which has been reproduced over 
about a century and half, that is an overwhelming diffusion of tacit competencies in the 
area of mechanical and electrotechnical production. These two issues put on the forefront 
how this cognitive path-dependence evolved over time, embodying in different 
specialisation and producing simultaneously continuity and variety.
In order to address these issues, we have displayed a quite heterogeneous set of 
methodologies. In particular, in chapter 5 a historical assessment of how Fiat's 
environment has been working from its very foundation at the turn of XX century. Signally, 
we have tried to show that even the well-known Fordist narration about Turin and Fiat can 
be better interpreted as the product of interaction between different systems colocated in
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the same territory and coevolving, rather than a mere imposition of Fiat's strategies and 
organisation on a passive territory. The following chapter has been focusing on the 
transition following Fiat's disengagement from Turin. Drawing on both historical account 
and previous empirical investigation we showed how the 80s and 90s restructuring set free 
a conspicuous volume of "energies" that were previously channelled into Fiat's system, in 
particular forcing many enterprises, mainly SMEs but not only, to search for a different 
setting of relationships, both productive and cognitive ones. Finally, in chapter 7, we came 
to present times, questioning how different clusters coevolved in the turn of the millennium. 
This passage pointed also a methodological shift, as more attention has been paid to the 
microfoundation of our model, trying to sketch the TPS dynamics drawing directly on the 
observation of a sample of about 400 firms which have been investigate through an 
extensive face-to-face questionnaire.
In this conclusion, rather than simply summarising the findings of our empirical 
work, we would like to sketch out a more complex and overwhelming narration of the Turin 
manufacturing history, cutting across all the three empirical chapters. Our position is that 
we had two shifts, the first one in the beginning of the 90s and the second in the turn of the 
millennium. The first shift, analysed in chapter 6, implied a process of divergence within 
Turin manufacturing tradition producing two quite distinctive bulks. Two TPSs seemed to 
coexist, a Fiat-centred TPS and a mechatronic one, each significantly distinguished from 
the other in terms of territorialised cognitive behaviours. Our point is that, in the decade 
between the two surveys we made, some further processes took place, at the same time 
differentiating and unifying the development path of mechanical and electrotechnical firms. 
On the one side, it seems to us that a convergence happened between some parts of the 
Fiat-centred and of the mechatronic TPSs, involving on the one side direct suppliers of 
machine tools and on the other side production services firms, the latter independently 
from their proximity to Fiat's environment. This lead to the emergence of what we called 
the "competencies core", a set of firms characterised by a high degree of both structural 
and organisative embeddedness and by a higher level of competitiveness than the rest of 
the sample. On the other side, at the fringe of this bulk expressing the core of the TPS we 
witnessed two different processes. First, further convergence happened between non-Fiat 
automotive producers and non-automotive firms, involving also Fiat indirect suppliers, 
within what we labelled the broader "mechatronic galaxy". Second, with respect to the mid 
90s situation a divide seemed to arise cutting across the mechatronic galaxy, 
distinguishing those firms who could gain or maintain a position of proximity to the 
competencies core, and hence experience an increase in competitiveness, from other 
firms which showed a negative correlation between competitiveness and embeddedness, 
suggesting the existence of some lock-in.
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8.4 Concluding remarks on our case study.
Before passing to draw some general conclusions about the added value of the 
TPS approach in the theoretical debate in Economic Geography, we would like to consider 
three further issues related to our empirical assessment. The first question to be 
addressed here is the role played by Fiat in this change. Although Turin has never been a 
proper one-company-town, there is no doubt that in the period between the end of the 
Second World War and the big organisational restructuring in the 80s Fiat played an 
hegemonic role in the destiny of Turin's territorial economy, justifying the claim that a Fiat 
TPS was to a certain extent the main evident expression of the local manufacturing 
tradition. The 80s crisis started a process of transformation which reached its peak, 
according to our interpretation, in the first years of XXI century, drawing an image of Turin 
productive fabric which is dramatically different from the previous one. The TPS that we 
sketched in chapter 7 is not any more a Fiat-centred one, but it is rather focused on a set 
of behaviours (mainly informal cooperation with a blend of co-design networking) in charge 
of the reproduction of the knowledge inherited by previous times. Some of the firms 
belonging to it have relationships with Fiat, other do not. At the same time, the image of 
the TPS is neither anti-Fiat nor Fiat-independent: as we have seen in chapter 5, co-design 
and co-engineering platform, which play an important role for the knowledge reproduction, 
have been established top-down by Fiat as a widespread practice in the 90s. The 
presence of Fiat is still important to maintain some degree of organisative embeddedness 
of some parts of the new TPS: we have seen, for instance, that scale intensive direct 
suppliers are embedded in Turin mainly thanks to co-design with Fiat, and that Fiat- 
centred codesign platform are probably the only chance for indirect suppliers to participate 
to some territorialised learning process.
The second point we would like to address is the fact that this final image was, in a 
sense, unexpected: given the image that emerged from the previous survey, we would 
have expected the confirmation of a dichotomy neat cut between Fiat's environment and a 
mechatronic TPS, each of them with its own destiny and development trajectory. The 
representation we get is, instead, more complex: the differences between the group are 
nuanced and, rather than an opposition between different clusters of TPSs, they can be 
better interpreted in terms of institutional proximity -  but also of geographical proximity, 
given the concentration of the competitive core in Turin metropolitan area -  to a bulk of 
knowledge and learning. This has some important consequences for our account of variety 
and continuity. Continuity is actually stronger than we expected and hence it makes the 
possibility of cutting clear boundaries, within a territory, between different TPSs sharing 
some common features such as a shared knowledge. At the same time, continuity did not 
mean homogeneity, but it simply addressed the issue of variety in a different manner: we 
have to focus our attention on thresholds and frontiers rather than sharp boundaries, on
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nuances and tones of gray rather than contrasted black and white dramatic pictures. More 
importantly, even when some homogeneity is given -  like in the importance of Marshallian 
externalities or of buzz -  this does not necessarily imply that such features have the same 
impact on firms' competitiveness, as the risk of a lock-in is always present.
The third important issue is somehow an open question and it refers the possibility 
that the TPS model entails some predictive power. The impression is that our final TPS is 
more stable than the one we sketched in chapter 6, but it is doubtless less stable than the 
Fiat-centred one draft in chapter 5. Hence the question is about how the TPS is going to 
evolve in next years. Given the fact that Fiat reorganisation seems to be arrived to an end 
point and that the added value activities, like design and engineering, will not be 
delocalised; given the efforts from various agencies to sustain suppliers 
internationalisation; and given the evidence that in the last year we have even witnessed a 
re-embedding of Fiat production in Mirafiori, the main Turin plant, we can imagine that both 
the competencies core and scale intensive direct suppliers will remain relatively stable. 
The real playground is hence within the "mechatronic galaxy". It is likely that a deeper 
divergence will take place within this group of firms, with some of them closer and closer to 
the competencies core and others definitively trapped into the territorialised lock-in and 
eventually disembedding, moving closer to hi-tech firms in the deterritorialisation space. 
The problem is given by the fact that, apart a good number of machine tools producers 
and some components makers, most of the mechatronic galaxy is made of firms 
specialised in very generic production, without a clearly recognisable product, with weak 
entrepreneurship and limited access to learning processes. In other terms it is the typical 
case for dependent SMEs, which work at the lower levels of a supply-chain depending on 
customers not in terms of orders but also with reference to innovation transfer. The 
question, hence, is twofold: is the demand coming from the competencies core and scale 
intensive direct suppliers enough to absorb the supply? Are there other TPSs in the area 
with which these groups of firms can coevolve more successfully? Of course these 
questions cannot be addressed here, in that they need to take into account more complex 
territorial dynamics, included the role played by Public Administration.
8.5 Added value for the debate in Economic Geography.
We have now to consider how our TPS model can be collocated in the broader 
debate in Economic Geography, highlighting the added value that the systemic 
perspective add in addressing the issue of the relationships between economic activities 
and territories. The most important issue where the TPS approach challenged both NEG 
and NIG is the playground of simplification. For instance the way we have been 
conceptualising structural embeddedness was encompassing both NEG emphasis on 
pecuniary endowment and NIG preference for more institutional and relational assets.
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Traded and untraded relationships are not simply played one against the other, but rather 
positioned on a continuous line where the presence of the latter does not contradict the 
importance of the former. At the same time, considering territorial assets as part of the 
structural territorialisation rather than of the organisative one reduced the emphasis that 
both NEG and NIG put on quite contingent elements, such as specialisation or labour 
market segmentation. The same process of deconstruction applied to the territorialised 
learning issue: while recognising it as the main bulk of TPS, we have at the same time 
tried to distinguish between a variety of learning processes, from mere buzz to more 
explicit cooperation till the highest form of interactive learning. The first outcome of this 
process has been introducing a higher degree of variety within our account of 
embeddedness, which is not any more a one-dimension process but rather a multifaceted 
dynamic, where there is room for a broad range of territorialisation processes which can 
coexist in the same territory and in the same time. This leads us to consider the second 
and most important advancement offered by the TPS approach, that is the possibility of 
assume and to a certain extent explain the complexity of the territory, that is, in our 
productive perspective, the possibility that different systems coevolve in the same territory, 
still maintaining certain continuity with a common past.
We believe that the empirical assessment of TPS confirmed both these advances. 
For instance, we have seen that traded and untraded relationships are equally important in 
fostering firms' competitiveness, above all in the case of firms that are more exposed to 
the "risk" -  or the temptation -  of disembedding (in our case study this was the case of 
globalised scale intensive direct suppliers). Also we have seen that buzz is to some extent 
overestimated: on the one side, we have seen that when buzz is present it is some how 
ubiquitous and it is not very helpful in addressing the issue of variety within a given 
territory; on the other side, buzz utility is limited to the acquisition of information: when it is 
displayed to manage more strategic activities (like the establishment or control of the 
supply chain), it can be even counterproductive, producing some sort of lock-in. As far as 
the issue of variety and continuity is concerned, we found that interpreting a territory 
through the prism of TPS withdraw the possibility of simply adapting an a priori category, 
such as industrial district or one-company-town, Fordist or post-Fordist.
8.6 The three paradoxes of TPS conceptualisation.
Nevertheless, both our theoretical and empirical analysis showed some limitations 
that need to be addressed here. In particular, we can identify three paradoxes implicit in 
the TPS approach. The first one might be labelled "generalisation without comparison". 
The TPS might be virtually used as a prism to describe and analyse an infinitive range of 
territory-production interaction. More generally the distinction between Organisation and 
Structure can be applied to the relationship between the territory and the economic
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activities that take place in it even without a specific reference to industrial production. We 
might likely be able to describe Territorial Services Systems, or Territorial Tourist Systems. 
Also, Varela and Maturana's model of autopoietic system is not strictly bounded with 
economic categories, as it can be applied to the relationship between the territory and 
other social process, like class or ethnic conflicts. Finally, we can apply the same basic 
model to very different size of territories, that is to a range of geographical scales which 
stretches from the neighbourhood to the globe. At the same time, this generality implies 
that the way we applied systemic theorisation can be of little help in comparing what is 
going in different territories at a given time. This is because TPS model is very general in 
its basic assumptions, but it is far from universal in its operationalisation: which are the 
elementary systems producing the more complex territorial system and how they interact 
structurally and organisatively can be defined only with reference to a specific territory and 
to a specific set of questions we are asking that territory. Moreover, when we pass from 
theoretical operationalisation to empirical one we must recognise that our methodology 
massively relies on historical analysis in setting the hypothesis to be tested by the proper 
empirical assessment. To this respect we might conclude that the TPS and generally 
speaking the systemic approach to territorial studies is somehow closer to the humanistic 
and phenomenological streams in the geographical tradition than to the economic and 
industrial one. There is at work a strong notion of the uniqueness of each territory which 
makes it closer to the notion of place than to the concept of space.
This leads to the second paradox, that we might call "complexity with 
simplification". Despite the attempt at building a holistic comprehension of the territory, 
without reducing it to its economic dimension as in much of the territorial competitiveness 
literature, and despite the intention to take into account the complex uniqueness of each 
territory, some strong simplification is at work in our TPS model. Rejecting reductionism 
does not mean that our models pretend to be as complex as reality. More precisely, we 
built our TPS exactly to reduce the complexity of the territory as a whole and to make 
some sense of it. This is what we meant by saying that the TPS is not the territory, but a 
sort of interface between the elementary systems and the territory. Also it should be clear 
that this position is essential to our account of territorial variety. At the same time, we are 
nevertheless conscious that any operationalisation of a concept like TPS involves a 
situatedness of the observer. It is the researcher who decides which are the relevant 
questions to ask the territory and in doing so he/she unavoidably simplifies the richness of 
the territory, selecting some features and treating the other as something residual, as a 
black box which cannot be opened in the context of that contingent research. Under this 
perspective, the TPS approach still shares some of criticisms we have moved against the 
NEG approach: there is still a bin, a Pandora's Box or a QWERTY-like effect where
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fundamental pieces of the territory are put. This limitation is at work as well when we try to 
pass to some empirical assessment of our systemic model. As we have seen in the Turin 
case study, when dealing with history and stories, we can grasp to a certain extent the 
complexity of the territory, considering other elementary systems (such as the Public 
Administration or the labour market), and not simply the productive clusters locally 
interacting. This simplification became even more evident when we passed to the 
empirical analysis, where the chosen methodology -  the questionnaire -  implied that the 
TPS has been built just considering firms' perception of the territory where they operate. It 
is partially true that this problem might be addressed through a change in methodology, for 
instance interviewing key observers belonging also to other elementary systems, but there 
will be always and anyway a subjective simplification in defining the main characters of a 
territorial system.
The third paradox emerges when dealing with the definition of boundaries, which is, 
as we have seen, a recurrent issue across our work, probably the most problematic one: 
we might baptise it "proximity without boundaries". It is quite clear, in fact, that the setting 
of boundaries is sensitive to how proximity works in a given context. Usually boundaries 
can be reasonably fixed when proximity becomes too loose to contain and explain the 
processes taking place in a territory. This leads to the important issue concerning the 
spatial boundaries of the territory, that is its geographical scale, and the relationship that 
the TPS, as territorially defined entity, entails with other scale. This is something which is 
largely addressed in the geographical literature, mainly under the label of local-global 
relationships. The main point is, nevertheless, another: our emphasis on variety within a 
territory implies that there are also internal boundaries. The possibility of distinguishing 
different TPSs and/or other kind of cluster acting within a territory is based on the fact that 
we described territorial proximity as made up of two elements, geographical (that is 
spatial) and institutional proximity. This means that, even if we could approximately fix the 
geographical boundaries of the territory and as a consequence of the TPS, we still should 
deal with a more subtle notion of boundaries which relates to institutional proximity. In fact, 
while geographical proximity is to some extent a condition necessary and sufficient to 
produce structural embeddedness, the same does not apply to organisative 
embeddedness which is far more selective and needs a full account of territorial proximity. 
Even when we can identify the bulk of a TPS, like in the case of what we called in our case 
study the "competencies core", what happen in its fringe is something extremely fluid 
which escape fixed boundaries. The relationship between different groups of actors within 
a territory can hence take a broad range of nuanced shapes: being different does not imply 
necessarily otherness. Also what appears to be a disembedded behaviour can be
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expression of embeddedness into another unknown TPS or into a non-territorial productive 
system.
The main problem when dealing with these three paradoxes is that there is a sort of 
trade-off between them: when trying to solve one, we are likely to worsen at least one of 
the others. If we increase the complexity of our model we are going to make empirical 
analyses which are less and less fitting an eventual comparison with other territories. To 
fix clear boundaries will help in comparing different territories, but at the same time it 
implies an oversimplification of territorial complexity. As an example, during the theoretical 
operationalisation of the TPS and early stages of our empirical analysis (mainly in chapter 
6 and the beginning of chapter 7) we were actually oversimplifying the complexity of the 
territory, assuming that a question like "how many TPSs there are in Turin" was making 
sense. When it came to build up a synthetic image of Turin manufacturing fabric we had to 
shift to a fuzzier blurred notion of margins, talking about frontiers rather than boundaries. 
Vice versa, constructing a more complex account of TPS would increase the number and 
the quality of boundaries/frontiers to be taken into account. In this perspective our task has 
been piloting our theoretical and empirical research through the Scylla and Charybdis of 
the paradox. When we had to choose, we sacrificed comparability to variety and 
boundaries to (institutional) proximity. Doing so, we are conscious that we reduced the 
possibility of a fully satisfying validation of the model, floating between some sort of post­
structuralist story-telling and a search for some kind of weak structuration of the reality. 
More difficult is to assess to what extent we have been successful in balancing complexity 
and simplification. For instance, our choice to focus almost exclusively on firms’ behaviour 
in order to draw the diversification process within a given set of knowledge and 
competencies, can be criticised on two sides: from a complexity perspective, it is doubtless 
oversimplifying the complexity of the territory, but also that of the TPS as we have 
conceptualised it in chapter 4; from a reductionist standpoint, it is clear that we have not 
clearly settled the microeconomic foundation of our model, avoiding any statement about 
which are the purposes and the interested that motivate the individual actors.
8.7 An agenda for forthcoming research.
As a consequence there is room for further analysis on both theoretical and 
empirical sides. As far as conceptualisation is concerned, the main point is to more deeply 
consider the internal structure of elementary systems, which at present are more or less 
taken for granted as black boxes. This micro-foundation of the model might be addressed 
by taking into account some agent-structure model of explanation. Something has been 
done in the empirical analysis, when, starting from individual firms' behaviours, we have 
been identifying six elementary systems interacting and producing a TPS. Nevertheless
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this passage must be reconsidered in its theoretical assumptions and consequences. At 
the same time, an analogous work has to be carried out with reference to different kind of 
elementary systems. In chapter 5 we have tried to do this through an historical approach to 
the definition of Fiat-centred TPS. Nevertheless, we had to abandon them in chapter 7, 
where their access to the explanation was exclusively mediated by the assessment and 
the perception of the firms belonging to the sample. Also, treating the internal structure of 
non-purely-economic elementary systems implies a complexification of the theory which 
will easily run out of control. More importantly, opening the black boxes of Public 
Administration dynamics or of the labour market implies bringing into our TPS model a 
broad range of disciplines and competences going far beyond the NEG versus NIG divide. 
Then, if we are going to consider non-economic Territorial Systems the complexity would 
increase and we should need a Braudelian or Vidalian capability to keep together so many 
lines of a broader and broader narration.
The second point which might highlight some dark sides of our systemic 
conceptualisation is a deeper reflection on the concept of boundaries and how they can be 
seen more profitably as frontier. Reconsidering the primary systemic foundation of our 
interpretation would add little, as in biology the boundaries of an organism have to be set 
down in a quite clearly cut way. More interesting might be referring to previous application 
of system theory in the realm of social sciences. Another source of inspiration might come 
on the concept of threshold developed within Cultural Anthropology to identify the set of 
both symbolic and spatial temporary boundaries where some ritual transformation takes 
place. What we need is hence to operationalise the concept of blurred boundaries and to 
put it at work.
When it comes to empirical research, we think that the most urgent issue is the 
boundaries one, i.e. to analyse what happening at the fringe of the TPS we identified in 
chapter 7, with special reference to non-automotive and hi-tech systems. In the building of 
the questionnaire itself there was a strong bias toward assessing Fiat-dependence and the 
role that automotive specialisation is still playing in defining Turin manufacturing identity. 
The picture has to be completed by paying more attention to the groups and specialisation 
that we treated, in practice, as a residual category: this black box needs urgently to be de­
constructed. More generally some work is left in clarifying the nature of the relationships 
linking the territorialised bulk to the other(ness) spaces that surround it, mainly the 
territorialised competitiveness and the territorialised lock-in, understanding which kind of 
centripetal and/or centrifugal processes are at work.
The following step would be increasing the complexity of our picture, by introducing 
other elementary systems participating in our TPS. In chapter 5 we have seen that class 
conflict and migration processes within the labour market played a fundamental role in
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influencing the transformation of Fiat TPS, some how pushing Fiat management toward 
deverticalisation first and then delocalisation. In chapter 7, on the contrary, labour simply 
became a component of territorial endowment and it has severely filtered by the 
perception of the firms, leaving unaddressed important questions like the effects of 
flexibilisation of the labour market or the massive international immigration which replaced 
national immigration from the South. Even more importantly, introducing and detailing 
different elementary systems would help in increasing the complexity of our picture by 
introducing different Territorial Systems -  either productive or non-economic ones -  which 
might be co-localised in the same territory. Let us consider the role of the institutional 
actors, such as public administration, development agencies but also trade unions, 
chambers of commerce, and other private association. While being certainly interested in 
the destiny of mechanical tradition and hence being probably part of our TPS -  let us think 
to the positive correlation between institutional territorial assets and competitiveness 
emerged among direct Fiat suppliers -  it is also true that they have been playing on 
different tables. The efforts spent in getting Winter Olympic Games in 2006 and in 
upgrading the leisure facilities all around the Region witness the explicit attempt to build a 
Territorial Leisure System, centred on a mix of food, wine and culture that proved to be 
successful in other Italian and French regions.
Finally, some parallel work should be devoted to the issue of comparison between 
different territories. Of course, the more we proceed in our complexification of the image of 
the territory we want to forge, the more we will be moving toward an existentialist account 
of the uniqueness of a territory, the less we shall be able to make comparisons between 
territories. Nevertheless some attempts can be made, focusing on how similar knowledge 
traditions in different territories have led to different specialisation because of 
unpredictable divergences in the learning process. Consider, for example, Turin’s and 
Swiss Jura’s engineering specialisation: both of them have their roots in pre-industrial 
techniques and know-how, but, while Turin’s TPS evolved through specialising mainly-  
but not exclusively as we have seen -  in mass production and developed a certain kind of 
TPS, the Jura is historically specialised in micro-engineering workmanships carried on in 
small workshops, which likely resulted in one or more radically different kind of TPS. With 
a simplification, it is possible that these divergent structures are the outcomes of deep 
differences in the process of institutional learning. For instance, we might test the 
hypothesis that while Turin witnessed the emergence of just one large car producer 
adopting Fordist division of labour (out of more than one hundred independent competitors 
existing at the end of XIX century) and therefore a strong class conflictuality hegemonised 
by the Communist Party, the Swiss Jura’s institutional learning has been substantially 
influenced by the presence of an outstanding anarchist self-reflexivity, embodied in the 
Proudhonian watchmakers.
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Belonging to a group YES □  NO □
* since when_____
* nationality of the group: Italian □  Foreign □
Turnover._______________________ 2004____________ 1999 _ 1996,
Export (% on turnover): 2004____________ 1999 _ 1996.
Employment 2004____________ 1999 _ 1996.
2. COMPETITIVENESS AND FIRM'S STRATEGIES
Over the last eight years, did your firm increase its competitiveness
YES □  NO □
If YES, which have been the strategies which easened the competitiveness increase (score from 1 to 10)? 
Local supply-chain Quality certification
Regional supply-chain Internationalisation
National supply-chain Product innovation
International supply-chain Process innovation
Workforce selection Cooperation with other firms
Acquisition of external innovation
3.TERRITORIAL ASSETS AND STRUCTURAL EMBEDDEDNESS
Which role have the following territorial endowments played in enhancing firm's competitiveness? 
Infrastructure Environmental quality
Availability of spaces Social quality
Availability of specialised workforce Entrepreneurs associations
Labour cost Access to credit
Relationships with trade unions Availability of venture capital
Local taxation
Intermediation structure with PA 
Industrial and local development policies 
Local political stability 
Manufacturing tradition 
Trust and cooperation 
Specialised suppliers 
Long-term customers
University and other public research centres 
Private research centres 
Specialised fairs and expos
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4. BUZZ 1 - SUPPLY CHAIN ORGANISATION 
Over tha last ten years, the turnover of suppliers has been:
more than 50% □  between 50% and 30% □
between 30% and 10% □  less than 10% □
How important are acquaintances in establishing and managing a relationship with a supplier 
(nothing, few, quite important, fundamental)
Acquaintances of the entrepreneurs 
Acquaintances of the technicians 
How is trust created within the supply chain?
(regularly, sometimes, seldom, never)
Previous employment relationships 
Counsel from other firms 
Previous personal acquaintances 
Catalogues, fair, expos
5. BUZZ 2 -  GETTING INFORMATION
The exchange of information takes place through (multiple answers admitted):
Formal associations between entrepreneurs 
Informal associations between entrepreneurs 
Contractual relationships with other firms 
Fairs and expos
Employees from other firms of the same sector 
Journal
6. LOCAL COOPERATION NETWORKS
Have you established cooperation relationships with other fimis over the last eight years?
YES □  NO □
If YES, to what scale and to what purpose did the cooperation take place?






Have you established joint venture with local firms?
YES □  NO □
Do you participate in association and consortia?
YES □  NO □
Do you participate to EU programmes?
YES □  NO □
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Design and engineering activities are managed:
Autonomously and internally 
Autonomously and externally 
Together with customers 
Together with suppliers 
By clients
Do you participate to co-design and co-engineering networks?
YES □  NO □
If YES, with who:
Manufacturing firms belonging to the same sector 
Manufacturing firms belonging to another sector 
Design and engineering specialists 
ICT firms
University and public research centres 
Private research centres
8. EFFETTO DELLA CRISI FIAT SUL SISTEMA MANIFATTURIERO TORINESE  
Did automotive and Fiat's crisis impact negatively on your competitiveness?
YES □  NO □
If NO, because (mark one):
"We do not have any kind of relationship with automotive"
"Despite we work in the automotive sector we have not relationship with Fiat's supply chain” 
"My specialisation makes our work fundamental"
"We do not depend entirely on Fiat's orders"
If YES, because:
"We are direct suppliers"
"We are indirect suppliers"
"We operate in a collateral sector”
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Annex 2: Statistical appendices to chapter 7.








Local supply-chain 2,43 4,38 3,45 3,81
Regional supply-chain 1,43 4,00 2,82 3,26
National supply-chain 2,86 5,17 3,36 4,31
International supply-chain 3,00 4,83 4,18 4,36
Workforce selection 6,63 5,46 8,27 6,40
Acquisition of external innovation 5,57 3,92 7,45 5,12
Quality certification 4,57 6,38 6,36 6,07
Internationalisation 3,50 5,17 3,36 4,40
Product innovation 4,71 7,17 7,36 6,81
Process innovation 6,50 8,00 7,55 7,61








Local supply-chain 3,50 5,00 4,22 4,35
Regional supply-chain 3,79 4,20 3,67 3,95
National supply-chain 4,57 3,75 3,56 3,98
International supply-chain 3,43 2,30 3,00 2,81
Workforce selection 5,36 4,75 6,33 5,28
Acquisition of external innovation 3,14 3,95 5,44 4,00
Quality certification 4,00 5,38 4,70 4,80
Internationalisation 4,33 2,40 3,89 3,36
Product innovation 6,00 5,40 6,70 5,89
Process innovation 5,07 6,60 6,30 6,02








Local supply-chain 3,07 2,88 4,40 3,11
Regional supply-chain 3,71 2,96 4,40 3,36
National supply-chain 2,71 3,36 3,60 3,18
International supply-chain 2,43 3,96 3,60 3,43
Workforce selection 4,73 4,52 5,60 4,71
Acquisition of external innovation 5,13 5,32 4,40 5,16
Quality certification 5,87 5,24 6,00 5,53
1 ntemationalisation 4,07 5,40 2,40 4,64
Product innovation 6,93 6,12 5,50 6,30
Process innovation 6,80 6,74 5,50 6,60









Local supply-chain 2,94 3,15 4,12 3,43
Regional supply-chain 2,94 3,15 3,94 3,36
National supply-chain 3,00 4,54 3,94 3,77
International supply-chain 2,94 3,23 2,76 2,96
Workforce selection 4,71 3,31 7,61 5,42
Acquisition of external innovation 3,29 2,38 5,44 3,85
Quality certification 4,35 4,15 4,39 4,31
Internationalisation 5,35 4,23 3,71 4,45
Product innovation 8,05 7,29 7,00 7,48
Process innovation 5,94 5,79 5,39 5,69
Cooperation with other firms 3,88 2,69 6,11 4,40
DIRECT SUPPLIERS
Specialised Scale Production 
suppliers Intensive services Total
Infrastructure 4,23 5,43 4,47 5,01
Availability of spaces 4,31 4,60 4,76 4,59
Availability of specialised workforce 5,62 4,51 6,18 5,06
Labour cost 5.77 3,89 2,88 3,99
Relationships with trade unions 3,92 4,04 3,65 3,94
Local taxation 4,54 4,06 3,29 3,97
Intermediation structure with Public Administration 3,15 3,74 3,76 3,64
Industrial and local development policies 4,31 4,22 5,24 4,47
Local political stability 2,92 3,85 3,47 3,61
Manufacturing tradition 6,77 5,38 4,59 5,44
Trust and cooperation 6,54 5,04 7,41 5,82
Specialised suppliers 5,54 5,83 5,53 5,71
Long-term customers 6,46 5,83 8,41 6,51
University and other public research centres 5,00 4,07 6,00 4,66
Private research centres 3,31 3,63 5,06 3,89
Specialised fairs and expos 4,54 3,45 4,53 3,87
Environmental quality 5,08 4,06 4,65 4,36
Social quality 4,69 4,00 3,29 3,96
Entrepreneurs associations 5,69 4,60 4,59 4,78
Access to credit 5,23 4,43 3,94 4,45




Availability of spaces 
Availability of specialised workforce 
Labour cost
Relationships with trade unions 
Local taxation
Intermediation structure with Public Administration






University and other public research centres 
Private research centres 




Access to credit 
Availability of venture capital
FIAT-INDEPENDENT AUTOMOTIVE FIRMS
Infrastructure 
Availability of spaces 
Availability of specialised workforce 
Labour cost
Relationships with trade unions 
Local taxation
Intermediation structure with Public Administration






University and other public research centres 
Private research centres 




Access to credit 







4,41 4,95 4,88 4,77
3,23 4,38 4,31 4,01
4,11 4,33 3,88 4,17
4,41 4,71 3,38 4,36
3,73 3,95 3,69 3,83
4,42 3,86 2,69 3,81
3,81 3,55 3,50 3,62
3,54 3,40 3,25 3,42
3,85 4,19 3,19 3,89
4,76 5,07 4,00 4,77
5,36 5,02 6,35 5,39
5,73 6,16 5,50 5,91
5,69 5,72 7,71 6,10
3,92 3,57 3,81 3,72
3,19 3,50 3,88 3,48
3,62 3,64 3,69 3,64
4,24 4,10 3,53 4,02
3,92 4,14 3,06 3,86
4,37 4,31 3,81 4,24
5,15 3,74 3,56 4,14







5,00 3,76 4,33 4,17
5,54 5,29 5,25 5,35
4,54 4,64 5,50 4,72
5,12 3,69 4,08 4,14
4,08 3,35 3,25 3,54
4,96 3,55 3,58 3,92
3,96 3,96 3,83 3,95
4,00 3,85 4,08 3,92
3,63 4,15 3,50 3,92
5,85 5,25 3,75 5,23
5,31 5,49 4,67 5,33
5,28 6,20 5,50 5,86
6,15 5,84 6,67 6,03
3,58 3,87 4,33 3,85
3,40 3,65 4,17 3,65
4,28 4,02 3,67 4,04
4,33 4,02 3,50 4,03
3,96 3,95 3,50 3,89
4,15 3,91 4,08 4,00
4,04 4,20 4,42 4,19









Infrastructure 4,39 4,53 4,04 4,35
Availability of spaces 4,39 4,89 4,60 4,64
Availability of specialised workforce 5,09 4,51 4,88 4,81
Labour cost 4,15 4,64 4,16 4,34
Relationships with trade unions 3,27 4,39 3,60 3,79
Local taxation 3,64 4,31 3,79 3,94
Intermediation structure with Public Administration 3,06 3,42 3,25 3,25
Industrial and local development policies 4,67 3,42 4,08 4,03
Local political stability 3,97 4,00 4,38 4,09
Manufacturing tradition 5,32 5,19 4,20 4,98
Trust and cooperation 5,24 5,42 6,13 5,54
Specialised suppliers 5,65 5,95 5,88 5,82
Long-term customers 6,26 5,68 6,48 6,09
University and other public research centres 4,48 4,06 4,96 4,44
Private research centres 3,82 3,86 3,63 3,78
Specialised fairs and expos 3,61 3,69 3,83 3,70
Environmental quality 4,47 4,03 4,54 4,32
Social quality 4,44 4,50 4,46 4,47
Entrepreneurs associations 4,24 4,31 4,08 4,22
Access to credit 3,70 3,92 4,76 4,06
Availability of venture capital 3,91 3,58 4,19 3,84
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7.4 Factorial analysis
1 = Overall territorial embeddedness
1 2 3 4 5
Manufacturing tradition ,682 ,154 -.158 -.028 ,254
Trust and cooperation ,610 ,488 ,017 -.116 ,167
Specialised suppliers ,537 ,473 ,246 -.239 ,148
Long-term customers ,513 ,631 ,064 -.256 ,192
University and other public research centres ,791 -.094 -,098 -.066 -.004
Private research centres ,783 -.060 -,223 ,005 -.104
Specialised fairs and expos ,630 ,022 -.239 -.021 -.235
Environmental quality ,799 -,144 -.035 ,016 -.321
Social quality ,746 -.222 ,036 ,007 -.308
Infrastructure ,538 ,152 ,032 ,495 -.145
Availability of spaces ,552 ,335 ,006 ,462 -.059
Availability of specialised workforce ,437 ,373 ,450 ,125 -.299
Labour cost ,304 -.153 ,791 ,014 -.062
Relationships with trade unions ,672 -.060 ,023 ,294 ,192
Local taxation ,292 -.515 ,519 ,051 ,364
Intermediation structure with Public Administration ,725 -.194 -.181 .171 ,269
Industrial and local development policies ,638 -.199 -.050 .016 ,297
Local political stability ,742 -.205 -.133 ,078 ,162
Entrepreneurs associations ,806 -.164 -.073 -.068 -.048
Access to credit ,639 -,246 ,134 -.391 -.168
Availability of venture capital ,670 -.113 -.078 -.428 -.101
1 = Pecunary territorial assets Component
1 2 3 4 5
Infrastructure ,577 -.547 .290 -.059 -.530
Availability of spaces ,506 -.607 ,348 ,159 ,478
Labour cost ,551 ,476 ,423 -.522 ,113
Local taxation ,488 ,600 ,332 ,531 -.091
Access to credit ,786 ,123 -.425 -.043 ,024
Availability of venture capital ,732 -.040 -,551 ,022 ,037
1 = Institutional territorial assets Component
1 2
Intermediation structure with Public Administration ,855 ,026
Relationships with trade unions ,721 -.556
Industrial and local development policies ,719 ,578
Local political stability ,809 ,194
Entrepreneurs associations ,807 -.240
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1 = Relational territorial assets 
2 = Marshallian externalities
Component
1 2 3 4 5 6
Availability of specialised workforce ,513 ,278 ,518 ,567 ,021 ,260
Manufacturing tradition ,709 ,076 -.217 -.330 ,086 ,532
Trust and cooperation ,685 ,409 -.224 ,053 -.029 -.088
Specialised suppliers ,618 ,506 ,213 -.194 -.055 -,343
Long-term customers ,627 ,591 -,109 -.120 ,065 ,000
University and other public research centres ,782 -.256 -.176 ,113 -.423 -.034
Private research centres ,783 -.283 -,250 ,192 -.299 -.036
Specialised fairs and expos ,615 -.218 -.367 ,297 .552 -,154
Environmental quality ,806 -.380 ,297 -.172 ,122 -.070
Social quality ,741 -,402 ,402 -.242 ,093 -.043
• I
1 -  Informal cooperation 
3 = Formal cooperation
Component
1 2 3 4 5
Local cooperation Intensity ,473 ,536 -,248 ,053 ,127
Provincial cooperation Intensity ,396 ,609 -,360 -.128 -.297
Regional cooperation intensity ,426 ,603 -,269 -.085 -.238
Tacit communication intensity ,816 -.515 -.129 ,073 -.079
Regular visits to customers .517 -.322 ,244 ,275 -.468
Regular visits to suppliers ,539 -.428 ,098 ,043 -.517
Exchange of technicians with customers ,554 -.358 -.368 ,030 ,446
Exchange of technicians with suppliers ,537 -.456 -.359 -.091 ,374
Participation to informal cooperation networks ,435 ,561 -,070 ,261 ,057
Joint ventures (existing) ,537 ,187 ,548 -.438 ,199
Joint ventures (in future) ,563 ,172 ,565 -.398 ,145
Participation to consortia and associations ,270 .174 ,312 ,549 ,228
Participation to EU programmes ,110 ,203 ,285 ,606 ,195
1 = Personal acquaitances 
2 = Spin-off Component
1 2
Acquaitances with the entrepreneurs ,854 -.398
Acquaitances with the other firms' technicians ,842 -.425
Previous employment relationship ,498 ,697
Suggestion from other firms ,511 ,686
1 = Territorial learning intensity 
3 -  Design with customers Component
1 2 3 4 5 6
Design Intensity ,948 -.072 -.166 ,115 ,003 ,015
Autonomously and internally ,413 -.716 ,018 ,134 ,382 ,379
Autonomously and externally ,425 ,378 -,691 -.327 -.108 ,268
Together with customers ,575 ,016 ,492 ,052 -.607 ,227
Together with suppliers ,760 ,192 -,039 ,332 ,139 -.486
By clients -.052 ,754 ,220 ,396 ,303 ,363
Participation to co-design network ,433 ,204 ,467 -.660 ,335 -.062
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7.5 ANOVA analysis: firms' strategies and territorial structural assets.
Direct
suppliers Competencies u . . .





Local supply-chain 4,38 3,78 3,54 4,38
Regional supply-chain 4,00 3,33 3,54 4,03
National supply-chain 5,17 3,55 4,46 4,09
International supply-chain 4,83 3,24 3,08 2,76
Workforce selection 5,46 7,18 5,38 5,00
Acquisition of external 
innovation 3,92 5,80 3,92 3,62
Quality certification 6,38 5,06 5,85 4,83
Internationalisation 5,17 3,50 3,54 3,23
Product innovation 7.17 6,54 6,79 5,67
Process innovation 8,00 6,19 5,85 5,94












































Infrastructure 5,43 4,37 4,48 4,74 4,15 4,46 4,55
Availability of spaces 4,60 4,63 4,24 3,94 5,37 4,66 4,63
Availability of specialised 
workforce 4,51 5,16 3,97 4,24 4,60 4,79 4,63
Labour cost 3,89 3,99 3,55 4,59 4,15 4,41 4,16
Manufacturing tradition 5,38 4,58 4,41 4,96 5,44 5,25 5,04
Trust and cooperation 5,04 6,29 4,18 5,15 5,43 5,33 5,39
Specialised suppliers 5,83 5,63 4,61 6,00 5,91 5,80 5,72
Long-term customers 5,83 7,14 5,06 5,71 5,94 5,96 6,08
University and other public 
research centres 4,07 4,87 3,72 3,70 3,78 4,26 4,12
Private research centres 3,63 4,00 3,39 3,38 3,57 3,84 3,67
Specialised fairs and expos 3,45 4,04 3,09 3,63 4,10 3,65 3,75
Environmental quality 4,06 4,29 3,81 4,15 4,11 4,24 4,15
Social quality 4,00 3,83 3,72 4,06 3,95 4,47 4,03
Entrepreneurs associations 4,60 4,39 3,72 4,33 3,99 4,28 4,24
Access to credit 4,43 4,39 4,15 4,28 4,15 3,81 4,20
Availability of venture capital 4,11 4,09 3,48 4,00 3,71 3,74 3,88
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